People v. Garcia , 2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (2d) 210488-BNo. 2-21-0488
Opinion filed July 8, 2024
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 13-CF-654
)
JOSE M. GARCIA, ) Honorable
) Daniel B. Shanes,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Jose M. Garcia, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) for relief from his first
degree murder conviction (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) in connection with the shooting
death of Gabriel Gonzalez. Defendant’s petition claimed that the trial court imposed a de facto life
sentence that was unconstitutional based on his youth and developmental status at the time of the
offense. We previously issued an opinion reversing the summary dismissal and remanding the
cause with directions for the trial court to docket the petition for further proceedings. People v.
Garcia, 2022 IL App (2d) 210488, ¶ 23 (Garcia I). We relied heavily on (1) People v. Holman,
2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, which announced procedural requirements applicable under the eighth
2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bamendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) when sentencing a
juvenile to a natural or de facto life sentence, and (2) case law suggesting analogous constraints,
under the proportionate penalties clause of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), on
the imposition of life sentences on young adults possessing certain developmental and character
traits associated with juveniles. Garcia I, 2022 IL App (2d) 210488, ¶¶ 13-15. In doing so, we
were careful to note that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593
U.S. 98 (2021), undermined Holman’s reasoning. Garcia I, 2022 IL App (2d) 210488, ¶ 20. We
concluded, however, that Holman remained controlling precedent. Id. Our supreme court
subsequently recognized that, in light of Jones, Holman no longer accurately reflected eighth
amendment law. People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 41. Thereafter, the State petitioned in this
case for leave to appeal to our supreme court. The supreme court denied the State’s petition but
ordered us to vacate the judgment in our original opinion and reconsider the matter in light of
Wilson. People v. Garcia, No. 128815 (Ill. Jan. 24, 2024). We ordered the parties to submit
supplemental briefs addressing “the effect of [Wilson], on the issue of whether defendant’s
sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.” 1 People v. Garcia,
No. 2-21-0488 (Feb. 29, 2024) (unpublished minute order). Having reconsidered our decision in
light of Wilson, we vacate the summary dismissal of defendant’s petition and remand for further
proceedings.
1 We note that the State’s supplemental brief raises arguments almost entirely unrelated to
Wilson. We decline to consider these arguments. We will, however, consider the State’s assertion
that “[t]he proper framework for a young adult proportionate penalties challenge remains
unchanged in light of Wilson.”
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant’s conviction followed a February 2014 jury trial where the evidence established
that defendant fatally shot the victim outside a liquor store on March 10, 2013. The shooting was
evidently connected to a gang-related dispute. Defendant, born on December 21, 1994, was 18
years old at the time of the offense. The trial court sentenced defendant in April 2014 to an
aggregate 62-year prison term: 37 years for the murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2012))
plus a mandatory 25-year add-on sentence because defendant personally fired the shot that caused
Gonzalez’s death (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)). The sentence for murder was 17 years longer than the
statutory minimum 20-year sentence. Id. § 5-4.5-20(a)(1).
¶4 According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), defendant had an extensive
juvenile delinquency history, including adjudications for defacing school property, aggravated
assault, criminal trespass to residence, consumption of alcohol by a minor, and
resisting/obstructing an officer. Defendant (1) had spent time in juvenile correctional facilities,
(2) had learning disabilities and received special education services, and (3) had a history of
misbehavior in school. Although he did not finish high school, he earned a graduate equivalency
degree (GED) while incarcerated. He became a gang member at 17 after being released from
juvenile detention, although he may have had some form of prior gang affiliation. Defendant
reported mental health issues, including depression and anger management problems. Defendant
lived with both of his parents. His parents argued, but there was no physical abuse between them.
However, defendant got into physical altercations with his father on several occasions. The PSI
reflected that, in 2008, defendant received a “Psycho-Educational/Emotional [E]valuation,” which
revealed that he had a borderline intelligence quotient, suffered mild symptoms of depression, was
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bprone to angry outbursts, had an impulsive nature, was fearful of social rejection, and was easily
provoked.
