People v. Hale ( 2020 )

NOTICE
2020 IL App (5th) 180468-U NOTICE
Decision filed 12/28/20. The This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-18-0468 Supreme Court Rule 23 and
changed or corrected prior to may not be cited as precedent
the filing of a Petition for by any party except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE
limited circumstances allowed
the same.
under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County.
)
v. ) No. 14-CF-546
)
JORDAN X. HALE, ) Honorable
) William G. Schwartz,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Because the defendant is correct that the circuit court erred when it summarily
dismissed the defendant’s petition for postconviction relief at the first stage of
proceedings, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Jackson County and remand
for the appointment of counsel for the defendant, and for further proceedings on the
defendant’s petition.
¶2 The defendant, Jordan X. Hale, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of armed
robbery in exchange for a sentence of 26 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, to be followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. He now appeals the first-
stage, or summary, dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. For the following reasons,
we reverse the order of the circuit court of Jackson County and remand for the appointment of
counsel for the defendant, and for further proceedings on the defendant’s petition.
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¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On December 31, 2014, the defendant was charged, by a first amended information, with
two counts of armed robbery and two counts of home invasion. On March 17, 2015, in anticipation
of the defendant entering a negotiated plea of guilty to some of the charges against him, a “402
conference” was held during which the defendant’s appointed counsel noted that the defendant
had informed counsel that the defendant was not aware that certain statements he made to police
officers in the processing area of the Carbondale Police Department building were being audio and
video recorded. Counsel noted that signage existed in the processing area, alerting people to the
fact that audio and video recording was taking place, and noted that discovery materials that
counsel had received from the State alleged that police officers had read the defendant his Miranda
rights prior to the defendant’s statements in the processing area. Counsel told the trial judge that
counsel had informed the defendant that counsel thought the defendant’s statements “would come
into evidence at a trial,” but that the defendant had “some questions about that” and did not
“necessarily” agree with counsel’s assessment.
¶5 When given the opportunity by the trial judge to address the court, the defendant stated, “I
feel like it ain’t—they didn’t tell me—they was just asking me a lot of questions and I got confused,
and I was no way aware that it was voice [sic] and audio recorded.” He added that he felt like he
was being taken advantage of. When the trial judge pointed out that the defendant had been given
his Miranda rights, and that signage about audio and video recording was present in the processing
area, the defendant responded, “I can’t read.” The trial judge did not respond to the defendant’s
statement, instead stating that if there were to be a motion to suppress filed, it would be denied,
and that the defendant’s statements would be admitted at a trial.
¶6 On March 25, 2015, after a jury had been selected for the defendant’s trial, the defendant
entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of armed robbery, in exchange for a sentence of
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26 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections, to be followed by 3 years of
mandatory supervised release. When asked by the trial judge if the defendant both read and
understood the written guilty plea agreement form, the defendant answered “yes” to both points.
When asked if he had any questions about the form, the defendant answered that he did not. The
factual basis provided for the defendant’s plea included the following: that on December 29, 2014,
the defendant, along with another individual, forced his way into an apartment in Carbondale and
at gunpoint stole electronic items, a wallet, and a cell phone from the two women who lived in the
apartment. As the defendant exited the apartment, the victims “heard approximately four pops that
they believe[d] were gunshots.” The trial judge accepted the plea agreement, then admonished the
defendant as to his appellate rights, including the requirement that the defendant first attempt to
withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court.
¶7 Approximately two years later, on March 13, 2017, the defendant filed, pro se, a motion
for reduction of sentence, based upon purportedly newly discovered evidence. The motion was
denied, and the defendant appealed. The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss his appeal, and
this court granted the defendant’s request. See People v. Hale, No. 5-17-0122 (Oct. 25, 2017).
