People v. Melero , 2024 IL App (1st) 211665-U ( 2024 )


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    2024 IL App (1st) 211665-U
    No. 1-21-1665
    Second Division
    March 12, 2024
    NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
    limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    FIRST DISTRICT
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    )           Appeal from the
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF             )           Circuit Court of
    ILLINOIS,                              )           Cook County.
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
    )           No. 19 CR 16790
    v.                                  )
    )
    JESUS MELERO,                          )           Honorable
    )           Ramon Ocasio III,
    Defendant-Appellant.             )           Judge, Presiding.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1     Held:    Defendant's seven-year sentence for aggravated domestic battery is affirmed over
    his contention that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum
    sentence.
    ¶2     Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Jesus Melero was found guilty of aggravated
    domestic battery and the trial court sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal,
    defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a seven-year sentence of
    No. 1-21-1665
    imprisonment where the court based its decision on a personal belief or arbitrary reason and did
    not properly consider evidence in mitigation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    ¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND
    ¶4     On December 10, 2019, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated domestic
    battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2018)), two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-
    3.05), two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1)), one count of aggravated unlawful
    restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1), and one count of unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a)) following
    an incident occurring on November 6, 2019, where defendant allegedly punched, hit, and stabbed
    his wife. The case proceeded to a bench trial on May 6, 2021, at which the following evidence was
    presented.
    ¶5     The victim, Patricia Beltran, testified that she married defendant in July 2019 and they
    subsequently purchased a home together in Cicero, Illinois. According to Beltran, after they were
    married, Beltran noticed that defendant’s behavior changed and he became paranoid and he
    accused Beltran of having an extramarital affair. Defendant also would take her cell phone, erase
    messages, and look through it. She testified that he had an application called Life360 that would
    track her location. On November 6, 2019, an argument between Beltran and defendant ensued
    when defendant picked up Beltran from work. After Beltran made dinner at home, defendant stated
    that he wanted a divorce and instructed Beltran to sign “a divorce document.” She filled out the
    paperwork and defendant grabbed the document, stating that it was proof that she was having an
    affair because she was willing to get a divorce. Beltran testified that at that point she was “upset”
    and “scared” because defendant had “a look in his eye that was terrifying[.]” She stated to
    defendant that they needed a break from each other and she walked towards the front door.
    Defendant grabbed her hair and he “started hitting [her] and punching [her]” in the face. He then
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    No. 1-21-1665
    dragged her into the bedroom, and when she turned around, defendant started swinging a large,
    serrated knife at her. She jumped on top of the bed and started yelling for help. Defendant kept
    swinging the knife at her and stabbing her with it until she was cornered against the wall. She
    testified that he “stabbed [her] on [her] legs, on [her] arm, [her] fingers, and then on [her] torso.”
    She observed blood splattered everywhere. At some point, defendant began to calm down and she
    walked towards the bedroom door but he “slammed the knife on the floor in front of [her] feet”
    and threatened to cut off her toes if she left the room. Defendant then received a phone call from
    a coworker and afterwards “he snapped out of it” and began apologizing to Beltran. He helped her
    take a shower and change clothes. She testified that she was holding onto her left hand tightly
    because it was bleeding. She also had a large cut on her right arm. They laid in bed until 5 a.m.
    and defendant then helped her get ready and dropped her off at work. During this entire episode,
    defendant retained possession of Beltran’s cell phone. He returned her cell phone to her when he
    dropped her off at work.
    ¶6     While she was at work, Beltran’s fingers continued to bleed and she noticed that her fingers
    were turning purple. She called her sister-in-law, who picked her up from work around 3 p.m. and
    took her to Northwestern Immediate Care Center. Beltran testified that she turned her cell phone
    off when she left work with her sister-in-law, and she did not tell her sister-in-law how she
    sustained the injuries to her hand because she was “scared” and “was still processing.” At the
    medical center, Beltran informed medical staff that she cut herself on a mirror. She testified that
    she said this because she was “scared to get [defendant] in trouble because [she] didn’t want him
    to be mad at [her].” The doctor stated that the wound was too deep to treat there and she needed to
    go to the emergency room.
