People v. Hayes ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 172848-UOrder filed: June 26, 2020
FIRST DISTRICT
FIFTH DIVISION
No. 1-17-2848
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 97 CR 10247
)
RONALD HAYES, ) Honorable
) Vincent M. Gaughan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Hoffman and Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: First-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is reversed, where
defendant’s assertion—that an aggregate 80-year sentence imposed upon him for
crimes committed when he was 18 years old violated the proportionate penalties
clause—was not frivolous or patently without merit.
¶2 Defendant-appellant, Ronald Hayes, was found guilty of—inter alia—first degree murder,
and was sentenced to a total of 80 years in prison for crimes he committed when he was 18 years
old. Defendant’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and he thereafter filed
a postconviction petition asserting—inter alia—that his sentence violated the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I, § 11). That petition was
No. 1-17-2848
dismissed by the trial court at the first stage. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings. 1
¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with, inter alia, the October 31, 1996, murder of
DeMarco Lofton, the attempted murder of Shamika Boykin, and the armed robbery of both
victims. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of murder, attempted murder, armed
robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court merged some of the convictions and sentenced petitioner to 60
years’ imprisonment for murder, a consecutive sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for attempted
murder, and a concurrent sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery, for a total
aggregate sentence of 80 years’ imprisonment. Defendant would be eligible for day for day credit
against that sentence.
¶4 On direct appeal, defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. People v. Hayes,
319 Ill. App. 3d 810 (2001).
¶5 On May 16, 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq. (West 2016)). 2 Therein, defendant
asserted that, as applied to him, it was a violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution for the trial court to impose a de facto life sentence upon defendant for crimes
he committed when he was 18 years old. In support of this argument, defendant’s petition asserted
that his sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence, as he would not be eligible for parole until
1
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this
appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order stating with
specificity why no substantial question is presented.
2
Although styled as a petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, it is undisputed
that the trial court properly treated this pleading as defendant’s initial postconviction petition.
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No. 1-17-2848
he had served least 40 years, when he was 58 years old. He further contended that such a sentence
violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, where he was only 18 at the
time of the offenses, “neuroscience research suggests that the human brain’s capacity to govern
risk and reward is not fully developed until the age of 25,” the trial court failed to consider
defendant’s “age, family support and education in sentencing,” and the sentence therefore failed
to properly account for his relative youth and rehabilitative potential.
¶6 On July 20, 2017, the trial court entered a written order dismissing defendant’s
postconviction petition at the first stage. The trial court explained its decision by noting that
defendant was not a juvenile at the time he committed his offenses, and further concluding that
defendant was not actually sentenced to a de facto life sentence. Defendant now appeals.
¶7 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition at the first
stage because he sufficiently stated an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. We agree.
¶8 The Act “provides a remedy to a criminal defendant whose federal or state constitutional
rights were substantially violated at trial or sentencing.” People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28.
At the first stage of a postconviction proceeding, the trial court independently reviews the
defendant’s petition, taking the allegations as true, and determines if it is frivolous or patently
without merit. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009). If the petition is not dismissed at the first
stage it advances to the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2016). At the second stage, the
defendant must make a substantial showing of a deprivation of constitutional rights or the petition
is dismissed. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. If such a showing is made, the postconviction petition
advances to the third stage where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122–6
(West 2016).
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¶9 A petition is frivolous or patently without merit if it “ ‘has no arguable basis *** in law or
in fact.’ “ People v. Papaleo, 2016 IL App (1st) 150947, ¶ 19 (quoting Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11–
12 (2009)). A petition has no arguable basis in law or fact if it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. “A legal theory is
‘indisputably meritless’ if it is ‘completely contradicted by the record,’ and a factual allegation is
‘fanciful’ if it is ‘fantastic or delusional.’ “ Papaleo, 2016 IL App (1st) 150947, ¶ 19 (quoting
Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16–17(2009)). We review the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction
petition de novo. People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131359, ¶ 28.
¶ 10 In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005), the Supreme Court found that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” Id. at 82. Then, in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the Supreme Court concluded that the eighth amendment
“forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders” convicted of homicide. In each case, the Supreme Court relied in part on the lesser
moral culpability and greater rehabilitative potential of minors in support of its decisions, and “it
is clear the United States Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller has provided juveniles
with more constitutional protection than adults.” People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409,
¶ 68.
¶ 11 However, Miller itself did not impose an outright ban on the imposition of a life sentence
upon a juvenile convicted of homicide, let alone a ban on lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed
upon juveniles. See, Miller, 567 U.S. 479-80 (refusing to completely foreclose the possibility that
a life sentence could be constitutionally imposed upon a juvenile convicted of homicide). Rather,
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the Supreme Court held only that such a sentence could not be mandated, and that before a life
sentence could be properly imposed, “mitigating circumstances” such as “an offender’s youth and
attendant characteristics” must be considered. Id. at 483, 489.
