People v. Gordon , 2021 IL App (5th) 160455-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE
2021 IL App (5th) 160455-UB
NOTICE
Decision filed 08/24/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-16-0455 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Fayette County.
)
v. ) No. 16-CF-141
)
RICHARD L. GORDON, ) Honorable
) M. Don Sheafor Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The State presented insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of
obstructing justice where the State failed to prove that the defendant
furnishing false information to the police materially impeded his
apprehension; the case is remanded for further proceedings without
offending double jeopardy principles where the supreme court’s decision in
People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, changed the law posttrial by requiring the
State to prove material impediment and the State had no reason to present
evidence of material impediment prior to the change in the law.
¶2 After a jury trial, the defendant, Richard L. Gordon, was convicted of obstructing
justice in violation of section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/31-
4(a)(1) (West 2016)), for providing police officers with false information, i.e., a false name
and date of birth when he was asked to identify himself. The defendant appealed his
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conviction and argued, among other issues, that the State presented insufficient evidence
of his guilt because the State failed to prove that his furnishing false information materially
impeded the ability of the police to apprehend him. In the defendant’s direct appeal from
his conviction, we affirmed his conviction, holding that a conviction of obstructing justice
did not require proof that the defendant’s conduct resulted in material impediment to the
administration of justice. People v. Gordon, 2019 IL App (5th) 160455, ¶ 27. On January
27, 2021, the supreme court, in the exercise of its supervisory authority, directed us to
vacate our judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction and “consider the effect of [the
supreme court’s] opinion in People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, on the issue of whether the
evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for obstructing justice, and
determine if a different result is warranted.” People v. Gordon, No. 125537 (2021)
(supervisory order). For the following reasons, after considering the supreme court’s
opinion in Casler, we conclude that a different result is warranted. We reverse the
defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In the evening on June 21, 2016, a deputy with the Fayette County sheriff’s office
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by the defendant. The defendant told the officer
that he did not have his driver’s license with him, that his name was Bryan Lynn Watson,
and that his date of birth was June 9, 1971. The officer and the county’s dispatcher both
ran the defendant’s name and date of birth through their respective computer databases,
which yielded no person with the name and date of birth given by the defendant. The officer
then conducted a pat-down search of the defendant and recovered a wallet from the
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defendant’s pocket. The wallet contained an Illinois identification card bearing the
defendant’s real name, Richard Gordon. The officer ran the defendant’s real name through
the database and determined that the defendant had an outstanding warrant and a revoked
driver’s license. The officer placed the defendant under arrest, and the State charged the
defendant with multiple offenses stemming from the traffic stop including obstructing
justice, which is the only offense at issue in this appeal.
¶5 The statute creating the offense of obstructing justice for furnishing false
information provides that a “person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the
apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, he *** knowingly ***
furnishes false information.” 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2016). At the defendant’s trial,
the circuit court instructed the jury to find the defendant guilty of obstructing justice if it
found that the defendant knowingly furnished false information and that the defendant did
so with the intent to prevent his apprehension. The circuit court did not instruct the jury
that, before finding the defendant guilty, it must also find that the defendant’s false
information materially impeded his apprehension.
¶6 In his direct appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued that the State
presented insufficient evidence to prove him guilty of obstructing justice because the State
had failed to prove that his conduct of providing a false identification to the police
materially impeded his apprehension. We disagreed with the defendant’s argument, held
that the State was not required to prove that the defendant materially impeded his
apprehension, and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. Gordon, 2019 IL App (5th)
160455, ¶ 27. In the exercise of its supervisory authority, the supreme court has now
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directed us to vacate our judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction and reconsider the
sufficiency of the evidence in light of Casler, 2020 IL 125117.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 Prior to Casler, there was a split among the appellate court districts concerning
whether a finding of “material impediment” was necessary to sustain a conviction for
obstructing justice. Id. ¶¶ 43-53. The Casler court resolved this split of authority by holding
that a conviction of obstructing justice under section 31-4(a)(1) “unequivocally” requires
proof of material impediment. Id. ¶¶ 61, 69.
