In re A.A. ( 2021 )

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200544-UThis Order was filed under Supreme
FILED
Court Rule 23 and is not precedent NOS. 4-20-0544, 4-20-0546, 4-20-0547 cons. March 26, 2021
except in the limited circumstances Carla Bender
allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re A.A., a Minor ) Appeal from
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Adams County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 17JA57
v. (No. 4-20-0544) ) 17JA58
Audrianna P., )
Respondent-Appellant). )
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In re J.S., a Minor ) No. 17JA58
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
Petitioner-Appellee, )
v. (No. 4-20-0546) )
Audrianna P., )
Respondent-Appellant). )
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In re J.S., a Minor ) No. 17JA58
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
Petitioner-Appellee, )
v. (No. 4-20-0547) ) Honorable
Damon S., ) John C. Wooleyhan,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s fitness findings were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In July 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
respondent mother, Audrianna P., and respondent father, Damon S., as to their minor child, J.S.
(born June 30, 2017), and respondent mother’s parental rights as to her minor child, A.A. (born
November 7, 2013). Following a fitness hearing, the trial court found respondents unfit. In
October 2020, the court found it was in A.A.’s and J.S.’s best interest to terminate respondents’
parental rights.
¶3 Respondents appeal, asserting the trial court erred in finding respondents failed to
(1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of removal and (2) make
reasonable progress toward the return of the children to their care.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. Initial Proceedings
¶6 In August 2017, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging
A.A. and J.S. were neglected, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)
(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1) (West 2016)), in that J.S. was born at 31 weeks’ gestation, respondent
mother was “unable to provide for the minor’s feeding, diapering, clothing[,] and other needs as
a premature infant, even with prompting and reminders from hospital staff.” The petition further
alleged respondent father had not been active in caring for J.S., respondent mother had a history
of untreated mental health issues, and there was a prior intact case involving the same caregiving
concerns when A.A. was born. In May 2018, the trial court entered an order finding the minors
neglected. In June 2018, the court entered a dispositional order (1) finding respondents unfit and
unable to care for the minors, (2) making the minors wards of the court, and (3) placing custody
and guardianship of the minors with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶7 B. Termination Proceedings
¶8 In July 2019, the State filed a motion for the termination of parental rights,
alleging respondents failed to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the
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basis for the removal of the children and (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the
minors within any nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. The State alleged the
following specific nine-month periods: (1) May 11, 2018, to February 10, 2019; (2) February 11,
2019, to November 10, 2019; and (3) September 27, 2019, to June 26, 2020.
¶9 In June 2020, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the motion for termination of
parental rights. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of its own records
showing that visitation with respondents was suspended in June 2019. Further, the court took
judicial notice of the fact respondents never had unsupervised, overnight, or extended visitation.
The court heard the following evidence.
¶ 10 1. Deb Roberts
¶ 11 Deb Roberts, the director of the foster care program at Chaddock, testified she
supervised three caseworkers on the case. Roberts laid the foundation for the integrated
assessment and the service plan. According to Roberts, the assessment recommended
habilitation services because, although stable, the family’s house was inappropriate for the
children.
¶ 12 2. Gina Aschemann
¶ 13 Gina Aschemann, a former child welfare specialist with Chaddock, testified she
was assigned the case in September 2018. In December 2018, a service plan identified various
tasks for respondents to complete, including parenting classes, seeking employment, maintaining
adequate housing, obtaining mental health services, and cooperating. Respondent mother was
rated unsatisfactory for mental health services because she had not attended an appointment with
her psychiatrist since June, she was not taking medication as prescribed, and she was not
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involved in ongoing counseling services. Respondent father was rated unsatisfactory for mental
health services because he never completed a mental health evaluation.
¶ 14 Respondents were rated unsatisfactory for housing because their apartment was
dirty, there were bags of foul-smelling garbage in the house, there were holes in the walls, and
the refrigerator did not work. According to Aschemann, respondents then moved into a
one-bedroom apartment with a roommate. At the second apartment, Aschemann testified
respondents slept on a garbage covered mattress in the kitchen and there was nowhere to sit in
the living room because of bags of garbage.
¶ 15 Aschemann testified respondents were rated unsatisfactory for cooperation
because it was very difficult to schedule appointments, even though respondents would meet
with Aschemann if she called them on the day she wanted to go see respondents. On
cross-examination, Aschemann testified the service plan showed respondents were rated
satisfactory for cooperation.
