People v. Westbrook-Simmons ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 190497-UNo. 1-19-0497
Order filed September 8, 2021
Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
) No. 18 CR 4374
BRANDON WESTBROOK-SIMMONS, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Thaddeus L. Wilson,
) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Conviction for aggravated battery of peace officer affirmed. Evidence was
sufficient to show defendant knew victim was private security guard.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Brandon Westbrook-Simmons (also known as Brandon
Simmons) was convicted of aggravated battery of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West
2018)) and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he claims the evidence was
No. 1-19-0497
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the victim was a private security
guard. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with 15 weapons and aggravated battery offenses stemming from
an incident that took place on March 6, 2018, where private security guards at a housing complex
detained defendant after receiving a complaint, and defendant resisted and was found to have a
firearm and ammunition on his person. He went to trial on 10 counts. Relevant here, the trial court
ultimately found defendant guilty on three counts of aggravated battery, merged two of the counts
into the third, and then sentenced defendant on aggravated battery count XIII. Aggravated battery
count XIII alleged that defendant, in committing a battery, knowingly caused bodily harm to
Officer Robert Haynes when he struck Haynes about the groin with his knee, and defendant knew
Haynes to be a private security officer for “Protec Security” while Haynes was performing his
official duties.
¶4 At trial, Officer Haynes testified he was a police officer for the Leland Police Department
and Rockford Park District Police. On March 6, 2018, Haynes was employed by Pro Tech Security
Group as a security supervisor for the Parkway Gardens housing complex. He was working with
two officers, Ben Comas and Tom Kaniewski. Shortly after 3:30 p.m., he received a call and
responded to “the 6300 area” in the complex regarding a man who was “causing issues.” At the
location, Haynes observed a man matching the description given on the call. Haynes identified
defendant as that person in court. He recognized defendant at the scene because they had prior
contact before March 6, 2018.
¶5 Haynes walked with Comas to the location and observed defendant walking towards a gate.
Comas ran up and detained defendant and informed him that he was being detained for
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investigation purposes. Haynes caught up shortly thereafter, and Kaniewski drove up in a security
vehicle a few seconds later and then approached them on foot. Defendant was handcuffed and
lying on his stomach. Kaniewski conducted a pat down search of defendant, and then the officers
picked defendant up to walk him to the security vehicle to conduct a more thorough search and
detain him until the Chicago Police Department (CPD) arrived. Haynes recovered a loaded black
magazine from defendant. He placed defendant in the back seat of the vehicle and then recovered
a black semi-automatic Highpoint 9-millimeter gun from inside defendant’s pants.
¶6 Defendant thereafter “became very upset” and attempted to push through to the front seat
to escape through the front of the car. Defendant attempted to bite Haynes and then lunged forward
and bit Kaniewski’s left hand. Haynes placed his taser on defendant’s chest and informed him that
if he did not stop fighting, Haynes would tase him. Defendant nevertheless attempted to bite
Haynes again, so Haynes tased him. Defendant then complied, and the officers shut the vehicle
door.
¶7 Once CPD arrived, Haynes removed defendant from the security vehicle, and defendant
tried to lunge at Haynes and bite him in the face. When Haynes moved back, defendant kneed him
in the groin. In response, Haynes tased defendant in the back right shoulder, but then Haynes could
not stand any longer. Haynes attempted to catch his breath in the back of the security vehicle while
Comas, Kaniewski, and CPD officers fought with defendant on the ground. After defendant kneed
him in the groin, Haynes felt “a very sharp, hard groin pain and loss of breath a little bit.” CPD
officers then took defendant away.
¶8 Haynes identified photographs of himself that were taken by the evidence technician
depicting how he appeared on the day of the incident. He stated the photographs showed the
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security uniform he wore while working at Parkway Gardens: a black polo, navy blue “BU’s,” and
a navy blue ballistic vest. The vest had his name on it, “Parkway Gardens,” and read “police” on
the front in the top left corner. The back read “police” also. Haynes had a radio and some medical
equipment in his pockets. Because it was cold, he also wore a jacket “like Officer Kaniewski had,”
which read “Security Co.” along the sleeves. He later testified the coat read “security” on the back.
