Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Davis-Jones ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 190704-UFIFTH DIVISION
Order filed: July 24, 2020
No. 1-19-0704
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 16 CH 2181
)
DEBORAH DAVIS-JONES, a/k/a DEBORAH JONES, )
a/k/a DEBORAH DAVIS, WELLINGTON COURT )
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, UNKNOWN )
OWNERS AND NON-RECORD CLAIMANTS, )
UNKNOWN HEIRS AND LEGATEES OF ROBERTA )
L. DAVIS, WILLIAM P. BUTCHER, as special )
representative for Roberta L. Davis, deceased, )
)
Defendants ) Honorable
) Patricia S. Spratt,
(Deborah Davis-Jones, Defendant-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Rochford and Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
No. 1-19-0704
¶1 Held: We affirm the order of the circuit court confirming the judicial sale of a foreclosed
property over the defendant’s contention that the notice of sale included a deficient
description of the property’s improvements.
¶2 In this mortgage foreclosure action, the defendant, Deborah Davis-Jones, appeals from an
order of the circuit court of Cook County, confirming the judicial sale of her late mother’s
residence. On appeal, she argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it confirmed the
sale because the public notice of sale did not comply with section 15-1507(c)(1)(D) of the Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure Law) (735 ILCS 5/15-507(c)(1)(D) (West 2018). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 The following facts and procedural history relevant to our disposition of this appeal were
adduced from the pleadings and exhibits of record.
¶4 On December 30, 2009, Davis-Jones’s mother, Roberta Davis, obtained a loan from the
plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (the Bank), for $263,145. The note was secured by a mortgage
on real property located at 2884 Queensbridge Dr. in Lynwood, Illinois (the property).
¶5 On February 17, 2016, the Bank filed a complaint against Davis to foreclose on the
mortgage, alleging that Davis failed to make payments as of October 1, 2015. Subsequently, Davis
passed away. On May 12, 2016, the Bank filed a motion to appoint a special representative because
no probate estate had been opened for Davis. That same day, the Bank filed a motion to amend its
complaint to, inter alia, add Davis-Jones as an additional defendant. On June 1, 2016, the court
granted both motions and appointed William P. Butcher as special representative. The Bank filed
its amended complaint to foreclos the mortgage that same day. As of the filing of the Bank’s
amended foreclosure complaint, the amount due on the note was $237,224.34.
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¶6 On February 15, 2018, Davis-Jones filed her answer and affirmative defenses to the
amended foreclosure complaint. On April 20, 2018, the Bank moved for a judgment of foreclosure
and sale. The same day, the Bank moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for judgment
pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/15-1506 of the Foreclosure Law. On August 2, 2018, the circuit court
entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale and an order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank.
¶7 On October 2, 2018, the Bank filed a notice of sale in which it set forth the following
description of the property:
“LOT 5 IN WELLINGTON COURT SUBDIVISION, BEING A SUBDIVISION
IN PART OF THE SOUTHEAST ¼ OF THE SOUTHEAST ¼ OF SECTION 12,
TOWNSHIP 35 NORTH, RANGE 14, AND THE SOUTHWEST ¼ OF THE
SOUTHEAST ¼ OF SECTION 12, TOWNSHIP 35 NORTH, RANGE 14, EAST OF THE
THIRD PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF
RECORDED NOVEMBER 3, 2005 AS DOCUMENT 0530727062, IN COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS.
Commonly known as 2284 QUEENSBRIDGE DRIVE, LYNWOOD, IL 60411.
Property Index No. 32-12-411-005-0000.
The real estate is improved with a residence.”
The bank subsequently filed certificates of publication from the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin and
the Daily Southtown.
¶8 On November 20, 2018, the Bank moved to approve the sale of the property, attaching a
report of sale and distribution reflecting that the Bank successfully bid $182,500 for the property.
On December 26, 2018, Davis-Jones filed an opposition to the Bank’s motion to approve the sale,
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No. 1-19-0704
arguing that the description of the improvements to the property in the notice of sale was
insufficient.
¶9 On March 8, 2019, the circuit court entered an order approving the sale, finding that “all
notices required by 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c) have been properly given.” This appeal followed.
¶ 10 On appeal, Davis-Jones argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it confirmed
the sale of the property because the notice of sale did not comply with section 15-1507(c)(1)(D)
of the Foreclosure Law due to the vague and insufficient description of the improvements to the
property.
¶ 11 At the outset, we must first address the Bank’s argument that we should strike Davis-
Jones’s brief for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7). Under Rule
341(h)(7), an appellant's argument “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons
therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). “Citations to authority that set forth only general propositions of
law and do not address the issues presented do not constitute relevant authority for purposes of
Rule 341(h)(7).” Robinson v. Point One Toyota, Evanston, 2012 IL App (1st) 111889, ¶ 54. “[A]
reviewing court is not simply a depository into which a party may dump the burden of argument
and research.” People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, 2013 IL 115106,
¶ 56; see also Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 6 (holding that appellate courts
are not required to “complete legal research to find support for” an appellant's arguments). “Issues
that are ill-defined and insufficiently presented do not satisfy” Rule 341(h)(7) and are considered
forfeited. Walters, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 6.
