People v. Campbell ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 171743-UFIFTH DIVISION
Order filed: February 5, 2021
No. 1-17-1743
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County
)
v. ) No. 99 CR 2341 (03)
)
)
RICHARD CAMPBELL, ) Honorable
) Carol M. Howard,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s pro se motion for leave to
file a successive petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (2016)), asserting claims under the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the Proportionate
Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). We held
that: (1) having been convicted and sentenced for a murder committed when he
was 19 years old, the supreme court’s decision in People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932foreclosed the defendant’s eighth amendment argument based upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) that his age and 50-
No. 1-17-1743
year sentence qualifies him for the sentencing protections afforded to juveniles; and
(2) the petition failed to allege facts in support of an as-applied violation of the
Proportionate Penalties Clause showing that the evolving science on maturity and
brain development applies to his specific facts and circumstances.
¶2 The defendant, Richard Campbell, appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his
motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition seeking relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)). For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
¶3 The defendant was charged with first degree murder as the result of the death of Terrance
Willis. The evidence at trial established that the defendant and his codefendant, Kijel Grant, fired
15 shots at Willis, who later died of his wounds. At the time of the shooting, the defendant was 19
years old. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to 50 years’ imprisonment. The defendant filed a direct appeal from his conviction and this court
affirmed. People v. Campbell, No. 1-01-2203 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). Subsequently, the defendant filed a pro se petition seeking relief under the Act. The trial
court dismissed the petition at the second stage of that proceeding. The defendant appealed the
petition’s dismissal, and this court affirmed. People v. Campbell, No. 1-09-1080 (2010)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶4 On March 23, 2011, the defendant filed his first pro se successive postconviction petition
alleging police coercion and that newly discovered evidence demonstrated his actual innocence.
The trial court dismissed the petition and the first stage of that proceeding. The defendant appealed
the dismissal, and this court affirmed. People v. Campbell, 2014 IL App (1st) 113074-U. On July
16, 2012, the defendant filed his second pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, postconviction counsel, and
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appellate counsel. The trial court denied his motion and this court affirmed. People v. Campbell,
No. 1-15-2501 (2017) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶5 On April 10, 2017, the defendant filed a third pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, attaching his affidavit in support. The defendant alleged, inter alia, that
his 50-year sentence for an offense committed when he was 19 years old violates both the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the Proportionate
Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). In support of his claims,
the defendant relied upon the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012), which addressed the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences for juveniles
and research showing that an individual’s brain is not fully developed at 19. He argued that, in
sentencing him to a de facto life sentence, the trial court failed to take into consideration his youth
and attendant characteristics. The defendant contends that the petition shows that his 19-year-old
brain was no different than that of a juvenile, and as a consequence, he was entitled to the same
sentencing protections that juveniles are entitled to under the holding in Miller. On May 30, 2017,
the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition,
and this appeal followed.
¶6 In urging reversal of the order denying him leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, the defendant argues only that his motion established both cause for and prejudice from
failing to raise constitutional challenges to his 50-year sentence under the eighth amendment to
the United States Constitution and the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution.
On the issue of cause for not raising as-applied constitutional challenges to his 50-year sentence
in his initial postconviction petition, the defendant argues that the authorities upon which he relies
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No. 1-17-1743
were not available when he filed his initial postconviction petition. On the question of prejudice,
the defendant asserts that the trial court sentenced him to a de facto life sentence without first
considering his youthfulness and its attendant characteristics. No other argument seeking reversal
is set forth in his brief, and as a consequence, any other basis for reversal of the trial court’s order
has been forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018).
¶7 Under the Act, a defendant may raise a claim of a constitutional violation in his trial or in
sentencing. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. The Act contemplates the filing of one
postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 2. Claims not raised in an initial petition are waived (Id. ¶ 21) unless
the defendant can show cause for and prejudice from failing to raise the claim in the earlier petition
or makes a colorable claim of actual innocence (People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42). The
Act defines “cause” as “an objective factor that impeded [the petitioner’s] ability to raise a specific
claim during his or her initial postconviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). To
establish “prejudice,” a petitioner must demonstrate that the claim not raised in an initial
postconviction proceeding “so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated
due process.” Id. Our review of the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction
petition is de novo. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39.
¶8 In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. Before sentencing a juvenile offender to life in
prison, the sentencing judge must have the opportunity to consider mitigating factors such as, inter
alia, the juvenile’s age, the juvenile’s family and home environment, the effects of familial or peer
pressure, and the possibility of rehabilitation. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78.
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¶9 Because the defendant was 19 years old when he murdered Willis, “Miller does not apply
directly to this circumstance.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45. “[Y]oung adult defendants
are not entitled to a presumption that Miller applies to them.” People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st)
163145, ¶ 52. In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 54-61, the supreme court set 18 as the age
cutoff for sentencing protections in the eighth amendment context. Consequently, the decision in
Harris foreclosed the defendant’s eighth amendment argument that his age and sentence qualify
him for the protections afforded to juveniles pursuant to the holding in Miller. However, the Harris
court left open the question of whether a defendant convicted and sentenced to a de facto life
sentence for a crime that was committed when he was 19 years old could raise an as-applied
challenge to his sentence under the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution,
which provides that “all penalties shall be determined according to the seriousness of the offense
and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §
11); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48. The supreme court in Harris held that such a claim is more
appropriately brought in a proceeding under the Act or by means of a petition pursuant to section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). Id.¶ 10 However, to satisfy the cause and prejudice prerequisites to the filing of a successive
postconviction petition, the defendant must submit enough documentation to allow a court to make
that determination. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. “[U]nder Harris, a young adult
defendant must plead and ultimately prove, that his or her individual characteristics require the
application of Miller.” Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52. In his motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition, the defendant was only required to plead facts justifying further
proceedings. Id. ¶ 55. At the motion stage, the allegations of fact in his motion and supporting
affidavit must be taken as true. Id. ¶ 59.
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No. 1-17-1743
¶ 11 The defendant was required to show “how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and
brain development that helped form the basis for the Miller decision applies to *** [his] specific
facts and circumstances.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46. Other than alleging that he was 19 years
old when he committed the murder for which he was convicted and sentenced to 50 years’
imprisonment, the successive postconviction petition that the defendant sought leave to file fails
to set forth any individual characteristics which, even arguably, require that the sentencing
protections set forth in Miller should apply to him. Having failed to allege facts showing that the
holding in Miller should apply to his particular circumstances, the successive postconviction
petition that the defendant sought leave to file is insufficient to support an as-applied challenge to
the defendant’s sentence under the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 12 Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant
leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 13 Affirmed.
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