¶ 12 The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that Miller applies to discretionary, as well as
mandatory life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40), and also to de facto life
sentences, or sentences “that cannot be served in one lifetime” and have “the same practical effect
on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole”
(People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10). More recently, our supreme court concluded that any
sentence exceeding 40 years is a de facto life sentence, requiring the sentencing court to consider
“[the] defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327,
¶¶ 41-42.
¶ 13 Thus, while a juvenile offender may be sentenced to a natural life or de facto sentence of
life imprisonment, before doing so the trial court must:
“[D]etermine[ ] that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.
The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s youth and its
attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following
factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any
evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile
defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer
pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own
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No. 1-17-2848
attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL
120655, ¶ 46.
¶ 14 Obviously, a number of these decisions involved analysis of the protections provided by
the eighth amendment, while here we address defendant’s as-applied challenge brought pursuant
to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. However, as our supreme court
has indicated, the proportionate penalties clause provides “a limitation on penalties beyond those
afforded by the eighth amendment.” People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 69.
¶ 15 Furthermore, defendant—aged 18 at the time of the crimes to which he plead guilty—was
not a “juvenile” offender. “Because defendant was an adult, Miller [and its progeny] does not apply
directly to his circumstances.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45.
¶ 16 Nevertheless, our supreme court specifically considered Miller’s applicability to a young
adult defendant in both People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and Harris, 2018 IL 121932. It is
true that, in neither case did our supreme court expressly accept the premise that the protections
provided to juvenile offenders by Miller and its progeny should be extended to young adult
offenders; however, the court did not explicitly reject that assertion either. Moreover, in both cases
our supreme very explicitly did indicate that a postconviction proceeding would be an appropriate
venue to address that very issue. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48.
¶ 17 More recently, another panel of this court concluded that a postconviction petition was
improperly dismissed at the first stage, and explicitly concluded that a mandatory natural life
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to a defendant who was 19-years-
old at the time he committed murder, pursuant to Miller and its progeny. People v. House, 2019
IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 65, appeal allowed, 140 N.E. 3d 231 (Ill. 2020).
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¶ 18 We find that the allegations underlying defendant’s as-applied proportionate penalties
claim was sufficient under Thompson, Harris, and House to avoid summary dismissal at the first-
stage for being frivolous or patently without merit. Considering these three decisions, the factual
allegations contained in the petition and the record before us, we find that defendant’s as-applied
challenge was not based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory or fanciful factual allegations.
As defendant notes on appeal, the record reflects that defendant did not finish high school, was the
father of two young children, and had a great deal of family support, with his family paying for
private counsel to represent him. Defendant contends that this evidence could support a finding of
his greater rehabilitative potential. Defendant also asserts on appeal that actions for which he was
convicted “support an arguable claim because they reflect the precise hallmarks of transient,
youthful recklessness and lack of impulse control that Miller requires trial courts to consider as
mitigation at sentencing and therefore should have been considered as mitigation at Hayes’
sentencing hearing.”
¶ 19 Moreover, while the record indicates that the trial court was presented with and did
consider defendant’s youth and some of the attendant characteristics outlined above in originally
sentencing defendant (supra, ¶ 13), we reject the State’s argument to the contrary and conclude
that the record does not reflect that the trial court considered all those characteristics. Nor did the
trial court explicitly determine from its consideration of those characteristics and the evidence
before it that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or
irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.
¶ 20 We also acknowledge that on appeal the State raised several other merit-based arguments
against such a conclusion. First, the State asserts that defendant cannot rely upon the Thompson,
Harris, and House decisions, where they involved adult offenders sentenced to mandatory life
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No. 1-17-2848
sentences while here defendant was sentenced to a discretionary sentence. Second, the State
contends that defendant was not actually sentenced to a de facto life sentence, as he acknowledges
that he will be eligible for parole in as few as 40 years. Third, the State faults defendant for failing
to support his petition with adequate factual and legal allegations in support of his arguments.
¶ 21 In response, we initially reiterate that our supreme court has determined that that Miller-
based protections apply to discretionary, as well as mandatory life sentences, and also to de facto
life sentences, which it has defined as any sentence exceeding 40 years. Supra ¶ 12. Moreover, we
find these arguments to be “more appropriate to the second stage of postconviction proceedings,
where both parties are represented by counsel, and where the petitioner’s burden is to make a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 22.
¶ 22 In reaching this conclusion we note that the first stage in the proceeding allows the trial
court “ ‘to act strictly in an administrative capacity by screening out those petitions which are
without legal substance or are obviously without merit.’ [Citation.] Because most petitions are
drafted at this stage by defendants with little legal knowledge or training, this court views the
threshold for survival as low.” People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. It is sufficient that defendant
presents an argument that has an “arguable” basis in law and fact. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 11-12.
¶ 23 Finally, we note that our finding in no way expresses an opinion on the ultimate merits of
the assertions contained in defendant’s postconviction petition, or on whether defendant will
ultimately prevail on his postconviction claims. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 22.
¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition
and remand for second-stage proceedings.
¶ 25 Reversed and remanded.
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