¶5 After hearing other evidence in aggravation and mitigation, which we need not recount
here, the trial court imposed the aggregate 62-year prison sentence. The court stated that it had
considered the PSI and all evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The court noted defendant’s
history of delinquency and gang involvement. The court acknowledged that another individual
started the argument that led to the shooting but stressed that defendant took the conflict to a new
level by bringing a gun and shooting the victim. The court also observed that defendant fired
multiple shots, only one of which struck the victim; the missed shots endangered others nearby.
The court mentioned defendant’s problems in school but remarked that, by earning a GED in jail,
defendant had shown that he could “make a choice that is productive and healthy.” The court
emphasized that the crime was gang-related and stressed the need to impose a sentence that would
deter others from committing similar crimes. The court concluded by noting that defendant’s
actions showed that he did not value human life. Defendant moved for reconsideration of his
sentence. In denying the motion, the court specifically noted that, in imposing his sentence, it had
considered defendant’s young age and potential for rehabilitation.
¶6 In April 2021, defendant, through counsel, filed his petition under the Act, claiming that
his sentence was a de facto life sentence that violated the eighth amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny. As discussed below,
Miller placed limitations on the imposition of life sentences without parole for offenses committed
by those under 18. Id. at 479. Although defendant was 18 years old when he killed the victim here,
he cited People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, and People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st)
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B171362, for the proposition that a young adult may pursue an eighth amendment challenge under
Miller to a life sentence without parole.
¶7 Along with his petition, defendant submitted a 38-page report from James Garbarino,
Ph.D., a developmental psychologist. In his report, Garbarino stressed that he was not offering a
clinical diagnosis of defendant. Rather he was providing “an analysis of his development[al]
pathway from infancy to adolescence.” Garbarino explained that the immaturity of the adolescent
brain extends into early adulthood and includes the frontal lobes, which “play a crucial role in
making good decisions, controlling impulses, focusing attention for planning, and managing
emotions.” According to Garbarino, the maturation process involves the brain’s white matter, gray
matter, and neurotransmitters, all of which “are compromised in an individual under the age of
25.” In addition, social conditions affect the development of white matter, so certain youths “suffer
both from the general limitations of unformed brains and the disadvantaged functioning that arises
from their adverse childhood experiences.” (Emphasis in original.) Garbarino added that “the
hormonal conditions of such youths contribute to impaired brain function (relative to adults) in
matters of assessing and taking risks, emotional intensity, and dealing with peers (including social
rejection).” Based not on a clinical assessment but only on a review of documents concerning
defendant’s social history, Garbarino concluded:
“[Defendant] appears to be the embodiment of the developmental issues that
constitute the focal points of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama ***. As
an 18[-]year[-]old youth, he demonstrated immaturity of thought and emotional control,
impetuous and impulsive action, and failure to appreciate the full consequences of his
criminal behavior. He came out of a family and home environment that was toxic and
developmentally damaging because of abuse and abandonment. He lived in community
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bsettings that exacerbated rather than compensated for the traumatic features of his home
life. And, perhaps most importantly, the possibility of rehabilitation was present at the time
of his crime and sentencing.”
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 We begin by summarizing the relevant principles governing proceedings under the Act.
Our supreme court has stated as follows:
“The Act [citation] provides a remedy for incarcerated defendants who have
suffered a substantial violation of their constitutional rights at trial. Under the Act, a
postconviction proceeding contains three stages. At the first stage, the circuit court must
independently review the postconviction petition, without input from the State, and
determine whether it is ‘frivolous or is patently without merit.’ [Citation.] If the court
makes this determination, the court must dismiss the petition in a written order. [Citation.]
If the petition is not dismissed, the proceedings move to the second stage. [Citation.]
At the second stage, counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if he is indigent
[citation], and the State is permitted to file responsive pleadings [citation]. The circuit court
must determine at this stage whether the petition and any accompanying documentation
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. [Citation.] If no such showing is
made, the petition is dismissed. If, however, the petition sets forth a substantial showing of
a constitutional violation, it is advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts
an evidentiary hearing [citation].” People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶¶ 14-15.
