People v. Jorgenson , 2024 IL App (3d) 230741-U ( 2024 )


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  •             NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
    in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    
    2024 IL App (3d) 230741-U
    Order filed March 6, 2024
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    THIRD DISTRICT
    2024
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
    ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
    )       La Salle County, Illinois,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
    )       Appeal No. 3-23-0741
    v.                                       )       Circuit No. 23-CF-434
    )
    BRENNAN L. JORGENSON,                           )       Honorable
    )       Howard C. Ryan, Jr.,
    Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment.
    Presiding Justice McDade dissented.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    ORDER
    ¶1          Held: The court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition to deny
    pretrial release.
    ¶2          Defendant, Brennan L. Jorgenson, was charged on December 6, 2023, with unlawful
    possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (Class X) (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2022)), unlawful
    possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (psilocin) (Class X) (id.
    § 570/401(a)(11)), and eight counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (Class X and
    Class 2) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial
    release, alleging defendant was charged with a nonprobationable offense, and his release posed a
    real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community under section 110-
    6.1(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)).
    ¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND
    ¶4          The factual basis provided that on December 5, 2023, agents of the drug task force executed
    a search warrant on defendant’s residence. They located: (1) “a large-scale cannabis grow
    operation,” (2) over 20,000 grams of cannabis, (3) over 10,000 grams of psilocin mushroom bars,
    (4) over $17,000, (5) a scale, (6) a vacuum sealer, (7) a money counter, and (8) eight firearms,
    which were identified in the petition. The State attached photographs to the petition, depicting
    what was discovered. Defendant had prior convictions for criminal damage to property, possession
    of narcotics, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
    ¶5          A hearing was held on the petition on December 6, 2023. The State called Agent Luke
    Radtke of the La Salle Police Department who was assigned to the drug task force and was the
    lead agent in this case. Radtke stated that he had spoken to an informant about Tommy Higgins
    selling drugs and guns. The informant gave Radtke addresses where Higgins had been “staying
    and dealing drugs and selling guns out of and a stash house.” The address of the stash house was
    a house owned and occupied by defendant. Radtke initially began to get a search warrant for a
    different address, but the informant stated that he and Higgins were driving to another location to
    sell a gun. The informant told Radtke what to expect in the vehicle. Officers executed a traffic stop
    on the vehicle and took the informant and Higgins into custody. Defendant was “spotted at the
    traffic stop.” Regarding defendant’s residence, the informant told Radtke that he had driven
    Higgins there three or four times in the previous month. Higgins would go inside and come out
    2
    with drugs. Radtke obtained a search warrant for defendant’s house. Defendant had left the
    residence just prior to the execution of the search warrant, and he was stopped down the road by
    an officer and detained. Radtke discussed the photographs and what was discovered inside
    defendant’s house. He stated everything discovered at the house indicated that it was a large-scale
    operation. The informant had come to Radtke with the concerns about a family member who lost
    their life due to a gun that was given to him by Higgins. Everything told to him by the informant
    was “spot on.” Based on his training and experience and the information collected, Radtke stated
    he believed defendant and Higgins were in business together dealing drugs and selling guns. The
    State argued defendant posed a threat to the safety of the community based on the large number of
    drugs and guns. The State also noted defendant mentioned in his presentence investigation report
    that his four-year-old daughter lived in the residence where guns and drugs were in the house,
    unsecured.
    ¶6          Defense counsel admitted multiple character letters from defendant’s family and friends
    and noted defendant had his own construction business. Defense counsel also argued defendant
    did not physically possess the guns, nor did he use them against anyone. The court granted the
    State’s petition, finding it met its burden by clear and convincing evidence. In doing so the court
    stated it could not find any conditions to keep the community safe, based upon the large nature of
    the operation. It explained, “He’s already got conditions. He’s a felon. He’s not supposed to be
    committing crimes, and he’s not supposed to be having drugs. I can’t think of any pretrial
    conditions that he’s going to comply with because he hasn’t done it yet just in his normal life.”
    ¶7                                             II. ANALYSIS
    ¶8          On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in granting the petition to
    detain. We consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence, but the ultimate
    3
    decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered for an abuse of discretion.
    People v. Trottier, 
    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    , ¶ 13. Under either standard, we consider whether
    the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.; see also People v. Horne, 
    2023 IL App (2d) 230382
    , ¶ 19.
    ¶9            Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied
    in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified
    petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. 
    Id.
     § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of
    proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that
    defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any
    person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this
    threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the
    conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id.
    §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.
    ¶ 10          We find the court did not err in granting the State’s petition. First, Radtke testified he found
    out that defendant lived at and owned the stash house where guns and drugs were found. While
    defendant challenges the propriety of this evidence, the rules of evidence do not apply to detention
    hearings (id. § 110-6.1(f)(5)). The court was able to consider Radtke’s testimony and determine
    its credibility. Second, the large amount of drugs and guns found in this case posed a danger to the
    community. Third, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to find there
    were no conditions to mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. As the court noted, defendant appeared
    to run a large-scale operation that would be difficult to prevent defendant from running without
    detention. Moreover, defendant was a felon, and the court found that he had shown his inability to
    abide by any conditions set by the court. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting
    4
    the petition. We further find that the written order in this case was sufficient. See People v. Hodge,
    
    2024 IL App (3d) 230543
    , ¶ 11.
    ¶ 11                                            III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 12           The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.
    ¶ 13           Affirmed.
    ¶ 14           PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:
    ¶ 15           I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s order granting the State’s
    petition to deny pretrial release.
    ¶ 16           As the majority recites, section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states
    that “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release. . . .” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)
    (West 2022). To rebut this presumption, the State must prove the following three elements, by
    clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the
    defendant has committed a detainable offense; (2) that the defendant poses a real and present threat
    to the safety of any person, persons, or the community; and (3) that no conditions can mitigate this
    threat. 
    Id.
    ¶ 17           I agree with the majority’s findings that the State satisfied both the first and second of the
    above elements. As to the third element, section 110-10(b) of the statute sets out a nonexhaustive
    list of possible conditions for pretrial release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). During the
    hearing on its petition below, the State argued that, at the time when he committed the offenses
    charged in this case, defendant was already a convicted felon prohibited from possessing the drugs
    and guns found inside his home. However, the State did not specifically argue why any of the
    conditions listed under section 110-10(b) would not mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. Nor did
    the State argue why other conditions outside of the statute, such as preventing defendant or anyone
    5
    else from accessing the home where the drugs and guns were contained, would not mitigate the
    same. Under these circumstances, I find that the State did not satisfy the third element and would
    reverse the circuit court’s decision.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3-23-0741

Citation Numbers: 2024 IL App (3d) 230741-U

Filed Date: 3/6/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2024