Owagboriaye v. Sen , 2024 IL App (1st) 230735-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 230735-UFIRST DIVISION
March 25, 2024
No. 1-23-0735
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
OLUBUNMI OWAGBORIAYE, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 2021 M1 300807
)
RAJASHREE SEN and ATLAS REALTY ) The Honorable
GROUP, ) John Simon,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees. )
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the
court.
Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HELD: This appeal is dismissed because of the appellant’s failure to comply with
the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1,
2020).
¶1 Plaintiff-Appellant Olubunmi Owagboriaye (plaintiff) appeals, pro se, from a trial court
order granting defendants-appellees Rajashree Sen and Atlas Realty Group’s (defendants or
as named) motion to debar her arbitration award rejection and denying her motion to vacate
the judgment award. She contends that the court erred in granting the debarment because she
No. 1-23-0735
did her best in pursuing her case. She asks that we reverse and remand for further
proceedings, including a trial. For the following reasons, we dismiss the instant cause due to
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the rules governing appellate briefs and the numerous
defects in the record, which preclude consideration of her appeal.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 From the sparse record before us, we have gleaned the following relevant facts and
procedural history.
¶4 In June 2022, plaintiff filed, pro se, a personal injury lawsuit against defendants, the
landlord and property management company of a building, alleging she fell on some “thick
ice,” was transported via ambulance to a local hospital, and sustained injuries. Defendants,
represented by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)). The matter proceeded
to arbitration and on October 11, 2022, an award was entered in favor of defendants and
against plaintiff, with plaintiff therefore receiving $0.
¶5 On October 25, 2022, plaintiff filled out a preprinted court form entitled “Notice of
Rejection of Award.” Although she filled out the top of the form providing the date of the
award, her contact information, and her signature, she left the Proof of Service section
completely blank. Accordingly, she did not reference counsel for defendants, she did not
provide a date upon which she served counsel with her notice of rejection, she did not
indicate the method by which she served counsel, and she did not obtain the signature of a
notary public—all information required to be supplied and attested to in the form.
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¶6 On November 28, 2022, upon a motion filed by counsel for defendants, the trial court
issued a Judgment on Award of Arbitration. In its written order, the court noted that the
award had, again, been in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, that it had been filed with
the court, and that “a notice of rejection has not been filed” by plaintiff.
¶7 On December 2, 2022, plaintiff filed more preprinted court forms. Among these was a
motion form wherein she stated only that she was seeking a “new date & time” for a “court
date” she “missed due to unforeseen circumstances;” it is wholly unclear to what she is
referring. In the Proof of Delivery section, she stated she was sending the motion to counsel
for defendants; however, instead of doing so via email, she checked the box marked “mail or
third-party carrier” under the instructions to do so only if a party does not have an email
address; 1 she also failed to sign the bottom portion certifying that everything in the Proof of
Delivery section was true and correct and she failed to provide her name, address, contact
information or any attachment. In a second form, plaintiff filled in blanks stating that “The
hearing for the Motion I filed is scheduled for: * * * 12/19/2022 at 11:00am.” (Emphasis in
original.) In the Proof of Delivery section, she stated she was sending notice to counsel, but
she did not check any of the boxes regarding method of delivery and, although she checked
the last option stating she “completed an Additional Proof of Delivery form” (emphasis in
original), she did not attach any documents.
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Counsel for defendants made clear at the outset of the litigation her email information and
included it in all court documents; plaintiff utilized that email address in certain pleadings. Plaintiff never
stated in any court document that she did not have access to email. In fact, the record demonstrates that
she listed “internet” as an expense in her application for waiver of court fees, she wrote her email address
on certain pleadings (but later crossed it out), and she used her email address in documents filed in the
instant appeal.
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¶8 The record next reveals that a hearing was held in the trial court on December 19, 2022,
as plaintiff had requested. However, no corresponding transcript or bystander’s report is
included here. The trial court’s written order states that counsel for defendants was present,
but plaintiff was not, and the court struck plaintiff’s motion.
