Tag Holdings, LLC v. Rizza , 2024 IL App (1st) 241078-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 241078-UTHIRD DIVISION
July 31, 2024
No. 1-24-1078
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
TAG HOLDINGS, LLC, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 22 CH 4478
)
JOE RIZZA, JOE RIZZA FORD OF ORLAND PARK, )
INC., and 8100 WEST, LLC, ) Honorable
) Michael T. Mullen,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lampkin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the challenged order was
a permanent injunction not appealable as an interlocutory order under Rule 307(a)(1). Ill.
S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶2 The circuit court ordered TAG Holdings, LLC (“TAG”) and Joe Rizza, Joe Rizza Ford of
Orland Park, Inc., and 8100 West, LLC (collectively “Rizza”) to close on a real estate transaction.
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On appeal, Rizza seeks review of that order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1). Ill.
Sup. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 TAG offered to buy an automobile dealership and the underlying real estate from Rizza.
The transaction included (1) the purchase of real estate under a purchase and sale agreement
(“PSA”), (2) the purchase of the dealership and other assets located on the real estate under an
asset purchase agreement (“APA”), and (3) a letter obligating Rizza to provide financing to TAG
for the APA.
¶5 After initial agreement but apparent subsequent disagreement over the details of the
transaction, the parties did not close the deal. TAG filed a four-count complaint against Rizza.
Counts I and III requested specific performance and damages, respectively, as to the PSA, while
counts II and IV requested the same remedies as to the APA. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on all counts. The court granted TAG’s motion for summary judgment on
count I and ordered the parties to close on the real estate sale under the PSA, and the court
dismissed count III as moot because it had already granted specific performance on count I. The
court denied TAG’s motion for summary judgment on count II and granted Rizza’s motion for
summary judgment on that count. The court denied Rizza’s cross-motion for summary judgment
as to count IV. TAG filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling on count II. Count IV remains
pending.
¶6 Rizza seeks to appeal the court’s grant of summary judgment as to count I only.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, Rizza argues that the circuit court erred in ordering the parties to close on a real
estate transaction.
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¶9 As a threshold matter, we note that the parties disagree as to whether we have jurisdiction
to consider this appeal. Rizza argues that the circuit court’s order constitutes a preliminary
injunction appealable under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1). Ill. S. Ct. R. 301(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1,
2017). TAG argues that we lack jurisdiction because, among other issues, the order is not a
preliminary injunction.
¶ 10 Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) allows a party to appeal from an interlocutory order of the
circuit court “granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an
injunction.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 301(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). In Illinois, there are three types of injunctive
relief: a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction. County
of Boone v. Plote Construction, Inc., 2017 IL App (2d) 160184, ¶ 27. A temporary restraining
order is meant to be in place for a brief time and is an extraordinary remedy in the sense that it can
be issued without notice. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. It is an order meant to preserve the status quo until the
circuit court can hold a hearing to determine if it should grant a preliminary injunction. Id. A
preliminary injunction provides an injured party relief and maintains the status quo until the court
can hold a trial on the merits. Id. Both temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
preserve the status quo until further proceedings, are “limited in duration” and do not “extend
beyond the conclusion of the action,” and do not conclusively resolve the parties’ rights. Santella
v. Kolton, 393 Ill. App. 3d 889, 903 (2009). Therefore, both orders are interlocutory injunctions.
Id. By contrast, a permanent injunction is an order “of unlimited duration” that “ ‘alters the status
quo,’ meaning that it adjudicates rights between the interested parties.” Skolnick v. Altheimer &
Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 222 (2000). A court may enter a permanent injunction only “after the party
seeking the injunction demonstrates at ‘a hearing on the merits’ the requisite elements for
permanent injunctive relief.” In re Marriage of Seffren, 366 Ill. App. 3d 628, 637 (2006). A
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“permanent injunction is a final order appealable only pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 301 or
304.” Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 222 (2000). In other words, Rule 307(a)(1)
does not allow a party to challenge a permanent injunction. Santella, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 903 (citing
Steel City Bank v. Village of Orland Hills, 224 Ill. App. 3d 412, 417 (1991)).
¶ 11 Here, applying the standard set forth above, we conclude that the circuit court entered a
permanent injunction by ordering specific performance of the sale of real estate. The court ordered
the parties to close on the PSA by June 17, 2024. There is no indication that the court contemplated
modifying or vacating this order later. Rather, the court permanently altered the status quo by
ordering the transfer of real estate from one party to another. The court adjudicated both parties’
rights and obligations as to the real estate. Permanent injunctions do not fall within the scope of
Rule 307(a)(1), so we cannot review this injunction under that rule. See id.¶ 12 We remind Rizza that Rule 341(h)(4) requires a statement of jurisdiction with the supreme
court rule that confers jurisdiction upon the appellate court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(4) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020). The purpose of a jurisdictional statement is “not merely to tell this court that it has
jurisdiction, but to provoke counsel into making an independent review of the right to appeal,
before writing the brief.” Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 8
(citing Revolution Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 332 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598 (2002)). An accurate
jurisdictional statement is “necessary to the orderly administration of justice.” Id. Here, Rizza has
not provided the rule conferring jurisdiction on this court.
¶ 13 Because the circuit court entered a permanent injunction, that order is not appealable under
Rule 307(a)(1). Rizza does not appeal under any other Supreme Court Rule. Accordingly, we lack
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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¶ 14 CONCLUSION
¶ 15 Because we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we dismiss it.
¶ 16 Dismissed.
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