In re E.C. , 2021 IL App (1st) 210197-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 210197-UFIRST DISTRICT,
FIRST DIVISION
October 12, 2021
No. 1-21-0197
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF: ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
E. C., E. C., and C.M., ) Cook County, Illinois
) Juvenile Justice and
Minors-Respondents-Appellees, ) Child Protection Department,
) Child Protection Division.
)
)
(PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Nos. 17 JA 352-54
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
v. ) The Honorable
) Kimberly Lewis,
E.R., ) Judge Presiding.
)
Mother-Respondent-Appellant.) )
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pucinski and Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Mother’s rights to effective assistance of counsel, confrontation, and due process
were not violated by conducting a portion of termination of parental rights (TPR)
trial over Zoom audio-video conferencing.
¶2 Mother-respondent E.R. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to three of her minor children, Es. C., El. C., and C.M. E.R. asserts that conducting part of
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the TPR trial on Zoom violated her rights to effective assistance of counsel, confrontation, and
due process. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Initially, we note that E.R. does not challenge the evidence presented during the TPR
proceedings or argue that the court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We set forth here only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised in this appeal.
¶5 In April 2017, the State brought petitions for adjudication of wardship and moved for
temporary custody of Es. C., El. C., and C.M.1 The petitions alleged that the minors were
abused and neglected.
¶6 On April 13, 2017, following a stipulated adjudication hearing, the trial court found
probable cause that the minors were abused/neglected and an immediate and urgent necessity to
place temporary custody of the minors in the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) Guardianship Administrator. On September 27, 2017, the trial court found the
minors to be abused or neglected due to an injurious environment and at substantial risk of
physical injury. On February 7, 2018, the trial court entered a disposition order finding the
minors to be wards of the court with placement to remain with the DCFS Guardianship
Administrator.
¶7 On May 6, 2019, the State filed TPR petitions on behalf of the minors and a supplemental
petition for the appointment of a guardian with the right to consent to adoption, alleging that E.R.
was an unfit parent. The trial commenced in person on December 27, 2019. E.R. was found to be
unfit for a number of reasons, including her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
1
El. C. and Es. C have a different father than C.M. and both fathers’ parental rights were
terminated. They are not parties to this appeal.
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No. 1-21-0197
concern, or responsibility and failure to make reasonable progress towards the return of the
children from September 2017 to April 2019.
¶8 The best interests hearing commenced immediately after the trial court’s unfitness ruling,
but was continued to a later date for completion. In early March 2020, in-person court
appearances in the Circuit Court of Cook County were canceled and/or restrictions were imposed
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to address public health risks, Chief Judge Timothy C.
Evans entered General Administrative Order 2020-07, effective March 23, 2020, providing, in
part, “except in extraordinary or compelling circumstances, all matters in all Districts and
Divisions of the court shall be conducted by videoconference, subject to the limitations imposed
by the constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois.” Cook County Cir. Ct. Gen.
Adm. Order 2020-07 (Nov. 23, 2020). After a number of continuances, the trial court ordered
that the matter would proceed via Zoom audio-video conferencing.
¶9 E.R. objected to a Zoom hearing, arguing that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 and
the Juvenile Court Act, she had the right to be physically present in court, that counsel could not
effectively cross-examine witnesses over Zoom, and that trial by Zoom constituted a due process
violation.
¶ 10 The trial court ruled that conducting the hearing virtually “would not deprive any of the
parties of their right to a full and fair hearing,” noting:
“My ability to evaluate the credibility of witnesses has not been negatively impacted
by remote versus in-person hearing *** This hearing will be conducted to as to ensure
that the due process rights of the parties are maintained. This Court will do everything
within its power and authority to ensure that all witnesses called to testify are alone and
not subject to being coached and that witnesses are not using notes *** This Court will
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give counsel every opportunity to confer with their client before, during and after witness
examinations so that effective assistance of counsel will be provided.”
