Robinson v. Village of Sauk Village , 2021 IL App (1st) 200223 ( 2021 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2021.12.27
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Robinson v. Village of Sauk Village, 2021 IL App (1st) 200223Appellate Court JAVIER ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF
Caption SAUK VILLAGE, THE VILLAGE OF CRETE, MARK BUGAJSKI,
ANDREW VAUGHAN, ALLEN RINCHICH and JUAN GARCIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. First District, Fifth Division
No. 1-20-0223
Filed April 9, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-L-002000; the
Review Hon. Melissa A. Durkin, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Kevin O’Connor and Cameron J. Tober, of O’Connor Law Firm, Ltd.,
Appeal of Chicago, for appellant.
Timothy C. Lapp, of Hiskes, Dillner, O’Donnell, Marovich & Lapp,
Ltd., of South Holland, for appellees Village of Sauk Village, Mark
Bugajski, and Andrew Vaughan.
Patrick H. O’Connor, of Hartigan & O’Connor P.C., of Chicago, for
other appellees.
John K. Kennedy and Daniel Watkins II, of Kennedy Watkins LLC,
of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
Panel JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The plaintiff, Javier Robinson, filed the instant action against the defendants, the Village
of Sauk Village, the Village of Crete, Officer Mark Bugajski, Officer Andrew Vaughan,
Officer Allen Rinchich, and Officer Juan Garcia, seeking damages for injuries he sustained
when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Mark Coffey, who was fleeing from the police. 1
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, and the plaintiff
has appealed. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
remand the matter for further proceedings.
¶2 The plaintiff filed a six-count complaint, charging the individual defendants with willful
and wanton conduct that proximately resulted in the injuries he sustained when he was struck
by Coffey’s vehicle. The complaint also sought recovery from the two village defendants under
the doctrine of respondeat superior by reason of the actions of their respective individual
defendant-employees. The Village of Sauk Village, Bugajski, and Vaughan (collectively the
Sauk Village defendants) answered the plaintiff’s complaint, denying the material allegations
of willful and wanton conduct. The Village of Crete, Rinchich, and Garcia (collectively the
Village of Crete defendants) answered the plaintiff’s complaint, denying the material
allegations of willful and wanton conduct and raising seven affirmative defenses, including
immunities under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2016)). Thereafter, the Sauk Village
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Bugajski and Vaughan asserted immunity
under section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act (id. § 2-202), arguing that their actions did not
rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct, a lack of proximate cause, and immunity under
section 4-106 of the Tort Immunity Act (id. § 4-106). The Village of Sauk Village asserted
immunity under section 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act (id. § 2-109). The Village of Crete
defendants also moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under sections 4-106 and
2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act. Garcia also asserted immunity under section 2-201 of the Tort
Immunity Act (id. § 2-201). On January 9, 2020, the circuit court granted the defendants’
motions for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
¶3 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018).
The driver of the fleeing vehicle is referred to in the record both as Mark Coffey and Mark Coffee.
1
Throughout this opinion he is referred to as Mark Coffey.
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Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill.
2d 402, 411 (1993). In conducting that review, we have examined all of the pleadings and
evidentiary material on file at the time of the entry of the orders appealed from in their light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 Ill. 2d 388, 398 (1980). From that
evidentiary material taken with its inferences most favorable to the plaintiff (see Lapidot v.
Memorial Medical Center, 144 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147 (1986)), we adduce the following facts
relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
¶4 On August 10, 2017, Rinchich, Officer Patrick Hoernig, and Garcia were working the 6
p.m. to 6 a.m. shift as police officers for the Village of Crete. Rinchich and Hoernig were patrol
officers; Garcia was a sergeant and the officer in charge. While patrolling, Rinchich heard a
radio dispatch of a recently stolen black Buick LaCrosse (hereinafter referred to as the black
Buick), and soon thereafter, he saw what he believed to be the stolen black Buick traveling in
the opposite direction. Rinchich made a U-turn in his patrol car and began following the black
Buick. After following behind the vehicle for approximately a quarter of a mile, Rinchich
activated the flashing lights on his patrol car in an effort to cause the vehicle to stop. After
Rinchich activated the flashing lights on his patrol car, the black Buick being driven by Coffey
sped up. Rinchich gave chase and radioed Hoernig and Garcia, informing them that the black
Buick would not stop. Garcia and Hoernig joined in the chase behind Rinchich. Coffey, driving
the black Buick, led the officers through multiple jurisdictions at high rates of speed, at times
upwards of 90 miles per hour, disregarding traffic signals and into oncoming traffic. The black
Buick came to a stop in a churchyard in Dyer, Indiana. Upon entering the churchyard in pursuit,
Rinchich positioned his patrol car perpendicular to the black Buick with the headlights of the
patrol car shining on the driver’s side. Rinchich exited his patrol car with his weapon drawn
and yelled “hands” at Coffey. When Garcia and Hoernig arrived, they placed their patrol cars
adjacent to and behind Rinchich’s vehicle. Both officers exited their vehicles with their
weapons drawn.
