Turner v. City of Granite City ( 2021 )

NOTICE
2021 IL App (5th) 200291-UNOTICE
Decision filed 09/07/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0291 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
TINA M. TURNER, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Madison County.
)
v. ) No. 19-L-12
)
THE CITY OF GRANITE CITY, ) Honorable
) Sarah D. Smith,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Moore and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion in favor of the
defendant, the City of Granite City, as a matter of law where the plaintiff
failed to establish that the city owed a duty to her under section 3-102 of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.
¶2 The plaintiff, Tina M. Turner, brought an action against a municipality, the
defendant, the City of Granite City, seeking damages for injuries sustained after she
stepped into a pothole and broke her ankle while crossing a street in Granite City. The
defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that it owed no duty to the
plaintiff, who was neither an intended nor a permitted user of the area of the street where
she was injured. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint,
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and the plaintiff appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial
court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 At approximately 4 p.m. on December 1, 2018, the plaintiff and her brother met at
the plaintiff’s apartment in Granite City. They began walking to a nearby Taco Bell
restaurant for dinner. It was raining lightly, and sleeting, as the two walked down the
sidewalk along 22nd Street and approached a T-intersection at Iowa Street. When the
plaintiff stepped off the curb into the street near the intersection of 22nd Street and Iowa
Street, she stepped into a pothole filled with leaves and rainwater. As the plaintiff started
to fall, her brother caught her, but the plaintiff felt a pop as her right ankle twisted. After
the plaintiff fell, she sought medical care and learned she had suffered a fracture to her
right ankle.
¶5 On January 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the circuit
court of Madison County, seeking damages for the injuries she sustained from her fall. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent for failure to inspect the crosswalk area,
failure to maintain or repair the crosswalk area, and/or failure to warn of the condition of
the crosswalk area where the plaintiff injured her ankle.
¶6 On January 23, 2019, the city filed an answer and affirmative defenses. The city
generally denied the allegations of negligence, and also denied that the plaintiff was an
intended user of the crosswalk. In its affirmative defenses, the city alleged that the
plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
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¶7 On February 11, 2020, the city filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615,
2-619 (West 2018)). In its motion, the city claimed that, under the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-102
(West 2018)), municipalities, such as itself, had no duty to safeguard the street where the
plaintiff fell. In its motion, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had acknowledged there
was no marked crosswalk where she attempted to cross the street. 1 The defendant asserted
that it never intended for pedestrians to cross its streets outside of designated crosswalks,
and that the plaintiff could not establish that she was an intended user of the area of 22nd
Street where she fell. In support of its motion, the defendant attached excerpts of the
plaintiff’s deposition, along with four photographs. Also, attached to the defendant’s
motion were three Granite City ordinances related to crosswalks and an affidavit from the
mayor of Granite City.
¶8 On April 7, 2020, the plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the city’s motion to
dismiss, along with a supporting memorandum. Attached to the response were excerpts
from the plaintiff’s deposition, photographs of an alley near the plaintiff’s apartment that
intersected with 22nd Street, an additional seven photographs of the streets nearby, and a
recently adopted local ordinance for Granite City. The plaintiff argued that she had crossed
at a crosswalk, and that the defendant owed her a duty, even if the crosswalk was not
marked. She emphasized that there was no requirement for a crosswalk to be painted on
1
Plaintiff gave a deposition on January 23, 2020, wherein she offered testimony regarding the
circumstances of her crossing 22nd Street.
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the street under section 1-113 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/1-113 (West
2018)). Under the Code, plaintiff argued it was the law that “a crosswalk need not be
painted or marked on the surface of the street to constitute a statutory crosswalk but at any
intersection the extensions of sidewalk lines over the streets are regarded as crosswalks.”
The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s amendment to one of its ordinances, after the
fact of plaintiff’s injury, requiring pedestrians to use “marked” crosswalks, supported her
theory that the city intended pedestrians to use statutory, “unmarked” crosswalks prior to
that amendment.
¶9 In the deposition excerpts, the plaintiff acknowledged that some of the photographs
showed pictures of nearby intersections at each end of 22nd Street with designated
crosswalks, marked with striping and slanted curbs. These markings were not present at
the location where the plaintiff attempted to cross 22nd Street. The plaintiff also testified
that she was not paying attention when she stepped off the curb and into the pothole where
she broke her ankle.
