People v. Rak ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (2d) 170955-UNo. 2-17-0955
Order filed June 23, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 16-CF-922
)
DANIEL RAK, ) Honorable
) Donald M. Tegeler Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Jorgensen and Bridges concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated
domestic battery causing great bodily harm, as the jury could reasonably conclude
that defendant broke the victim’s nose and did so knowingly; where defendant
admitted striking the victim but the jury heard conflicting evidence of the cause of
the victim’s death, the jury was not confused and did not enter inconsistent verdicts
when it acquitted defendant of first-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter.
¶2 Defendant, Daniel Rak, appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of aggravated
domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2016)), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant concedes that he struck his father, Jeffrey
Rak, but he argues that the State failed to prove that he acted knowingly or that he caused Jeffrey’s
2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Unasal fractures. He also argues that the jury’s questions during deliberations indicated confusion,
resulting in inconsistent verdicts. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In February 2016, defendant was living with his girlfriend, Brittani Decker, and Jeffrey in
Jeffrey’s large two-story house. On Thursday, February 11, 2016, defendant struck Jeffrey twice
on the nose, after learning that Jeffrey had walked in on Decker while she was bathing. In the early
morning hours of Sunday, February 14, 2016, defendant found Jeffrey lying dead on the floor in
Jeffrey’s bedroom. The official cause of death was “subdural hematoma due to blunt force trauma
due to altercation.”
¶5 On July 19, 2016, defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree murder (id. § 9-
1(a)(2)) and one count of aggravated domestic battery (id. § 12-3.3). The murder count alleged
that, on or about February 11-14, 2016, “defendant[,] without lawful justification, repeatedly
struck Jeffrey Rak’s head, knowing usch [sic] acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to Jeffrey Rak, thereby causing the death of Jeffery [sic] Rak.” The aggravated-
domestic-battery count alleged that, on or about February 11, 2016, defendant “knowingly caused
great bodily harm to Jeffrey Rak, a family member of the defendant, in that said defendant struck
Jeffery [sic] Rak in the face and in so doing, fractured Jeffrey Rak’s nose.”
¶6 The following evidence was presented at defendant’s jury trial. Kane County sheriff’s
deputy Michael Flanery testified that, at about 3:30 a.m. on February 14, 2016, he was dispatched
to a home in rural Sycamore. When he arrived, he encountered defendant and Decker, who were
sitting inside on the stairs. Flanery entered a bedroom on the first floor and saw Jeffrey, lying dead,
and paramedics, who were packing up their equipment. Jeffrey had two black eyes and a red
substance running from his nose. While waiting for detectives to arrive, Flanery spoke with
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Udefendant and Decker. Defendant was crying and distraught; he also vomited several times.
Defendant told Flanery “that he had gotten into a fight with his dad two days prior” and that “he
had punched his dad in the face.” Defendant stated that he felt sick and asked Flanery to speak
with Decker. Flanery spoke with Decker in the kitchen, while defendant remained on the stairs.
Two deputies arrived, and defendant and Decker accompanied them to the sheriff’s office.
¶7 Decker testified that, on Thursday, February 11, 2016, she arrived home at about 6 or 7
p.m. After speaking with defendant for a few minutes, she went to take a bath in the second-floor
bathroom. She did not close the bathroom door, because Jeffrey never went upstairs. While she
was in the bathtub, Jeffrey entered the bathroom and asked her if she had received his text asking
her to “get more booze and cigarettes.” She told him that she had picked up the items he wanted
and that she would bring them downstairs when she was done. She asked him to leave the
bathroom. He continued talking to her and asked about marks on her legs. She again asked him to
leave the bathroom. She testified that she was extremely uncomfortable, upset, mad, and
embarrassed. When she finished her bath, she handed defendant a glass vodka bottle and cigarettes
and asked defendant to take them items to Jeffrey. Decker was crying and embarrassed. Defendant
asked her what was wrong, and she told him what Jeffrey had done.
¶8 Decker testified that she remained upstairs while defendant carried the vodka and cigarettes
to Jeffrey’s bedroom at the bottom of the stairs. Decker heard defendant say, “why would you do
that,” “why did you go in there,” “why didn’t you yell for her,” “why didn’t you knock.”