¶8 Thereafter, on June 25, 2018, the defendant filed, pro se, a postconviction petition
(petition) in which he raised claims of, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, due to the
failure of trial counsel to investigate the defendant’s mental health history and request a fitness
hearing for the defendant. The petition alleged there were “bona fide” questions with regard to his
fitness, based upon “some mental issues in the past,” including (1) “a history of mental illness,”
(2) diagnoses of bipolar disorder and “attention hyper deficit disorder,” (3) prior hospitalization
and medication of the defendant for mental health issues, and (4) learning disabilities and
“emotional behavior disorder.” The petition alleged that the defendant did “not understand or
comprehend the issues in front of him or in his plea deal of guilty,” and that counsel was ineffective
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because counsel “failed to show that the petitioner was on the right medications, for him to
understand his plea deal in front of him.” The petition alleged that the defendant “may have had a
mental defect” which would have prejudiced the defendant “at the time of plea deal,” which in
turn demonstrated “ineffective assistance of counsel.” The petition further alleged that trial counsel
was in a hurry, which was why counsel did not properly investigate the defendant’s mental health
history or otherwise properly investigate the case prior to the scheduled trial.
¶9 On August 27, 2018, the judge who accepted the defendant’s guilty plea entered a written
order in which he summarily dismissed the postconviction petition at the first stage of proceedings.
In the written order, the trial judge stated that the petition did not include any affidavits, records,
or other supporting evidence, or an explanation for the absence of said documents. The trial judge
also ruled that the defendant’s allegations were contradicted by the record, and that the petition
was “patently without merit.” This timely appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 This court reviews de novo the first-stage, or summary, dismissal of a petition for
postconviction relief. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). At the first stage of proceedings
on such a petition, a defendant “need only present a limited amount of detail in the petition.” Id.As the Hodges court noted, “[b]ecause most petitions are drafted at this stage by defendants with
little legal knowledge or training,” reviewing courts will view “the threshold for survival as low.”
Id. A defendant need only state the “gist” of a constitutional argument, a requirement that is met
if a defendant alleges “enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for purposes
of invoking the Act,” even if the petition as drafted at the first stage “lacks formal legal arguments
or citations to legal authority.” Id. The trial court may dismiss a petition at the first stage as
“frivolous or patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Id. at 11-12. Moreover, “[w]here defendants are acting pro se, courts should review their
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[first-stage] petitions ‘with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.’ ” Id. at 21 (quoting
Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)). Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel may not be dismissed at the first stage of proceedings “ ‘if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the
defendant was prejudiced.’ ” (Emphases in original.) People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 19
(quoting Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17). In other words, there is no requirement that a defendant
“demonstrate” or “prove” the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the first stage
of proceedings; instead, “first-stage postconviction petitions alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel are judged by a lower pleading standard.” Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 12 The defendant in this case points out in his opening brief on appeal that in his pro se
petition, he alleged, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because
counsel did not investigate the defendant’s mental health history and did not ask for a hearing on
the defendant’s mental fitness. He notes that in the petition, he alleged multiple details about his
prior mental illnesses, and alleged that he did “not understand or comprehend the issues in front
of him or in his plea deal of guilty.” He contends these allegations are sufficient, under the above
legal standards, to survive a first-stage dismissal. With regard to trial counsel’s duty to investigate
the defendant’s mental health history and request a fitness hearing, the defendant contends that the
defendant’s March 17, 2015, statements—on the record, in the presence of trial counsel—that the
defendant became confused when questioned by police, and that he could not read, should have
prompted trial counsel to investigate to make certain the defendant was fit to enter his guilty plea
(or go to trial) the following week. With regard to how he was prejudiced by the alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel, he contends that “[i]t is at least arguable that further inquiry into [the
defendant’s] mental illness, along with the evidence that he had an inability to understand
questions during his police interview and that he could not read, would have raised a bona fide
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doubt as to his ability to understand the nature of his plea agreement and to his ability to plead
guilty.” With regard to the lack of affidavits or other supporting documentation to accompany the
petition, the defendant points out that such documentation is not needed at the first stage of
proceedings if the allegations in the petition are supported by facts already in the record (see, e.g.,
People v. Hanks, 335 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898-99 (2002)), and that in this case the defendant’s
statements in the record that he became confused when questioned by police, and that he could not
read, provide all the support necessary at this stage of the proceedings. He also notes the well-
established point of law that when ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged, the failure to
produce an affidavit from counsel in which counsel admits counsel’s own ineffectiveness is
excused at the first stage of proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 402 Ill. App. 3d 638, 641-
42 (2010).
