Rodik v. Ezike ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 200550-UFIFTH DIVISION
Order filed: February 5, 2021
No. 1-20-0550
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
IRENE RODIK, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County
v. )
)
DR. NGOZI EZIKE, in her official )
capacity as DIRECTOR of the )
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
PUBLIC HEALTH, an Illinois ) No. 2018 CH 00173
Government Agency and PONNI )
ARUKUMAR, M.D., in her official )
capacity as COOK COUNTY )
MEDICAL EXAMINER, a Government )
Agency of the County of Cook. ) Honorable
) Sanjay T. Tailor,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court order dismissing the plaintiff’s action for failure to state causes of
action for mandamus and declaratory judgment is affirmed.
No. 1-20-0550
¶2 The plaintiff, Irene Rodik, appeals from an order of the circuit court, dismissing her actions
for mandamus and declaratory judgment against the defendants, Dr. Ngozi Ezike and Dr. Ponni
Arukumar, for failure to state causes of action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 The plaintiff commenced the instant action with the filing of a four-count complaint
seeking mandamus and a declaratory judgment against both defendants. In her complaint, the
plaintiff alleged the following facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
¶4 On November 16, 2016, Valerie Teper, the plaintiff’s daughter, was found unresponsive in
her apartment and later pronounced dead. Dr. Arukumar, in her official capacity as Chief Medical
Examiner for the County of Cook, prepared a Postmortem Examination Report, stating that Teper
died of furanyl fentanyl toxicity and listing the manner of death as “Accident.” Dr. Arukumar
certified the results of Teper’s postmortem examination, and a death certificate was issued listing
her manner of death as “ACCIDENT.”
¶5 The plaintiff made a request upon the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) to
correct Teper’s death certificate to state that her manner of death was “Homicide-unsolved.” The
IDPH responded by informing the plaintiff that it is the responsibility of the Cook County Medical
Examiner to make corrections to the manner of death listed on Teper’s death certificate and that
the IDPH would make the correction on the recommendation of the Cook County Medical
Examiner.
¶6 Dr. Arukumar authored a letter dated February 5, 2019, denying the request to correct the
manner of death stated on Teper’s death certificate. The letter states that “[t]he manner of Accident
applies ‘when an injury or poisoning causes death and there is little or no evidence that the injury
or poisoning occurred with intent to harm or cause death. In essence the fatal outcome was
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No. 1-20-0550
unintentional.’ ” The letter went on to state: “The level of Fentanyl that was in her [Tepper’s]
system did not deem this case as Suicide. We also cannot rule this Homicide based on the
information available to us.”
¶7 On September 19, 2019, the plaintiff filed the instant action. Count I of her complaint
sought a writ of mandamus compelling Dr. Ezike, in her official capacity as the director of the
IDPH, to correct the cause of death on Teper’s death certificate from accidental to homicide. Count
II of her complaint sought a writ of mandamus compelling Dr. Arukumar, in her official capacity
as Cook County Medical Examiner, to correct the cause of death on Teper’s death certificate from
accidental to homicide. Count III of her complaint sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that Dr.
Ezike, in her official capacity as the director of the IDPH, “be ordered to correct the death
certificate of Teper to state that the manner of death was homicide and not accidental.” Count IV
sought a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Dr. Arukumar, in her official capacity as Cook County
Medical Examiner, “be ordered to correct the death certificate of Teper to state that the manner of
death was homicide and not accidental.”
¶8 On November 1, 2019, Dr. Arukumar filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)),
arguing that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state claims for either mandamus or declaratory
judgment. On March 10, 2020, the circuit court entered an order, granting Dr. Arukumar’s motion
“with prejudice,” denying the plaintiff’s oral motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and
terminating the case “in its entirety.” This appeal followed.
¶9 This matter was disposed of at the trial level on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-
615 of the Code. Consequently, the only question before this court is whether the dismissed counts
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state causes of action upon which relief can be granted. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights,
139 Ill. 2d 501, 505 (1990). The issue presented is one of law, and our review is de novo,
independent of the reasoning of the trial court on the question. T & S Signs, Inc. v. Village of
Wadsworth, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1084 (1994).