Defendant’s “voice was raised,” but he was not “yelling.” She heard Jeffrey say, “she’s like my
daughter.” Defendant returned upstairs after a couple of minutes. Defendant apologized to Decker
and asked if she was okay. Defendant told her that he had “hit” Jeffrey and that he “might have
broke his nose.” He also told her that “[h]e hurt his hand.” Defendant told Decker that he was
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Ugoing downstairs to check on Jeffrey and asked if she wanted to go. Decker declined because she
still did not want to see Jeffrey. Defendant checked on Jeffrey “numerous times that same night.”
¶9 Decker testified that, the next day, defendant told her that Jeffrey wanted to speak with her.
As she was leaving the house, she and defendant stopped in Jeffrey’s room. When counsel asked
Decker to describe Jeffrey’s face, Decker pointed to the area “on the bridge of [her] nose across
the eyes” and testified that it “was swollen.” She also “believe[d]” that that there was a little blood
coming from his nose. She stated that there was “dry blood.” She spoke with Jeffrey and left the
house. When she returned in the early evening, she found defendant and Jeffrey in Jeffrey’s room,
laying together and watching television. She thought that they “both had probably been drinking a
little bit,” but not “how Jeff was the night before.” They were “together happy, getting along great.”
She spoke with them for a couple minutes and then went upstairs “to give them time to hang out
together alone.” Defendant joined her upstairs shortly thereafter.
¶ 10 Decker testified further that, on Saturday morning, Jeffrey sent her a text message
requesting cigarettes. She brought cigarettes downstairs, placed them on the staircase railing, and
sent Jeffrey a text saying where they were. When she left the house for the day, the cigarettes were
gone. When she returned on Saturday evening, she walked by Jeffrey’s room and saw that the door
was open slightly. She heard the television and thought she heard him snoring. She testified that,
at some point, she and defendant discussed whether Jeffrey should go to the hospital. Decker
testified that they “both asked [Jeffrey] repeatedly and he said, no, I’m fine, I’m fine.” Defendant
told her that he might get in trouble, because “they had gotten into a fight.” They did not call 911
on Saturday night. Eventually, they both went to sleep.
¶ 11 Decker testified that defendant woke her at about 3:45 a.m. Sunday, saying “there’s
something wrong with my dad.” She called 911, as she followed defendant downstairs. When she
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uentered Jeffrey’s bedroom, she saw him lying on the floor. Defendant started CPR. Decker thought
that Jeffrey was not breathing. When the paramedics arrived, she and defendant sat on the steps.
Decker identified various photographs taken of the home.
¶ 12 On cross-examination, Decker testified that she uses heroin “[o]n and off” and that she was
using heroin while living in Jeffrey’s house. She testified further that, on Friday night, after she
had seen defendant with Jeffrey and after defendant had joined her upstairs, she went downstairs
and saw Jeffrey on the floor next to his bed “[w]here [they] found him constantly.” She said that
he was always falling out of bed. She testified: “And like, so I go upstairs and I get [defendant]
and [defendant] comes down like he always did and picks him up like a kid, like one arm behind
his neck and the other behind his knees like you were carrying a kid and he picks him up and he
puts him back in bed like he did every day.” Decker testified that, although Jeffrey was awake, he
could not get up on his own. She testified further that Jeffrey had lost control of his bladder, which
happened “often.” She stated that when Jeffrey had an accident, defendant would clean him and
change his clothes. Defendant told her that they needed to convince Jeffrey to go to the doctor and
that he did not care if he got in trouble. Defendant never asked Decker to hide anything from the
police.
¶ 13 Kane County sheriff’s detectives Nathan Moravec and Raul Salinas interviewed defendant
at the sheriff’s office on the morning of Sunday, February 14, 2016. A video recording and
transcript of the interrogation were admitted at trial and played for the jury. At 6:20 a.m., Moravec
began recording the interrogation room where defendant was being held, but he did not enter
because Salinas had not yet arrived. At about 7:16 a.m., defendant knocked on the door and said
he wanted to speak with someone. Moravec opened the door and told defendant that he was waiting
for someone else to arrive. Defendant put his head down on the table and said “that he had had a
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Ufight with his father, bopped him in the nose.” Moravec told defendant that he would speak with
him after his partner arrived.
