Steven W. v. Meeli W. , 2021 IL App (2d) 200652 ( 2021 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2022.08.01
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Steven W. v. Meeli W., 2021 IL App (2d) 200652Appellate Court STEVEN W., Petitioner-Appellee, v. MEELI W., Respondent-
Caption Appellant.
District & No. Second District
No. 2-20-0652
Filed October 27, 2021
Rehearing denied November 22, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County, Nos. 20-F-30, 20-
Review OP-99; the Hon. Joseph R. Voiland, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on Krista Carls, of Krista Carls, P.C., of Hinckley, for appellant.
Appeal
Anthony Sammarco, of Stogsdill Law Firm, P.C., of Wheaton, for
appellee.
Panel JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment, with
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 On October 8, 2020, the trial court entered a plenary order of protection compelling
respondent, Meeli W., to return the parties’ minor children to the custody of petitioner, Steven
W., and an order finding Meeli to be in indirect civil contempt, which resulted in the issuance
of a writ of body attachment against her. Meeli appeals, arguing that (1) an Estonian court’s
denial of Steven’s Hague application mandated the dismissal of Steven’s petition for a plenary
order of protection, (2) Steven improperly used the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986
(Act) (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2020)) to obtain possession of the children, (3) Steven
failed to show harassment under the Act, (4) Steven failed to show abuse under the Act, (5) the
trial court improperly refused to let Meeli testify remotely, (6) the trial court erred in refusing
to acknowledge that Steven purportedly signed a “residency document” consenting to the
children’s residence in Estonia, and (7) the trial court improperly relied on falsified evidence
in entering the plenary order. Because we find that Steven failed to show harassment under the
Act, we reverse the trial court’s issuance of the plenary order of protection and vacate the trial
court’s contempt order and writ of body attachment against Meeli.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 We summarize the relevant facts from the record on appeal. On November 24, 2012, Steven
and Meeli were married in Tartu, Estonia. The parties produced two children while married:
J.W. and S.W., who were born in November 2012 and April 2016, respectively. J.W. was born
in Estonia, and S.W. was born in Downers Grove. The family resided in Clarendon Hills
between July 2015 and January 2018 and then moved to Plano, where they lived from January
2018 to January 2020. While the family lived in Plano, J.W. was enrolled in an elementary
school there.
¶4 Between July 2015 and January 2020, the family traveled to and from Estonia “on several
occasions,” after purchasing round-trip airline tickets for each visit. On January 8, 2020, the
family left Illinois for another trip to Estonia. Steven testified that the family planned to return
to Illinois on January 24, 2020, as reflected by their round-trip tickets. On January 24, 2020,
while in Estonia, Meeli and Steven purportedly disagreed whether the family—specifically the
children—were to remain in Estonia indefinitely. Eventually, Steven returned to Illinois, while
the children remained in Estonia with Meeli. On March 31, 2020, Steven filed his verified
petition for an emergency order of protection (No. 20-OP-99 (order of protection case)) to
obtain a court order prohibiting Meeli from continuing to withhold the children from Steven.
That same day, Steven also filed his emergency petition to allocate parental responsibilities or,
alternatively, for injunctive relief (20-F-30 (family case)).
¶5 A. Steven’s Allegations
¶6 An affidavit was attached to Steven’s petitions concerning the January 2020 trip. Steven
averred that, while in Estonia, the parties stayed with Meeli’s parents, Tarmo S. and Anne S.
(collectively, the grandparents). According to Steven, early in the morning of January 24, 2020,
as he was packing the children’s belongings, Meeli told him that “she could not make the
[return] flight” because she had an earache. Steven suggested that he return to the United States
with the children and Meeli could join them after she had seen a doctor. Meeli refused. Both
Meeli and the grandparents “physically prevented” Steven from packing the children’s bags
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and physically withheld the children’s passports from Steven, prompting Steven to call the
Estonian police. However, the police informed Steven that they could not compel anyone to
make a visit to the airport.
¶7 After determining that it would be impossible to make their flight, Steven suggested that
he, Meeli, and the children find a hotel, prompting an argument with the grandparents. Meeli
and the grandparents then contacted the police and reported that Steven had insulted Anne. The
police asked Steven to leave the grandparents’ apartment so that things could “settle down.”
Afterwards, Meeli and Steven both walked to the United States Embassy. On the way, Steven
noticed that Meeli “showed no signs of being too sick to fly or being affected by any earache
whatsoever.” At the embassy, Steven told officials that “[Meeli] and her family were
attempting to take the children from [him] and otherwise detain them in Estonia.”
