Brasher v. Knapp ( 2021 )

NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 200590-UOctober 12, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and Carla Bender
is not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0590
4th District Appellate
limited circumstances
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
BRADLEY H. BRASHER, ) Appeal from
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
DON KNAPP, State’s Attorney of McLean County, ) No. 20MR55
Respondent-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Rebecca S. Foley,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to direct the
Department of State Police to issue a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card
where petitioner failed to meet the applicable standards set forth in section 10(c)
of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2020)).
¶2 In January 2020, petitioner, Bradley H. Brasher, filed a motion to direct the
Department of State Police (the Department) to issue him a FOID card. After a hearing on the
motion, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground petitioner was barred from
possessing a firearm under federal law.
¶3 On October 16, 2020, petitioner filed a motion asking the circuit court to
reconsider its judgment. On November 23, 2020, the court held a hearing on petitioner’s motion.
The circuit court acknowledged it erred by failing to consider our supreme court’s decision in
Johnson v. Department of State Police, 2020 IL 124213, 161 N.E.3d 161, and proceeded to “re-
analyze the evidence that is in the record in this case” in light of Johnson. Ultimately, the court
determined petitioner failed to establish (1) the circumstances of his criminal convictions,
criminal history, and reputation indicated he would not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety and (2) granting petitioner relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
Therefore, the court again denied petitioner’s motion.
¶4 Petitioner appeals, arguing the circuit court erred by (1) failing to consider all
relevant caselaw and (2) requiring “witnesses not law.” We disagree and affirm.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 A. Motion to Direct the Department to Issue a FOID Card
¶7 On January 28, 2020, petitioner filed a pro se motion in the circuit court of
McLean County pursuant to section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID
Card Act) (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2020)). Petitioner sought an order directing the Department to
issue him a FOID card. In June 2020, petitioner again filed a motion seeking an order directing
the Department to issue him a FOID card, and in September 2020, petitioner filed amendments
to the motion, including additional attachments. Attached to petitioner’s amended motion was a
copy of a letter from the Department denying his application for a FOID card. In the letter, the
Department denied petitioner’s application pursuant to his convictions for: (1) criminal damage
to state property, a Class 3 felony, in Ford County case No. 11-CF-60; (2) domestic battery in
McLean County case No. 13-CF-183; (3) domestic battery in Ford County case No. 11-CF-12;
and (4) domestic battery in Champaign County case No. 05-JD-73. Additionally, the letter noted
federal law prohibited firearm ownership by (1) “persons who have been convicted of a crime
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punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and (2) “[p]ersons convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
¶8 In his amended motion, petitioner argued (1) he has never been convicted of a
forcible felony; (2) he had not been convicted of a firearm barring offense in the prior seven
years; (3) although he had been convicted of domestic battery, “the nature of such convictions
are not life time barring” (citing Coram v. State, 2013 IL 113867, 996 N.E.2d 1057, and Hensley
v. Illinois State Police, 2012 IL App (3d) 110011-U); (4) the circumstances surrounding his
convictions were unlikely to reoccur; (5) he had a reputation in the community as an “honest,
hardworking, law abiding, and non-violent individual”; and (6) granting his petition would not
be contrary to the public interest.
¶9 Petitioner attached to his motion: (1) copies of Coram, Hensley, Johnson, Fuller
v. Department of State Police, 2019 IL App (1st) 173148, 125 N.E.3d 1145, and Wakefield v.
Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (5th) 140363-U; (2) the letter from the Department
denying his FOID card with petitioner’s handwritten notes; (3) an unofficial transcript from
Heartland Community College; (4) an academic progress report from Heartland Community
College showing petitioner had completed 36 of 60 required hours towards a pre-criminal justice
associates degree; (5) the articles of organization for “Blac Cultivation LLC,” a limited liability
company listing petitioner as a manager; (6) petitioner’s insurance license permitting him to
produce fire and casualty insurance; (7) screenshots of text messages purportedly between
petitioner and a victim from one of his prior convictions; and (8) petitioner’s order for probation
and record sheet in McLean County case No. 13-CF-183.