¶ 16 Respondent mother completed a parenting class, but she required one-on-one
instruction to pass. Respondent mother was unable to implement the parenting skills during
visits. When visiting, respondents required prompts to provide appropriate meals, change
diapers, and monitor the children. Respondent mother was provided coaching services through a
visitation specialist and a “Birth to Three” program that was eventually placed on hold due to
lack of progress. Aschemann admitted a number of the visitation worker’s notes did not indicate
anyone else was present for the visit, but the visits were always supervised by the visitation
specialist. Respondent father completed a parenting program but required prompting to provide
age-appropriate discipline and games, and he allowed respondent mother to do the majority of
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the caretaking. Aschemann testified respondents were rated unsatisfactory for overall progress
toward the return of the children.
¶ 17 In a June 2019 service plan evaluation, respondents were again rated
unsatisfactory for housing because they continued to live in the one-bedroom apartment with a
roommate. Respondents indicated they were looking for a new place to live but failed to find a
new apartment. Respondents were not engaged in any mental health services. Respondent father
was rated unsatisfactory for cooperation because he failed to proactively provide information,
including information that he stopped working. Aschemann testified there were continued
concerns about respondents’ parenting skills and the “Parents as Teachers” program suspended
services due to lack of progress. The visitation specialist continued to prompt and assist
respondents with age-appropriate parenting.
¶ 18 In November 2018, Aschemann discussed the upcoming psychological
evaluations with respondents. Aschemann testified she asked respondents if they had concerns,
questions, or difficulties. Respondents were able to get to visits and never indicated a need for
bus passes, even though Aschemann offered passes. Aschemann recalled a conversation with
respondent father about claiming J.S. on his taxes. Aschemann testified, “He was angry when
the subject came up and I informed him that he would not be able to claim them. I believe he
told me that he was going to do it anyway and the—something to the effect of the government
can find him—can catch him.” Respondents did not inquire about the children’s well-being.
¶ 19 According to Aschemann, respondent mother was never employed, although she
had a job delivering papers before Aschemann received the case. Respondent father was
employed at a factory when Aschemann began working on the case, but he was fired after
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correcting a supervisor. Respondent father also briefly worked at the People’s Choice Thrift
Store.
¶ 20 3. Stacy Bucher
¶ 21 Stacy Bucher, a child welfare specialist with Chaddock, testified she was assigned
the case in July 2019. According to Bucher, the same service plans remained in effect in January
2020. In January 2020, Bucher rated respondents unsatisfactory for housing because they
continued to reside in the one-bedroom apartment with a roommate. Bucher rated respondents
unsatisfactory for parenting because visits had been suspended and they never inquired about the
children. Respondents were rated unsatisfactory for mental health services because neither
engaged in any services. Cooperation was also rated unsatisfactory because respondents failed to
contact Chaddock.
¶ 22 On February 5, 2020, Bucher had an in-person meeting with respondents.
Respondents were still residing in the one-bedroom apartment and Bucher observed “a big pile
of dead bugs and empty boxes stacked all over the kitchen.” Respondent mother reported the
landlord had been in to spray for “a severe roach problem and mice and *** bedbugs.” On
January 23, 2020, respondents told Bucher they had been working at McDonald’s for “several
weeks to a month.” At the February 5, 2020, meeting, respondent mother was no longer
employed. Respondent father was still employed but did not provide paycheck stubs for
verification.
¶ 23 The same service plan was in place for June 2020. Respondents were rated
unsatisfactory for housing because they continued to reside in the one-bedroom apartment.
Respondent mother failed to inform Bucher of a recent move to Payson, Illinois, to live with her
mother. Bucher rated respondents unsatisfactory for parenting, cooperation, and mental health
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services because they failed to contact Chaddock or engage in services, although respondent
mother had seen a psychiatrist.
¶ 24 4. Trial Court’s Order
¶ 25 Following the fitness hearing, the trial court held a separate best interest hearing.
In October 2020, the court entered an order finding respondents unfit due to their failure to
(1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the
children or (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to the parents within a
nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. The court further found it was in the best
interest of the children to terminate respondents’ parental rights.
¶ 26 This appeal followed. We docketed respondent mother’s appeal with respect to
A.A. as case No. 4-20-0544 and with respect to J.S. as case No. 4-20-0546. We docketed
respondent father’s appeal with respect to J.S. as case No. 4-20-0547. We have consolidated the
cases for review.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 On appeal, respondents assert the trial court erred by determining they failed to
(1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of removal and (2) make
reasonable progress toward the return of the children to their care.