Haynes also identified photographs taken of Kaniewski, which showed his jacket displaying
“security” on the back. Our review of the photos corresponds with Haynes’ description, though he
is not depicted wearing a jacket in the photos.
¶9 Haynes testified that Parkway Gardens had a closed-circuit security system, which was
working properly on March 6, 2018, and recorded the incident. The camera was mounted
approximately 50 feet in the air on one of the buildings and “maybe 50 to 100 feet” from the
vehicle and where the incident took place. The State published the video for the court, while
Haynes narrated the footage. Haynes’ description matched his testimony regarding the incident.
He added that the security officers initially stopped defendant because CPD informed them that
defendant had an active warrant and had been barred from Parkway Gardens. Haynes had personal
knowledge of defendant’s ban.
¶ 10 Our review of the video shows, in relevant part, a marked CPD vehicle arrives inside the
complex. Two officers exit and approach the security vehicle, where the security officers are
standing. As the security officers remove defendant from the vehicle, there is a struggle with all
the security officers and police officers attempting to restrain defendant, who resists. Following
the struggle, Haynes sits in the back seat of the security vehicle while Kaniewski sits on defendant,
who is on the ground.
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¶ 11 On cross-examination, Haynes testified that he prepared a “police report” on March 8,
2018, as part of his job as security for Parkway Gardens, stating he was kneed in the groin. Haynes
tased defendant after defendant kneed him, because defendant was resisting. Haynes did not go to
the hospital or receive medical treatment as a result of being kneed in the groin. He also did not
lose time from work.
¶ 12 On redirect, Haynes testified that he had scratches on his arms but did not include them in
the report because he was unsure how he got them. Defendant’s demeanor as Haynes pulled him
out of the security vehicle was aggressive and hostile.
¶ 13 Benjamin Comas testified he was in the military and, on the date in question, was working
as a security officer at Parkway Gardens with Haynes and Kaniewski. His testimony was
substantially similar to Haynes’ testimony of the incident. He identified defendant in court as the
person he ran up to after being informed someone was attempting to break into an apartment.
Comas added that, when he first ran up to defendant and grabbed his shoulder, defendant asked,
“What are you doing, officer?” Comas testified that defendant “obviously recognized [him] right
away.” Comas told defendant that he was being detained. Haynes helped him handcuff defendant,
then Kaniewski drove up in the security vehicle. Once defendant was in the security vehicle,
Comas observed Haynes retrieve a magazine and handgun from his pants. Comas subsequently
saw defendant’s mouth “going for” Haynes’s forearm, so he grabbed defendant’s feet because he
had been kicking.
¶ 14 Eventually two CPD officers arrived on the scene. At that time, defendant was still in the
backseat of the security vehicle and Haynes told the officers, “[T]his is your case now. The
offender is yours.” Defendant then “acted up again” and kicked Haynes in the groin. Following
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the kick, Kaniewski put defendant on the ground and Comas stood by Haynes to ensure he was
okay. He remembered Haynes was in pain and sitting in the back of the security car.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Comas testified that Haynes said someone bit him. There were five
officers total when defendant was being removed from the white Pro Tech security vehicle to be
handed over to CPD officers.
¶ 16 Chicago police officer Vanessa De La Huerta testified she and her partner Danielle
Cusimano responded to the scene, in uniform, in a marked vehicle. There were three security
officers at the scene “standing by their Pro Tech security vehicle with the offender inside.” Haynes
had the offender, whom De La Huerta identified in court as defendant, step out of the security
vehicle. Once outside, defendant lunged at Haynes and attempted to bite his face. There was a
struggle and Haynes tased the defendant. De La Huerta did not see anything happen between when
defendant lunged at Haynes and when Haynes tased defendant because “there was so much going
on at that time.” However, she observed Haynes breathing heavily and “kind of kneeled down as
if he were in pain.” Haynes subsequently gave De La Huerta a handgun and magazine, which she
secured.