¶ 10 The McLean County State’s Attorney’s Office filed an objection to petitioner’s
motion. It argued (1) the denial of petitioner’s FOID card application demonstrated “substantial
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justice,” (2) 20 years had not passed since petitioner committed a forcible felony, (3) petitioner’s
“history and reputation are such that the Petitioner is likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety,” (4) granting relief would be contrary to the public interest, and (5) granting relief
would be contrary to federal law. Specifically, as to the last argument, the state’s attorney
contended petitioner was barred from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(1) of the Federal
Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act) (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018)). The federal
provision bars firearm possession not only for violent offenses but also for “ ‘serious’ criminal
offenses,” which the state’s attorney argued applied to petitioner’s conviction for criminal
damage to state property in Ford County case No. 11-CF-60. Alternatively, the state’s attorney
argued petitioner was prohibited from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(9) of the Gun
Control Act due to his misdemeanor domestic violence convictions.
¶ 11 Petitioner replied, contending that under section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) of the Gun
Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i) (2018)), he was exempt from federal restrictions and,
further, the denial of his FOID card due to federal restrictions was unconstitutional as applied to
him, citing Coram. Petitioner argued “substantial justice” was not accomplished by denying him
a FOID card and, though he agreed he should not have committed the crimes he was convicted
of, he has “grown to become a successful productive citizen, who is now a father of two ***,
Certified Computer Scientist, a License[d] Insurance Agent, Local Business Owner[,] and a
student pursuing a minor [in] Criminal Justice and a [Bachelor’s degree] in Law.” Petitioner also
moved to strike (1) his juvenile domestic violence conviction in Champaign County case No.
05-JD-73 and (2) his conviction for possession of cannabis.
¶ 12 B. Hearing on the Motion
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¶ 13 On October 16, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion. At the outset,
the court denied petitioner’s motions to strike his juvenile domestic violence conviction and
cannabis conviction. The court asked petitioner if he wished to present oral testimony, and
petitioner responded, “I do have an opening statement, but to my understanding the burden is on
the State to prove the character of the individual who I am today.” Petitioner argued the relevant
convictions were 7 to 15 years old and he was “now a 28-year-old father of two, a business
owner who is in pursuant [sic] of a BA in law who has served the community *** with multiple
customer service focused jobs.” Further, petitioner argued, “The State has yet to prove the
petitioner is a danger to the public as a 28-year-old man, or how it would be against the public’s
interest for a 28-year-old law student to possess a firearm.”
¶ 14 The circuit court reviewed petitioner’s attached exhibits. The court declined to
admit the case law copies, explaining to petitioner, “You can argue them, but they are not
admitted as exhibits.” In the absence of the necessary foundation, the court also declined to
admit screenshots of text messages. Otherwise, the court admitted petitioner’s exhibits. The
state’s attorney asked the court to take judicial notice of petitioner’s prior convictions:
(1) Champaign County case No. 05-JD-73, (2) Ford County case No. 11-CF-60, (3) McLean
County case No. 13-CF-183, and (4) McLean County case No. 15-CM-168.
¶ 15 Petitioner argued the state’s attorney had only presented his criminal history and
had not “proven beyond an extent that [he is] a danger to the public or it would be against the
public’s interest as the 28-year-old man [he is] today to possess a firearm.” Petitioner made no
reference to the case law attached to his motion during his argument.
¶ 16 The state’s attorney argued petitioner was prohibited from possessing a firearm
under federal law. In addition, the state’s attorney explained that section 10 of the FOID Card
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Act required the court to consider “[w]hether the applicant has been convicted of a forceful
felony within the past 20 years, the circumstances regarding that conviction and granting relief
would not be contrary to the public interest[,] and it would not be contrary to Federal law.” The
state’s attorney argued petitioner did not offer testimony to explain the circumstances of the
offenses or establish petitioner’s present character. In response, petitioner reiterated he believed
he was exempt from the federal restrictions.
¶ 17 Following argument, the circuit court began by noting there are five criteria to
consider under section 10 of the FOID Card Act. The court determined petitioner had satisfied
the service requirement (see 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(0.05) (West 2018)) and petitioner’s felony
conviction did not meet the definition of a forcible felony under Illinois law (see id. § 10(c)(1)).
As for the remaining factors, the court focused on the fourth factor: “granting relief would not be
contrary to Federal law” (see id. § 10(c)(4)). The court noted federal law prohibited firearm
ownership to those who have been convicted of (1) a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than one year and (2) domestic battery. Citing Baumgartner v. Greene County State’s Attorney’s
Office, 2016 IL App (4th) 150035, 52 N.E.3d 654, the court noted Coram was not applicable to
petitioner where Coram cited a prior version of the FOID Card Act. Continuing to cite
Baumgartner, the court determined that, where petitioner had not lost any rights with his
domestic violence conviction in McLean County case No. 13-CF-183, those civil rights could
not have been restored. The court determined, “Accordingly, Mr. Brasher remains under a
Federal firearm disability. As such, the Court will not address the remaining elements of [section
10 of the FOID Card Act].” As to the felony conviction and the other domestic violence
convictions, the court determined the federal exemption in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) of the Gun
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Control Act did apply, as petitioner’s rights were restored in those cases. The court denied
petitioner’s motion.