¶9 On December 20, 2022, plaintiff filed a series of motions and notices. One was a motion
to “compel discovery;” she provided no other content or explanation. Despite knowing
defendants were represented, plaintiff stated in the Proof of Delivery section that she was
sending a copy of the motion to defendants via personal hand delivery. She accompanied
this with a Notice of Court Date for Motion form, wherein she wrote that a hearing on her
motion would take place on January 6, 2023. Again, she listed only defendants in the Proof
of Delivery section. Another motion she filed was entitled “Vacate Judgment Awarded.” In
the Proof of Delivery section, she again stated was sending the motion to defendants via
personal hand delivery.
¶ 10 Eventually, defendants filed a motion to debar plaintiff’s rejection of the arbitration
award for lack of proper service. In her response, plaintiff admitted that when she filed her
motions on December 20, 2022, she sent the notices to defendants rather than their counsel
despite knowing they were represented “because the defendant’s [sic] lawyer’s contact
address was not handy then.”
¶ 11 The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ open motions. There is no transcript or
bystander’s report in the record. In its written order, dated April 4, 2023, the court
acknowledged that both plaintiff and counsel for defendants were present. It then denied
plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment award and granted defendants’ motion to debar. The
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court stated that plaintiff’s notice of rejection had not been served on counsel for defendants
and that she had failed to file a certificate of service of the notice of rejection as required by
Illinois Supreme Court Rule (Rule) 93(a). Accordingly, the court ordered that the judgment
on award entered by the arbitrators in favor of defendants and against plaintiff “shall stand.”
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff seemingly, and solely, argues that the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motion to debar because she did her best and had no “purposeful improper
intent” in failing to provide notice to their counsel of the various motions she filed during this
litigation and in failing to abide by our supreme court rules.
¶ 14 As a threshold matter, we note for the record that defendants filed in our Court a motion
to strike plaintiff’s brief on appeal for violations of Rules 321, 341 and 342. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1,
2019). That motion was taken with the case, and we address it now.
¶ 15 It is indisputable that plaintiff’s brief, which can at best be described as cursory, fails to
comply with the supreme court rules governing appellate review. For example, Rule
341(h)(6) states that the appellant’s statement of facts “shall contain the facts necessary to an
understanding of the case, stated accurately * * *, and with appropriate references to the
record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Similarly, Rule 341(h)(7)
directs that the appellant’s arguments be supported by citation to relevant legal authority and
by “the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1. 2020).
Additionally, it is well established that a reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly
defined with “cohesive arguments” presented and pertinent authority cited. Obert v. Saville,
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253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). “The failure to elaborate on an argument, cite persuasive
authority, or present a well-reasoned argument violates Rule 341(h)(7) and results in waiver
of that argument.” Sakellariadis v. Campbell, 391 Ill. App. 3d 795, 804 (2009). “The
purpose of the rules is to require parties before a reviewing court to present clear and orderly
arguments so that the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues involved.” Hall
v. Naper Gold Hospitality, LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7.
¶ 16 In the instant cause, plaintiff’s brief fails to meet a great majority of the requirements
mandated by these rules. For example, there is no Table of Contents or Points and
Authorities section and no introductory paragraph regarding the Nature of the Case or
Statement of Jurisdiction. While she provides a Statement of Facts section, there is not a
single citation to the record on appeal. Indeed, plaintiff repeatedly includes “facts” she
insists occurred and references items like photographs, legal communications with attorneys,
and appearances before “the Judge” that we are wholly unable to locate, and thus verify,
anywhere in the record before us. Further, she does not provide a standard of review and her
Argument section comprises less than a page; it is barely developed and does not contain any
citation to legal authority. And, she fails to provide an Appendix or the contents required in
one, such as the judgment appealed from, any pleadings, or her notice of appeal.
¶ 17 Compliance with Rule 341 is not an inconsequential matter. Supreme court rules “ ‘ “are
not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption
must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” ’ ” Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit
Commission of Kane County, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 353 (2006) (quoting Roth v. Illinois Farmers
Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 490, 494 (2002) (quoting Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210
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(1995))). Where an appellant’s brief fails to comply with the supreme court rules, this Court
has the inherent authority to strike the brief and dismiss the appeal. See McCann v. Dart,
2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12; see also Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill. App. 3d 36, 42 (2005);
Coleman v. Windy City Balloon Port, Ltd., 160 Ill App. 3d 408, 419 (1987) (“without
adequate support in the record, an allegation included in the statement of facts contained in
an appellate brief lies outside the record [citation]; * * * [and] should be stricken and not
considered on appeal”).