¶8 The next day, while the parties were visiting Meeli’s grandmother at a nursing home,1
Steven asked Meeli about the location of the children’s passports. Meeli refused to tell him
where they were. Steven told Meeli that if she “was not trying to take the children from [him],
there was no legitimate reason for her to withhold the children’s passports from [him].” As
Meeli and Steven continued to argue, Steven tripped over a door jamb and a kitchen chair.
Meeli accused Steven of attempting to shove the kitchen furniture into her, and she again called
the Estonian police. Steven was held by the police overnight. Tarmo picked Steven up from
the police station, leaving him and his belongings at a hotel. He forbade Steven from returning
to the grandparents’ apartment.
¶9 Meeli and the grandparents continued to impede Steven’s contact with the children. Steven
was allowed to say goodnight to his children only via webcam, and either Meeli or the
grandparents would terminate the connection if Steven “said something to the children which
would displease” Meeli or the grandparents.
¶ 10 Steven contacted an Estonian attorney dealing with custody cases. Steven’s contact with
the children remained limited. He was able to physically visit the children only approximately
two times per week for one or two hours, all while in Tarmo’s presence. During a later visit,
after Steven’s Estonian counsel provided Meeli with “a deadline to respond to [counsel’s]
demands for a voluntary return of the children to the United States of America,” Anne
“panicked” and physically removed the children from Steven, before shoving Steven “in an
effort to push [him] down [some] stairs.” Steven called the Estonian police, who asked him to
file a report. Tarmo similarly removed the children from Steven during a visit at a local
McDonald’s restaurant.
¶ 11 Steven and his counsel continued seeking to reach an agreement with Meeli concerning the
voluntary return of the children, but Meeli’s behavior “indicated that she had absolutely no
intention to permit the children to return to the United States.” On March 9, 2020, Steven
received Meeli’s “final response,” indicating that she would not permit the children to return
to the United States. Steven returned to the United States, where he initiated this action.
¶ 12 B. Further Proceedings
¶ 13 Steven appeared before the Honorable Joseph R. Voiland at the hearing on Steven’s
petition for an emergency order of protection. The court asked Steven’s counsel, “And,
1
During the July 20, 2020, hearing on the issuance of a plenary order of protection, Steven testified
instead that they attempted to visit Meeli’s grandmother but that “[they] did not make it.”
-3-
[Counsel], this is one of those law school questions, isn’t this covered by the Hague
Convention?” Steven’s counsel responded, “[T]he Hague Convention would permit Steven to
retain counsel in Estonia, where the children are currently located[,] in an effort to determine
that Illinois is the most appropriate forum, but the Hague Convention would not make any
substantive rulings. It only addresses where.” After finding that “one of the remedies that the
emergency order of protection does address is the improper concealment of minor children,”
the court found a basis to issue an emergency order of protection “subject to the court retaining
jurisdiction over [Meeli].” Consequently, the court granted Steven’s petition for an emergency
order of protection, which directed Meeli to return to the court’s jurisdiction with the children
by April 15, 2020, when it would be determined “whether or not [the] order of protection
should be extended on a plenary basis.”
¶ 14 On April 15, 2020, Meeli did not appear with the children, leading the court to extend the
emergency order of protection an additional 14 days. On April 29, 2020, counsel for both
parties appeared before a different judge, the Honorable John F. McAdams. Meeli’s counsel
presented her motion to stay the proceedings as well as her motion to reconsider the issuance
of the emergency order of protection, arguing that “[Steven] signed a document in January
[2020] in which he intended for the children and [Meeli] to live in Estonia.” The court denied
her motions and extended the order of protection to June 4, 2020.
¶ 15 On June 4, 2020, the parties appeared for a status hearing on Steven’s pending petitions,
once again before the Honorable Joseph R. Voiland. The court extended the order of protection
to July 20, 2020, when a hearing on the issuance of a plenary order of protection was scheduled
to take place. Additionally, the court entered a written order consolidating the order of
protection case with the family case.
¶ 16 On June 17, 2020, Meeli filed a motion seeking permission to appear via video or other
electronic means at the hearing for the order of protection proceedings. On June 23, 2020,
Steven filed his petition for adjudication of civil contempt, seeking “an [o]rder of [r]ule issue
against [Meeli] to show cause” why “she should not be held in contempt of court.” On June
29, 2020, with both parties’ counsel present, the court held hearings on both Meeli’s motion
and Steven’s petition. The court denied Meeli’s motion. The court reasoned that granting the
motion would be counterintuitive, as it would “reward [Meeli] for her refusal to comply with
the pending order [of protection].” The court also expressed its concerns that Meeli would not
comply with any future court orders unless she was physically present during the proceedings.