¶ 10 The photos used by the parties in the plaintiff’s deposition also included a satellite
overview of the neighborhood, and pictures of the location where the plaintiff was injured,
which was located near the T-intersection at Iowa Street and 22nd Street. The photos of
the T-intersection showed curbs on both sides of the roadway where the plaintiff intended
to cross. The opposite side of the roadway had a section of grass along the curb between
the street and the sidewalk. The photos did not reveal any markings indicating the presence
of a marked crosswalk. There were no stop signs or sloped curbs in the area where the
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plaintiff chose to cross. During her deposition, the plaintiff identified the location where
she fell and circled the spot in the road where she broke her ankle.
¶ 11 At the time the plaintiff was injured, the defendant had a local ordinance that was
entitled, “Prohibited Crossing.” Granite City Municipal Code § 10.22.040 (eff. 1979).
Granite City amended its ordinance on March 3, 2020, after the plaintiff filed her lawsuit.
In the plaintiff’s memorandum, she relied upon the amendment to the ordinance. The
plaintiff argued that the city inserted the word “marked” before the term “crosswalk,” and
that by doing so, the city was admitting that its prior ordinance allowed pedestrians to cross
at unmarked crosswalks.
¶ 12 During the hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the city pointed out that
the incident occurred near the intersection of 22nd Street and Iowa Street, and defense
counsel offered the photographs depicting the location where the plaintiff fell. The
defendant argued that the Tort Immunity Act limited a municipality’s duty to maintain the
property and that a municipality’s duty extended only to those who were intended and
permitted users of the property. In particular, the city emphasized that even if the court
found that the plaintiff crossed in an unmarked, statutory crosswalk, such a finding would
only mean that the plaintiff was a permitted user, not both a permitted and intended user.
The defendant also relied upon the affidavit from the mayor which averred that the city
intended to allow pedestrians to cross only in marked crosswalks, and the street was to be
used and maintained for vehicular traffic. In addition, the defendant argued that the cost
for maintaining every intersection suitable for pedestrians to cross was too expensive for
the city to maintain.
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¶ 13 In her argument, the plaintiff responded that section 1-113 of the Code defined a
statutory crosswalk as an area marked with lateral lines extending from the sidewalk, as
well as those sidewalks without marked lines. The plaintiff stated that because she crossed
the street in a “statutory crosswalk,” as defined by the Code, she was an intended and
permitted user of the crosswalk. Therefore, she was owed a duty of care by the defendant.
In addition, the plaintiff reasserted her arguments of being an intended user based on the
defendant’s amendment to its ordinance to add the term “marked” in front of “crosswalks.”
She concluded that it was illogical to walk an additional block to the marked crosswalk at
the end of the block before crossing 22nd Street because it would have been in the opposite
direction, and she would have had to cross an unmarked alley.
¶ 14 After hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court took the matter under
advisement. On September 17, 2020, the court entered an order granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss. In its order, the trial court found that the plaintiff crossed in a statutory
crosswalk, but that this designation only made the plaintiff a permitted user of the street.
The court made specific findings that “[t]here were no sloping curbs, painted surfaces, curb
cuts or other paved walkways to the surface of the adjacent street where Plaintiff identified
she crossed.” The trial court also found that nearby intersections at each end of 22nd Street
had white paint and sloped curbs which demonstrated the intended purpose for pedestrians
to cross the street at those locations.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting the city’s motion
to dismiss because the defendant, a local public entity, had a duty to repair and maintain
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the statutory crosswalk where the plaintiff stepped into a pothole and broke her ankle. In
response, the defendant argues that tort immunity applies; therefore, it did not have a duty
to repair an unmarked crosswalk because it did not intend for pedestrians to cross the road
where the plaintiff fell, even if the plaintiff was considered a permitted user of the street.
¶ 17 In an action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury to the plaintiff
proximately caused by the breach to recover damages. Harden v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL
App (1st) 120846, ¶ 16. The city sought dismissal pursuant to both section 2-615 and
section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2018)) and
claimed that the plaintiff could not establish that a duty was owed to her under the Tort
Immunity Act. A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 attacks the legal sufficiency
of a complaint, and a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) admits the
sufficiency of a complaint but asserts an affirmative matter defeating the claim. Torres v.
Peoria Park District, 2020 IL App (3d) 190248, ¶ 16. Statutory immunity is an affirmative
matter to be considered under section 2-619(a)(9) alone. Williams v. Board of Education
of the City of Chicago, 222 Ill. App. 3d 559, 562 (1991). We review a section 2-619
dismissal de novo. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003).