¶ 10 This appeal arises from the first-stage summary dismissal of defendant’s petition. At the
first stage of postconviction review, the petition’s allegations must be liberally construed and taken
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bas true. People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 126 (2007). A petition is frivolous or patently without
merit and will be summarily dismissed at the first stage if it has no arguable basis either in law or
in fact (People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2009)), i.e., it “is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation” (id. at 16). “An example of an indisputably meritless
legal theory is one which is completely contradicted by the record.” Id. “Fanciful factual
allegations include those which are fantastic or delusional.” Id. at 17. We review de novo a first-
stage dismissal. People v. Barghouti, 2013 IL App (1st) 112373, ¶ 13.
¶ 11 In Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing scheme that mandates
a life sentence without parole for crimes committed by a juvenile (i.e., one under 18) violates the
eighth amendment. In Holman, our supreme court considered the applicability of Miller to
discretionary life sentences imposed on juveniles. Holman, 2017 IL 120655. The Holman court
held that the eighth amendment does not categorically forbid discretionary life sentences without
parole for juveniles, but before imposing such a sentence, the court must “determine[ ] that the
defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable
corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 46. In making the determination, the trial
court must consider “the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics” (id.) as identified in
Miller.
“Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile
defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile
defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of
participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have
affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bpolice officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the
juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” Id. (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78).
¶ 12 In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27, the supreme court held that Miller applies to
any life sentence for a juvenile, whether “mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto.” The
Buffer court determined that a sentence of more than 40 years is a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 41.
Notably, in explaining when a life sentence could be imposed on a juvenile offender, the Buffer
court drew no distinction between mandatory and discretionary sentencing schemes:
“to prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced for an offense
committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence,
mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to
consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27.
Thus, under Buffer, a juvenile could receive a life sentence mandated by statute if the trial court
considered the requisite factors.
¶ 13 In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 60-61, our supreme court declined to extend
Miller’s eighth amendment protections to all offenders under age 21, noting that the Supreme
Court was clear that age 18 was the dividing line between juveniles and adults for purposes of
eighth amendment protections. However, as the First District noted in People v. Wilson, 2022 IL
App (1st) 192048, ¶ 87, the proportionate penalties clause is an alternative vehicle for sentencing
challenges based on Miller’s concerns about the immaturity of young offenders. The Wilson court
observed:
“In recent years, *** our supreme court has acknowledged that young adults—at
least those who were 20 years of age or younger at the time of their crimes—may rely on
the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller to support
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bas-applied challenges to life sentences brought pursuant to the Illinois proportionate
penalties clause [citation].” Id.The Wilson court cited People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 29, 32, Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48,
and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44. Wilson, 2022 IL App (1st) 192048, ¶¶ 87-88.
¶ 14 The proportionate penalties clause states that a court must determine all penalties based on
the “seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. To succeed on a proportionate penalties claim, the
defendant must show that his sentence “is so disproportionate to the offense as to violate the
constitution.” People v. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 40. Stated differently, “[t]he
proportionate penalties clause is implicated when a defendant’s sentence is cruel, degrading, or so
wholly disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the moral conscience of the community.”
People v. Benford, 2021 IL App (1st) 181237, ¶ 12. In recognizing the potential viability of a
proportionate penalties claim based on the concerns articulated in Miller, our supreme court has
(as one appellate court noted) accepted
“the possibility that a young-adult offender might demonstrate, through an adequate factual
record, that his or her own specific characteristics were so like those of a juvenile that
imposition of a life sentence absent the safeguards established in Miller was cruel,
degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of
the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st)
191743, ¶ 27.
¶ 15 In People v. Cortez, 2021 IL App (4th) 190158, ¶ 47, the court elaborated on the elements
of a proportionate penalties claim based on Miller concerns:
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B“[T]o establish an as-applied constitutional challenge to his or her life sentence based on
Miller principles, a young adult offender is required to allege and ultimately demonstrate
that (1) at the time of the commission of the underlying offense, his or her own specific
characteristics—those related to youth, level of maturity, and brain development—placed
him or her in the same category as juvenile offenders described in Miller and (2) his or her
sentencing was not Miller compliant, in that a life sentence was imposed without regard
for the offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics. Further, as discussed, a defendant
must present a claim that has an arguable basis in law and fact to survive the first stage of
postconviction proceedings.”