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    No. 1-21-1665
    ¶7     Her sister-in-law then picked up Beltran’s sister, Toni, and dropped them both off at the
    police station at Blue Island Avenue and 15th Street where Beltran intended to file a police report
    and obtain an order of protection. The officers at Blue Island instructed her that she needed to go
    to the police station in Cicero to do that. At this time, Beltran did not inform the police as to why
    she needed an order of protection and her family members also were not aware.
    ¶8     Her sister-in-law retrieved them from the police station and drove to the emergency room
    at Northwestern. When Beltran first spoke with a nurse, she did not explain what caused the
    injuries because her sister was with her, and she had not yet told her sister or sister-in-law what
    happened. Beltran testified that she was embarrassed and ashamed of what happened. Eventually,
    after speaking with a security guard who intimated that her daughter had been a victim of domestic
    violence, Beltran decided to reveal what defendant had done and a social worker was called.
    Beltran received medical treatment, which included 20 stitches on her left hand and the wounds
    on her forearm and leg were cleaned.
    ¶9     Beltran was discharged from the hospital in the early hours of November 8, 2019. She went
    to her brother’s house that morning and later to the police station, where she obtained an order of
    protection against defendant. In obtaining the order, she submitted an affidavit, attesting to the
    events that occurred on November 6. She further averred that, on September 19, 2019, defendant
    picked up Beltran from work and accused her of cheating on him. When they arrived home, they
    continued arguing and defendant punched her, threw items at her, and swung a pipe at her. He then
    proceeded to throw her down the stairs. She testified that, following the September incident, she
    went to Loyola Hospital for medical treatment and informed medical staff that she tripped and fell
    down the stairs. According to Beltran, she stated this, rather than that defendant injured her,
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    No. 1-21-1665
    because he was with her in the treatment room at all times. After leaving the police station, she
    called defendant to inform him of the order and she stayed at her brother’s house for a few days.
    ¶ 10   At this point, the State entered into evidence several photographs of Beltran, which were
    taken at the Cicero Police Department a few days after the incident. The photographs showed that
    Beltran had a black eye and wounds on her arm and leg. Photographs from Northwestern Hospital
    were also introduced, which showed the injuries to her left hand.
    ¶ 11   Beltran further testified that she later underwent surgery on her fingers as well as physical
    therapy to regain movement in her fingers. She testified that she has permanent scarring due to her
    injuries and she lost sensation on the top half of two fingers as a result of this incident.
    ¶ 12   Finally, the State entered a certified copy of defendant’s 2014 misdemeanor domestic
    battery conviction.
    ¶ 13   The trial court found defendant guilty of all counts and subsequently merged all other
    counts into the aggravated domestic battery count. In so finding, the trial court stated that it
    believed Beltran to be a victim of emotional and mental abuse and that defendant “intentionally
    and knowingly caused great bodily harm to [Beltran] by cutting her with a knife to her arm, to her
    hand, to her leg.”
    ¶ 14   On June 2, 2021, defendant filed a motion requesting that the court vacate its findings of
    guilt, or in the alternative, grant him a new trial. However, soon after that motion was filed,
    defendant “fired” private counsel, and the trial court later appointed a public defender to represent
    defendant. On November 16, 2021, defendant’s appointed counsel filed an amended motion for a
    new trial. On December 22, 2021, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial.
    ¶ 15   Also on December 22, 2021, the court conducted the sentencing hearing. Defendant’s
    presentence investigation (PSI) report was submitted to the court. In aggravation, the State
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    No. 1-21-1665
    submitted Beltran’s victim impact statement. Beltran’s statement illustrated an environment of fear
    created by defendant, specifically stating that he was “possessive and angry” and that he installed
    cameras throughout their home so he could watch her. She further stated that she was still learning
    to use her left hand and she would never be the same emotionally and felt like she was “faking
    being alive.” The State also submitted a statement from defendant’s daughter, Alysa Melero.