¶ 18 C. Motion to Reconsider
¶ 19 On October 16, 2020, petitioner filed a motion asking the circuit court to
reconsider its judgment. In his motion, petitioner argued he had lost rights with his conviction,
listing:
“1. The Right to Bear arms.
2. The right to Defend home on The Common Law Principle of Castle Doctrine.
3. The right to privacy from public searched of record.
4. The right to pursue certain Professions.”
Petitioner argued that, as these rights had been lost, they could be restored, relevant to the federal
exception in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) of the Gun Control Act. The state’s attorney did not file a
written response to petitioner’s motion.
¶ 20 On November 23, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on petitioner’s motion to
reconsider the judgment. Petitioner cited to Johnson, arguing the following propositions: “[O]ne,
the right to keep and bear arms is a civil right, two, Illinois has a regulatory mechanism to restore
those rights, and three, relief granted under Section 10 of the FOID Card Act constitutes a
sufficient restoration of civil rights as intended by section [921(a)(33)(B)(ii)].”
¶ 21 The state’s attorney maintained their objection to petitioner’s motion, “primarily
on [petitioner]’s background.” Specifically, the State argued, “his criminal history is what
prohibits him from receiving a FOID card.”
¶ 22 The circuit court acknowledged it erred in applying Baumgartner in light of the
decision in Johnson. The court granted rehearing and proceeded to reanalyze the evidence in
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light of Johnson. The court determined that, under Johnson, a petitioner must still meet the
requirements of section 10(c)(1) through (4). See Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 19. As to the first
factor, as the court had previously determined, petitioner had not committed a forcible felony. As
to the fourth factor, that a petitioner is not prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law,
the court acknowledged Johnson held if a petitioner “can meet all of the elements of the FOID
Card Act then their civil rights have been restored which would eliminate the prohibition under
Federal law.” See id. ¶ 47. The court then turned to the second and third factors:
“[C]ircumstances regarding a criminal conviction and reputation, and then whether or not
granting relief would be contrary to the public interest.” The court noted it had not previously
reviewed those factors where it denied petitioner’s motion on the federal prohibition factor.
¶ 23 The circuit court reviewed the evidence presented by petitioner. The court noted
the Heartland Community College transcript “showing classes taken *** showing progress
toward, but no degree obtained.” As to petitioner’s insurance license, the court stated the
following:
“The fact that Mr. Brasher has obtained his insurance license is evidence in his
favor as it assumes the director of insurance was advised of his felony conviction
and considered mitigating factors and evidence of rehabilitation pursuant to
Section 500-76 of the Illinois Insurance Code. However, other than the license
itself there is no evidence in this record with regard to that process.”
The court further noted petitioner did not testify at the hearing and presented no witnesses in
support of his motion. The court then reviewed petitioner’s criminal history including his
convictions for domestic battery, his felony conviction for criminal damage to state property, and
his conviction for possession of cannabis. The court determined:
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“Mr. Brasher has not established that his criminal history and reputation indicate
that he is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, nor has he
established that granting relief is not contrary to the public interest. As he fails to
meet these requirements, he has failed to establish that his civil rights have been
restored. Accordingly, the motion for the order to direct the Illinois State Police to
issue his FOID card will be denied.”
¶ 24 This appeal followed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 Prior to addressing petitioner’s arguments, we note the state’s attorney has not
filed a brief in the matter.
“[I]n the absence of an appellee’s brief, a reviewing court has three options:
(1) the court may serve as an advocate for the appellee and decide the case when
the court determines that justice so requires; (2) the court may decide the merits of
the case if the record is simple and the issues can be easily decided without the aid
of an appellee’s brief; or (3) the court may reverse the trial court when the
appellant’s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error that is supported by the
record.” Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 14,
11 N.E.3d 26.
Because the record before us is simple and the claimed errors are such that this court can easily
decide them without the aid of an appellee’s brief, we will address the merits of petitioner’s
appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133,
345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).
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¶ 27 On appeal, petitioner argues (1) the court erred by failing to analyze “all relevant
and similar case law regarding firearm restoration” and (2) the court stated a preference “for
witnesses not law.”