¶5 Bugajski and Vaughan, police officers in the Village of Sauk Village, were eating in the
Sauk Village police station when they heard a radio dispatch that police officers from the
Village of Crete were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle. Both officers got into their respective patrol
cars and drove to the area where the radio dispatch indicated that the pursuit was heading.
Before Bugajski and Vaughan could locate the pursuit, they were advised that it had passed
out of Sauk Village. The two officers continued to monitor their radios as they patrolled in
Sauk Village until they heard a subsequent radio broadcast that the pursuit was heading back
into Sauk Village. The officers drove toward Steger Road and Torrence, where they could see
flashing lights in the distance. The next radio broadcast stated that the fleeing black Buick was
heading in the direction of a church parking lot on Steger Road in Dyer, Indiana. Bugajski
proceeded to the church parking lot, where he observed the three patrol cars from the Village
of Crete and the three officers from the Village of Crete, Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig, out
of their patrol cars with their weapons drawn and pointed at Coffey, who was seated in the
black Buick with its engine running.
¶6 Rinchich got no closer than 10 or 15 feet from the black Buick. Coffey remained in the
vehicle with the engine running and never opened the door of the car. One minute and nineteen
seconds after Rinchich arrived in the church parking lot, Coffey put the black Buick in gear
and drove off. Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig followed in pursuit. Bugajski, along with
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Vaughan, who had arrived in the church parking lot after the black Buick drove off, monitored
the chase on the radio, blocked off intersections, and at times joined in the pursuit.
¶7 The black Buick driven by Coffey reentered Illinois with Rinchich, Garcia, and Hoernig in
pursuit. The black Buick and the pursuing officers were traveling at high rates of speed, which
at times were upwards of 100 miles per hour, disregarding traffic signals and into oncoming
traffic. The chase traveled through a residential neighborhood, where Coffey exited the black
Buick, got into another vehicle, and drove off. After Coffey switched cars, Vaughan began
pursuing that vehicle with Hoernig and Garcia following. As the vehicle in which Coffey was
traveling sped through the intersection of 221st Street and Sauk Trail, it struck the plaintiff,
who was walking across the street in a crosswalk. Coffey continued to flee, returning to Indiana
where he was shot and killed by a local police officer. The plaintiff was taken to a hospital in
an ambulance.
¶8 On January 9, 2020, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. In its oral ruling, the circuit court found that the defendants were immune from
liability under section 4-106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that neither a local
public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping
prisoner. See 745 ILCS 10/4-106 (West 2016). The circuit court reasoned that, at the point in
time that the police officers pointed their guns at Coffey as he sat in the black Buick in the
church parking lot, he was in custody, as no reasonable person in his position would have felt
free to leave, and that, when he struck the plaintiff, he was an escaping prisoner. Following the
hearing, the circuit court entered a written order, granting both the Sauk Village defendants’
motion for summary judgment and the Village of Crete defendants’ motion for summary
judgment “for the reasons stated on the record.”
¶9 In urging reversal of the summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants, the
plaintiff argues that, at the time he was struck, Coffey was not an escaped or escaping prisoner
and, as a consequence, the defendants are not immune from liability under section 4-106 of the
Tort Immunity Act. He contends that Coffey “was not in custody in the church parking lot as
there was no limitation on his freedom of movement before he fled from the lot.”
¶ 10 Section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act provides, in relevant part: “Neither a local
public entity nor a public employee is liable for: *** (b) Any injury inflicted by an escaped or
escaping prisoner.” Id. § 4-106(b). A prisoner is defined as “a person held in custody.” Id. § 4-
101. It follows then that an individual cannot escape unless he is first in custody. People v.
Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 259 (2005). The Tort Immunity Act does not define the term
“custody.”