¶ 16 With these principles in mind, we consider whether defendant’s claim is frivolous or is
patently without merit, i.e. whether it is based on “an indisputably meritless legal theory or a
fanciful factual allegation.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. As to legal theory, although the exact
parameters of a Miller-based claim under the proportionate penalties clause may not be entirely
settled, the legal basis for defendant’s claim—that the proportionate penalties clause forbids
mandatory life sentences (whether natural or de facto) without the possibility of parole for young
adult offenders who from a developmental standpoint should be treated as juveniles—is certainly
not “indisputably meritless.” Moreover, the claim is factually sufficient to proceed to the second
stage. Defendant submitted a lengthy report from a developmental psychologist who observed that
defendant had many of the traits that, per Miller, the sentencer must be permitted to consider before
imposing a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a crime committed by
an offender under the age of 18. Notably, the offense in this case took place less than three months
after defendant’s eighteenth birthday.
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B¶ 17 Our decision in People v. Mauricio, 2021 IL App (2d) 190619, cited by the State, does not
call for a different result. Mauricio was a direct appeal from the defendant’s conviction for first
degree murder and the resultant 55-year prison sentence. We rejected the defendant’s argument
that a young adult can challenge his sentence under the eighth amendment as construed in Miller.
Id. ¶¶ 20-24. In also rejecting the defendant’s age-based proportionate penalties challenge to his
sentence, we cited the seriousness of the offense (the trial court had found exceptionally brutal and
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty) and other aggravating and mitigating factors. Id.
¶ 29. We rendered no opinion on whether the proportionate penalties clause might require the
application of the Miller safeguards in cases involving young adults whose developmental
characteristics are in the juvenile category. Nor did the occasion seem to call for such an opinion.
While the expert testimony at the sentencing hearing in Mauricio “particularly focused on
defendant’s traumatic childhood experiences and how those experiences may have impacted
defendant” (id. ¶ 7), the testimony did not appear to establish that, from a developmental
standpoint, the defendant had the characteristics of a juvenile. 2
2 In Howard, the defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim was similarly flawed. The
defendant’s claim was essentially that the trial court did not adequately consider defendant’s youth;
hence, in our view, it was a nonconstitutional abuse-of-discretion claim not cognizable in a
postconviction petition. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 40. In Howard, as in Mauricio, the
defendant had not made a sufficient showing based on his individual circumstances that he was
entitled to the Miller protections as a young adult. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. We do not read either Mauricio or
Howard to categorically foreclose Miller-based proportionate penalties challenges in appropriate
cases.
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B¶ 18 We turn now to the effect of Wilson on defendant’s claim. Had defendant’s sentence been
discretionary, Wilson might well have been fatal to his claim. Under Holman, a Miller-compliant
hearing required a determination that “the [juvenile] defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable
depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of
rehabilitation” before imposition of a discretionary sentence on the defendant. Holman, 2017 IL
120655, ¶ 46. However, Wilson recognized that, in light of Jones, Holman is no longer good law.
Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 (citing Jones, 593 U.S. at 105). In Jones, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument that imposing a discretionary life sentence required the type of
determination mandated in Holman. Id. ¶ 34 (citing Jones, 593 U.S. at 101, 105). Instead, imposing
a discretionary life sentence requires only “[a] hearing where youth and its attendant characteristics
are considered as sentencing factors *** to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life
without parole from those who may not.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones, 593 U.S. at
111. “[U]nless a sentencing court ‘expressly refuses as a matter of law to consider the defendant’s
youth ***’ [citation], a discretionary sentencing scheme, in itself, satisfies Miller’s requirement
that sentencing courts account for youth and its attendant circumstances.” Wilson, 2023 IL 127666,
¶ 38 (quoting Jones, 593 U.S. at 115 n.7). Contrary to defendant’s argument that the trial court
failed to consider his young age and rehabilitative potential, the court—in ruling on defendant’s
motion to reconsider his sentence—confirmed that it had indeed considered those factors.
Moreover, consideration of rehabilitative potential necessarily encompasses consideration of
transient characteristics of young adulthood, such as immaturity and impetuousness.