    Therein, Alysa stated that defendant “brainwashed” her; defendant is “paranoid” and “lost”;
    defendant hurt everyone in her family; she was “locked inside the house for days at a time”; she is
    terrified of defendant; she heard Beltran’s cries and she wished she could have protected Beltran
    from defendant; defendant called Beltran derogatory names and hit her; and defendant threatened
    to shoot or hit Beltran and herself constantly. Lastly, she stated that she did not “want him near
    any of us.”
    ¶ 16   In mitigation, defense counsel argued that defendant has a high school education, two
    children, no felony arrests or convictions, and 21 years of reliable employment as a union painter.
    Defense counsel asked for the court to impose the minimum sentence. The court asked if defendant
    would like to make a statement in allocution. Inexplicably, defendant stated “I brought you a
    Christmas present.” He then stated, “I just want it over with” and affirmed that he was declining
    the opportunity to speak on his own behalf.
    ¶ 17   In announcing sentence, the trial court stated: “I get the impression that you don’t accept
    responsibilities for your actions. I think that the maximum sentence is probably not enough but
    that’s all I can give you.” After merging the other counts into aggravated domestic battery, the
    court sentenced defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to consider his
    sentence, which the trial court denied.
    ¶ 18   This appeal followed.
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    ¶ 19                                       II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 20   On appeal, defendant argues that his seven-year sentence is excessive and the trial court
    abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence. He requests that this court reduce his
    sentence or remand for a new sentencing hearing.
    ¶ 21   The Illinois Constitution requires a trial court to impose a sentence that balances the
    seriousness of the offense and the defendant's rehabilitative potential. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11;
    People v. Lee, 
    379 Ill. App. 3d 533
    , 539 (2008). To achieve such balance, the trial court must
    consider both aggravating and mitigating factors including: “the nature and circumstances of the
    crime, the defendant's conduct in the commission of the crime, and the defendant's personal
    history, including his age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal history, general moral
    character, social environment, and education.” People v. Maldonado, 
    240 Ill. App. 3d 470
    , 485-
    86 (1992). The trial court, as opposed to the reviewing court, is the best situated to assess these
    factors. People v. Steppan, 
    105 Ill. 2d 310
    , 323 (1985). Accordingly, the trial court has broad
    discretion to impose a sentence, and a sentence that is within statutory limits is reviewed for an
    abuse of that discretion. People v. Contursi, 
    2019 IL App (1st) 162894
    , ¶ 23. This court will not
    substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because we would have weighed the
    sentencing factors differently, and we will alter a sentence only when it varies greatly from the
    spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. 
    Id.
    Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan 1, 1967), reviewing courts have the power
    to reduce sentences; however, that power should be used “cautiously and sparingly.” People v.
    Alexander, 
    239 Ill. 2d 205
    , 212 (2010).
    ¶ 22   Here, defendant was found guilty of aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2 felony with a
    statutory sentencing range of 3 to 7 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018).
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    No. 1-21-1665
    Defendant’s sentence was the statutory maximum sentence for this offense. Because the court’s
    sentence falls within the statutory range, we must presume it is proper. See People v. Neasom,
    
    2017 IL App (1st) 143875
    , ¶ 49. Such a sentence will only be overturned upon “an affirmative
    showing that the sentence imposed greatly departs from the spirit and purpose of the law or is
    manifestly contrary to constitutional guidelines.” People v. Boclair, 
    225 Ill. App. 3d 331
    , 335
    (1992). For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s imposition of the maximum
    sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
    ¶ 23   Our review of the record shows that the relevant facts of the case support a finding that the
    seven-year sentence is not greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly
    disproportionate. The evidence presented at the trial showed that, while in their home, defendant
    suddenly attacked Beltran, pulling her hair and punching her in the face, and he inflicted serious
    injuries to her by repeatedly cutting her with a knife while she was trapped in the corner of their
    bedroom. He further threatened her during this incident, stating that he would cut off her toes if
    she tried to leave. His actions were both violent and erratic. Moreover, Beltran’s testimony
    depicted defendant as a highly possessive and paranoid individual who tracked Beltran’s location
    and did not allow her any semblance of privacy. The evidence also showed that, in her affidavit in
    obtaining an order of protection, Beltran referenced a prior violent episode during which defendant
    swung a pipe at her and pushed her down a flight of stairs. Beltran’s testimony and her victim
    impact statement demonstrated that she was extremely fearful of defendant, going so far as to
    avoid certain traffic routes and hospitals when seeking treatment for her injuries. Beltran’s injuries,
    which included knife wounds to her torso, leg, forearm, and fingers, were not insignificant by any
    means. In addition to the stitches she received on her hand, she later required surgery and physical
    therapy to regain use of her fingers, and she has permanent scars from her wounds and has lost
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    No. 1-21-1665
    feeling in her fingers. Taken together, the evidence showed a dangerous man who caused severe
    physical injuries and emotional damage to Beltran.