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No. 1-19-0704
¶ 12 Here, the Bank contends that Davis-Jones did not cite to any authority to support her claims
on appeal. In response, Davis-Jones argues that this is an issue of first impression, and therefore,
there was no authority available to cite. Although we acknowledge that there does not appear to
be a case that shares identical facts with the instant case, we remind Davis-Jones that it is possible
to cite to authority in order to distinguish and analogize a set of facts. In the future, it is strongly
advised that she do so. Nevertheless, we decline the Bank’s invitation to strike Davis-Jones’s brief
and dismiss her appeal.
¶ 13 Turning to the merits, it is well established that the provisions of the Foreclosure Law “have
been construed as conferring on circuit courts broad discretion in approving or disapproving
judicial sales.” Household Bank, FSB v. Lewis, 229 Ill. 2d 173, 178 (2008). Therefore, we will not
reverse the court’s approval of a judicial sale absent an abuse of discretion. MidFirst Bank v. Riley,
2018 Il App (1st) 171986, ¶ 37; Credit Union 1 v. Carrasco, 2018 Il App (1st) 172535, ¶ 22. The
circuit court abused its discretion if it committed an error of law or where no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the court. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Lewis, 2014 IL App (1st) 131272,
¶ 31.
¶ 14 Whether a trial court properly approved or confirmed a sale of foreclosed property is
governed by section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law, which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
“Upon motion and notice in accordance with court rules applicable to motions
generally, which motion shall not be made prior to sale, the court shall conduct a hearing
to confirm the sale. Unless the court finds that (i) a notice required in accordance with
subsection (c) of Section 15-1507 was not given, (ii) the terms of sale were unconscionable,
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No. 1-19-0704
(iii) the sale was conducted fraudulently, or (iv) justice was otherwise not done, the court
shall then enter an order confirming the sale.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b).
The objecting party bears the burden of proving that sufficient grounds exist to disapprove of a
judicial sale. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. 2010 Real Estate Foreclosure, LLC, 2013 IL App
(1st) 120711, ¶ 32.
¶ 15 Under section 15-1508(b)(i), notice must be provided in accordance with section 15-
1507(c), which mandates “public notice of the sale.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c); 1508(b)(i) (West
2018). Section 15-1507(c)(1) states that “[t]he notice of sale shall include at least the following
information, but an immaterial error in the information shall not invalidate the legal effect of the
notice.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(1) (West 2018). One piece of information that must be included
in the public notice is “a description of the improvements on the real estate.” 735 ILCS 5/15-
1507(c)(1)(d) (West 2018).
¶ 16 Here, Davis-Jones argues that the notice of sale did not comply with section 15-1507(c) of
the Foreclosure Law, and as a consequence, the circuit court abused its discretion when it
confirmed the sale. Specifically, she contends that the description of the property provided in the
notice of sale, which states that “[t]he real estate is improved with residence,” is insufficient and
vague.
¶ 17 The Bank responds that the notice of sale complied with the notice provisions of section
15-1507(c)(1). It also contends that, even if we find that the description contained in the notice of
sale was somehow defective, section 15-1507(c)(1) states that only material errors will invalidate
the legal effect of a notice of sale and this error was not material. We agree with the Bank.
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¶ 18 The record reflects that the notice of sale includes the following description of the
improvements to the property: “The real estate is improved with residence.” Put simply, the notice
of sale includes “a description of the improvements on the real estate,” as required by section 15-
1507(c)(1)(D). 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(1)(D) (West 2018). Davis-Jones does not provide any
authority to support her claim that this description is in some way insufficient to satisfy those
requirements. Rather, she argues, in a conclusory fashion, that the description is “vague.” She also
contends, again without citing to authority, that “[a] proper, statutorily sufficient description”
would be the following: “2 story single family residence with walkout basement, exterior front
brick, wood paneling on sides and back.” However, there is nothing in section 15-1507(c)(1)(D)
that requires the notice of sale’s description of the improvements to the property to include the
level of specificity urged by Davis-Jones. Consequently, we cannot say that the circuit court
committed an error of law or that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court.
¶ 19 That said, even if we were to find that the description of the improvements in the notice of
sale was deficient, we would still find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because
Davis-Jones has not shown that the deficiency was material. Section 15-1507(c)(1) of the
Foreclosure Law states that “an immaterial error in the information shall not invalidate the legal
effect of the notice.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(1) (West 2018). Thus, Davis-Jones was required to
show that the defect in the notice of sale was material, and she has failed to do so here.
¶ 20 To begin, we note that, at no point in these proceedings has Davis-Jones acknowledged
that the Foreclosure Law requires her to show materiality. As far as this court can tell, the closest
she has come to making any such argument is her contention that the deficient description of the
property in the notice of sale contributed to the property’s low sale price by not informing third-
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party bidders of the improvements to the property. Even if we were to assume this is an argument
in support of materiality, we find that Davis-Jones’s conclusory allegation that the description of
the property contributed to the low sale price fails. For one, she has not provided any evidence to
establish that the property was sold at a price significantly below its value. Nor has she provided
any evidence to suggest that adding the information she sought would have resulted in the property
being sold for a higher price or attracted more bidders. In sum, she has failed to show that the
allegedly deficient description was material.
¶ 21 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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