Woolsey v. The Illinois State Police , 2024 IL App (4th) 210467 ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 210467-UB
FILED
This Order was filed under March 19, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-21-0467
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT
Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
JASON F. WOOLSEY, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Jersey County
THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, ) No. 19CH27
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Allison Lorton,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed, finding section 7.5(v) of the Illinois Freedom of
Information Act prohibited, without exception, the Illinois State Police from
disclosing Firearm Owners Identification Card information.
¶2 On March 12, 2021, pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5
ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)), the trial court ordered the Illinois State Police (ISP) to provide
plaintiff, Jason F. Woolsey, all documents relating to his application for a firearm owner’s
identification (FOID) card, made pursuant to the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID
Card Act) (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)). On July 22, 2021, the court awarded Woolsey
his attorney fees and costs pursuant to FOIA. ISP appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether a
permanent injunction bars ISP from producing the records to Woolsey and (2) whether the
language of FOIA exempts the documents from disclosure. Originally, we affirmed the trial court’s
decision. See Woolsey v. The Illinois State Police, 2022 IL App (4th) 210467-U, ¶ 2. ISP petitioned
the supreme court for leave to appeal. On January 24, 2024, the supreme court denied ISP’s petition
but issued us the following order:
“In the exercise of this Court’s supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Fourth
District, is directed to vacate its judgment in Woolsey v. Illinois State Police, case
No. 4-21-0467 (06/09/22). The appellate court is directed to consider the effect of
this Court’s opinion Hart v. The Illinois State Police, 2023 IL 128275, on the issue
of whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
and determine if a different result is warranted.” Woolsey v. The Illinois State
Police, No. 128668 (Ill. Jan. 24, 2024) (supervisory order).
¶3 Accordingly, we vacate our judgment in Woolsey. In light of our supreme court’s
decision in Hart v. Illinois State Police, 2023 IL 128275, we now reverse the trial court’s judgment,
and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this order.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On November 8, 2018, Woolsey sought from ISP, pursuant to FOIA, documents
related to his FOID card, including (1) his application, (2) any denial of the application, and
(3) any document containing any information relating to any legal disability that would have made
Woolsey ineligible for a FOID card. He also specifically limited his request to information about
his own FOID card and sought documents relating to ISP’s processing time for FOID appeals in
general. The request contained Woolsey’s name, city of residence, and social security number.
¶6 ISP denied Woolsey’s request for the documents, citing section 7.5(v) of FOIA (5
ILCS 140/7.5(v) (West 2020)), exempting from disclosure, inter alia, the names and information
of people who have applied for FOID cards. ISP further advised it did not possess documents
related to the processing times of FOID appeals.
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¶7 On June 5, 2019, Woolsey filed a single-count complaint in the trial court seeking
production pursuant to FOIA of the same information and, in addition, his attorney fees and costs
incurred in prosecuting the matter. Woolsey later filed a motion for summary judgment, citing as
support a judgment entered by the Madison County circuit court in a factually similar case. ISP
also moved for summary judgment, asserting the same claims it makes herein, namely, the
disclosure is barred by a permanent injunction, and the plain language of FOIA excludes from
disclosure the information sought. The permanent injunction ISP relied upon was entered by the
Peoria County circuit court in an action brought by the Illinois State Rifle Association. That
injunction provides ISP is prohibited from releasing “personally identifying information” of those
who have applied for FOID cards.
¶8 The trial court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, at which time
Woolsey withdrew his request for information relating to the processing times of FOID card
appeals. On March 12, 2021, the court granted Woolsey summary judgment and denied ISP’s
cross-motion. The court generally adopted the reasoning of the Madison County circuit court in
the matter referenced above. The court noted the exemption claimed by ISP did not “speak
specifically to an applicant seeking his/her own information from a public body.” Further, the court
explained the use of the terms “people” and “names,” being plural, suggested section 7.5(v) of
FOIA did not apply to those seeking information about their own FOID card applications (id.).
Without explanation, the court found the permanent injunction did not prohibit ISP from releasing
to Woolsey the information he sought.
¶9 Subsequently, Woolsey filed a petition seeking his attorney fees and costs pursuant
to FOIA. On July 22, 2021, the trial court awarded Woolsey $2046.45 in fees and costs and, on
August 17, 2021, granted ISP’s motion to stay enforcement of the court’s orders pending appeal.
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¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 We review the issue of statutory interpretation de novo. Sandholm v. Kuecker,
2012 IL 111443, ¶ 41. Our review of a trial court’s entry of summary judgment is also de novo.
Id. The section of primary interest from FOIA states as follows:
“Statutory exemptions. To the extent provided for by the statutes referenced below,
the following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:
***
(v) Names and information of people who have applied for or received
Firearm Owner’s Identification Cards under the Firearm Owners Identification
Card Act.” 5 ILCS 140/7.5(v) (West 2020).