¶ 14 At 7:28 a.m., Moravec and Salinas entered the room and spoke with defendant. Defendant
told the detectives that he was 30 years old and had lived with his dad for five or six years. He
explained that he and Decker lived upstairs and that Jeffrey lived on the first floor. Defendant said
that Jeffrey would often get drunk and fall down. He said that he was constantly finding Jeffrey on
the ground. Defendant explained that, on Thursday, Jeffrey had been drinking and went upstairs
to ask Decker to get him alcohol. Jeffrey saw Decker in the bathtub and asked her about the marks
on her legs, which upset her. Defendant said that he “got, sort of, upset.” He went to Jeffrey’s
bedroom and “yelled at him.” He asked Jeffrey, “ ‘What the hell are you doing?’ ” He told the
officers that he was “screaming at him, and then [he] just got more pissed ‘cause [Jeffrey] was
talking about seeing her legs.” Defendant stated that he threw a bottle that might have bounced off
Jeffrey’s face. He said that Jeffrey grabbed him and that he pushed Jeffrey and struck him in the
face. He said that they “tussled a little bit” and that he “bopped [Jeffrey] in the nose.’ Defendant
said that Jeffrey was sitting on the bed, leaning back on pillows, and that he hit Jeffrey “[m]aybe
twice.” Jeffrey said, “Oh. You hurt my nose.” Jeffrey’s nose was bleeding “[p]retty decent” after
defendant struck him. Defendant stated: “I guess I hit him in the nose really good.” Defendant
denied hitting Jeffrey with a bottle but stated “I definitely punched him in the face.” Defendant
was asked if he had anything in his hand when he hit Jeffrey and defendant replied, “Nothing but
my fist.”
¶ 15 The video recording showed defendant sitting, hunched over, and leaning on a table. He
held up his head with his right hand. Defendant was asked what he meant when he said that he
“bopped” Jeffrey in the nose, and with his bent right arm still leaning on the table, defendant
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Ushaped his right hand into a loose fist and brought it toward his left shoulder. Defendant then swung
his right hand downward and to the right, leading with the outer edge of his hand and keeping his
hand in a loose fist. He repeated this motion twice, stating “I hit him like that.” He said that Jeffrey
was on the bed and he was standing over him. Defendant demonstrated the same motion later in
the interview and stated, “but harder than that.”
¶ 16 Defendant told the detectives that he spoke with Jeffrey the next morning. He brought him
some water and told him why Decker was upset. Jeffrey still had blood on him and was holding a
rag. Defendant asked him if he was sure that he was okay. Jeffrey told defendant that he thought
that defendant broke his nose. Jeffrey told him that he went in the bathroom and “set it.” Defendant
stated that he asked Jeffrey if he wanted to see a doctor, but Jeffrey replied that he was fine.
Defendant knew that Jeffrey was taking warfarin, a blood thinner, so he was worried that “he was
having trouble clotting ‘cause he said he’s had trouble clotting before.” Jeffrey’s “eyes were a little
swollen but his nose was, like, really red.” They had a good conversation and told each other that
they loved each other. Defendant said they spoke for about an hour and a half. Defendant told him
to text him if he needed anything. Defendant went back upstairs. Defendant told the detectives that
he spent all day Friday in bed. Decker left for work on Saturday around 3 p.m. Defendant could
not recall if he had seen Jeffrey on Saturday.
¶ 17 Salinas testified that defendant was arrested on June 3, 2006, after Salinas received a copy
of the autopsy and neuropathologist report. On cross-examination, Salinas testified that he attended
the autopsy, which was completed on February 14, 2016. Salinas was asked whether he was told
that Decker and defendant claimed to not have seen bruising around Jeffrey’s eyes “as late as the
morning of Saturday, February 13th, 2016.” He stated: “They told me he had swelling,” but he
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uexplained that it “could be mistaken for bruising.” When shown “a picture of bruising,” defendant
stated that Jeffrey “didn’t have that when I saw him this morning.”
¶ 18 Dr. James Filkins, an expert in forensic pathology, performed the autopsy on Jeffrey.
Filkins observed 35 bruises of various sizes and colors, which he stated was common for
alcoholics, who tend to stumble and fall. Jeffrey also had a broken nose and “black eyes around
each eye.” He explained that “if you break your nose without your eyes being hit because of the
way the blood vessels run in that part of the face and head, there can also be blood leaking out and
puffing up the eyes to give the appearance of black eyes.” When asked how quickly that reaction
might appear, he stated “[t]hat might happen instantly. It might take a little while to develop, a few
minutes or so, but something like that would come on, I think fairly soon.” He testified further:
“The swelling would come on as the blood is—from the broken nose is beginning to leak into the
tissue around the eyes.” When viewing a photograph of Jeffrey’s face, People’s exhibit No. 25B,
Filkins pointed out “[t]he red discoloration around the eyes.” He also pointed out the “deviation
or alteration in the configuration of [Jeffrey’s] nose and that there is some bruising up near the
bridge of the nose between the bridge of the nose and the inner part of his right eye. These are
indicative of the fracture to the nose that he had.”