¶ 28 A. The Law of Section(10)(c)
¶ 29 We begin by discussing the state of the law relevant to section 10(c) of the FOID
Card Act. Under the FOID Card Act, the Department may deny an application for a FOID card if
the applicant has been convicted of domestic battery or is a person prohibited from acquiring or
possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by state statute or federal law. 430 ILCS 65/8(l), (n)
(West 2020). Section 10 of the FOID Card Act provides a mechanism by which a petitioner can
appeal the denial of his application for a FOID card. Pursuant to section 10, “Any person
prohibited from possessing a firearm *** under Section 8 of this Act may *** petition the circuit
court *** requesting relief from such prohibition.” Id. § 10(c). A circuit court may grant a FOID
card applicant relief where he establishes the following requirements:
“(0.05) when in the circuit court, the State’s Attorney has been served with
a written copy of the petition at least 30 days before any such hearing in the
circuit court and at the hearing the State’s Attorney was afforded an opportunity
to present evidence and object to the petition;
(1) the applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws
of this State of any other jurisdiction within 20 years of the applicant’s application
for a [FOID card], or at least 20 years have passed since the end of any period of
imprisonment imposed in relation to that conviction;
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(2) the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable,
the applicant’s criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety;
(3) granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and
(4) granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.” Id.
The language that bars the circuit court from granting relief where contrary to federal law took
effect on January 1, 2013. See Pub. Act 97-1131 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (amending 430 ILCS 65/10).
¶ 30 Under the Gun Control Act, it is unlawful for any person “who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm. 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2018). However, the Gun Control Act further provides:
“A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for
purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if
the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under
such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights
expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2018).
In Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 (2007), the Supreme Court noted that, although the
term “civil rights” was not defined in the Gun Control Act, “courts have held *** that the civil
rights relevant under the *** provision are the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury.”
¶ 31 The plurality opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in Coram, 2013 IL 113867,
¶ 74, determined that under a version of the FOID Card Act predating the 2013 amendments,
section 10(c) could remove a federal firearms disability and entitle a petitioner to a FOID card.
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While the lead opinion in Coram addressed the 2013 amendments (see Coram, 2013 IL 113867,
¶ 75 (“Relief granted pursuant to statutory review removes the federal firearm disability.”
(Emphasis in original.)), those comments were dicta, and a majority of the court did not agree
with that dicta. See id. ¶ 101 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) (“The
amendments make clear that a circuit court no longer has the authority to make findings or grant
relief under section 10 if the court concludes that the applicant would be in violation of federal
law if he or she were to possess a firearm.”); id. ¶ 124 (Theis, J., dissenting, joined by Garman,
J.) (“[U]nder the amended statute, the relief procedures under section 10 cannot remove a federal
firearms disability.”). Since the 2013 amendments, the appellate courts have agreed with the
majority of the supreme court in Coram that a circuit court is prohibited from granting a
petitioner relief under section 10 of the FOID Card Act when he is prohibited from possessing a
firearm under federal law. See Walton v. Illinois State Police, 2015 IL App (4th) 141055, ¶ 23,
39 N.E.3d 1095; People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 133633, ¶ 29, 44 N.E.3d 486; People v.
Frederick, 2015 IL App (2d) 140540, ¶ 28, 40 N.E.3d 63; O’Neill v. Director of the Illinois
Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (3d) 140011, ¶ 31, 28 N.E.3d 1020; Odle v.
Department of State Police, 2015 IL App (5th) 140274, ¶ 33, 43 N.E.3d 1223.
¶ 32 However, in Johnson, 2020 IL 124213, the supreme court reconsidered the federal
restriction under section 922(g)(9) of the Gun Control Act. In Johnson, the petitioner, much like
petitioner here, had been convicted of a misdemeanor battery against her then-husband but did
not serve a term of confinement and therefore did not lose any of the rights discussed in Logan.
Id. ¶¶ 3, 28-29. The circuit court determined the petitioner satisfied the requirements of sections
10(c)(1) through (3) of the FOID Card Act, and thus she was eligible to have her FOID card
reinstated but for her firearm disability under federal law. Id. ¶ 9.
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¶ 33 In analyzing the federal firearms restrictions, the supreme court stated:
“The ‘civil rights restored’ provision uniformly has been described as ‘a
measure by which the government relieves an offender of some or all of the
consequences of his conviction,’ and ‘extend[s] to an offender a measure of
forgiveness.” [Logan, 552 U.S. at 26]. The law of the convicting jurisdiction
controls whether civil rights have been restored (Caron v. United States, 524 U.S.