¶ 11 The TPR trial proceeded on February 8, 2021 over Zoom. The court heard the testimony
of a former caseworker, the foster care supervisor, and E.R. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court terminated E.R.’s parental rights, finding that it was in the best interests of the minors to
allow the appointment of a guardian to consent to adoption.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 E.R. argues that the Zoom hearing violated her rights to effective assistance of counsel,
confrontation, and due process
¶ 14 Initially, we note that E.R.’s brief does not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule
341(h)(7) because her argument does not contain any citations to the record in support of her
claims. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1 2020).2 While this alone is grounds for forfeiture
(see In re Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 61), “because the merits of the case can be
ascertained from the record and we have the benefit of [] cogent brief[s]” from the State and the
Public Guardian, we will consider the merits of E.R.’s arguments. See Antonson v. Department
of Human Services, 2021 IL App (1st) 192272-U, ¶ 18; see also Twardowski v. Holiday
Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (finding that plaintiff’s insufficient brief
did not preclude “meaningful review” and the “merits of the present case can be readily
ascertained from the record on appeal”).
2
E.R. attempts to “adopt[] and incorporate[] by reference” a reply brief filed in an unrelated case,
In re R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411. While the legal issues in the instant appeal overlap with In re R.D.,
the contentions in the reply brief respond specifically to the parties’ arguments and the circumstances in
that appeal rather than the case at hand. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(j) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“The reply brief, if
any, shall be confined strictly to reply to arguments presented in the brief of the appellee”). We therefore
will not consider a reply brief filed in an unrelated appeal.
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¶ 15 First, E.R. maintains that “trial by zoom denied [her] effective assistance of counsel”
because the sixth amendment “encompasses meaningful in-person interaction between
respondent and counsel, before trial and simultaneously during trial.”
¶ 16 The sixth amendment right to counsel applies to criminal defendants (see U.S. Const.,
amend. VI (“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense”)), whereas E.R.’s right to counsel originates from the
Juvenile Court Act (Act). 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2020). “Though the statutory right to
counsel in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act lacks constitutional footing *** that right is
closely linked to its constitutional counterpart.” In re Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 42 (citing In re
R.G., 165 Ill. App. 3d 112, 127 (1988)). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in parental
rights proceedings are assessed using the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984). See, Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 43.
¶ 17 E.R. does not claim that counsel was ineffective. Rather, E.R. erroneously relies on
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), in
asserting that effective assistance of counsel requires “meaningful in-person interaction” with
counsel at every stage of the proceedings. Neither case stands for that proposition. See Powell,
287 U.S. at 71 (failure of the trial court to give defendants “reasonable time and opportunity to
secure counsel was a clear denial of due process”); Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70 (addressing whether
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s conflict of interest).
¶ 18 E.R. also asserts a denial of her right to confront witnesses under the sixth amendment.
Again, this right applies in criminal prosecutions (see U.S. Const., amend. VI (“[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to *** be confronted with the witnesses against
him”)), whereas child protection proceedings under the Act are civil in nature. See In re J.S.,
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2020 IL App (1st) 191119, ¶ 41. The sixth amendment confrontation clause has been applied to
civil cases “involving procedures before administrative agencies” where there has been “gross”
deviation from fair procedure. In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489, 495 (1986). To the extent that
“confrontation rights may be an aspect of due process in civil proceedings, the confrontation
clause need not be applied strictly.” Id. In her brief, E.R. fails to distinguish between civil and
criminal proceedings, much less explain how her sixth amendment rights have been violated in
this case.
¶ 19 E.R. also relies on her right to be present and to cross-examine witnesses under the Act
(see 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1)), but the right to be present, in-person or otherwise, is not absolute.
See, e.g., In re M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d 399, 403 (2000); In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶
73 (finding that while Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 “does not specifically state that remote
participation is the same as the statutory right to be ‘present’ at a hearing, such a finding is
implicit in the Rule’s provision allowing persons to ‘participate’ remotely”).
¶ 20 Moreover, even in criminal proceedings, the requirement of face-to-face, in-person
confrontation “is not absolute.” People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 59 (2000). The Supreme Court
has held that the right to face-to-face, in person confrontation may need to give way to policy
concerns where “necessary to further an important state interest” as long as it “does not impinge
upon the truth-seeking” purpose of the confrontation clause. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
850-51 (1990); see also Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d at 59 (finding the trial court preventing defendant
from viewing testifying witness at all fell outside of the narrow exception in Craig).