¶ 18 The defendant is a local public entity. In determining whether the defendant owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, we look to section 3-102 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS
10/3-102(a) (West 2018)). Section 3-102 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition
for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity intended and
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permitted to use the property in a manner in which and at such times as it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used, and shall not be liable for injury unless
it is proven that it has actual or constructive notice of the existence of such a
condition that is not reasonably safe in reasonably adequate time prior to an injury
to have taken measures to remedy or protect against such condition.” 745 ILCS
10/3-102(a) (West 2018).
¶ 19 The Tort Immunity Act is in derogation of the common law and strictly construed
against the public entity. Curatola v. Village of Niles, 154 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1993). Under
the Tort Immunity Act, municipalities have a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain
property for intended and permitted uses; no duty will be imposed unless plaintiff is both
permitted and intended user. Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort, 166 Ill. 2d 155, 160 (1995).
An intended user of property is also a permitted user; but a permitted user is not necessarily
an intended user. Boub v. Township of Wayne, 183 Ill. 2d 520, 525 (1998).
¶ 20 In general, a municipality does not have a duty to maintain the streets to a standard
of care for pedestrian use since pedestrians are not the intended users of a street. Curatola,
154 Ill. 2d at 210. Illinois municipalities are currently charged with the duty to use ordinary
care to make crosswalks safe for pedestrian use, such as marking a crosswalk on the street
for pedestrian use, where municipalities manifestly intend that pedestrians will use the
crosswalk. Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at 164; Sisk v. Williamson County, 167 Ill. 2d 343, 347
(1995). The cost of making all public streets and roadways reasonably safe for unrestricted
pedestrian use would be an extreme burden on municipalities with limited resources.
Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at 164. Therefore, municipalities have no duty to maintain property for
pedestrians where the pedestrians are outside of marked crosswalks or other areas
designated and intended for the protection of pedestrians. Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d at 348.
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¶ 21 In this case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not cross in a marked crosswalk.
Therefore, we must consider whether the plaintiff was an intended user of the property
where the plaintiff attempted to cross 22nd Street to establish if the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care. The nature of the property itself determines if the plaintiff was an
intended user of the street where she injured herself in a pothole. Vaughn, 166 Ill. 2d at
163; Sisk, 167 Ill. 2d at 351 (“Intent must be inferred from the circumstances. We need
look no further than the property itself to determine the municipality’s manifestations of
intent with regard to use of the property by pedestrians.”). The nature of the property, the
pavement markings, signs, and other physical manifestation of the intended use of the
property must be considered to determine if the defendant had a duty to maintain the road
for pedestrian use where the plaintiff fell. Dunet v. Simmons, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603,
¶ 30.
¶ 22 The plaintiff argued that she was in an “unmarked crosswalk” according to section
1-113(a) of the Code, which states a crosswalk is:
“That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of the
lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the
curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway, and in
the absence of a sidewalk on one side of the highway, that part of the highway
included within the extension of the lateral line of the existing sidewalk to the side
of the highway without the sidewalk, with such extension forming a right angle to
the centerline of the highway[.]” 625 ILCS 5/1-113(a) (West 2018).
According to the definition in the Code, and our review of the black and white photographic
exhibits, it is difficult to determine if the plaintiff stepped into a pothole that was within an
“unmarked crosswalk.” Nevertheless, as the defendant argued, crossing in an unmarked
crosswalk, as defined by the Code, only showed a permitted use of the intersection, at best,
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and being a permitted user does not automatically make a pedestrian an intended user.
Dunet, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603, ¶ 30.
¶ 23 Here, the plaintiff crossed near a T-intersection at Iowa Street and 22nd Street. The
photographs show the curb that the plaintiff had to step down from in order to access the
street. The intersection did not have a stop sign or a painted crosswalk, and there was no
connection to a sidewalk on the opposite side of 22nd Street. Because there was no
sidewalk connection, a pedestrian would also have to step up and over a curb and then cross
a grass section to reach a sidewalk on the opposite side of the crossing. In comparison, the
nearby intersections showed that the defendant intended for pedestrians to cross where they
had installed stop signs, modified the sidewalks to have sloped curbs into the intersection,
and painted crosswalks across the intersections.