¶9 Similar to the defendant in the present case, the defendant in Casler had outstanding
warrants and gave the police a false name when he was asked to identify himself, which
the officers quickly realized was a false name. Id. ¶¶ 6-10. A jury convicted the defendant
of obstructing justice for providing the false information with the intent of avoiding arrest
on the outstanding warrants. Id. ¶¶ 3, 15-17, 62. The Casler court, however, reversed the
defendant’s conviction because the circuit court did not instruct the jury that, before
convicting the defendant of obstructing justice, it must find that the defendant’s conduct
had “materially impeded the administration of justice.” Id. ¶ 62.
¶ 10 The relevant facts of the present case are nearly identical to the facts in Casler. Here,
the defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, the defendant gave the police a
false name and date of birth when the police asked the defendant to identify himself, and
the police quickly determined that the identification information that the defendant gave
them was false. Also similar to Casler, the jury that convicted the defendant of obstructing
justice was never instructed to determine whether the defendant’s false information
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materially impeded his apprehension. Accordingly, based on the supreme court’s holding
in Casler, we are obligated to reverse the defendant’s conviction for obstructing justice.
¶ 11 In its supplemental brief, the State agrees that the defendant’s conviction for
obstructing justice must be reversed in light of the supreme court’s Casler opinion. The
State, however, argues that, instead of reversing the conviction outright, this court should
remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings on the obstructing justice
charge. The defendant argues against a remand for further proceedings.
¶ 12 In Casler, after holding that the defendant’s conviction must be reversed, the
supreme court addressed the proper remedy in light of the double jeopardy protections in
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. Id.
¶¶ 55-56. In remanding that case for further proceedings, the Casler court held that its
decision in that case constituted a posttrial change in the law. The Casler court further held
that “a second trial is permitted when a conviction is reversed because of a posttrial change
in law.” Id. ¶ 57.
¶ 13 In Casler, the supreme court concluded that “the State had no reason to introduce
evidence regarding a material impediment requirement because, at the time of trial, [the
supreme court] had not yet held that the government was required to prove that element
with regard to the furnishing of false information.” Id. ¶ 65. Therefore, the Casler court
concluded, the State’s failure to present evidence of a material impediment was “more akin
to trial error than to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 66. The Casler court noted that
“[t]he double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction is
overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings leading to the conviction.” Id. ¶ 57.
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Instead, “where a reviewing court determines that the evidence presented at trial has been
rendered insufficient only by a posttrial change in the law, double jeopardy concerns do
not preclude the government from retrying the defendant.” Id. ¶ 66.
¶ 14 Because its ruling in Casler constituted a posttrial change in the law, the supreme
court in Casler remanded that case for further proceedings. In the present case, like Casler,
the State had no reason to present evidence of material impediment at the defendant’s trial;
per Casler, material impediment was not an element of the offense at the time of the
defendant’s trial.
¶ 15 In his supplemental brief, the defendant suggests that the supreme court’s remand
in Casler was “questionable.” However, we have no authority to reject the supreme court’s
express holding in Casler. “Once our supreme court has declared the law with respect to
an issue, this court must follow that law, as only the supreme court has authority to overrule
or modify its own decisions.” John Crane, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 2013 IL App
(1st) 093240-B, ¶ 69. The supreme court in Casler remanded the proceeding in that case
because the State had no reason to present evidence of material impediment at the
defendant’s trial. The supreme court expressly stated that its decision in Casler changed
the law posttrial and, therefore, a retrial did not violate the defendant’s double jeopardy
rights. The supreme court’s decision in Casler was a posttrial change in the law not only
for the defendant in Casler, but also for the defendant in the present case. Therefore, we
reject the defendant’s request to ignore the supreme court’s analysis set out in Casler which
establishes that a remand for further proceedings is the proper remedy in this appeal.
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¶ 16 CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand
for further proceedings.
¶ 18 Reversed and remanded.
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