People v. Brakes ( 2021 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2022.05.16
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People v. Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption TARIK BRAKES, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, First Division
No. 1-18-1737
Filed August 30, 2021
Modified upon
denial of rehearing September 20, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 15-CR-990(01),
Review 17-CR-09666, 17-CR-09667; the Hon. Timothy Joseph Joyce, Judge,
presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Adrienne N. River, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg
and Daniel Piwowarczyk, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for
the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Pierce and Coghlan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In three separate indictments, the State charged Tarik Brakes with armed robbery of
Reginald Williams and Steve Martin, attempted armed robbery of Demacio Bailey and
Demario Bailey, and first degree murder for the shooting death of Demario. Three other
codefendants—Isaiah Penn, Carlos Johnson, and Tarik’s brother, Deafro Brakes—were
charged with similar offenses. During Tarik’s jury trial, the trial court allowed the State to
introduce a photo of him, taken two months before the charged offenses, showing Tarik
holding a gun next to Johnson, who is contorting his hands in what Johnson’s counsel described
as a gang sign. After hearing the remaining evidence against Tarik, the jury found him guilty
on all relevant charges. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 45 years in prison.
¶2 Tarik challenges the admission of the photograph of him with Johnson, arguing (i) it was
irrelevant, (ii) it served as a back door for prejudicial gang evidence, and (iii) whether relevant
or not, it was more prejudicial than probative. We agree with Tarik that the photograph was
irrelevant because the State provided no link between the photograph and the charged offenses.
But we find the error in admitting the photo harmless. The State introduced the photograph
through one witness and never mentioned it again. Moreover, the evidence against Tarik was
strong enough to override any possible effect the photograph may have had on the jury.
¶3 Tarik, a minor at the time of the offenses, also challenges his sentence. First, after People
v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, his 45-year sentence is an unconstitutional de facto life sentence
that the trial court did not intend to impose. And secondly, if his sentence is constitutional,
then the truth-in-sentencing law requiring him to serve 100% of his first degree murder
sentence is not. The State agrees that the trial court did not intend to impose a life sentence but
argues that, because Tarik is entitled to good-conduct credit for the attempted armed robbery
offenses, he will only serve 39 of 45 years under Buffer’s 40-year ceiling. This court has
repeatedly rejected the State’s request to consider good-conduct credit in this context (People
v. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308), but after oral argument, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, and overruled Peacock and its progeny. See id. ¶ 1
(“a statutory scheme that affords a juvenile an opportunity to be released from prison after
serving 40 years or less of the term imposed does not constitute a de facto life sentence”).
¶4 Now bound by Dorsey, we conclude Tarik did not receive a de facto life sentence, and his
constitutional challenge to the term of years of his sentence must fail. Dorsey also undermines
Tarik’s as-applied challenge to the statutory sentencing scheme requiring him to serve 100%
of his 33-year first degree murder sentence. He argues the mandatory scheme violates Miller
because it does not give him a chance to demonstrate rehabilitation before the term of his
sentence expires. Dorsey reaffirms the principle that the relevant sentencing scheme need only
provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation before he spends more than 40 years in prison.” (Emphasis added and internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 65. Nothing requires the General Assembly to guarantee an
opportunity for release before 40 years. See id. ¶¶ 53-54. Adding on the consecutive sentences
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for which he may receive good time credit, his sentence still falls below Buffer’s 40-year line.
¶5 Background
¶6 Because Tarik does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we briefly
recount the narrative of the offenses, including detail relevant to our analysis.
¶7 Tarik, Deafro, Johnson, and Penn met at Tarik’s house. There, they discussed committing
robberies. Tarik had a “block gun,” a semiautomatic .380-caliber handgun that anyone on the
block could use. The group went to a viaduct on 63rd Street in Chicago.