¶ 24 The plaintiff in Dunet brought a wrongful death action and survival action against a
municipality alleging negligence, after a pedestrian was killed in an automobile accident
while crossing the street at an intersection. Dunet, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603, ¶ 5. The
intersection was not marked, the curb was painted yellow, it was not cut out or sloped for
pedestrian access to the street, and the intersection was a busy, high-volume street with six
lanes of traffic. Dunet, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603, ¶ 29. The intersection in both Dunet,
and in the case at hand, did not have the same features as the nearby intersections which
were equipped with traffic signals and marked crosswalks, intended for pedestrian
crossings. Dunet, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603, ¶ 29. Therefore, based on the appearance of
the place where the plaintiff stepped off the curb, the city did not have the intent for
pedestrians to cross at the unmarked crosswalk. Dunet, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603, ¶ 29.
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¶ 25 The plaintiff argued that her case should be distinguished from the Dunet case
because she lived in a quiet neighborhood, and it was not an area of heavy traffic. She
additionally argued that it was unreasonable for her to have walked in the opposite direction
that required her to cross an alley to reach a marked crosswalk. However, foreseeability
alone under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act does not establish whether a duty
of care exits. Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417, 428 (1992). In Wojdyla, even
though the plaintiff argued it would be unreasonable to expect pedestrians to walk a mile,
round trip, to use a crosswalk, the city did not intend for pedestrians to cross outside of a
crosswalk. Wojdyla, 148 Ill. 2d at 428. Tort immunity applies to intended and permitted
foreseeable users, not solely foreseeable users. Wojdyla, 148 Ill. 2d at 428. Additionally,
pedestrians have been found to be intended users of the area where a sidewalk intersects
an alley, so having to cross an alley to reach a marked crosswalk had no bearing on the
city’s intent. Kavales v. City of Berwyn, 305 Ill. App. 3d 536, 544 (1999). When
considering the nature of the intersection, the plaintiff has not established that the defendant
intended for pedestrians to cross the road at the T-intersection, even though it may have
been foreseeable that pedestrians would avoid walking out of their way to use a marked
crosswalk at the end of 22nd Street.
¶ 26 We also disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that the city’s ordinances established
an intent by the defendant for pedestrians to cross 22nd Street at the T-intersection. The
defendant’s local ordinance defines “crosswalk,” and that definition does not mirror the
Illinois Vehicle Code’s definition. Granite City Municipal Code § 10.22.060 (eff. 1979)
defines “crosswalk” to mean:
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“A. That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections
of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from
the curbs or in the absences of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; or
B. Any portion of the roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly
indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.”
The plain meaning of the city’s definition of crosswalk requires a sidewalk connection on
the opposite side of the road for it to be considered an “unmarked crosswalk.” Since there
was no sidewalk connection on the opposite side of the road from where plaintiff stepped
into the street, there was no unmarked crosswalk at the T-intersection. The defendant did
not have a duty to maintain the area where the plaintiff fell, when that area, based upon the
ordinance, was not intended to be a crosswalk.
¶ 27 The plaintiff also argued that the defendant’s postaccident amendment to the
“Prohibited Crossing” ordinance as establishing that the plaintiff was an intended user of
the unmarked crosswalk at the time of her injury. We disagree. The city inserted the word
“marked” in front of the term “crosswalk” in the “Prohibited Crossing” ordinance. Granite
City Municipal Code § 10.22.040 (adopted Mar. 3, 2020). That ordinance now reads:
“between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians
shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. No pedestrian shall cross a
roadway other than in a marked crosswalk in any business district.” The amendment to the
ordinance to add the word “marked” to designate the crosswalk had no effect on a
pedestrian crossing 22nd Street when the municipality’s definition of crosswalk, marked
or unmarked, did not apply to that T-intersection.
¶ 28 The plaintiff has not established that she was an intended and permitted user of the
area of 22nd Street where she fractured her ankle. Specifically, the plaintiff cannot maintain
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a cause of action for negligence without establishing that the plaintiff is owed a duty of
care. Dunet, 2013 IL App (1st) 120603, ¶ 31. The defendant intended pedestrians to cross
at both ends of the 22nd Street block, as evidenced by the stop signs, painted crosswalks
on the pavement, and modifications of the sidewalk to slope into the intersection. The
plaintiff has not shown that the defendant had a similar intent for pedestrians to cross 22nd
Street at an unmarked area, without a sloped or cut curb, that did not directly connect to a
sidewalk on the other side of the road. Since the plaintiff has not shown she was an intended
user of the intersection where she fell, she cannot show that she was owed a duty by the
defendant; therefore, she cannot maintain a cause of action for negligence. Accordingly,
the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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