308, 316 (1998)) because ‘Congress sought to accommodate a state’s judgment
that a particular person *** is, despite a prior conviction, sufficiently trustworthy
to possess firearms” (McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir.
1995)). See also United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1997) (‘by
reinvesting a person with core civic responsibilities, the state vouches for the
trustworthiness of that person to possess firearms’ unless that right is expressly
withheld). Thus the provision queries whether an offender’s legal status has been
altered by a state’s dispensation of forgiveness. Logan, 552 U.S. at 26.
Illinois law provides a path to do exactly that—restore firearm rights
under a specific restoration of rights provision. Sections 10(c)(1)-(3) of the FOID
Card Act as a mechanism to relieve an offender of some of the consequences of
his conviction and extend a measure of forgiveness to certain qualified offenders.
Specifically, the State has a process for determining, after an individualized
hearing, that the individual is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
safety and that is would not be against the public interest for the individual to
possess firearms. 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2012). Thus, Illinois law indeed
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provides a status altering dispensation by restoring firearm rights.” Johnson, 2020
IL 124213, ¶¶ 26-27.
¶ 34 The supreme court disagreed with the notion “civil rights” encompassed only
those rights discussed in Logan and found that “(1) the right to keep and bear arms is a ‘civil
right,’ (2) Illinois has a regulatory mechanism to restore those rights through an individualized
determination, and (3) relief granted under section 10 of the FOID Card Act constitutes a
sufficient restoration of civil rights as intended by section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).” Id. ¶ 30. In support,
the supreme court considered that recognizing firearms rights as civil rights that could be
restored was consistent with the legislative purpose of the federal statute at issue, explaining:
“A state regulatory scheme that restores a person’s eligibility for firearm rights by
affirmatively and expressly evaluating that person’s future dangerousness—
through evidence, and not generalization—is entirely consistent with the
trustworthiness rationale that underpins the ‘civil rights restored’ provision.
Indeed, such a scheme is a direct and relevant path for a state to show that a
person is rehabilitated and can be trusted to possess firearms. It reflects a
determination by the convicting jurisdiction that the particular consequence of the
conviction should no longer be imposed.
***
Thus, to ignore the express and measured finding under a section 10
hearing that an individual no longer poses a risk to public safety would frustrate
the very legislative purpose underlying the federal statute.” Id. ¶¶ 41-43.
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¶ 35 Ultimately, the supreme court held that the petitioner’s firearm rights lost as a
result of her conviction “were restored under Illinois’s regulatory scheme (430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-
(3) (West 2012)), which affirmatively provided for a ‘status-altering dispensation.’ ” Id. ¶ 47.
¶ 36 B. This Case
¶ 37 In this case, petitioner argues the circuit court erred by (1) failing to consider all
relevant case law and (2) requiring petitioner to present “witnesses not law” in deciding
petitioner was not eligible for relief under section 10 of the FOID Card Act.
¶ 38 1. Relevant Case Law
¶ 39 Petitioner argues the circuit court failed to consider all relevant case law in
determining he was not eligible for relief under section 10 of the FOID Card Act. Specifically,
petitioner cites to Coram, Johnson, and Hensley.
¶ 40 At the outset, we note Hensley is an unpublished order under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 23(b) (eff. July 1, 2011), entered prior to January 21, 2021. Unpublished orders are
“not precedential except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or law of the case” but may be cited for persuasive purposes if entered on or after
January 1, 2021. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021). Accordingly, neither we nor the circuit
court may consider the decision in Hensley.
¶ 41 As discussed above, Coram addressed a prior version of the statute. That prior
version of the statute is inapplicable to petitioner, and therefore, the decision by the supreme
court to remove the petitioner’s firearm disability in Coram does not warrant a different result in
this case. See Baumgartner, 2016 IL App (4th) 150035, ¶ 33. In addition, the circuit court
addressed Coram and determined, as we do here, “that case addressed a previous version of the
FOID Act that is inapplicable to [petitioner].”
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¶ 42 Finally, as to Johnson, the circuit court acknowledged it did not consider Johnson
in the original hearing on petitioner’s motion but did discuss Johnson at length in the hearing on
petitioner’s motion to reconsider the court’s judgment. In its application of Johnson, the court
acknowledged petitioner could be granted relief so long as he met “the full requirements of the
FOID Card Act”—namely section 10(c)(1), (2) and (3).
¶ 43 We therefore find no error, as the court fully considered the relevant case law at
the hearings.