Concerning Steven’s petition, the court issued its rule to show cause and allowed Meeli until
July 20, 2020, to respond thereto.
¶ 17 On July 20, 2020, Steven and counsel for both parties appeared at the hearing on the
issuance of a plenary order of protection. 2 Again, Meeli did not personally appear before the
court. Steven was called as a witness. During his direct examination, he essentially repeated
the allegations he made in the affidavit accompanying his petition for an emergency order of
protection.
¶ 18 On cross-examination, Steven admitted that he, Meeli, and J.W. “permanently” moved to
the United States in July 2015 after having lived in Estonia. Steven also acknowledged booking
round-trip tickets for that trip, despite the family’s plans to remain in the United States
2
This hearing began on August 20, 2020, and was eventually continued to September 9, 2020.
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indefinitely. Steven suggested that they booked the return tickets because Meeli’s green card
application was still pending at the time.
¶ 19 Meeli’s counsel showed Steven a document—which seems to have been written in
Estonian—and asked him whether his signature appeared on the document. Steven responded,
“There is a signature that appears that it could be my signature, yes.” Counsel then asked, “Isn’t
it true that on February 23, 2017, you signed this *** document in Estonia?” Steven could not
recall. When asked whether he understood “that [the] document established residency *** for
[his] children in Estonia,” Steven replied, “No.” Instead, Steven indicated that the document
was intended “to record where [the children] will be while they are in Estonia.” He continued,
“This is for the police, so if the police find the children lost in the mall, they could return the
[children] to an address.”
¶ 20 Meeli’s counsel showed Steven a second document—which she later referred to as the
January 2020 residency document—and asked whether the signature on the document was his.
Steven admitted that the signature “could be [his].” Steven first claimed that he had not seen
the document “[that] year,” before acknowledging that he had previously seen the document
when Meeli sent it to his Estonian attorney in “[e]arly March [2020].” Steven did not recall
signing the document. Steven disagreed that the document “provide[d] an address for a new
place of residence,” although he acknowledged that the document contained his children’s
names and the grandparents’ address. Steven affirmed that he was denying that he had “not
done anything to establish residency of [his] children in Estonia.” While he previously testified
that he did not remember signing the document, Steven eventually attempted to explain why
he did in fact sign it:
“[G]enerally, if you were staying in Estonia for a period of time, you must report to the
Estonian police where your staying place is, all students, anyone that’s visiting, other
than a tourist. All Estonian citizens are required to have their address filed with the
police. My understanding is if the police for some reason *** have the children, that
they then know where to take the children[,] *** like if the children are lost in the mall,
then they’d bring the children to [the listed] address.”
¶ 21 Meeli’s counsel asked Steven whether between January 8, 2020, and January 24, 2020,
when the family was still in Estonia, J.W. was “required to go to school.” Steven indicated that
he and Meeli had notified J.W.’s Plano school that they were on vacation “and that as soon as
[they] returned, he would return to school.” Steven specified that sometime after January 24,
2020, when the family was purportedly scheduled to return to the United States, he learned
that Meeli unilaterally told the school that the children would not be returning. On redirect
examination, Steven’s counsel asked him questions concerning J.W.’s school. Steven testified
that J.W. had left several items at the school after being removed by Meeli, including a coat,
clothing, crayons, pencils, and a book bag. Steven rested his case after testifying. 3 At this
point, before Meeli presented her case, the court continued the hearing on the issuance of a
plenary order to August 20, 2020. The court also continued the hearing on the rule to show
cause until the conclusion of the hearing on the issuance of a plenary order, presumably to first
determine whether Meeli wrongfully held the children in Estonia.
The trial court initially planned to hear the parties’ witnesses out of order and agreed that Steven
3
would call an additional witness after Tarmo later testified. However, Steven eventually changed his
mind and rested his case retroactively.
-5-
¶ 22 On August 20, 2020, the hearing on the issuance of a plenary order resumed, and Tarmo
testified remotely on behalf of Meeli, with the aid of an interpreter. On direct examination, he
testified that beginning on January 9, 2020, he resided in Estonia with Anne, Meeli, Steven,
and the children. When Tarmo picked up the family from the airport, he understood “that they
were to come here to first register the children[,] and then [Steven] would need to complete his
business and then he would return *** also.” In anticipation of receiving the family in their
home, the grandparents purchased extra beds, bookcases, armoires, and other furniture, and
they made further preparations for the children.