¶8 Once there, the group robbed Williams. A boy, eventually identified as Tarik, pointed a
gun at him and members of the group took Williams’s phone and some money. The group then
crossed the viaduct and robbed Martin. Martin also identified Tarik as the person who pulled
out a gun and took Martin’s phone from his pocket. After taking the phone, the group left but
came back briefly to have Martin unlock his phone.
¶9 Two members of the group then came up to Demario and Demacio, who were walking
together through the viaduct. One of the group grabbed Demario, and the other grabbed
Demacio. Demario was able to break free and hit the person holding Demacio. A boy wearing
a camouflage jacket walked up, and a gunshot went off. Demario fell to the ground and later
died from a gunshot wound. Penn, one of the codefendants, testified that Tarik shot Demario.
¶ 10 Mercedes Austin and Ciera Wilson were walking on 63rd Street near the viaduct when they
saw a group of four boys running from the viaduct. Though neither could see their faces, Austin
said one of the boys wore a camouflage jacket. Of the offenders who robbed Martin, he
described the one with the gun as having a chipped tooth and wearing a camouflage jacket.
Williams described his gun-wielding assailant similarly—having a chipped tooth and black
camouflage pants and jacket.
¶ 11 Williams and Martin both went to a nearby gas station after the robberies. Police eventually
arrived with Johnson and a man named Jermaine Jones for a show-up identification. Williams
identified both as involved in the robbery—one took his phone and one had the gun. Martin
only identified Johnson as a robbery participant. Sergeant Shawn Ryan later had Williams view
a lineup containing Johnson and Jones. Williams again identified them, but Jones was later
released because “it was determined he was excluded as a suspect.” In a separately conducted
photo array, Williams signed his name and identified Tarik as the person who held the gun and
had a chipped tooth. Martin also viewed a photo array; he identified Tarik as the person with
the chipped tooth. Demacio also viewed several photo arrays but was unable to identify, though
he did point out Tarik in court.
¶ 12 Shortly after Demario’s murder, Demacio identified Tracy Norwood, David Phillips, and
Leshawn Norwood as three of the offenders. Officers obtained security footage from a nearby
high-rise residence, which showed the three leaving the elevator at various times more than 30
minutes after the robberies and murder. The three were never charged.
¶ 13 During Penn’s testimony, which largely corroborated the victims’, the State attempted to
admit a Facebook photo showing Tarik and Johnson together. The trial court had earlier denied
Tarik’s motion in limine seeking to exclude the photo. It shows Tarik holding a gun that is
pointing toward the camera. Tarik stands next to Johnson, who is manipulating his hands in a
way that Johnson’s counsel argued was a gang sign. The photo was posted about two months
before the robberies and murder. The trial court allowed Penn to testify about the photo, and
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he identified both Tarik and Johnson. He then explained that Tarik was holding a different type
of gun than the murder weapon.
¶ 14 The only physical evidence recovered was a .380-caliber shell casing that had been ejected
from a semiautomatic firearm. The gun was never found.
¶ 15 The jury found Tarik guilty of Demario’s murder, attempted armed robbery of Demario,
and armed robbery of both Martin and Williams. Tarik filed a motion for a new trial, arguing,
in part, that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the Facebook photo. The trial
court denied the motion.
¶ 16 After hearing evidence and arguments at sentencing, the trial court found that “nobody set
out to murder Demario Bailey or anyone else.” The court added that “evidence for
rehabilitation is not insubstantial,” given Tarik’s and Johnson’s strides in pursuing an
education while incarcerated. The court avoided a de facto life sentence by declining to impose
a discretionary firearm enhancement on Tarik. Instead, the trial court sentenced Tarik to a 33-
year prison sentence for first degree murder. That sentence had to run consecutively with a six-
year sentence for attempted armed robbery, which also had to run consecutively with two
concurrent six-year sentences for armed robbery. Tarik’s aggregate sentence, then, is 45 years.
The trial court denied Tarik’s motion to reconsider his sentence—in part on eighth amendment
grounds.