¶ 11 The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the legislature. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001). In construing any statute, the
inquiry begins with the language of the statute. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997)
(citing People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1988)). When, as in this case, the legislature does
not define a term used in a statute, we look to other sources for its plain and ordinary meaning.
People ex rel. Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 572 (2002).
¶ 12 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “custody” as “judicial or penal
safekeeping: control of a thing or person with such actual or constructive possession as fulfills
the purpose of the law or duty requiring it: imprisonment or durance of persons or charge of
things.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 559 (1993). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “custody” in general as “[t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection,
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preservation, or security.” Black’s Law Dictionary 412 (8th ed. 2004). Custody can be either
physical or constructive. See Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 253-54. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“physical custody” as “[c]ustody of a person (such as an arrestee) whose freedom is directly
controlled and limited.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1183 (8th ed. 2004). “Constructive custody”
is defined as “[c]ustody of a person (such as a parolee or probationer) whose freedom is
controlled by legal authority but who is not under direct physical control.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 412 (8th ed. 2004).
¶ 13 In Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205 (2011), the supreme court was called upon to
determine whether an individual was an escaping prisoner within the meaning of section 4-
106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Although the supreme court found no necessity to determine
how broad the term “custody” may be, it found that the subject individual was in custody, as
his freedom of movement had been directly controlled and limited, and that a reasonable person
in his position would not feel free to leave. Id. at 217.
¶ 14 In Ries, an individual who was suspected of having fled from the scene of a traffic accident
was placed in the back seat of a squad car by a Chicago police officer. It was at this point that
the supreme court found that the individual was in custody. Id. After being left unattended in
the rear seat of the squad car, the individual climbed into the front seat and drove away. While
being pursued by the police, he collided with the vehicle in which the plaintiffs were riding.
Id. at 208. On those facts, the supreme court concluded that the individual was an escaped or
escaping prisoner and, as a consequence, the City of Chicago was immune from liability for
the plaintiffs’ injuries under section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. at 217.
¶ 15 Also of significance is this court’s decision in Townsend v. Anderson, 2019 IL App (1st)
180771. In Townsend, two Chicago police officers stopped a vehicle that was occupied by four
men, two in the front seat and two in the rear. Id. ¶ 3. The two officers approached the vehicle,
one from the driver’s side and one from the passenger side. Id. ¶ 31. The driver was ordered
out of the vehicle and placed in handcuffs. The front seat passenger was also ordered out of
the vehicle. As one of the officers was attempting to handcuff the front seat passenger, one of
the rear seat passengers jumped into the front seat and was trying to put the vehicle in gear
when the other officer grabbed at him. The man was able to elude the officer’s attempts to
restrain him, put the vehicle in gear, and drive off. One of the officers relayed what had
occurred over the radio, giving a description of the fleeing vehicle and its direction of travel.
Id. ¶ 6. The two officers did not pursue the fleeing vehicle; they remained at the scene where
they had handcuffed the driver and front seat passenger. The two men in the fleeing vehicle
were taken into custody about 5 minutes later after the fleeing vehicle had struck a vehicle in
which the plaintiff was a passenger. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7. The plaintiff filed suit against the City of
Chicago, the police officers involved in the initial traffic stop, and the police officers who
subsequently apprehended the driver of the fleeing vehicle. Id. ¶ 1. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from liability. The circuit court
granted the motion, finding that the defendants were immune from liability pursuant to the
provisions of section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. On appeal, this court affirmed,
holding that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an escaping prisoner within the meaning of
section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. ¶ 34. In so holding, this court reasoned that the
passengers in the vehicle stopped by the police officers “would not have reasonably felt free
to leave the scene of that stop” (id. ¶ 32) and that the positioning of the officers on both sides
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of the stopped vehicle “effectively curtailed *** [the passengers’] freedom of movement” (id.
¶ 31).