¶ 13 The State’s sole response on appeal is that (1) the failure to attach supporting
documentation to the petition is fatal to the petition, and (2) the record positively rebuts the
allegations in the petition. With regard to the first part of this response, the State posits that even
in the cases cited by the defendant in his opening brief on appeal, some type of documentation was
attached to the petitions in question, whereas in this case no documents were attached. The State
suggests there are various hypothetical documents the defendant could have attached to his petition
in this case, and contends it is a statutory violation to fail to attach at least some type of
documentation to a petition, regardless of what that documentation may be. With regard to the
second part of the State’s response, the State contends that the trial judge was correct in his ruling
that the allegations in the petition were positively rebutted by the record, because the record shows
that when asked by the trial judge if the defendant both read and understood the written guilty plea
agreement form, the defendant answered “yes” to both points, and that when asked if he had any
questions about the form, the defendant answered that he did not. The State suggests that this brief
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exchange on the date the defendant entered his plea of guilty negates the statements the defendant
made a week earlier about becoming confused when questioned by police, and about his inability
to read. The State asserts that “the record as a whole reflects that [the] defendant was able to
effectively communicate with counsel and with the court, and that he understood the nature of the
proceedings.”
¶ 14 In his reply brief, the defendant aptly notes that the hypothetical documents the State
suggests he should have filed with the petition—such as an affidavit or report from a medical
professional detailing his cognitive disabilities at the time of his guilty plea—would have been
available only if counsel had properly investigated his mental health issues. In other words, the
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel is the reason such documents could not be produced at
the time the petition was filed: because no investigation was conducted by counsel, and therefore
no such documentation was generated. The defendant also reiterates his position that supporting
documentation is not required—by statute or by case law—at the first stage of proceedings if the
allegations in a petition are supported by facts already of record, and that no affidavit is required
in which counsel avers counsel’s own ineffectiveness. He also reiterates his position that his
allegations are not positively rebutted by the record.
¶ 15 In light of the low threshold, discussed in detail above, necessary for a defendant’s pro se
allegations in a postconviction petition to state the gist of a constitutional claim, and thus to survive
a first-stage dismissal—and in light of the fact, also discussed above, that at the first stage a
defendant need not prove the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim—we conclude
that the petition does in fact state the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, is adequately supported at this stage of the proceedings by the facts already of record in
this case, is not positively rebutted by the record, and therefore is sufficient to survive a first-stage
summary dismissal.
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¶ 16 We agree with the defendant that in People v. Hanks, 335 Ill. App. 3d 894, 899 (2002), our
colleagues in the First District correctly determined that providing supporting information by way
of attachments at the first stage of proceedings is not an absolute requirement, because the Illinois
Supreme Court has never established a blanket rule that a petition must always include attachments
to survive summary dismissal. As the defendant notes, the Hanks court held that a petition meets
pleading requirements when “the record, the contents of the court file, and the exhibits allow for
objective and independent corroboration of the allegations.” Id. In this case, the defendant is
correct that the defendant’s statements, already in the record, that he became confused when
questioned by police, and that he could not read, make his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to investigate the defendant’s mental health and request a fitness hearing at least
arguable, which is all that is necessary at this point in the proceedings. This is particularly true in
this case because of the difficulties the defendant points to in terms of securing additional
documentation to attach to the pro se petition at the time it was filed—such as an affidavit or report
from a medical professional detailing his cognitive disabilities at the time of his guilty plea, or an
affidavit from trial counsel averring trial counsel’s own ineffectiveness. Thus, the State’s first
argument in support of affirming the summary dismissal of the petition fails.