¶ 19 Filkins testified that when he examined Jeffrey’s internal organs, “the principal internal
injury was a subdural hematoma in [Jeffrey’s] skull,” which he explained was bleeding on the
surface of the brain but under the “tough fibrous tissue called the dura.” According to Filkins,
because the blood he observed had the consistency of “jelly,” he opined that the subdural
hematoma was “not fresh.”
¶ 20 Filkins submitted Jeffrey’s brain to Dr. Marc Reyes, an expert in neuropathology, who
examined the brain and prepared a report. After reviewing Reyes’ report, Filkins determined that
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uthe cause of death was a “subdural hematoma due to blunt head trauma due to an altercation.” He
obtained information about the blunt force trauma and altercation from “investigative sources.”
Filkins testified that “a forceful blow from an adult that lands in the right spot can” break
someone’s nose. Filkins reviewed Jeffrey’s toxicology report and testified that it did not reveal
any other possible causes of death. Filkins agreed that “the timing of this subdural hematoma,
based on both [his] findings and Doctor Reyes’ finding, [was] consistent with a blow to the nose
that may have occurred on February 11, Thursday, before [Jeffrey] was found deceased on
February 14th.” Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:
“Q. So earlier, before you testified, I asked you about the bruises on his body below
his shoulders. So, in your opinion, did any of those bruises that you saw cause the subdural
hematoma in the victim’s head?
A. Well, I think I testified that some of them could have, but what I can say to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty is that if [Jeffrey] was struck a blow to his nose with
sufficient force to cause the fractures that I identified, that blow would absolutely have
enough force to cause a bleed or a re-bleed.
So some of the other bruises might represent a fall or a trip and maybe if that was
hard enough or bad enough fall or trip, maybe that could have shaken things up and caused
a re-bleed, maybe, maybe not. We don’t know.
I mean, obviously, [Jeffrey] tended to drink and fall and stumble so we don’t really
know. But whatever caused the broken nose was absolutely of sufficient force to cause the
subdural bleeding or re-bleeding.
Q. And the best evidence you have of what caused that subdural hematoma and
broken nose?
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-UA Absolutely.”
¶ 21 On cross-examination, Filkins testified that he did not recall the police telling him that
defendant and Decker claimed to not have seen any bruising on Jeffrey’s eyes for at least the next
30 hours after defendant struck Jeffrey. Filkins testified that the absence of bruising could
“[p]ossibly” be the result of a “backhand slap that is hard enough to cause a nosebleed but doesn’t
cause any fractures.” He testified further that he did not think that “a backhand slap, even if it is
done by an adult and it is done forcefully, could break bones in the nose.” Filkins opined that
Jeffrey died about 12 hours before defendant found him. Filkins agreed that Jeffrey’s broken nose
and bruising could be consistent with Jeffrey walking into the bathroom, falling, and striking his
face on the toilet five or six hours before he died. He testified: “In this case, it’s also my opinion
that the altercation and the blow to the nose is what caused the subdural to bleed or re-bleed.”
¶ 22 Reyes testified that he examined Jeffrey’s brain and observed an older, preexisting subdural
hematoma and a recent one. In his opinion, the recent subdural hematoma was the cause of
Jeffrey’s death. The more recent subdural hematoma was consistent with Jeffrey being struck on
Thursday night. Reyes’ reviewed Jeffrey’s medical records and stated that he “was not a healthy
individual. He had a lot of problems.” He had seizures. He also developed blood clots, which were
treated with warfarin.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Reyes agreed that if he did not know the date of the altercation, he
would estimate the subdural hematoma was 12 hours to 7 days old. He did not take a sample of
the blood clot for testing. He stated that he did not need to narrow his estimate of the recency of
the subdural hematoma because he knew when it happened.