¶ 16 In both Ries and Townsend, the individual who was found to have been an escaping
prisoner was determined to have been in custody before fleeing, as he would not have
reasonably felt free to leave and his freedom of movement had been directly controlled and
limited: in Ries when the individual was placed in the rear seat of a squad car and in Townsend
when the two police officers took up positions on both sides of the vehicle in which the
individual was riding. In this case, the plaintiff argues that, although a reasonable person in
Coffey’s position would not have reasonably felt free to leave when he was confronted in the
church parking lot by multiple police officers with guns drawn, he was not in custody, as the
police never controlled or limited his freedom of movement. The defendants argue that
Coffey’s freedom of movement was curtailed, controlled, or limited when the police officers
in the church parking lot displayed their guns and shouted commands. According to the
defendants, “[t]he curtailing of freedom of movement sufficient to establish ‘custody’ for
purposes of section 4-106(b) [of the Tort Immunity Act] is accomplished by physical restraint
or a show of authority.”
¶ 17 Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, we do not believe that a mere show of authority is
sufficient to establish physical custody. If the defendants were correct, then every individual
who runs from a pursuing police officer would be deemed in custody and, as a consequence,
an escaping prisoner. We find no support for such a proposition.
¶ 18 The facts of record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that,
although a reasonable person in Coffey’s position at the time that he was confronted in the
church parking lot by multiple police officers with guns drawn would not have reasonably felt
free to leave, his freedom of movement had not been controlled or limited. He was seated in
the black Buick with the engine running, the police officers had not taken up positions that
prevented him from exiting the vehicle on both the driver’s side and the passenger’s side, and
the officers’ patrol cars had not been parked in such a position so as to restrict the black Buick’s
movement either forward or in reverse. Stated otherwise, the evidence in the record does not
establish, as a matter of law, that Coffey was in the physical custody of the officers when he
fled the church parking lot; his freedom of movement had not been directly controlled or
limited.
¶ 19 In further support of their argument that Coffey was an escaping prisoner at the time that
he struck the plaintiff, the defendants rely on an allegation in the plaintiff’s complaint, which
states that “the stolen vehicle was being driven by Mark Coffey, now deceased, who, on
information and belief, was wearing an ankle monitor” and an exhibit attached to the Crete
defendants’ motion for summary judgment reflecting that Coffey was on mandatory supervised
release and that states “DO NOT ATTEMPT TO SEARCH, DETAIN OR ARREST SOLELY
ON THIS RECORD.” Relying on the supreme court’s holding in Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, the
defendants conclude that “Coffey was an escapee, he was escaping custody when he was out
stealing cars while subject to electronic monitoring.”
¶ 20 In Campa, the supreme court found that a defendant who was transferred to the Cook
County Sheriff’s Day Reporting Center while he was awaiting trial (id. at 245-46) was in
custody within the meaning of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)), as
significant restraints were placed on his liberty (Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 255). Terms and
conditions for the defendant’s participation in the day reporting center program included the
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requirement that he report to the day reporting center as scheduled. Id. at 246. The supreme
court noted that, although the conditions of the day reporting center program are not as onerous
as the conditions of confinement in a correctional institution, the day reporting center program,
nevertheless, is a form of restraint that falls within the broad meaning of the term “custody.”
Id. at 254.
¶ 21 It appears that the defendants are arguing that, by virtue of the fact that Coffey was on
supervised release and wearing an ankle monitor when he struck the plaintiff, he was an
escaped or escaping prisoner within at the meaning of section 4-106 of the Tort Immunity Act.
The flaw in the argument is the absence of any evidence in the record supporting the
proposition that Coffey had escaped, or was escaping, from the constructive custody of
correctional authorities when he fled from the police in a stolen vehicle and struck the plaintiff.
¶ 22 Summary judgment is to be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018).
Based on the foregoing analysis, we find that the defendants failed to meet their burden of
establishing as a matter of law that, when he struck the plaintiff, Coffey was an escaped, or
escaping, prisoner. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants based upon the immunity afforded under section 4-106 of
the Tort Immunity Act.
¶ 23 This court may, however, affirm the judgment of the circuit court on any basis that appears
in the record, regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon that basis or whether the circuit
court’s reasoning was correct. Retirement Plan for Chicago Transit Authority Employees v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 2020 IL App (1st) 182510, ¶ 34. As appellees, the defendants may
“urge any point in support of the judgment on appeal, even though not directly ruled on by the
trial court, so long as the factual basis for such point was before the trial court.” Shaw v. Lorenz,
42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969). The defendants have argued their entitlement to summary judgment
on a number of other grounds, which we will address in turn.
¶ 24 The defendants argue that they are immune from liability for the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff under section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2016)),
which provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution
or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.”