¶ 23 On January 13, 2020, after discussing “the [January 2020 residency document]” with
Meeli, Tarmo presented the document to Meeli and Steven. Tarmo saw Steven sign the
document, and Tarmo signed it as well. Meeli’s counsel showed Tarmo her exhibit 10, which
Tarmo identified as the signed form. Tarmo stated that “[t]he document was about Meeli and
the children having the right to live [in Estonia].” After the parties signed the form, Tarmo and
Meeli took it “to the *** city government [(in Estonia)].” Tarmo also indicated that he had the
original form in his possession and that Meeli’s exhibit 10 was a true and accurate copy of the
original signed form. Tarmo remembered signing a similar form at some point in 2017, as he
had purportedly allowed Steven, Meeli, and the children to live with him at that time as well.
Meeli’s counsel sought to admit both the February 2017 and the January 2020 residency
documents “for the purpose of establishing that [Tarmo] observed [Steven] sign [the]
document,” but the trial court denied her request, finding that counsel had failed to comply
with the rules of evidence concerning the authentication of foreign documents.
¶ 24 Tarmo acknowledged that Meeli had placed the children’s passports in a safe that was kept
in their apartment. On January 24, 2020, Steven began looking through the grandparents’
belongings—presumably attempting to find the passports. Steven appeared to be angry and
sought to provoke the grandparents into hitting him. This prompted Anne to call the police.
¶ 25 Tarmo further testified that he and Meeli did not prevent Steven from seeing the children.
Tarmo did accompany Meeli whenever she met Steven for his visits with the children.
¶ 26 After Tarmo testified, the hearing on the issuance of a plenary order of protection was
continued to September 9, 2020. The emergency order of protection was extended through that
date as well. On September 1, 2020, Steven filed a motion requesting a hearing on the pending
April 29, 2020, rule to show cause and a motion for a default judgment. That same date, Meeli
filed her motion to dismiss Steven’s petition for a plenary order of protection and petition for
rule to show cause, arguing that the Estonian court had recently denied Steven’s Hague
application, “finding that the *** children have not been improperly removed from the United
States nor improperly retained in Estonia.” Consequently, Meeli argued, the pending matters
before the court must be dismissed because “[t]he issue of whether or not the children have
been improperly removed from the United States and retained in Estonia has been decided
pursuant to the Hague Convention, a U.S. Treaty, of which the United States and Estonia are
signatories.”
¶ 27 On September 9, 2020, counsel for both parties appeared for the continued hearing on the
issuance of a plenary order of protection. The court addressed the parties’ pending motions.
Meeli’s counsel brought a translated and properly authenticated copy of the Estonian court’s
order and tendered copies of it to the court and opposing counsel. The court continued the
hearing in order to have an opportunity to review the Estonian order and set a briefing schedule
on Meeli’s motion to dismiss.
-6-
¶ 28 As Meeli represented, the Estonian court order—which is contained in the record and dated
July 17, 2020—did deny Steven’s Hague application. The Estonian court further concluded
that Steven brought forth his Hague application not because Meeli had removed the children
but because of the “termination of the cohabitation of [Meeli and Steven].” Regardless, because
the children resided in Estonia since January 2020, the court found that no unlawful removal
or retention had taken place and dismissed Steven’s petition.
¶ 29 On September 25, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Meeli’s motion to dismiss. At the
conclusion of that hearing, the trial court found that the Estonian decision did not divest the
trial court of jurisdiction, that res judicata did not apply to the matter, and that it was not
preempted or estopped by the Estonian court’s decision in any manner, “because the issues
decided by the Estonian court under the provisions of the Hague Convention are clearly
different and do not pertain to the issues before the court as it relates to the [Act].” The court
then denied Meeli’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 30 On October 8, 2020, the trial court commenced its hearing on the issuance of a plenary
order of protection. Meeli called Steven to once again testify. Meeli asked Steven whether
Meeli told him prior to the January 2020 trip that she was planning on staying in Estonia with
the children. Steven responded “No” and explained that Meeli would not “talk about anything
to do with the children.” Meeli asked several questions about Steven’s various visits with the
children during his last stay in Estonia. These visits included three meetings at a local café, a
meeting at a playground, three visits at a library, a visit at a “playroom,” a visit at the
grandparents’ house, and a visit at McDonald’s. When asked whether Steven could “think of
any time [Meeli] said, [‘N]o, you can’t see the children[,’] ” Steven replied, “Yes. I called a
dozen times every single day asking to see the children.” However, Steven agreed that he had
been able to see the children via video chat.
¶ 31 After Steven testified, the court orally issued its ruling. The court found that, despite the
fact that the parties went to Estonia together, “it was the intention of both [Steven] and [Meeli]
to return to Illinois *** and that [Meeli] elected not to go.” According to the court, because
Meeli therefore “refused and continues to refuse to return the *** children to the State of
Illinois,” Meeli “improperly removed” the children. Therefore, the court determined that
Steven was an abused person as defined by the Act and that Meeli “has harassed [Steven] as
defined in [section] 103(7)(v) [of the Act].” The court agreed with Meeli that “there has not
been an improper concealment of the child[ren], but *** there has been an improper removal
of the child[ren].”