    ¶ 24   Additionally, defendant’s daughter, Alysa, submitted a victim impact statement that
    matched Beltran’s depiction of defendant. Her statement also indicated that individuals other than
    Beltran have been caused harm by defendant and are at risk of further harm. Further, although
    defendant does not have an extensive criminal history, there is a prior misdemeanor conviction for
    domestic battery, indicating that this is not the first time defendant has been the perpetrator of
    domestic violence and his behavior has escalated. Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial
    court’s imposition of the maximum sentence was an abuse of discretion.
    ¶ 25   Nonetheless, defendant contends that the trial court “seemingly imposed the maximum
    sentence upon [defendant] either for a personal belief or arbitrary reason.” A defendant’s sentence
    may be remanded for resentencing when a trial court fashions a sentence based on the court’s
    personal beliefs or arbitrary reasons. People v. Bolyard, 
    61 Ill. 2d 583
    , 586-87 (1975). Here, in
    announcing sentence, the trial court stated: “I think that the maximum sentence is probably not
    enough but that’s all I can give you.” Defendant asserts that the court erroneously based its
    sentencing decision on the opinion that the maximum for aggravated domestic battery is too low.
    The State argues that the court’s statement only stressed the seriousness of the offense and the
    court did not disregard the statutory sentencing limits. We agree with the State and reject
    defendant’s argument for the following reasons.
    ¶ 26   We do not find that the court’s limited statement can be construed as a personal belief in
    regards to these types of crime. In Bolyard, the supreme court found that the trial court had abused
    its discretion in sentencing the defendant because the court’s sentence was based on a personal
    belief. 
    61 Ill. 2d at 587
    . However, there, the trial judge expressly opined that certain crimes,
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    No. 1-21-1665
    regardless of the specific facts of the case, are not deserving of probation and arbitrarily denied
    consideration of probation for an eligible defendant. Bolyard, 
    61 Ill. 2d at 585-587
    . In this case,
    the trial court did not announce a definitive opinion on the sentencing range for aggravated
    domestic battery, and even if the court did believe the maximum sentence should be increased for
    that offense, the court did not ultimately sentence defendant outside the range. Thus, we do not
    find the court’s sentencing decision was based on a personal belief or arbitrary reason.
    ¶ 27   Further, this court should not focus on a few words or statements of the trial court but
    consider the entire record as a whole. People v. Ward, 
    113 Ill. 2d 516
    , 526-27 (1986). Here, the
    statement that the maximum was too low was directly preceded by: “I get the impression that you
    don’t accept responsibilities for your actions.” This suggests that the court was, in fact, reflecting
    upon the specific facts and circumstances of defendant’s case, and in particular, defendant’s lack
    of remorse. Our supreme court has held that lack of remorse may be properly considered in
    determining a sentence, but a court may not rely on the defendant’s exercise of his right against
    self-incrimination and must rely on other sources. Ward, 
    113 Ill. 2d at 529
    ; People v. Barrow, 
    133 Ill. 2d 226
    , 281 (1989); see also People v. Matute, 
    2020 IL App (2d) 170786
    , ¶ 62 (A
    “[d]efendant’s invocation of his right to not allocate” cannot serve as a basis for a finding of lack
    of remorse.). Notwithstanding defendant’s refusal to make a statement in allocution, the record
    otherwise supports the court’s finding that defendant did not accept responsibility and showed no
    remorse for his actions. At a previous appearance before the court, defendant asserted: “I wanted
    to show you, Judge, how my wife came here and lied to you in your courtroom. She spit on your
    floor. She lied to you, sir. And with all respect, she lied to the State’s Attorney. She lied to the
    detectives, and everybody else.” These statements indicate that defendant refused accountability
    for his actions, and, in fact, the accusatory nature of his statements lend credence to Beltran and
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    No. 1-21-1665
    Alysa’s victim impact statements. Because the trial court is best situated to assess a defendant’s
    demeanor and credibility, we see no reason to reject the trial court’s finding that defendant failed
    to take responsibility for his actions. See Alexander, 
    239 Ill. 2d at 213
     (the trial court, having
    observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in the best position to consider the defendant’s
    credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age).