¶ 44 2. Requirements of Section 10(c)(2) and (3)
¶ 45 Finally, petitioner argues the circuit court erred by requiring “witnesses not law.”
We understand this as an argument that the circuit court erred in determining petitioner failed to
satisfy the requirements of section 10(c)(2) and (3). Petitioner again cites to Coram and Hensley
as representing cases where similarly situated petitioners presented no witnesses but obtained
relief from the circuit court. As noted above, we cannot consider Hensley because it is an
unpublished order entered before January 1, 2021. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021).
¶ 46 At the hearing to reconsider petitioner’s motion, the circuit court determined
petitioner was not barred from possessing a firearm under federal restrictions if he could satisfy
the other requirements of section 10(c). The court acknowledged petitioner had not committed a
forcible felony, satisfying section 10(c)(1) of the FOID Card Act. This left petitioner to satisfy
section 10(c)(2), “the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the
applicant’s criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act
in a manner dangerous to public safety,” and section 10(c)(3), “granting relief would not be
contrary to the public interest.” See 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2020).
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¶ 47 Petitioner presented little evidence to demonstrate he was not likely to act in a
manner dangerous to public safety and granting him relief would not be contrary to the public
interest. This appears to be due to petitioner misunderstanding where the burden lies. At the
initial hearing on the motion, petitioner stated, “to my understanding the burden is on the State to
prove the character of the individual who I am today.” This is an incorrect statement of law.
Under section 10(c), the court may grant relief where “it is established by the applicant to the
court’s satisfaction” the four requirements of the section. (Emphasis added.) 430 ILCS 65/10(c)
(West 2020); see also Brown v. Illinois State Police, 2020 IL App (3d) 180409, ¶ 20, 159 N.E.3d
457 (“The trial court may not grant relief, however, unless the petitioner has proven the *** four
requirements to the trial court’s satisfaction.” (Emphasis added.)). Petitioner presented to the
court minimal evidence far below what any court would reasonably believe to be to its
“satisfaction” to establish requirements (2) and (3).
¶ 48 Petitioner points to Coram, where the petitioner presented no witnesses. Although
Coram addressed a prior version of the statute, we find it is distinguishable from petitioner’s
case. In Coram, the petitioner presented evidence in the form of a psychological report. Coram,
2013 IL 113867, ¶ 12. The examining psychologist “ ‘strongly recommended’ that Coram be
‘reconsidered for a FOID [card],’ noting, ‘from a mental health standpoint, there is no indication
that [Coram] would be dangerous if given a FOID [card], and allowed to access any form of
weaponry.” Id. Although the petitioner presented no witnesses to testify in court, he did present
adequate evidence for the court to consider. Petitioner failed to do so in this case.
¶ 49 In Johnson, the petitioner presented multiple witnesses, including her current
husband and several law enforcement personnel who knew her personally, in addition to
testifying herself. Johnson, 2020 IL124213, ¶ 8. Therefore, it was “undisputed that Johnson
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satisfied the first three criteria for relief after an evidentiary hearing,” where the court had a
strong basis for that finding. Id. ¶ 20.
¶ 50 It was not error for the circuit court to require petitioner to establish requirements
(2) and (3) of section 10(c) with satisfactory evidence, as petitioner bore the burden of proof. The
circuit court did not require this satisfactory evidence be witnesses, it merely needed to be
sufficient to demonstrate petitioner’s character was such that he could satisfy the requirements.
¶ 51 Petitioner presented as evidence of his character (1) his records from Heartland
Community college, which demonstrated he had been attending college classes but had not yet
obtained a degree; (2) the articles of organization for Blac Cultivation LLC, of which he was a
manager; (3) and his insurance license. Although, as the circuit court acknowledged, that
petitioner obtained an insurance license was a factor in his favor, petitioner presented no
evidence in the record as to the process of obtaining his license. Overall, none of the evidence
presented demonstrated petitioner was unlikely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety
when compared to his criminal record, which contained three separate convictions for domestic
violence. Petitioner did not attempt to explain the circumstances of his convictions or his current
reputation. Therefore, it was not error for the court to find petitioner failed to satisfy the
requirements of section 10(c)(2) and (3).
¶ 52 The record supports the circuit court’s finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate
he was eligible for relief under factors (2) and (3) of section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act.
Moreover, petitioner was not eligible for the exemption in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) of the Gun
Control Act. Thus, the circuit court properly denied his motion for relief seeking an order
directing the Department to issue petitioner a FOID card.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 55 Affirmed.
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