¶ 19 However, the statutory scheme under which defendant was sentenced mandated that
defendant receive a de facto life sentence. The minimum sentence for first degree murder was a
20-year prison term. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2012). With the mandatory 25-year
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Benhancement for personally discharging a firearm (see id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)), the minimum
sentence the trial court could have imposed was a 45-year prison term, which constitutes a de facto
life sentence. In People v. Campbell, the First District observed:
“Key to the result in Wilson, where the court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of
the petitioner’s motion for leave [to file a successive postconviction petition], was its
observation that there was ‘no dispute that [he] was sentenced under a sentencing scheme
that granted the sentencing court the discretion to consider [his] youth and attendant
circumstances and to impose less than a de facto life sentence.’ *** [Citation.] As the
Wilson court makes clear, this is the discretion that Miller requires a sentencing court to
have when sentencing a defendant who was a juvenile at the time the crime was committed.
So long as the court had this discretion and ‘it is clear from the record that [it] did not
refuse, as a matter of law, to consider [the defendant’s] youth,’ the Eighth Amendment is
complied with.” (Emphases in original.) People v. Campbell, 2023 IL App (1st) 220373,
¶ 49 (quoting Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶¶ 42, 44).
¶ 20 In Campbell, the trial court sentenced the defendant, a juvenile offender, to a 110-year
prison term. Id. ¶ 29. The shortest sentence that the defendant could have received under the
applicable statutes was just over 50 years. Id. ¶ 1. The State did not dispute that the statutes
imposed a mandatory de facto life sentence in violation of Miller; rather, the State argued that the
error was harmless. Id. ¶ 51. According to the Campbell court, “[t]he State’s position is that a
Miller-compliant sentencing scheme is not required where the sentence imposed is so far above
the statutory minimum that one can surmise that the discretion to impose something less than a life
sentence would have made no difference.” Id. The Campbell court rejected the argument:
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B“At issue here, however, is more than just a misapprehension of the applicable
minimum sentence. Yes, under Miller and Buffer, the minimum sentence is constitutionally
required to be something less than 40 years. But our supreme court’s recent decision in
Wilson confirms that Miller guarantees not just a different sentencing range but also
mandates that the sentencing court have the discretion to impose something less than a life
sentence without the possibility of parole. [Citation.]
***
Although the court here exercised a degree of discretion by choosing a sentence
between 50 years in prison and statutory natural life, our supreme court’s holding in
Buffer—that any sentence greater than 40 years is the legal equivalent of a natural life
sentence—reveals that exercise of discretion to be meaningless under Miller. Where the
minimum sentence available is more than 40 years, there is simply no constitutionally
significant choice to be made.” Id. ¶¶ 53-55.
Similarly, here, the fact that the trial court imposed a sentence well above the minimum does not
signify a constitutionally sufficient exercise of discretion.
¶ 21 We hasten to add that, should the proceedings on remand result in a judgment that
defendant’s 62-year prison term violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied, such a
judgment would not necessarily preclude imposition of the same sentence under current law.
Miller held that the eighth amendment bars sentencing schemes that subject an offender under the
age of 18 to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at
479. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s particular characteristics entitle him to the same
protections under the proportionate penalties clause, his sentence would have to be vacated
because, under the law in effect at the time he was sentenced, there was no possibility that
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-Bdefendant would be paroled. Current law, however, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person
under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of first degree murder who is sentenced on or
after June 1, 2019 *** shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner Review Board after
serving 20 years or more of his or her sentence ***.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2022). If
defendant establishes that he is entitled to be resentenced, that new sentence, whatever its length,
will comply with Miller because defendant will be eligible for parole in less than 40 years.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County
summarily dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition. We remand with directions to docket
the petition for further proceedings under the Act.
¶ 24 Vacated and remanded.
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2024 IL App (2d) 210488-BPeople v. Garcia, 2024 IL App (2d) 210488-BDecision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 13-CF-654;
the Hon. Daniel B. Shanes, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Thomas C. Brandstrader, of Highwood, for appellant.
for
Appellant:
Attorneys Eric F. Rinehart, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino,
for Edward R. Psenicka, and David S. Friedland, of State’s Attorneys
Appellee: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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