¶ 29 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State has the burden of proving
parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. 3d 1057,
1067, 808 N.E.2d 596, 604 (2004). In making such a determination, the court considers whether
the parent’s conduct falls within one or more of the unfitness grounds described in section 1(D)
of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). Evidence supporting a finding of
unfitness on any ground enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)
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(West 2018)) is enough to support a finding of unfitness, even where the evidence may not
support an unfitness finding on another ground. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d
1105, 1113 (2002). A reviewing court will not overturn the trial court’s finding of unfitness
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. The
trial court’s decision is given great deference due to “its superior opportunity to observe the
witnesses and evaluate their credibility.” Id.¶ 30 In this case, the State alleged respondents were unfit on two grounds: they failed
to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the
children and (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors within any
nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. The State alleged the following three
specific nine-month periods: (1) May 11, 2018, to February 10, 2019; (2) February 11, 2019, to
November 10, 2019; and (3) September 27, 2019, to June 26, 2020. The trial court found
respondents unfit based on the allegations in the State’s petition.
¶ 31 On appeal, respondents contend the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We may affirm on any basis in the record, and we need not
review all the grounds for a finding of unfitness if we uphold the trial court’s findings as to one
ground of unfitness. See In re D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 751 N.E.2d 54, 61 (2001). As we find
the trial court’s finding as to reasonable progress dispositive, we begin there.
¶ 32 The trial court’s finding that respondents failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the minors within the following three specific nine-month periods: (1) May
11, 2018, to February 10, 2019; (2) February 11, 2019, to November 10, 2019; and
(3) September 27, 2019, to June 26, 2020, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Reasonable progress is measured by an objective standard that considers the progress made
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toward the goal of returning the child to the parent. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391, 757
N.E.2d 613, 617 (2001). Specifically, reasonable progress includes a parent’s compliance with
service plans and court directives, in light of the condition that gave rise to the removal of the
child. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1050 (2001).
¶ 33 Here, the children were taken into protective care after respondents failed to
demonstrate the ability to adequately care for J.S. following his premature birth. Respondent
mother also previously had an intact case following the birth of A.A., her older child. Over the
course of the nine-month periods the State specified, respondents were assigned numerous tasks,
including finding appropriate housing, seeking mental health services, and completing parenting
programs. Respondents never found appropriate housing. At the beginning of the nine-month
periods, respondents’ apartment was dirty, there were bags of foul-smelling garbage in the house,
there were holes in the walls, and the refrigerator did not work. Respondent thereafter moved
into a one-bedroom apartment with a roommate where they slept on a garbage-covered mattress
in the kitchen. Aschemann testified there was nowhere to sit in the living room because bags of
garbage covered all available surfaces. Respondents repeatedly stated they were looking for
more suitable housing but failed to follow through. In February 2020, respondents were still
residing in the one-bedroom apartment with a roommate, and the landlord had recently treated
the premises for a severe problem with roaches, mice, and bedbugs.
¶ 34 In addition to their failure to make reasonable progress toward appropriate
housing, respondent mother failed to engage in mental health services. Although she attended
one appointment with a psychiatrist in January 2020, she did not engage in any follow up
services or counseling, and she had a history of failing to take her medications as prescribed.
Respondent father failed to engage in any mental health services.
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¶ 35 Moreover, respondents were provided with parenting services, including
one-on-one education and visitation specialists supervising their visits. Respondents completed a
parenting class but were unable to implement the parenting skills during visits. When visiting,
respondents required prompts to provide appropriate meals, change diapers, and monitor the
children. Respondent mother was provided coaching services through a visitation specialist and
a “Birth to Three” program that was eventually placed on hold due to lack of progress.
Respondent father required prompting to provide age-appropriate discipline and games, and he
allowed respondent mother to do the majority of the caretaking.
¶ 36 Respondents assert only three visits were attended by a parenting coach and,
therefore, the State failed to provide adequate services. However, Aschemann admitted a
number of the visitation worker’s notes did not indicate anyone else was present for the visit but
the visits were always supervised by the visitation specialist. The very fact there were visitation
worker’s notes indicated the specialist was there and simply was not listed as another person
present at the visit.
¶ 37 During the nine-month periods that stretched from May 2018 to June 2020,
respondents failed to make any significant progress toward the return of the children. Their
housing was inappropriate, and despite repeated assurances they were seeking adequate housing,
they never moved to a new apartment or cleaned up the present apartment. Additionally,
respondents failed to engage in mental health services and failed to make progress toward
appropriate parenting skills. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court’s finding that
respondents failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Respondents do not challenge the court’s best-interest findings.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.
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¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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