Although the Crete defendants assert that Rinchich and Garcia were not in the execution or
enforcement of any law at the time that Coffey struck the plaintiff, they, like the Sauk Village
defendants, argue that their actions in the pursuit of the vehicles driven by Coffey did not rise
to the level of willful and wanton conduct.
¶ 25 The Tort Immunity Act defines willful and wanton conduct as “a course of action which
shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an
utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.” Id. § 1-
210. Whether conduct is willful and wanton is ultimately a question of fact for the jury. Doe v.
Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 390 (1994).
¶ 26 There are undisputed facts in this case that could support a finding of willful and wanton
conduct on the part of the individual defendants. Those include the nature of the area of the
pursuit, which included suburban, residential, and commercial areas; the fact that the pursuit
took place in both Illinois and Indiana; the duration of the pursuit; the fact that the vehicles
driven by Coffey traveled at speeds upwards of 100 miles per hour, disregarded traffic signals,
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and drove into oncoming traffic; and the fact that Coffey was suspected only of driving stolen
vehicles, nonviolent, property-based felonies.
¶ 27 We find that under the specific facts of this case there exists a jury question as to whether
the individual defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct in pursuing the vehicles
driven by Coffey, precluding summary judgment based on the immunity afforded public
employees under section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act. See Suwanski v. Village of Lombard,
342 Ill. App. 3d 248, 256-58 (2003).
¶ 28 Next, the defendants argue that the actions of the individual defendants in pursuing the
vehicles driven by Coffey were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. They argue
that Coffey’s actions of stealing cars, fleeing from the police, and disregarding traffic and
criminal laws “alone” cased the plaintiff’s injuries.
¶ 29 The issue of proximate cause is ordinarily determined by the trier of fact. Lee v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992). However, where the facts are undisputed and
reasonable people would not differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts, proximate
cause may be determined as a matter of law. Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit
School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 476 (2001) (Harrison, J., specially concurring). In Lee
v. Chicago Transit Authority, the supreme court held that the term “proximate cause” describes
two distinct requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455. Cause in fact
exists where there is a reasonable certainty that a defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.
Id. “A defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury only if that conduct is a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” First Springfield Bank
& Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999) (citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455). “A defendant’s
conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about an injury if, absent that
conduct, the injury would not have occurred.” Id. Legal cause is a question of foreseeability.
Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456. The relevant inquiry is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable
person would see as a likely result of his conduct. Id.¶ 30 Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a defendant’s conduct was a substantial
factor in bringing about a plaintiff’s injury, there is a question for the jury to decide. Id. at 455.
There may be more than one proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. Suwanski, 342 Ill. App.
3d at 255.
¶ 31 As to factual causation, there can be little doubt that reasonable minds could differ as to
whether the individual defendants pursuing the vehicles driven by Coffey in the manner that
they did was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the collision with the
plaintiff. As noted by the court in Suwanski:
“A police pursuit is unique in the sense that it can occur only if two vehicles are
involved, the car that is fleeing and the car that is chasing. It is essentially symbiotic;
both vehicles are necessary to have a chase. Thus, from the standpoint of causation in
fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, under the facts of this case, to separate the two in
terms of causation. Of course, a jury may very well conclude that both drivers were the
proximate cause of the harm.” Id. at 255-56.
¶ 32 As for legal causation, we believe that a jury could reasonably find that, by chasing the
vehicles driven by Coffey at high rates of speed through residential and commercial suburban
streets, knowing that he was disregarding traffic signals and driving into oncoming traffic, the
individual defendants should have reasonably anticipated that Coffey’s conduct and his hitting
and injuring a third party were the natural and probable result of their own conduct in pursuing
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Coffey under these particular conditions. See id. at 256; see also Freeman v. City of Chicago,
2017 IL App (1st) 153644, ¶¶ 46-48.
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we conclude that there exist genuine issues of fact precluding
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the question of whether the actions of the
individual defendants were a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
¶ 34 Section 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act provides that “[a] local public entity is not liable
for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not
liable.” 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2016). Having found that the individual defendants were not
entitled to summary judgment due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact, it follows
that their employers, the Village of Crete and the Village of Sauk Village, were not entitled to
summary judgment.
¶ 35 We reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants and remand this
matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.
¶ 36 Reversed and remanded.
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