¶ 10 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, “the performance of
official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.” Madden
v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). “For a complaint seeking mandamus to withstand a
challenge to its legal sufficiency, it must allege facts which establish a clear right to the relief
requested, a clear duty of the respondent to act, and clear authority in the respondent to comply
with the writ.” Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997).
“As a general matter, mandamus will lie only to direct an official to perform an act which is purely
ministerial or, put another way, mandamus will issue to order an individual to do an act over which
he has no discretion.” Dennis E. v. O’Malley, 256 Ill. App. 3d 334, 341 (1993).
¶ 11 In support of her argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing her mandamus action,
the plaintiff asserts that Dr. Arukumar’s classification of the manner of Teper’s death on her death
certificate is a ministerial function and not a discretionary act. In support of the argument, the
plaintiff relies upon the provisions of section 9-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012, which provides
that the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance to another causing the death of that person by
injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of the controlled substance is a homicide. 720 ILCS
5/9-3.3(a) (West 2014). Having alleged that Teper died from an injection of furanyl fentanyl, a
controlled substance that she could not have legally obtained, and that “[t]he furanyl fentanyl [a
controlled substance] found in TEPER’S system was neither described as either methamphetamine
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or other bath salts” (see 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2014), the plaintiff reasons that classifying the
manner of Teper’s death as a homicide is a ministerial act. We disagree.
¶ 12 The supreme court has defined the terms “discretionary” and “ministerial” as follows:
“[D]iscretionary acts are those which are unique to a particular public office, while
ministerial acts are those which a person performs on a given state of facts in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without reference to the
official’s discretion as to the propriety of the act.” (Emphases added.)Snyder v. Curran
Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 474 (1995).
A strong argument can be made that the completion of a death certificate is a ministerial act on the
part of the Cook County Medical Examiner. However, the opinions contained therein, such as the
manner of death, are not. The classification of the manner of the decedent’s death as either
accident, suicide, or homicide is the opinion of the author informed by the facts surrounding the
death and the author’s judgment, education, and experience.
¶ 13 Assuming, for the sake of analysis only, that the plaintiff is correct in her assertion that Dr.
Arukumar erroneously classified the manner of Teper’s death on her death certificate as
“Accident” when it should have been classified as a homicide, the remedy of mandamus cannot
be used to compel Dr. Arukumar to, as the plaintiff requested, “correct the cause of death on
TEPER’s death certificate from accidental to homicide.” Mandamus is a proper remedy only when
the acts to be compelled are purely ministerial and require no exercise of judgment by the public
officer. Crump v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 181 Ill. App. 3d 58, 60 (1989). “ ‘Mandamus
cannot be used to direct a public official or body to reach a particular decision or to exercise its
discretion in a particular manner, even if the judgment or discretion has been erroneously
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No. 1-20-0550
exercised.’ ” Mabwa v. Mendoza, 2014 IL App (1st) 142771, ¶ 36, (quoting Crump, 181 Ill. App.
3d at 60).
¶ 14 As the relief prayed in her mandamus action against Dr. Arukumar sought an order
compelling the performance of a discretionary act, Count II of the plaintiff’s complaint failed to
state a cause of action and was properly dismissed by the circuit court on those grounds. We next
address the propriety of the circuit court’s dismissal the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action
against Dr. Arukumar, which was pled in Count IV of her complaint.
¶ 15 The plaintiff is correct in asserting in her brief that she sought a declaratory judgment
against Dr. Arukumar “based on the same *** allegations in support of her mandamus count.” In
the first paragraph of the relief sought by the plaintiff in Count IV of her complaint, the declaratory
judgment action against Dr. Arukumar, she sought essentially the same relief that she sought in
her mandamus action; namely, a “judgment declaring that the Defendant Ponni Arukumar, M.D.,
in her official capacity as Cook County Medical Examiner be ordered to correct the death
certificate of TEPER to state that her manner of death was a homicide and not accidental.”