¶ 24 Defendant presented testimony from Dr. Douglas C. Miller, an expert in anatomical
pathology, pathology, and neuropathology. Miller testified that he examined the autopsy report,
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uphotographs, and Jeffrey’s medical records. Jeffrey’s medical records showed that he was a
chronic alcoholic who would suffer seizures when he stopped using alcohol. He suffered seizures
apart from alcohol withdrawal and fell often. He was found to have a subdural hematoma in 2010.
He also had been previously diagnosed with nasal fractures. He had liver disease, heart disease,
emphysema, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. He also had deep vein thrombosis and was
treated with warfarin. Jeffrey was taking numerous additional medications.
¶ 25 Miller testified that he also examined a slide that Reyes had prepared. The slide contained
a portion of the dura where the clot was adhering to it, and Miller testified that “the most reasonable
determination” was that the subdural hematoma was five days old. If he had had the entire clot, he
could have determined that it was even older than that. According to Miller, “the most reasonable
probability” was that Jeffrey’s injury occurred on Monday. He also testified that he was “above 50
percent” convinced that Jeffrey died of a subdural hematoma but that there was no way to rule out
that he died of a sudden cardiac death or a “Sudden Unexplained Death in Epilepsy.” He testified
that the age of Jeffrey’s nasal fracture could not be determined because sections of that tissue had
not been preserved. He also testified that a histological examination of the bruised tissue around
Jeffrey’s eyes was not needed to conclude that Jeffrey broke his nose shortly before his death on
Saturday.
¶ 26 On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:
“Q. All right. So if Doctor Filkins said that he thinks the death was—could be two
days before, the trauma was two days before the death, and Doctor Reyes says that he
thinks that the traumatic injury that caused the subdural hematoma was on Thursday, three
days before the death, and you agree that the trauma and the clot at this stage could be three
days but maybe five days, those three estimates come pretty close together, correct?
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-UA. Fairly close. They don’t completely—they are not completely congruent, but
they’re fairly close, three to five days.”
¶ 27 At the close of evidence, the State requested that the jury be instructed on involuntary
manslaughter, as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.
¶ 28 The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, in relevant part, as follows:
“To sustain the charge of first degree murder, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Jeffrey
Rak and;
Second Proposition: That when the defendant did so, he knew that his acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to Jeffrey Rak.”
The jury was instructed on involuntary manslaughter, in relevant part, as follows:
“To sustain the charge of involuntary manslaughter, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Jeffrey
Rak; and
Second Proposition: That the defendant performed those acts recklessly; and
Third Proposition: That those acts were likely to cause death or great bodily harm.”
The jury was instructed on aggravated domestic battery, in relevant part, as follows:
“To sustain the charge of aggravated domestic battery, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant knowingly caused great bodily harm to Jeffrey Rak;
and
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-USecond Proposition: That Jeffrey Rak was then a family or household member to the
defendant.”
¶ 29 During deliberation, the jury sent out the following questions: “We need to get a clear
definition of ‘knowingly’ and ‘great’ bodily harm to—” There was an arrow pointing from the
word “ ‘great’ ” to a written remark stating, “This could be subjective.” The trial court provided
an additional pattern instruction for “knowingly.” The court further informed the jury that “[y]ou
have been given all instructions in this case.”
¶ 30 The jury found defendant not guilty of first-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter,
but guilty of aggravated domestic battery. Following the denial of defendant’s posttrial motions,
the trial court sentenced defendant to 48 months’ probation.
¶ 31 This timely appeal followed.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of aggravated domestic battery. More specifically, he argues that the evidence
did not prove that (1) he was consciously aware that by striking Jeffrey he was practically certain
to cause great bodily harm and (2) his act of striking Jeffrey was the cause of Jeffrey’s nasal
fractures. He also asserts that jury confusion exacerbated the evidentiary shortfalls, resulting in the
guilty verdict.
¶ 34 We review sufficiency of the evidence claims to determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People
v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). A
conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Ua reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id. “[I]t is not the function of this court to retry the
defendant.” Id. The trier of fact must assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their
testimony, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence,
and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on these matters. People
v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001).
¶ 35 A defendant commits aggravated domestic battery by knowingly causing great bodily harm
to a family member. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2016). A defendant acts knowingly when he is
consciously aware of the nature of his conduct and that his conduct is practically certain to cause
a particular result. 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b) (West 2016). Because one’s mental state is rarely
susceptible to direct proof, whether a person acted with intent, such as knowingly, is generally
established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the
circumstances surrounding his actions. People v. Lattimore, 2011 IL App (1st) 093238, ¶ 44.