¶ 12 A. Hart
¶ 13 In Hart, our supreme court granted ISP’s petition for leave to appeal from two
consolidated cases from the Appellate Court, Fifth District. Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶¶ 1-2. The
plaintiffs in Hart, pursuant to FOIA, requested documents from ISP—like Woolsey had in the
present matter—related to their FOID card application and any legal disability regarding their
ineligibility for a FOID card. Id. ¶ 4. ISP denied the plaintiffs’ requests, citing section 7.5(v) of
FOIA. Id. ¶ 5. The trial court in both plaintiffs’ cases entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, ultimately, ordered ISP to produce the plaintiffs’ applications for a FOID card and relatedly
requested documents. Id. ¶¶ 8-11. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. See
Hart v. Illinois State Police, 2022 IL App (5th) 190258, ¶ 34. The appellate court found the
legislature’s use of plural terms for “names” and “people,” as opposed to singular terms, meant
section 7.5(v) did not apply to an individual’s request for his or her own FOID card information.
Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 12. The appellate court also reasoned that section 7(1)(c) of FOIA
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permitted a person to consent to the disclosure of their own personal information contained within
public records. Id. ¶ 13; see 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2018). The appellate court rejected ISP’s
argument that it could not verify whether a FOIA requester was in fact the same person requesting
the information being sought, and it found the permanent injunction issued by the Peoria County
circuit court of no moment. Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶¶ 14-15.
¶ 14 Our supreme court, in Hart, found the legislature’s use of plural terms rather than
singular terms did not, “in itself, mean that a request for one’s own information is excluded from
section 7.5(v).” Id. ¶ 21. The Hart court noted section 7.5(v) did not permit a concealed carry
license holder’s and applicant’s information to be disclosed unless authorized by the Firearm
Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2018)). Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 22. The
Firearm Concealed Carry Act provides a provision “for the release of one’s own denial and
revocation information pertaining to concealed carry licenses.” Id. The court explained, “If the
legislature had similarly intended for information regarding an individual’s FOID card to be
subject to disclosure under FOIA, it would have said so. It did not.” Id.¶ 15 The court in Hart also disagreed with the appellate court’s characterization of a
FOID card application and subsequent denial letter as public records. Id. ¶ 24. The court found
such information to be private information under section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West
2018)) that is not subject to disclosure under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA (id. § 7(1)(b)) by state or
federal law or court order. Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 24.
¶ 16 Lastly, the Hart court stated, “while the plaintiffs are not entitled to the disclosure
of their requested information under FOIA, they may obtain their FOID card applications and
revocation letters through the Firearms Services Bureau, the division of ISP that processes FOID
card applications and determines FOID card eligibility.” Id. ¶ 25.
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¶ 17 B. This Case
¶ 18 On appeal, Woolsey argued (1) the Peoria County circuit court’s permanent
injunction was irrelevant and (2) section 7.5(v) of FOIA was inapplicable to his case. ISP argued
the plain language of FOIA barred ISP’s disclosure to Woolsey of information related to his FOID
card, and that the Peoria County circuit court’s permanent injunction prohibits the release as well.
Based on our supreme court’s decision in Hart, we agree with the State on its first argument.
¶ 19 In our original decision, we found Hart, 2022 IL App (5th) 190258, to be
persuasive. This is no longer the case. When discussing the reasoning employed by the Fifth
District in Hart, our supreme court explained:
“[When interpreting section 7.5(v)], the appellate court emphasized that the
statute uses the plural terms ‘names’ and ‘people’ and, therefore must not exempt
from disclosure an individual’s request for his or her own information. However,
section 1.03 of the Statute on Statutes provides that ‘[w]ords importing the singular
number may extend and be applied to several persons or things, and words
importing the plural number may include the singular.’ [Citation.] This is a well-
settled principle of statutory construction. [Citation.] Accordingly, contrary to the
appellate court’s reasoning, the legislature’s use of the plural terms ‘names’ and
‘people’ does not, in itself, mean that a request for one’s own information is
excluded from section 7.5(v).” Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 21.
¶ 20 Therefore, we find section 7.5(v) does not permit ISP to release Woolsey’s FOID
card application and related documents pursuant to FOIA as he requested. Additionally, we find
Woolsey’s FOID card information is not a public record subject to FOIA, nor do we find FOIA
authorizes an individual to consent to the release of his or her own FOID card information. Id.-6-
¶ 24. Ultimately, Woolsey can obtain the information he seeks through the Firearms Services
Bureau; however, “FOIA is not the proper means for obtaining the requested information.” Id.
¶ 25.
¶ 21 Because we agree with ISP that section 7.5(v) of FOIA prohibits it from providing
Woolsey his FOID application, denial letter, and information relating to any legal disability
preventing ISP from issuing Woolsey a FOID card, we need not address its argument pertaining
to the Peoria County circuit court’s permanent injunction. Because we are reversing the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment for Woolsey, we also vacate the court’s subsequent order
awarding Woolsey attorney fees and costs pursuant to FOIA.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 24 Reversed; cause remanded.
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