¶ 32 Having found that Meeli harassed Steven “by improperly removing the minor children
from the state, or the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois[,] and refusing to return the minor
children,” the court noted that Meeli had failed to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence
“the presumption that the improper removal of the children from this jurisdiction has caused
and is causing emotional distress to [Steven].” After making these findings, the court entered
a plenary order of protection consistent with the terms of Steven’s previous emergency order.
Based on its findings of abuse and harassment under the Act, the court also found Meeli to be
in indirect civil contempt of court for willful failure to return the children to Illinois pursuant
to its previous emergency orders. Furthermore, “in light of the fact that [Meeli was] not
physically present in [the] courtroom,” the court issued an order of attachment to “remain in
effect until the purge is satisfied.”
-7-
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 34 We agree with Meeli’s arguments that Steven failed to show either harassment or abuse
under the Act. While Meeli makes several additional arguments concerning other perceived
errors that the trial court allegedly made, in light of our resolution of the foregoing, we need
not address those contentions.
¶ 35 A. Motion to Strike
¶ 36 Initially, we consider Steven’s motion to strike Meeli’s reply brief, which we ordered to be
taken with this case. Steven argues that, in Meeli’s reply brief, Meeli failed to “provide
appropriate references to the [r]ecord on [a]ppeal or *** controlling precedent” in support of
her claims that Steven consented to the children’s permanent relocation to Estonia. Steven
similarly argues that Meeli’s reply brief did not contain adequate citations of the record to
support her argument that the Estonian court order precluded the trial court from maintaining
this action. Steven additionally suggests that Meeli’s reply brief improperly referenced
unadmitted evidence, such as testimony detailing Meeli’s version of events and the January
2020 residency document. Steven also takes issue with Meeli’s arguments that Steven
allegedly falsified testimony concerning the residency document. According to Steven, these
arguments were improper because they were accompanied by citations to Tarmo’s testimony
within the record, which could not possibly establish the allegedly false nature of Steven’s
testimony. For these reasons, Steven requests that we strike Meeli’s reply brief in its entirety.
¶ 37 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules require arguments in an appellant’s brief, including the
reply brief, to be accompanied by “citation[s] of the authorities and the pages of the record
relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The Illinois Supreme Court Rules are not
“mere suggestions” but instead “have the force of law and are to be construed in the same
manner as statutes.” In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (2010). “A party’s brief that fails to
substantially conform to the pertinent supreme court rules may justifiably be stricken.” Gruby
v. Department of Public Health, 2015 IL App (2d) 140790, ¶ 12. However, striking a party’s
brief is a harsh sanction and should be done only when a party’s noncompliance with the rules
hinders our review. Id.¶ 38 We agree with Steven that Meeli’s reply brief was problematic. As Steven points out,
many—but not all—of the factual statements that Meeli sets forth in her reply are
unaccompanied by any citations of the record. Several of Meeli’s citations—specifically those
relating to the Estonian court order—list imprecise page ranges within the record instead of
references to single pages. Meeli also details testimony that was not properly admitted before
the trial court, such as her “version of events” surrounding the January 2020 Estonia trip.
Furthermore, although there is testimony in the record indicating the existence of the January
2020 residency document, as well as Tarmo’s understanding that “[t]he document was about
Meeli and the children having the right to live [in Estonia],” the document itself was not
admitted into evidence, meaning that Meeli’s claim that “[Steven] signed a document
consenting to residency of the children in Estonia” mischaracterizes the evidence adduced
before the trial court. Finally, Steven correctly points out that Tarmo’s testimony could not
affirmatively establish whether Steven gave falsified testimony before the trial court
-8-
concerning the January 2020 residency document, 4 although other portions of the record—
which Meeli confusingly failed to cite—do establish that he gave conflicting testimony
concerning the supposed document.
¶ 39 While Meeli’s noncompliance is not to be countenanced, it did not hinder our review,
which is the primary factor in deciding whether to impose the harsh penalty of striking her
brief. Id. As mentioned above, Steven failed to prove either harassment or abuse under the Act
as a matter of law. While Meeli discusses as much in her opening brief, she does not make
such an argument in her reply brief. Instead, her reply brief predominately responds to Steven’s
arguments concerning the preclusive effect of the Estonian court ruling, Steven’s purported
consent, and the trial court’s jurisdiction under the Act. Therefore, because Meeli’s reply brief
did not add to our analysis, her repeated errors cannot be said to have hindered our review.