¶ 36 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Defendant’s Mental State
¶ 37 Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he acted with the requisite mental state, i.e., that he was consciously aware that his
conduct was practically certain to cause great bodily harm, where he hit Jeffrey with “a couple of
backhand strikes from [his] bare hand” and “there was no disparity in Jeffrey’s and [defendant’s]
size and strength.” We hold that the evidence as to defendant’s mental state was sufficient.
¶ 38 First, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the strikes to Jeffrey’s face were much
more serious than defendant suggests. Defendant concedes that he did not strike Jeffrey with an
open hand, but he also asserts that the evidence does not support a conclusion that “his hand was
tightly clenched to form a fist.” In support, defendant points to his demonstration during his
interrogation. To be sure, when demonstrating how he struck Jeffrey, defendant’s hand was not
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Utightly closed. However, he also did not demonstrate that he struck Jeffrey with the back of his
open hand. Defendant demonstrated a backhand and downward motion leading with the outer edge
of his loosely closed hand, seeming to indicate that he struck defendant with the outer edge of a
loose fist. Although defendant argues that, based on the demonstration, there is no evidence that
defendant’s hand was tightly clenched to form a fist, the jury could have found otherwise.
Certainly, the jury could have found that defendant was downplaying the severity of the strikes,
given that he was being questioned by the detectives. The video makes clear that, at the time
defendant demonstrated the movement, defendant was tired, had vomited recently, and showed
little energy. He was leaning on the table, holding his head with his hand when he first
demonstrated the movement.
¶ 39 Moreover, the evidence of defendant’s demeanor when he confronted Jeffrey supports a
reasonable inference that he struck Jeffrey significantly harder than he suggests. Defendant
admitted that he was “upset” when he learned that Jeffrey had walked in on Decker taking a bath.
Defendant stated that he went to Jeffrey’s bedroom, yelled at him, and threw a bottle of vodka at
him. In addition, immediately after the incident, defendant told Decker that he had “hit” Jeffrey,
that he “might have broke his nose,” and that “[h]e hurt his hand.” At the scene, defendant told
Flanery that “he had punched his dad in the face.” Defendant told the detectives, “I definitely
punched him in the face.” He also stated: “I guess I hit him in the nose really good.” Indeed, at one
point, while demonstrating the strike, defendant added, “but harder than that.”
¶ 40 Defendant asserts that he and Jeffrey were similar in size and weight, and therefore, the
jury could not have reasonably concluded that he was consciously aware that he was practically
certain to cause Jeffrey great bodily harm. We disagree. Defendant cites in People v. Lengyel, 2015
IL App (1st) 131022, where the defendant punched the victim in the head four or five times and
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uthe victim subsequently died of a stroke. The appellate court reduced the defendant’s second-
degree murder conviction to involuntary manslaughter, relying in part on evidence that the
defendant and the victim were of similar size and noting that the victim, after being hit, broke
down the defendant’s bedroom door to confront him. Similarly, in People v. Nibbe, 2016 IL App
(4th) 140363, the defendant approached the victim on a sidewalk and punched him in the head,
causing him to fall and hit his head on the pavement, suffering a skull fracture, which caused the
victim’s death. The appellate court reversed the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction, noting
that the victim “was not substantially smaller or weaker than defendant” and that the victim “died
from his head striking the concrete and not from the blow to the face.” Id. ¶ 34.
¶ 41 Lengyel and Nibbe are easily distinguishable from this case. Here, although there might not
have been a great disparity in Jeffrey’s and defendant’s size, the evidence established that Jeffrey
suffered from numerous medical issues and was much weaker than defendant. Decker testified that
Jeffrey often lost control of his bladder, fell out of bed, and could not climb back into bed. She
testified that defendant “picks him up like a kid, like one arm behind his neck and the other behind
his knees like you were carrying a kid and he picks him up and he puts him back in bed.” Certainly,
defendant was significantly stronger than Jeffrey to be able to pick him up like a child. In addition,
defendant was aware that Jeffrey was taking warfarin, which caused him to bleed excessively,
making him more susceptible to a serious injury when struck.