¶ 21 In In re R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 15, we recently held that conducting hearings
to terminate respondents’ parental rights over Zoom “did not impinge upon the truth-seeking
purpose of the confrontation clause.” In R.D., “respondents were represented by counsel and had
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the opportunity to be present, to be heard, to present evidence, and to cross-examine the
witnesses against them. While in-person testimony and cross-examination are preferred
[citation], respondents and their counsel could view and hear the witnesses as they testified.” Id.The trial court ensured that all witnesses were alone and not using documents while testifying
and found that its ability to evaluate the credibility of witnesses was not negatively impacted by
remote proceedings. Id. We also held that the use of Zoom furthered important state interests by
“enabling courts to conduct business while keeping people safe from a deadly virus” and by
advancing the State’s interest in the welfare of the children. Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 22 Similarly, in the instant case, E.R. was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to
be present, to be heard, to present evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses against her. The
trial court ensured that the witnesses were alone and not referencing documents while testifying
and the court found that it was able to effectively assess the credibility of witnesses.
Additionally, the same important state interests in the welfare of the minors and safely resolving
the case amidst a global pandemic at issue in R.D. are present here. See R.D., 2021 IL App (1st)
201411, ¶ 16.
¶ 23 Finally, E.R. alleges a deprivation of her interest in the care, custody, and management of
her children, a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363
(2004). When the State moves to terminate parental rights, “it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures.” See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
¶ 24 In determining whether administrative procedures are constitutionally sufficient, we
consider (1) the “private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if
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any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”, and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involve and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976);
In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2001) (applying Mathews to TPR proceedings).
¶ 25 Balancing the Mathews factors, we find that the Zoom hearing conducted in this case
complied with the requirements of procedural due process. E.R. has a protected liberty interest in
maintaining a relationship with her children, but the children have their own interests in a “stable
and safe home environment” free from the “uncertain and fluctuating world of foster care.” D.T.,
212 Ill. 2d at 364-65. In addition, as discussed herein, E.R. was not denied the right to be present,
to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses against her, or to confer with counsel. See R.D., 2021 IL
App (1st) 201411, ¶ 20 (noting that “counsel conducted contemporaneous cross-examination,
and through the monitor, counsel could observe the witness’s demeanor and body language”).
¶ 26 Finally, the State has a “ ‘parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare
of the child[ren] and a fiscal and administrative interest of reducing the cost and burden of such
proceedings.’ ” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 365 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766). Further delay would
arguably “impose[] a serious cost on the functions of government, as well as an intangible cost to
the lives of the children involved.” M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 403. And, “[g]iven the seriousness
of the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty of when it would be safe to hold in-
person hearings, we must weigh this factor accordingly.” See R.D., 2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶
21. Accordingly, we find that completing this trial over Zoom did not violate E.R.’s right to
procedural due process. See, e.g., id. (holding that Zoom TPR proceedings did not violate
parents’ rights to procedural due process under Mathews); M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 403
(weighing the factors under Mathews, the court held that mother’s absence from TPR
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proceedings due to her hospitalization did not violate due process where she was represented by
counsel and further delay would impinge on State’s and children’s interests).
¶ 27 We further find that these proceedings were conducted in conformity with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 241, which provides that a “case participant may testify or otherwise
participate in a civil trial or evidentiary hearing by video conferencing from a remote location” if
“good cause” is shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 241 (eff. May 22, 2020). “Good cause is likely to arise when
a witness is unable to attend a trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident, illness, or limited
court operations.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). The trial court
“should take into consideration and balance any due process concerns” when deciding whether to
allow remote testimony. Id.
¶ 28 In In re P.S., the Fifth District held that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in
denying Father’s request for a continuance and electing to conduct the termination proceedings
via a videoconferencing platform in conformity with Rule 241.” P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027,
¶ 63. The father argued that conducting TPR proceedings via Zoom violated his “ ‘due process
right to appear personally at all stages of the proceeding.’ ” Id. ¶ 51. The court found that “good
cause” was shown because of the limited court operations “due to the public health concerns
presented by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.” Id. ¶ 59.
¶ 29 Likewise, in-court operations were limited in this case due to the COVID-19 pandemic
and the court properly “took steps to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings and the parties’
rights” (see id. ¶ 60) by addressing its ability to assess credibility, providing opportunities for
E.R. to confer with counsel in breakout rooms and ensuring that the witnesses were alone and not
referring to documents while testifying.
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¶ 30 CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, E.R.’s rights to effective assistance of counsel, confrontation,
and due process were not violated by completing a best interests hearing over Zoom amidst a
global pandemic. The trial court’s termination of E.R.’s parental rights for all three children is
affirmed.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
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