While we consequently decline to strike her reply brief, we do ignore any noncompliant
portions therein. Additionally, in light of Meeli’s repeated infractions of Rule 341, we do offer
her a stern warning to comply with our supreme court’s rules in the future.
¶ 40 Having disposed of Steven’s motion to dismiss, we now turn to the substance of this appeal.
¶ 41 B. Harassment and Abuse under the Act
¶ 42 Because the trial court improperly found that Meeli’s conduct constituted harassment and
abuse under the Act, it erred when it issued a plenary order of protection. “In any proceeding
to obtain an order of protection, the central inquiry is whether the petitioner has been abused.”
Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 348 (2006). Therefore, to obtain relief under the Act, a petitioner
must prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. A circuit court’s finding of abuse
will not be disturbed on appeal unless such a finding was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Id. at 349.
¶ 43 Pursuant to the Act, “ ‘Abuse’ means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a
dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation but does not include
reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis.” (Emphasis added.)
750 ILCS 60/103(1) (West 2020). The Act further defines “harassment” as “knowing conduct
which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances;
would cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the
petitioner.” Id. § 103(7). Under the Act, the following conduct creates a rebuttable presumption
of emotional distress:
“[I]mproperly concealing a minor child from petitioner, repeatedly threatening to
improperly remove a minor child of petitioner’s from the jurisdiction or from the
physical care of petitioner, repeatedly threatening to conceal a minor child from
petitioner, or making a single such threat following an actual or attempted improper
removal or concealment, unless respondent was fleeing an incident or pattern of
domestic violence.” Id. § 103(7)(v).
¶ 44 In her opening brief, Meeli argues that the terms of section 103(7)(v) do not apply to this
case. Instead, Meeli points out that the family simply traveled to Estonia, that Meeli and Steven
had a disagreement as to whether they planned to stay in Estonia, and that Steven eventually
returned to the United States, alone. While Meeli acknowledges that Steven’s petition for an
4
Still, we note that, because it conflicts with Steven’s testimony, Tarmo’s cited testimony does give
rise to an inference that Steven may have lied about signing the document.
-9-
emergency order of protection alleged that she sequestered the children and refused to return
them to the United States, she argues that these allegations “do not rise to the level of
harassment.” In response, Steven argues that “[Meeli] does not elaborate on how the court’s
finding was incorrect, against the manifest weight of the evidence, or how the court may have
committed error in its application of the [Act].” Steven further asserts that his “evidence
absolutely fell within the statutory definition of harassment as a matter of law.” We disagree.
¶ 45 In his closing argument, Steven did not argue that Meeli’s conduct satisfied the
aforementioned elements of harassment under section 103(7), requiring “knowing conduct
which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances[,]
would cause a reasonable person emotional distress[,] and does cause emotional distress to the
petitioner.” Id. § 103(7). Instead, Steven argued that Meeli’s removal of the children
constituted harassment per se under section 103(7)(v) of the Act, 5 contending that “[t]he [Act]
says that if you take a child away from another parent, that’s a form of harassment which is
proscribed by [the Act].” The trial court agreed with Steven. In issuing a plenary order of
protection, the trial court repeatedly emphasized that Meeli “improperly removed” the children
from the State of Illinois and that the removal in and of itself constituted harassment under the
Act:
“[Meeli] has improperly removed the minor child [sic] from the state of Illinois and
[that determination] is based upon the testimony *** that, although the parties did go
to Estonia, *** it was the intention of both [Steven] and [Meeli] to return to Illinois[,]
and that they had plane tickets and were prepared to go and that [Meeli] elected not to
go. ***
[T]he court further finds that [Meeli] has refused and continues to refuse to return
the [children] to the *** State of Illinois.
***
Pursuant to the [Act], [Steven] is an abused person as defined by Section 103(1)
*** and [Meeli] has harassed [Steven] as defined in 103(7)(v).
***
As a result, the court finds that [Meeli] has harassed [Steven] by improperly
removing the minor children from the state, or the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois
and refusing to return the minor children to this jurisdiction.”
The trial court also found that, because Meeli’s conduct fell under section 103(7)(v), there was
a rebuttable presumption that Steven suffered emotional distress and that it was Meeli’s burden
to rebut that presumption:
“[Meeli] has failed to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence the presumption
that the improper removal of the children from this jurisdiction has caused and is
causing emotional distress to [Steven], and again[,] pursuant to [the Act,] it is the
burden of [Meeli] to rebut the presumption that there is abuse under the terms of the
[A]ct.”