¶ 42 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, taking into account defendant’s
emotional state at the time of the strikes, his own description of the strikes, and his knowledge that
Jeffrey was much weaker than he was, a rational trier of fact could have found that, when defendant
struck Jeffrey, he did so with the knowledge that his actions were practically certain to cause great
bodily harm.
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-U¶ 43 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Causation
¶ 44 Defendant next argues that the evidence was “too speculative and uncertain” to establish a
causal connection between defendant’s conduct and Jeffrey’s broken nose. According to
defendant, “no rational jury could reasonably exclude the possibility that the nasal fractures ***
were the product of a preceding or intervening cause.” We disagree.
¶ 45 The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant caused Jeffrey’s nasal fractures
based on the overwhelming circumstantial evidence. There is no dispute that defendant struck
Jeffrey in the nose twice on Thursday evening and, as noted, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the strikes were more serious than defendant claims. Moreover, when defendant
struck Jeffrey, Jeffrey exclaimed, “You hurt my nose.” Defendant described Jeffrey’s nose as
bleeding “[p]retty decent” after the strikes. Jeffrey told defendant the next day that he thought that
defendant broke his nose and that he went into the bathroom to “set it.” The jury could have
reasonably relied on Jeffrey’s statement that defendant had broken his nose, especially given
Jeffrey’s additional comment that he attempted to “set it.” In addition, Filkins confirmed that
Jeffrey had a broken nose, which he testified was apparent from his visual inspection of Jeffrey’s
body at the outset of the autopsy. The jury was shown a picture of Jeffrey’s face, as Filkins pointed
out “[t]he red discoloration around the eyes.” He also pointed out the “deviation or alteration in
the configuration of [Jeffrey’s] nose and that there is some bruising up near the bridge of the nose
between the bridge of the nose and the inner part of his right eye,” stating that “[t]hese are
indicative of the fracture to the nose that he had.” Filkins also testified that “a forceful blow from
an adult that lands in the right spot” could break someone’s nose.
¶ 46 In addition, Decker testified that she saw Jeffrey on Friday morning and, when asked to
describe Jeffrey’s face, she pointed to the area “on the bridge of [her] nose across the eyes” and
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Utestified that it “was swollen.” This is consistent with Filkins’ explanation that “[t]he swelling
would come on as the blood is—from the broken nose is beginning to leak into the tissue around
the eyes.” Filkins also pointed out the “deviation or alteration of the configuration of [Jeffrey’s]
nose and that there is some bruising up near the bridge of the nose between the bridge of the nose
and the inner part of his right eye. These are indicative of the fracture to the nose that he had.”
Although defendant claims that he and Decker “had not seen any bruising on Jeffrey’s face for at
least 30 hours after the altercation,” the jury could have found otherwise. Decker saw Jeffrey on
Friday morning and, as noted, her description was consistent with Filkins’ description. Defendant
was not clear as to when he last saw Jeffrey alive, but the evidence seems to suggest that it was
also Friday morning. Although defendant stated that he did not see the bruising that was apparent
in Jeffrey’s photo taken at the scene, the jury could have found that defendant was downplaying
the situation to explain why he failed to seek medical attention. The jury was free to reject his
testimony. The jury was also free to reject defendant’s theory that, because Jeffrey was prone to
falling, Jeffrey suffered the injury after defendant had hit him. The jury heard no evidence that
such a fall occurred.
¶ 47 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant broke Jeffrey’s nose when he struck him on
Thursday night.
¶ 48 C. Whether Alleged Jury Confusion Influenced the Verdicts
¶ 49 Finally, defendant argues that the jury was confused, as shown by its request for
clarification as to what constitutes a knowing mental state and great bodily harm. He claims that
the confusion influenced the guilty verdict and that the verdicts on the offenses were “logically
inconsistent.” Although defendant concedes that logically inconsistent verdicts do not per se
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Urequire reversal, he asserts that it is a factor to consider in determining whether defendant was
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Murray, 34 Ill. App. 3d 521, 532 (1975).
¶ 50 Defendant was found not guilty of first-degree murder and not guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. A person commits first-degree murder when he kills an individual without lawful
justification “if, in performing the acts which cause the death: *** he knows that [his] acts create
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.” 720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(2) (West 2016). A person commits involuntary manslaughter when he unintentionally kills an
individual without lawful justification and “his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the
death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs
them recklessly.” 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2016). A person commits aggravated domestic battery
when he “knowingly causes great bodily harm” to a family member. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West
2016).