¶ 17 Analysis
¶ 18 Tarik challenges his conviction on one ground: the trial court erroneously admitted the
Facebook photograph from two months before the offenses showing Tarik with a gun and
Johnson flashing an alleged gang sign. We agree the photograph is irrelevant, and so the trial
court erred in admitting it. The error was harmless, however, given the State’s limited use of
the photograph and the otherwise sufficient evidence.
¶ 19 As to his sentence, Dorsey instructs us that Tarik did not receive a de facto life sentence,
and his constitutional challenge fails.
¶ 20 Photographic Evidence
¶ 21 Tarik argues the trial court erroneously admitted a photograph showing him holding a gun
next to Johnson who appears to be making an alleged gang sign with his hands. Tarik claims
the photograph is irrelevant because no trial evidence connected the gun shown to the gun used
in the offense. He also contends the photo was unduly prejudicial, as it shows Tarik behaving
in a “menacing” way and implies his and Johnson’s membership in a gang. We agree the
photograph is irrelevant to the State’s case and admitting it into evidence was error. But the
error was harmless.
¶ 22 Relevant evidence is admissible unless more prejudicial than probative. People v. Starks,
2014 IL App (1st) 121169, ¶ 60. Relevant evidence tends to “make any fact of consequence to
the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. We review a trial
court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 262 Ill. App. 3d 808,
819 (1994).
¶ 23 Evidence that a defendant possessed a physical object is admissible if “there is proof to
connect it to the defendant and to the crime charged.” Id. at 821 (citing People v. Free, 94 Ill.
2d 378, 415 (1983)). Both connections are required, though it is enough that the physical
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evidence be “suitable for the commission of the crime.” Id. No one disputes that Tarik is the
person in the photograph holding a gun. But, the parties disagree about the sufficiency of the
connection between the gun in the photograph and the gun Tarik used during the robberies and
murder.
¶ 24 The State offers several reasons on relevancy, but none stand up to scrutiny. First, the State
claims the photo shows Tarik and Johnson “had the kind of relationship that would extend to
shared participation in the charged offenses.” The State relies on People v. Manuel, 294 Ill.
App. 3d 113 (1997), which is distinguishable. There, we upheld as relevant a series of previous
drug transactions between the defendant and a buyer that were “not part of the same episode”
under review. Id. at 124. True, we said the evidence was relevant to show the willing “illicit
relationship” between the defendant and his buyer but because the defendant had attempted to
argue that he had been “ ‘ensnared’ ” into selling drugs. Id. Evidence of the previous
relationship also explained why the defendant had delivered additional narcotics beyond the
previously agreed-to amount. Id.¶ 25 The photograph here serves no similar explanatory function. Witnesses testified that both
Tarik and Johnson participated in the relevant offenses. Penn, one of the codefendants, testified
about how the plan to commit robberies came to be. Unlike Williams, where the defendant
made allusions to entrapment and delivered an otherwise unexplainable amount of drugs, here
the jury did not need help reconciling contradictions or seemingly unexplainable portions of
the State’s case. The narrative was straightforward: a group of teenagers planned to commit,
and did commit, robberies and killed one of their victims as they did so. Absent a claim of
other crimes—a theory the State disavows—what Tarik was doing two months before, and
with whom, made no fact in consequence more or less probable.
¶ 26 The State also claims the photograph “corroborated the identifications of [Tarik] as the
gunman.” We fail to see how. That Tarik possessed a gun two months before the shooting says
nothing about the witnesses’ ability to accurately identify the shooter they saw. Tarik’s gun
possession says similarly little about whether he would use a gun to commit a crime. In People
v. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 52, on which the State relies, we upheld the admission
of evidence of uncharged crimes where the defendant had previously brandished or fired a gun
of the same caliber as the gun he fired during the offense under review.