    Thus, the trial court properly considered defendant’s lack of remorse in deciding that the maximum
    sentence was warranted. See People v. Donlow, 
    2020 IL App (4th) 170374
    , ¶ 84 (“[T]rial courts
    may consider a defendant’s lack of remorse or lack of veracity in imposing a sentence, since those
    are factors which may have a bearing on the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.)).
    ¶ 28   Lastly, defendant asserts that the record shows ample mitigating evidence that
    demonstrates his rehabilitative potential, specifically his consistent employment history as a union
    painter for 21 years and his lack of prior felony convictions. Further, in his reply brief, he contends
    that “[t]he only way to definitively know whether the court properly considered the appropriate
    factors in mitigation is where a court lists the specific factors it considered when fashioning a
    sentence, which the court in this case failed to do.” However, the court is not required to recite
    each factor considered or the weight given to the evidence presented. People v. Garibay, 
    366 Ill. App. 3d 1103
    , 1109 (2006). Moreover, absent some affirmative indication to the contrary, the trial
    court is presumed to have properly considered all relevant factors and any evidence in mitigation
    or aggravation. People v. Jackson, 
    2014 IL App (1st) 123258
    , ¶ 48. In the instant case, defendant
    has not made such a showing. Defendant’s criminal history and employment history were
    presented to the court by defense counsel at the hearing and in defendant’s PSI, of which the court
    acknowledged receipt. There is nothing in the record that affirmatively shows that the court
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    No. 1-21-1665
    ignored defendant’s evidence in mitigation. Moreover, the trial court is “presumed to know the
    law and apply it properly.” People v. Smith, 
    176 Ill. 2d 217
    , 260 (1997). Because there is no express
    indication in the record that the court disregarded factors in mitigation, defendant’s argument that
    the mitigating evidence was not considered is meritless. To the extent that defendant implores this
    court to reweigh the evidence in mitigation and arrive at a lesser sentence, we reject his request.
    See People v. Knox, 
    2014 IL App (1st) 120349
    , ¶ 46 (the reviewing court will not reweigh evidence
    the trial court relied upon in sentencing the defendant). The trial court has broad discretionary
    powers in its sentencing decision, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
    See Alexander, 
    239 Ill. 2d at 212-13
    .
    ¶ 29     In any case, the presence of a mitigating factor does not automatically entitle the defendant
    to the statutory minimum sentence. People v. Sharp, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 130438
     ¶ 133. In fact, the
    seriousness of the offense is the most significant factor in determining a sentence (People v. Busse,
    
    2016 IL App (1st) 142941
    , ¶ 28), and as we have explained, the evidence presented showed that
    defendant inflicted serious physical injuries upon Beltran, which left permanent scars, and caused
    her emotional trauma. It would not be unreasonable to find that the seriousness of the offense
    outweighed defendant’s solid employment history and lack of felony convictions. Thus,
    defendant’s argument that the trial court did not properly consider mitigating evidence is without
    merit.
    ¶ 30     Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
    defendant to seven years’ imprisonment.
    ¶ 31                                     III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 32     For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
    ¶ 33     Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1-21-1665

Citation Numbers: 2024 IL App (1st) 211665-U

Filed Date: 3/12/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/12/2024