¶ 17 We turn, therefore, to the State’s second argument. We recognize that if this case involved
only the question of whether the defendant can read, then the trial judge’s ruling that the record
(which, as explained above, contains the defendant’s affirmative statements that he both read and
understood the written guilty plea agreement form) contradicts the defendant’s assertion that he
cannot read would be more persuasive. However, the petition’s allegations about the mental fitness
of the defendant at and around the time of his guilty plea by their very nature call into question the
validity of any statements made by the defendant at and around the time of that plea, including his
statements that he both read and understood the written guilty plea agreement form. In light of the
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petition’s allegations, we conclude that the brief exchange between the trial judge and the
defendant about the defendant’s understanding of the court proceedings and the content of his
guilty plea is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the record positively rebuts the allegations
in the petition about the mental fitness of the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d
175, 190-91 (2010) (“brief exchanges” with trial judge wherein defendant asserted that defendant
understood the trial judge’s instructions or admonitions “do not positively rebut” allegations in
postconviction petition as to defendant’s mental fitness and “do not conclusively demonstrate an
ability to understand the proceedings or assist in the defense”).
¶ 18 We also agree with the defendant that the principal case cited by the State in support of its
argument on this point, People v. Rosado, 2016 IL App (1st) 140826, ¶¶ 45-49, is factually
distinguishable from this case, because in Rosado, the record showed that the defendant was
actually examined by medical professionals and found fit to proceed, and the record also showed
that the defendant’s extensive interactions with his own counsel and with the court demonstrated
that he understood the proceedings and his part therein—in other words, the defendant’s claims in
Rosado were positively rebutted by the record. As discussed above, the record in this case does
not positively rebut the defendant’s claims for purposes of a summary dismissal of the petition,
because the trial judge’s interactions with the defendant in this case were simply too fleeting,
perfunctory, and devoid of detail to create such a record. Therefore, the State’s second argument
fails as well.
¶ 19 We note again that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be dismissed at the
first stage of proceedings “ ‘if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.’ ” (Emphases
in original.) Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 19 (quoting Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17). In other words, in
contrast to the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), there is no
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requirement at the first stage of proceedings on a postconviction petition that a defendant
“demonstrate” or “prove” the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim; instead, “first-
stage postconviction petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are judged by a lower
pleading standard.” Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶¶ 19-20. Moreover, the defendant is correct in his
assertion of the general principle of law that “[i]n order to establish prejudice for failure to request
a fitness hearing, the petition must arguably show that ‘facts existed at the time of trial that would
have raised a bona fide doubt of his ability “to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” ’ People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 304
(2002).” In this case, we agree with the defendant that, with regard to his pro se claims on these
points, it is at least arguable that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and it is at least arguable that the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Thus, to
the extent the trial judge held the petition to a higher, incorrect standard at the first stage of
proceedings, the trial judge erred in doing so. See Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 20 For these reasons, we agree with the defendant that the trial judge’s summary dismissal of
the petition was improper. As a result, the entire petition must advance to the second stage of
proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d 854, 858, 860 (2007) (if any claims in
a postconviction petition are not subject to summary dismissal, the entire petition must be docketed
for second-stage proceedings); see also, e.g., People v. Henderson, 2014 IL App (2d) 121219, ¶ 41
(same). At this point, of course, the defendant has not fully developed his arguments. If, after
consultation with appointed counsel at the trial court level on remand, the defendant wishes to
persist in his claims, he should have the opportunity to file an amended petition (see, e.g., People
v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 100 (2002)), and the State should have the opportunity to respond thereto,
including by raising arguments not raised in this appeal, should the State choose to present such
arguments to the trial court.
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¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Jackson County and
remand for the appointment of counsel for the defendant, and for further proceedings on the
defendant’s petition.
¶ 23 Reversed and remanded.
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