¶ 27 Nothing in the photo of Tarik holding a gun suggests he had, or would ever, use a gun in
the manner required to commit robbery or murder. We also reject the State’s argument that the
similarity in weapon types between the gun in the photo and the gun Tarik used in the robberies
and murder bolsters the photo’s relevance. Unlike Hensley, no evidence was adduced on its
caliber, and unlike Hensley, Penn testified the gun in the photo was not the gun used in the
shooting. All we have is visual similarity and the description of both guns as “semiautomatic.”
These comparisons are too broad to be probative.
¶ 28 Having found the photo irrelevant, we conclude it was inadmissible. Accordingly, we need
not determine whether it contains improper gang evidence or whether the trial court’s prejudice
analysis was improperly truncated. Because Tarik preserved this claim of error, we turn instead
to the question of whether the error in admitting the photo was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. E.g., People v. Donahue, 2014 IL App (1st) 120163, ¶ 109. The State bears the burden
to show that it was. Id.¶ 29 An error can be harmless (i) where the error did not contribute to defendant’s conviction,
(ii) where the other evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant’s conviction, or (iii) where
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the excluded evidence would have been duplicative or cumulative. People v. Lerma, 2016 IL
118496, ¶ 33. Our supreme court has often resolved cases by finding that all three tests are
satisfied. See id.; see also People v. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 40. Several cases from this court
establish, consistent with logic we think, that a finding of harmlessness under either of the
three approaches suffices. See People v. Ortiz, 2017 IL App (1st) 142559, ¶ 44 (finding
exclusion of evidence harmless where it did not contribute to conviction even though it would
not have been cumulative or duplicative); People v. Anderson, 2017 IL App (1st) 122640, ¶ 90
(same). We find the error did not contribute to Tarik’s conviction.
¶ 30 We agree with Tarik that the evidence is not overwhelming. Though Tarik was eventually
identified consistently as the member of the group with the gun, Williams’s and Demacio’s
identifications suffer from initial inconsistencies—both identified people as offenders who
officers never charged. But even though the evidence was not overwhelming, the photograph
played a small role in the State’s case. The State introduced the photo during codefendant
Penn’s testimony, and he did no more than lay the foundation for its admission. The State never
mentioned the photo to the jury before that and never mentioned it again. We also think the
photo ended up being a minor part of Penn’s overall testimony—remember the jury listened to
him substantially corroborate the victims’ testimony and place a gun in Tarik’s hand.
¶ 31 Considering the totality of the evidence, the admission of the photo amounted to no more
than a passing reference. Though irrelevant, the Facebook photograph did not contribute to
Tarik’s conviction. We affirm the judgment of guilt.
¶ 32 Sentencing
¶ 33 Tarik challenges his sentence, primarily arguing that the trial court imposed a 45-year
sentence—a de facto life sentence according to Buffer, 2019 IL 122327—though disclaiming
any intent to do so. The State agrees that the trial court did not intend to impose a de facto life
sentence. Still, the State argues Tarik’s sentence does not qualify because he is eligible for up
to 50% good conduct credit for the sentences imposed on the nonmurder offenses. The State
acknowledges this court’s many decisions rejecting reliance on good-conduct credit in
determining whether a sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence (e.g., Peacock, 2019 IL
App (1st) 170308), but urges us not to follow them. In light of our supreme court’s recent
decision in Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, we agree with the State and find Tarik’s sentence does
not constitute a de facto life sentence.
¶ 34 The basic principles are well settled. The United States Supreme Court has found all
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violate the
eighth amendment. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). The Illinois Supreme Court
applied Miller to de facto life sentences (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10 (per curiam))
and discretionary life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40). Our supreme court
also set the maximum sentence a juvenile can receive without being considered a de facto life
sentence at 40 years. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 42. Now we add Dorsey to the juvenile
sentencing canon, which holds that a juvenile defendant’s opportunity for release after 40 or
fewer years is the only relevant consideration, whether that is the sentence the trial court
imposed or not. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 64.