¶ 17 De La Huerta’s body camera was recording when she arrived on the scene, and the video
was published for the court. The body camera footage shows De La Huerta exiting her vehicle and
approaching a white security vehicle, which reads “Pro Tech Security.” (The exhibit containing
this footage that was provided to this Court does not have audio, only video.)
¶ 18 In the footage, De Le Huerta approaches the driver’s side where Haynes is next to the open
back door. Haynes’ vest reads “police” and Kaniewski, who is nearby, has a jacket which reads
“security” on the back and “security officer” on the sleeve. As Haynes removes defendant from
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the security vehicle, a struggle ensues, and the body camera is partially obscured while the officers
and security guards attempt to restrain defendant. At some point, Haynes tases defendant, who
falls to the ground. Once he is on the ground, Kaniewski gets on top of defendant. Haynes is shown
sitting in the back seat of the security vehicle. Haynes emerges from the vehicle and winces. Comas
and Haynes retrieve the firearm and magazine from the front of the security vehicle and Haynes
hands them to De La Huerta and gestures toward his groin.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, De La Huerta testified she did not see defendant knee Haynes.
Haynes did not cry out that he had been kneed in the groin, but he sat back in the security vehicle
and was breathing heavily. She clarified that she observed a struggle but did not see what every
person was doing during the struggle and did not have a clear view of defendant’s knee.
¶ 20 The trial court granted a directed finding on counts II and III (armed violence).
¶ 21 After closing arguments, the court found defendant guilty of one count of armed habitual
criminal (AHC), two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), and three counts of
aggravated battery to a peace officer, Robert Haynes. The aggravated battery counts were premised
on defendant striking Haynes in the groin with his knee, knowing Haynes was a private security
officer for Pro Tech Security, while Haynes was performing his official duties (count XIII), to
prevent Haynes from performing his official duties (count XIV), and in retaliation for Haynes
performing his official duties (count XV).
¶ 22 In relevant part, the court found the private security guards were “dressed in uniform,
visibly identifying themselves as security officers” and that “[u]nder the law, private security
guards are specifically delineated as coming under the definition of a peace officer.” The court
found defendant knowingly and intentionally kneed Haynes in the groin “battering him and
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knowing him to be a security officer performing his official duties in attempting to prevent him
from doing and performing his official duties.” It found defendant not guilty of two counts of
aggravated battery to Kaniewski.
¶ 23 Defendant filed a post-trial motion challenging the findings of guilt on the AHC and
UUWF charges, alleging in pertinent part that the State failed to prove aggravated battery to
Haynes because the evidence did not show he knew that Haynes was a private security officer. The
court granted the motion with respect to the weapons counts, acquitting defendant of the armed
habitual criminal and UUWF counts. However, the court denied defendant’s motion with respect
to his claim regarding the three aggravated battery counts charging battery to Haynes.
¶ 24 In ruling on the motion, the court stated it reviewed the trial transcripts, the exhibit
photographs, and the security video. The court also noted the officers testified they had prior
contact with defendant. However, the court concluded that, even without the prior contact, the
evidence showed as follows:
“[T]here’s a security vehicle that says Security. Defendant is taken to that vehicle.
It was clear it’s a security vehicle. They have Security on their jacket, though it’s on the
back of the jacket. But given the length of time and manner of contact that he had with
them prior to the battery that’s alleged, he knew they were security. And if he didn’t, then
he must have thought they were the police because Police was on the front of the vest
visible and under the law it would not make a difference whether it was proven police or
proven security.
The statute in the law is still—and the count is still the same.”
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¶ 25 The court merged aggravated battery counts XIV and XV into aggravated battery count
XIII, which was premised on defendant striking Haynes in the groin with his knee, knowing
Haynes was a private security officer while Haynes was performing his official duties. The court
sentenced defendant to eight years’ imprisonment on that count.