¶ 51 Defendant argues that the verdicts are logically inconsistent, because “[i]f [defendant’s]
act of striking Jeffrey was not at least recklessly performed and either did not cause a strong
probability of great bodily harm or was not likely to cause great bodily harm, it is difficult to see
how that same conduct could be knowingly performed and actually cause great bodily harm.”
¶ 52 In response, the State asserts that the verdicts were not logically inconsistent because the
jury could have concluded that defendant knew “that it was highly probable that his acts of striking
Jeffrey Rak in the nose would inflict great bodily harm in the form of a broken nose but did not
act knowingly or recklessly in causing the death of Jeffrey Rak.” (Emphases in original.) The State
further argues that the verdicts could have been an expression of lenity. We agree with State.
¶ 53 First, to sustain the charge of both first-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, the
jury was instructed that it was required to find, as the first proposition, that “defendant performed
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uthe acts which caused the death of Jeffrey Rak.” The jury could have concluded that the State did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s act of striking defendant, although sufficient
to establish that defendant caused great bodily harm in the form of a broken nose, was insufficient
to establish that defendant caused Jeffrey’s death. We reject defendant’s argument that the jury
could not have reasonably concluded that defendant broke Jeffrey’s nose without also concluding
that he caused Jeffrey’s death. According to defendant, “[s]uch a finding is not only inconsistent
with the theory of the case advanced by the prosecution at trial, it is also unsupported by the totality
of the evidence, which established a causal connection between Jeffrey’s fatal subdural hematoma
and blunt force trauma sufficient to cause his nasal fractures.”
¶ 54 However, defendant overlooks the testimony of his own expert, Miller, who testified that
the subdural hematoma was likely five days old. Miller also testified that sudden cardiac death or
“Sudden Unexplained Death in Epilepsy” could not be excluded as the cause of death. Indeed,
defense counsel argued in closing argument that there was no objective evidence to establish the
age of the subdural hematoma and that the opinions of the State’s experts were based on when
defendant struck Jeffrey. Defense counsel also argued that even Filkins acknowledged that Jeffrey
“could have died of a fatal seizure” and “absolutely *** could have died of a heart attack.” Defense
counsel also argued that there was testimony that a subsequent injury would not make an existing
subdural hematoma produce more blood. Thus, the jury could have concluded that the evidence
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused the subdural hematoma or, even,
that a subdural hematoma was the cause of death.
¶ 55 Moreover, even if the verdicts were logically inconsistent, the jury could have been
exercising its power of lenity. See Murray, 34 Ill. App. 3d at 536 (“The jury’s historic power of
lenity must prevail *** over the traditional doctrine concerning legally and logically inconsistent
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2020 IL App (2d) 170955-Uverdicts.”) This case is sad and unfortunate. Even if the jury believed that defendant’s act of
striking Jeffrey caused his death, the jury could have believed that the conviction of aggravated
domestic battery provided sufficient punishment. To be sure, as noted by defendant, involuntary
manslaughter is generally a Class 3 felony subject to a nonextended sentencing range of 2 to 5
years’ imprisonment (see 720 ILCS 5/9-3(d)(2) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a) (West
2016)), whereas aggravated domestic battery is generally a Class 2 felony subject to a nonextended
sentencing range of 3 to 7 years’ imprisonment (see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(b) (West 2016); 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2016)). Nevertheless, this distinction would not be readily apparent to an
average juror, who could rationally believe that involuntary manslaughter was the more serious
offense, given that the defendant would be held accountable for the victim’s death.
¶ 56 Finally, we do not agree that the jury’s questions during deliberations demonstrated
confusion serious enough to question the validity of its verdict. The jury asked for, and received,
a definition of “knowingly.” We presume that the additional definition answered the question. The
jury indicated that describing “bodily harm” as “great” is subjective, but the comment did not
demonstrate confusion. Indeed, whether an injury constitutes great bodily harm is a question for
the trier of fact. People v. Cisneros, 2013 IL App (3d) 110851, ¶ 12. Here, the jury’s comment
implicitly recognized that great bodily harm is not susceptible to a precise legal definition (People
v. Doran, 256 Ill. App 3d 131, 136 (1993)), and in finding defendant guilty of aggravated domestic
battery, the jury agreed that the nasal fractures suffered by Jeffrey amounted to great bodily harm.
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 59 Affirmed.
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