People v. Nunley , 2020 IL App (4th) 180230-U ( 2020 )

NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 180230-UThis order was filed under Supreme
FILED
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-18-0230 June 26, 2020
as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender
the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Woodford County
MATTHEW D. NUNLEY, ) No. 17CF87
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Charles M. Feeney III,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when sentencing defendant to four years’ imprisonment for obstructing justice
where the sentence was (1) within the permissible sentencing range and (2) not
greatly at variance with the purpose of the law nor disproportionate to the nature
of the offense.
¶2 In December 2017, defendant, Matthew D. Nunley, pleaded guilty to obstructing
justice, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2016)). In January 2018, the trial court
sentenced defendant, who was extended-term eligible, to four years’ imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC).
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing his four-year prison sentence is excessive. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. The State’s Charges and Defendant’s Guilty Plea
¶6 In August 2017, the State charged defendant by information with one count of
obstructing justice (count I) (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2016)) and one count of domestic battery
(count II) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2016)).
¶7 In December 2017, defendant entered a blind plea to count I in exchange for the
State dismissing count II. The trial court admonished defendant he faced extended-term
sentencing, “up to six years in [DOC] and a $25,000 fine.”
¶8 Following the aforementioned admonishments, the State provided the following
factual basis for defendant’s plea:
“If called to testify, Deputy Brad Rebman would state the Woodford
County communications received a call from Victoria Bowald—I’m sorry, from a
Kathy Bowald that her daughter Victoria Bowald had been—complained that she
had been in some type of domestic argument incident with her boyfriend, this
defendant ***. Deputy Rebman responded to that dispatch *** in East Peoria,
Woodford County, Illinois. When he arrived to investigate [defendant] stated that
Victoria Bowald was not present when Deputy Rebman asked to speak with her to
make sure she was safe. And when, in fact, the whole time, it was learned later,
that Victoria Bowald was in the house, that this defendant would not allow the
deputies to have any contact with her to check on her welfare.”
¶9 B. Sentencing Hearing
¶ 10 In January 2018, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The State requested a
sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment based on defendant’s criminal history, which included
offenses dating back to 2005. The State argued defendant would not “be a good candidate for
probation based upon his past conduct ***.” Defense counsel, after “taking into account the cost
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of a prison sentence, *** the type of case this is[,] and where it’s situated,” recommended
probation.
¶ 11 In fashioning defendant’s sentence, the trial court considered the factual basis at
the time of defendant’s plea, the presentence investigation report, the financial impact of
incarceration, evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, defendant’s statement in allocution,
and the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. In mitigation, the court noted
“defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause nor threaten serious physical harm to another” and
“defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious
physical harm to another.” In aggravation, the court found “defendant has a history of prior
criminal activity” and “[i]n looking at the defendant’s Presentence Investigation [report] and his
criminal history, every single time the defendant has been placed on a continuing order[,] he has
violated it.” The court stated further:
“[Defendant] has—I’ve not given hardly any weight to it other than it’s a
crime of violence, but it’s 2006. He was 17 years of age at the time. But he
commits the felonies involving the aggravated battery of a police officer or
policing volunteer. But anyway, eight months later he commits the DUI and the
reckless driving. He gets sentenced on those offenses, the DUI and the reckless
driving, and four months later he commits his first felony. He gets sentenced on
that. That gets revoked. He gets resentenced to [DOC] for two years.
Following that sentence *** to [DOC], one year and four months later he
commits another felony. He is then sentenced on that felony to two years and six
months ***. One year and eight months later he commits another crime,
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disorderly conduct. And at least based on that 2010 felony he is extended-term
eligible here.”
¶ 12 Before pronouncing the sentence, the trial court commented on the nature and
circumstances of the offense. The court noted defendant lied to the police, “to protect his own
hide.” The court then made the following statements:
“Based upon the defendant’s prior criminal history, the circumstances of
this offense, the court does not believe the defendant is likely to comply with a
period of probation, given his prior criminal history. This is his third felony. A
period of probation or conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of
the offender’s conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice.
The fact that he was trying to cover up his own violence in the domestic
battery situation, or potentially trying to cover up his own violence, I should say,
would also support the court finding that imprisonment is necessary for the
protection of the public.”
The trial court then sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment and assessed mandatory
fines and costs.
¶ 13 In February 2018, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing the
trial court imposed an excessive sentence given the mitigation evidence and the fact defendant
was employed at the time of his arrest. At a hearing in March 2018, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues his four-year prison sentence is excessive where his
sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law and manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. We disagree.
¶ 17 The trial court has discretion when sentencing, and we will not reverse the court’s
decision absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d
656. The court is granted such discretion in sentencing because “the trial court is in a better
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence at the sentencing
hearing.” People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 137, 817 N.E.2d 1110, 1115 (2004). The trial
court errs where the sentence is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or
manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210,
737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). We presume the sentencing court considered all relevant factors in
aggravation and mitigation unless the record affirmatively reveals otherwise. People v.
Chirchirillo, 393 Ill. App. 3d 916, 927, 913 N.E.2d 635, 645 (2009). When determining what
constitutes an appropriate sentence, “a defendant’s history, character, and rehabilitative potential,
along with the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society, and the need for deterrence
and punishment” are all considered. People v. Hernandez, 319 Ill. App. 3d 520, 529, 745 N.E.2d
673, 681 (2001).
¶ 18 Obstructing justice is a Class 4 felony, which carries a nonextended term
sentencing range of one to three years in prison and an extended sentencing range of three to six
years in prison. 720 ILCS 5/31-4(b)(1) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a), 5-5-3.2(a) (West
2016). However, defendant’s prior felony convictions made him eligible for extended term
sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered (1) the factual basis given during
defendant’s plea, (2) defendant’s presentence investigation report, (3) the monetary costs to
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incarcerate defendant, (4) the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, (5) defendant’s
statement in allocution, and (6) the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. At the time of
sentencing, defendant had seven prior criminal convictions, including felony convictions.
Previously, defendant received probation sentences in four cases and the court noted defendant,
each time, violated probation. In 2008, defendant was sent to prison for violating his probation.
Defendant was again sent to prison in 2010, following his second felony conviction. Given
defendant’s criminal history, the court expressed concern regarding the likelihood defendant
would comply with another period of probation. While defendant’s criminal conduct did not
cause or threaten serious harm, the court determined a prison sentence was necessary to protect
the public where defendant sought to “cover up his own violence.” Ultimately, the court found a
period of probation or conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of defendant’s
conduct.
¶ 19 Although the State recommended a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment, the
trial court had discretion to impose any sentence within the applicable sentencing range. See
People v. Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d 779, 783, 623 N.E.2d 755, 758 (1993) (“counsel’s
[sentencing] recommendations are deserving of whatever weight the sentencing court wishes to
accord them and nothing more”). Here, defendant’s four-year sentence fell within statutory
limits, and nothing in the record indicates the court considered improper factors in sentencing
defendant. Thus, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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