¶ 26 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he knew Haynes was a private security guard. He asks that we reduce his conviction to battery and
remand for resentencing.
¶ 27 The State must prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979); People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009).
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask “ ‘whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” People v. Ramos, 2020 IL App
(1st) 170929, ¶ 57 (quoting People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 322 (2005)).
¶ 28 As a reviewing court, we do not retry the defendant; instead, it is the trier of fact’s
responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from the facts. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. We thus defer to the findings of
the trier of fact “on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses.” Id. We will only reverse a criminal conviction if “the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.¶ 29 Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery to a private security officer. As charged
here, a person commits the offense of aggravated battery when, in committing a battery other than
by discharge of a firearm, he knows the individual battered to be a private security officer
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performing his official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018). A person commits battery
if he knowingly without legal justification by any means causes bodily harm to an individual. 720
ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2018).
¶ 30 Defendant does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of battery or
that Haynes was performing his official duties at the time of the battery. Rather, he solely argues
the evidence does not support a finding of aggravated battery because the evidence failed to show
that he knew Haynes was working as a private security officer, rather than as a police officer, at
the time of the offense. Thus, we limit our review to that issue.
¶ 31 “An admission by a defendant is not required for the trier of fact to conclude that a
defendant had knowledge of something.” People v. Jasoni, 2012 IL App (2d) 110217, ¶ 20. Such
evidence “may be established by evidence of the acts, statements, or conduct of the defendant, as
well as the surrounding circumstances.” People v. Jaynes, 2014 IL App (5th) 120048, ¶ 46. The
evidence must sufficiently support an inference of knowledge based on established facts rather
than pyramided on intervening inferences. People v. Lissade, 403 Ill. App. 3d 609, 613 (2010).
¶ 32 Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, we conclude
the evidence was sufficient to show defendant knew Haynes was a private security officer when
he struck Haynes in the groin. Haynes was with two other security guards who responded to the
call. Defendant was detained and searched first by Comas, then by Haynes. Haynes placed
defendant in a vehicle clearly marked “security.” Haynes was wearing a vest that read “police”
and “Parkway Gardens” on the chest, and Kaniewski was wearing a jacket that read “Security.”
Moreover, Haynes testified he had previous experience with defendant, and defendant had
previously been banned from the premises, which supports an inference that defendant knew there
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was security for the housing complex. To that we would add that, at the time that defendant kneed
Haynes in the groin, an actual police vehicle had arrived on the scene, highlighting a clear contrast
with the security vehicle in which defendant had initially been placed.
¶ 33 In light of these circumstances, when three security officers, one wearing a “security”
jacket and Haynes wearing a vest reading “Parkway Gardens,” detained defendant, patted him
down, and escorted him to a vehicle marked “security,” and were attempting to transfer him to
uniformed CPD officers in a marked police vehicle when defendant kneed Haynes, and further in
light of defendant’s previous encounters with this security team, we find it was reasonable for the
trial court to infer that defendant knew Haynes was a security officer when he kneed him in the
groin. See Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35 (it is the trier of fact’s responsibility to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence); Jaynes, 2014 IL App (5th) 120048, ¶ 46 (knowledge may be
established by evidence of the surrounding circumstances). Accordingly, we cannot say “the
evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of
the defendant’s guilt.” Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35.
¶ 34 In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s claim that the evidence
was insufficient because the trial court made a factual finding that it did not matter whether
defendant believed Haynes was a police officer or a private security officer. The trial court, in
ruling on defendant’s posttrial motion, found the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant knew
Haynes was a security officer and that, if he did not know, he “must have” thought Haynes was a
police officer, which would be treated the same under the aggravated battery statute. We do not
find that the trial court’s statement changes the sufficiency of the evidence against defendant. We
may affirm on any basis in the record regardless of the circuit court’s reasoning (People v.
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Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 349 (2000)), and the evidence here amply supports a finding that
defendant knew, as charged, that Haynes was a private security officer when he kneed him.
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
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