¶ 46 Here, even if we were to assume that Meeli’s alleged conduct did amount to an improper
removal from the state, such an improper removal in and of itself does not fall under the
5
Steven also acknowledged as much during oral argument.
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language of section 103(7)(v). Therefore, Steven’s argument was incorrect, and the trial court
erred in asserting that “[Meeli] has harassed [Steven] as defined in [section] 103(7)(v).”
¶ 47 As set forth above, section 103(7)(v) of the Act provides four different types of conduct
that are presumed to cause emotional distress. Id. § 103(7)(v). The first type of described
conduct concerns the “improper[ ] conceal[ment]” of a minor child from a petitioner. Id. The
second type of described conduct concerns repeated threats to improperly remove a petitioner’s
child. Id. The third type of conduct involves repeated threats to conceal a minor child from a
petitioner. Id. Finally, the fourth type of conduct involves making “a single such threat
following an actual or attempted improper removal or concealment, unless respondent was
fleeing an incident or pattern of domestic violence.” Id.
¶ 48 Meeli’s conduct as alleged does not fall within any of the four types of conduct enumerated
in section 103(7)(v). Although Steven did testify that Meeli and the grandparents effectively
concealed the children from him by limiting his access to them, Tarmo testified that Steven
had unbridled access to both children. After hearing both Steven’s and Tarmo’s testimony, the
trial court agreed with Meeli that “there has not been an improper concealment of the
child[ren].” “A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences
to be drawn.” Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350-51. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s finding
that no concealment took place. As such, the first type of conduct detailed in section
103(7)(v)—which involves the concealment of a minor child—clearly does not apply.
¶ 49 Furthermore, Steven makes no argument that Meeli ever threatened to improperly conceal
or remove the children. In fact, the record rebuts such a conclusion. Steven testified that Meeli
refused to “talk about anything to do with the children.” Steven also repeatedly testified that
he was surprised by Meeli’s supposed unilateral decision to withhold the children in Estonia.
Clearly, if Steven was surprised by Meeli’s actions, it seems unlikely that she threatened to
remove or conceal the children prior to the family’s January 2020 trip to Estonia. Because
Steven did not allege that Meeli threatened to remove or conceal the children, the second, third,
and fourth types of conduct described under section 103(7)(v)—which all require threats to be
made against a petitioner—do not apply. Despite having previously argued that Meeli’s
conduct constituted harassment under section 103(7)(v), Steven conceded at oral argument that
none of the four types of conduct described in section 103(7)(v) included Meeli’s actions. 6
Steven did not contend an alternative basis of harassment either before the trial court or on
appeal by arguing that Meeli’s conduct satisfied the general elements of harassment set forth
in section 103(7) of the Act. Therefore, he forfeited such an argument. Peal v. Lee, 403 Ill.
App. 3d 197, 211 (2010).
¶ 50 Because Meeli’s conduct therefore did not fall under section 103(7)(v) of the Act, the trial
court erred in finding that Meeli’s conduct created a rebuttable presumption of emotional
6
Even if Meeli’s conduct hypothetically did fall under section 103(7)(v), we are unconvinced that
this would definitively mean that she harassed Steven. The Act specifies that the different types of
conduct listed in section 103(7)(v) “shall be presumed to cause emotional distress.” 750 ILCS
60/103(7)(v) (West 2020). However, emotional distress is only one element of harassment under
section 103(7). Id. § 103(7). Therefore, even if Meeli’s conduct fell under section 103(7)(v), Steven
would still presumably need to show the remaining elements to establish harassment under the Act.
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distress 7 and by consequently holding that “[Meeli] has harassed [Steven] as defined in
103(7)(v).” Thus, because the trial court’s finding of harassment was based on an improper
application of the Act and not by the evidence presented, its finding of harassment was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. See Maurissa J.B. v. Ingrida K., 2019 IL App (2d) 190107,
¶ 45 (holding that the trial court’s finding of harassment was against the manifest weight of the
evidence when it was not based on the evidence presented). Because the trial court’s finding
of abuse was based on the finding of harassment, it too was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. 750 ILCS 60/103(1) (West 2020) (providing that “abuse” includes “harassment” as
defined by the Act).
¶ 51 Regardless, Steven suggests that Meeli’s arguments to this point should be stricken
pursuant to Rule 341. Specifically, Steven contends that “Meeli’s [b]rief fails to comply with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 and does not provide an accurate or appropriate reference to
the [r]ecord on [a]ppeal so that a counter argument may be provided.” While Steven does not
identify which of Meeli’s allegations he is referring to, it is true that some of the factual
allegations that premised Meeli’s arguments lacked citations to the record. These unsupported
allegations include the parties’ departure date for the January 2020 trip to Estonia and the
allegations that the parties stayed with grandparents while in Estonia, that Meeli and Steven
had a disagreement while in Estonia, and that Steven left Estonia in March 2020.