¶ 16 In analyzing a pleading, courts look to the content of the pleading rather than its label.
Padilla v. Vasquez, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1023 (1991). The relief sought by the plaintiff in Count
IV, in the form of an order directing Dr. Arukumar to correct Teper’s death certificate to state that
her manner of death was a homicide and not accidental, is nothing more than a prayer for
mandamus masquerading under Count IV’s caption of “DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.” And
for the same reasons stated in support of our finding that Count II of the plaintiff’s complaint failed
to state a cause of action, we find that the request for mandamus relief in Count IV also fails to
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state a cause of action. The plaintiff argues, however, that it is the additional relief sought in Count
IV which entitles her to declaratory judgment relief. Again, we disagree.
¶ 17 The test of the sufficiency of a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment action is whether
the complaint alleges facts showing an actual or justiciable controversy between the parties. AG
Farms, Inc. v. American Pemier Underwriters, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 684, 689 (1998). The elements
of an action for declaratory judgment are: “(1) a plaintiff with a tangible legal interest, (2) a
defendant with an adverse interest, and (3) an actual controversy regarding that interest.” Id.¶ 18 The second paragraph of relief prayed by the plaintiff in Count IV of her complaint sought:
“[A] judgment that the Defendant Ponni Arukumar [M.D.]’s failure to correct
Teper’s death certificate manner of death from accidental to homicide violates the drug
induced homicide statute as set forth in 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3 and violates REDIK’S [the
plaintiff] rights as a victim pursuant to the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act.
(725 ILCS 120/1; et al)”
The allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint fail to show either an interest adverse to the interests
of Dr. Arukumar or an actual controversy between the parties.
¶ 19 Section 9-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-3.3 (West 2014)), upon which
the plaintiff relies, is a criminal statute setting forth the elements of drug-induced homicide.
Nowhere in that statute are any rights created in favor of an individual relating to the determination
of the manner of a person’s death set forth in a death certificate. The statute creates no tangible
rights in favor of the plaintiff. As for the plaintiff’s status as a victim pursuant to the provisions of
section 3 the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/3 (West 2018)), Count
IV of the plaintiff’s complaint identifies no interest of Dr. Arukumar that is adverse to the interests
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No. 1-20-0550
of the plaintiff in establishing her status as a victim. We conclude, therefore, that Count IV of the
plaintiff’s complaint seeking a declaratory judgement fails to state a cause of action and was
properly dismissed by the circuit court.
¶ 20 The brief filed by the plaintiff in this case addresses only the dismissal of the claims for
mandamus and declaratory judgment pled against Dr. Arukumar. However, the circuit court’s
order states that the plaintiff’s action “is terminated in its entirety.” The plaintiff has made no
argument as to the propriety of the circuit court’s order as it relates to her claims against Dr. Ezike.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) provides that issues not argued in an
appellant’s brief are forfeited. The plaintiff, therefore, has forfeited any issue relating to the
propriety of the dismissal of her claims against Dr. Ezike. Forfeiture aside, we find that the claims
against Dr. Ezike set forth in Counts I and III of the plaintiff’s complaint fail to state causes of
action for the same reasons set forth above supporting our finding that the claims against Dr.
Arukumar failed to state causes of action.
¶ 21 Finally, the plaintiff argues that her action should not have been dismissed “with
prejudice,” and we should remand this matter to the circuit court with directions to allow her to
file an amended complaint. The decision of whether to allow a plaintiff to file an amended
complaint rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Lakeside Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Zale
Construction Company, 145 Ill. App. 3d 505, 509 (1986). A primary factor in determining whether
leave should be given to file an amended complaint is whether an amended complaint could cure
the defects in the dismissed complaint. Id.-8-
No. 1-20-0550
¶ 22 We believe that no cause of action could be pled against Dr. Arukumar or Dr. Ezike for
either mandamus or declaratory judgment based upon the facts alleged by the plaintiff in this case.
We find, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s action “with
prejudice” and did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s oral motion to file an amended
complaint.
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the March 10, 2020 judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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