¶ 35 The State correctly argues that Tarik is only guaranteed to be in prison for 39 years of his
45-year sentence. The trial court sentenced Tarik to 33 years in prison (served at 100%) for
murder, which runs consecutively with a 6-year sentence (served at 50%) for one count of
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attempted armed robbery, which runs consecutively to three other concurrent 6-year sentences
(also served at 50%) for other counts of attempted armed robbery. Thus, 33 plus 3 plus 3 equals
39.
¶ 36 Our task, then, is to decide whether we account for good-conduct credit. This court has
repeatedly held that we do not. E.g., People v. DiCorpo, 2020 IL App (1st) 172082, ¶ 53
(collecting cases). Though immaterial, the State argues that no other district of our appellate
court has followed suit; that argument is no longer true. See People v. Simental, 2021 IL App
(2d) 190649, ¶ 20 (“agree[ing] with the reasoning” of Peacock and its progeny).
¶ 37 The State contends that Peacock and similar cases ignore the “opportunity for release”
language in cases like Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10. The court in Dorsey agreed. The supreme
court focused on the statutory sentencing scheme as a whole. It found that the “due process”
procedures baked into the good-conduct credit provisions guaranteed a defendant credit “as
long as it is not revoked because he [or she] commits a disciplinary offense.” Dorsey, 2021 IL
123010, ¶ 61. According to Dorsey, the defendant’s apparent “power to shorten his [or her]
sentence” offers an opportunity for release. Id. ¶ 54. Whether the defendant earns that credit
and spends more than 40 years in prison is, after Dorsey, irrelevant. See id. ¶ 58.
¶ 38 Under these principles, we have but one option: affirm Tarik’s 45-year sentence. Because
the consecutive six-year sentences are eligible for 50% credit, they give him the “power” to
behave and potentially achieve release before he has served 40 years.
¶ 39 Our conclusion about Tarik’s term of years sentence also defeats his constitutional
challenge to the statute requiring him to serve 100% of his first degree murder sentence. See
730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2020). Tarik argues this statute is unconstitutional as applied
to him because it does not allow him to demonstrate rehabilitative potential and be released
before the term of his sentence expires. He relies almost exclusively on People v. Othman,
2019 IL App (1st) 150823, ¶¶ 91-109 (Othman I), where we found the challenged statute
unconstitutional. But the Illinois Supreme Court later entered a supervisory order instructing
this court to vacate the portions of its opinion addressing the defendant’s sentence. People v.
Othman, 2020 IL App (1st) 150823-B, ¶¶ 3-5 (Othman II).
¶ 40 The State points us to the Fourth District’s decision in People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App
(4th) 110409, ¶¶ 58, 60, where our court rejected a similar challenge to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(i)
because the truth-in-sentencing consequences of a defendant’s sentence do not render the
substantive sentence unconstitutional. We would agree with the analysis in Pacheco anyway;
Dorsey all but compels us to do so.
¶ 41 We first say a word about the precedential value of Othman I. Even assuming the reasoning
in Othman I survived the supervisory order, we would not find it persuasive. The analysis was
dicta because the court found the defendant’s 55-year sentence substantively unconstitutional
under the proportionate penalties clause. Othman I, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823, ¶¶ 77-86. So
the court’s further analysis of the constitutionality of section 3-6-3(a)(2)(i) was not necessary
to its judgment. And, as the court in Pacheco explained, the remedy for a juvenile defendant
who receives a de facto life sentence is a challenge to the substantive sentence, not the statute
requiring the sentence to be served at 100%. Cf. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶ 58
(explaining, defendant’s 20-year sentence not equivalent to life without parole and so sentence
is not unconstitutional merely because it must be served at 100%).
¶ 42 But, assuming further that Othman I is sound precedent, Dorsey effectively overrules it.