¶ 52 While Meeli’s failure to provide citations for each of these factual allegations is another
example of her failure to comply with Rule 341, it seems disingenuous to suggest that her
failures impeded Steven’s ability to respond to her arguments. Most of the unsupported factual
assertions Steven identifies were properly supported in Steven’s brief, which undercuts the
force of his argument considerably. Furthermore, it is obvious that Meeli and Steven had a
disagreement while in Estonia; otherwise there would be no controversy between the parties
culminating in this action. Therefore, all these unsupported allegations were readily known to
Steven and could not have resulted in surprise. Because Meeli’s failures to adhere to Rule 341
therefore did not prejudice Steven or hinder our review, we will not strike her arguments.
¶ 53 Citing In re Marriage of Timke, 219 Ill. App. 3d 423 (1991), Steven additionally argues
that Meeli forfeited any rights to appellate review by her repeated violations of the trial court’s
emergency orders. We disagree. In Timke, the trial court entered an order holding the
respondent in contempt for failure to comply with the petitioner’s discovery demands and with
orders requiring the respondent to appear in court. Id. at 425. At that time, the respondent
departed for the Cayman Islands, telling the petitioner “ ‘[t]hat no judge would tell him what
to do with his money after he had worked for 40 years.’ ” Id. The Timke court noted:
“Our supreme court has clearly and unmistakably held that a party who is adjudged
to be in contempt of the trial court for failure to abide by its orders, and who has
removed himself beyond its process and concealed himself outside the State of Illinois
and seeks to attack the final decree of the court which he is defying, is not entitled to
appellate relief.” Id. at 426.
As such, the Timke court decided that the respondent was not entitled to appellate review of
his arguments.
Accordingly, the trial court also erred in shifting the burden of disproving emotional distress onto
7
Meeli.
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¶ 54 Timke is easily distinguishable from this matter. There, the respondent fled Illinois in
response to the trial court’s contempt order. Id. at 425. Here, on the other hand, Meeli was
outside of the trial court’s jurisdiction before the court issued any of its emergency orders or
its October 8, 2020, contempt order. In fact, Meeli was outside of the trial court’s jurisdiction
before this action commenced. Therefore, unlike the respondent in Timke, it cannot be said that
Meeli fled the state to evade the court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, because the trial court’s
determination of abuse was against the manifest weight of the evidence, there was no basis
under the Act for the court to order Meeli to return the children to Illinois.
¶ 55 While Steven’s failure to show harassment and abuse under the Act resolves this matter,
we are nonetheless compelled to briefly address what we consider to be Steven’s improper use
of the Act in the underlying proceedings. The purpose behind the Act is to aid victims of
domestic violence by preventing further abuse. 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2020). One misuses
the Act by using its provisions for the primary purpose of obtaining custody of a child. Radke
v. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 264, 269 (2004). Such an issue is better “resolved under the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.” Id.¶ 56 During oral arguments, Steven was asked what relief he hoped to obtain through the
issuance of a plenary order of protection. Eventually, he responded:
“If I was fortunate to have this matter affirmed on appeal, and if I was fortunate
enough to prevail in the pending custody proceedings, I would have a very good chance
of counsel in Estonia *** securing an order from their court for custody of the children
and enforcement of the Illinois decree. That’s why we’re here.”
When asked whether the pending custody proceedings were a better vehicle for Steven’s
claims, Steven suggested that he had previously filed a petition under the family case but that
no evidence was elicited “on the custody matter” and they “really didn’t get to that.”
¶ 57 Steven’s responses plainly show that the primary motivation behind his petition for a
plenary order of protection was to obtain custody of the children. He admitted that obtaining
such an order was one step that he needed to take in order to obtain a favorable custody
determination in Estonia. He further admitted that he used the Act’s provisions to advance his
claims because the family case remained stagnant before the trial court. For these reasons,
Steven has misused the Act, and such a misapplication should not be rewarded through the
issuance of a plenary order of protection.
¶ 58 For all of these reasons, we agree with Meeli that Steven failed to show abuse under the
Act. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s issuance of a plenary order of protection.
Similarly, because the court’s findings of abuse were against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the court had no basis to either enter the October 8, 2020, order holding Meeli in
contempt for failing to return the children or issue a writ of body attachment against her.
Therefore, we vacate those orders as well.
¶ 59 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 60 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County.
¶ 61 Reversed.
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