As we have explained, Dorsey shifts the focus of the inquiry from the sentence imposed to the
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actual time a defendant must serve. See Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 65 (requiring possibility of
release before juvenile defendant surpasses 40 years in prison). In other words, a juvenile
defendant’s sentence (whether served at 100%, 85%, or 50%) may be subject to a constitutional
challenge only if it will keep the juvenile in prison for more than 40 years. Id. (relying on
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327). Tarik’s sentence allows for possible release after 39 years, just
beneath Buffer’s ceiling, and so is constitutional even if Tarik serves part of his sentence at
100%.
¶ 43 Finally, Tarik argues that applying section 3-6-3(a)(2)(i) to his sentence violates the
proportionate penalties clause, relying on People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002) (Leon
Miller). There, the juvenile defendant’s sentence offended our constitution based on a
confluence of three factors: (i) one statutory provision required trial of the juvenile defendant
in adult court, (ii) another statute allowed the juvenile offender to be convicted on a theory of
accountability without regard to his actual conduct, and (iii) the sentencing statute required a
sentence of natural life without giving the trial court discretion to consider the facts of the case.
Id. at 340-41. Leon Miller is distinguishable in two material ways. First, Tarik was convicted
as the actual shooter, and the trial court accounted for his culpability. Second, after Dorsey,
Tarik is not serving the equivalent of a life sentence. Under those circumstances, section 3-6-
3(a)(2)(i) is not unconstitutional.
¶ 44 If Tarik’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause, it is not because he had to
serve part of it at 100%. As Pacheco hinted, if a 100% sentence is unconstitutional or an abuse
of discretion, it follows from the term of years as substantively unreasonable. Cf. Pacheco,
2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶ 58. Because Tarik only challenged his sentence as
unconstitutional (either as an unconstitutional life sentence or based on the applicability of the
truth-in-sentencing statute), we do not evaluate the term of years sentence for its substantive
reasonableness under the proportionate penalties clause and express no opinion on that issue.
¶ 45 In a petition for rehearing, Tarik argues we overlooked an alternative basis on which to
vacate his sentence. He points us to his claim that the trial court’s sentencing findings were
insufficient under section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
105(a)(1)-(9) (West 2020)). We acknowledge our original opinion did not address this
argument, and on further review we find it unpersuasive.
¶ 46 Even when sentencing under section 5-4.5-105, the trial court is not required to announce
“each and every factor that it considers in rendering a sentence.” People v. Villalobos, 2020 IL
App (1st) 171512, ¶ 74. At sentencing, the trial court repeatedly referred to most of the factors
in section 5-4.5-105. We quote a portion of the findings below and insert the relevant citations
where they apply:
“Clearly, these are juveniles. They were under the age of 18 at this time [(730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-105(a)(1) (West 2020))]. It did not see[m] to me that any of these persons were
subjected to outside pressure [(id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(2))]. There was no older gang
structure that was motivating them or ordering them to go out and do this.
Indicated that their family life was perhaps not perfect throughout their young lives
at this point, but there was nothing so traumatic or so horrid that they were put on some
irrevocable track [(id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(3))].
The potential for rehabilitation or evidence for rehabilitation is not insubstantial
[(id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(4))]. It’s showed by the fact they have not been in trouble with the
law, with the court system prior to this [(id.§ 5-4.5-105(a)(8))]. It’s also shown by the
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efforts to engage in education while they have been locked up both in the juvenile
detention center and in Cook County Jail. It’s clear from the certificates presented that
they are making good faith efforts to seek to get educated under the circumstances
where they don’t have to.
At this time there doesn’t seem to be any cognitive difficulties [(id. § 5-4.5-
105(a)(1))] *** and then there is the circumstances of the offense which I’ve already
indicated are beyond compelling [(id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(5))].”
For Tarik, the trial court considered his role in the offense when rejecting the applicability of
the firearm enhancements. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(6), (b) (West 2020).
¶ 47 The trial court sufficiently considered the factors in section 5-4.5-105, expressly citing the
statute and making findings under all but one subsection (id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(7)). We cannot
find error due to the trial court having failed to specifically mention one of the factors.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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