¶ 18 While we recognize that plaintiff here is proceeding pro se, we note that this status does
not relive her of the obligation to comply with the Rules. To the contrary, our courts have
repeatedly held that “a pro se litigant * * * is not entitled to more lenient treatment than
attorneys.” Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. Thus, parties choosing to
represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and are held to the
same standards as licensed attorneys. See Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8
(compliance with rules governing briefs on appeal is compulsory regardless of a party's
status); Matlock v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶
14, and Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11 (content and
formatting rules are mandatory, pro se litigants are not absolved from these requirements); In
re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009) (“pro se litigants are presumed to
have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures and must comply with the same
rules and procedures as would be required of litigants represented by attorneys”). It is a
choice pro se litigants make to proceed on their own, and they are charged with the risks they
assume by doing so, whatever they may be. See Matlock, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 14,
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and Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11 (a reviewing court may choose to dismiss an
appeal upon the failure to abide by rules regarding briefs on appeal); Dart, 2015 IL App (1st)
141291, ¶ 12; see also Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (reviewing court
has every right to strike an appellant’s brief and dismiss her cause when her rule violations
impede review).
¶ 19 Accordingly, we grant defendants’ motion taken with this case and, in our discretion, we
strike plaintiff’s brief and dismiss this appeal. See Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12;
accord Matlock, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 14, and Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11.
¶ 20 That said, we observe that even if we were inclined to consider the appeal on the merits,
defects in the record preclude us from doing so. See In re Estate of Jackson, 354 Ill. App. 3d
616, 62-21 (2004). Plaintiff’s pro se brief alleges that the trial court erred in entering the
final order in this cause, namely, in granting defendants’ motion to debar and denying her
motion to vacate judgment award. She asserts, without more, that the court “reversibly
erred” in doing so because “the facts at hand did not support” its decision. Fatal to plaintiff’s
contentions, however, is the fact that the record on appeal is devoid of any information from
which we could determine whether the arguments in her pro se brief have any merit.
¶ 21 Specifically, from what we can glean within the sparse record that is presented, there
were at least two hearings conducted by the trial court. One took place on December 19,
2022, as requested by plaintiff herself. It is wholly unclear what prompted that hearing; all
that is clear is that plaintiff did not attend and the trial court struck whatever motion she had
filed to obtain that court date. The second hearing (we do not know for certain its date)
resulted in the trial court’s April 4, 2023 written order. This order confirmed the parties were
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present, and it denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment award and granted defendants’
motion to debar, declaring that the judgment on award entered by the arbitrators in favor of
defendants and against plaintiff “shall stand.”
¶ 22 Clearly, the record on appeal does not contain any report of the proceedings below, nor
any acceptable substitute such as a bystanders’ report, or an agreed statement of facts, as
authorized under Rule 323 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (eff. Dec. 13, 2005)). Without such a report of
the proceedings, we have no basis of knowing what evidence, testimony, or arguments were
presented at these hearings, on what basis the trial court entered the order granting
defendants’ motion to debar, and whether such judgment was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Similarly, we have no way of knowing what testimony plaintiff presented in
support of her motion to vacate judgment award, and whether she offered any evidence of her
reasonable efforts or “best intentions” to abide by court rules in pursuing this appeal, which
seem to be the crux of her argument before us. As such, we can only speculate as to the trial
court’s reasons for denying her motion.
¶ 23 Plaintiff, as the appellant here, had the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete
record of the proceedings below to facilitate meaningful review of her claims. See In re
Alexander R., 377 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557 (2007); see also Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc.,
217 Ill. 2d 144, 156 (2005); Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001); Foutch v.
O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). “[A] reviewing court is not simply a depository into
which a party may dump the burden of argument and research.” People ex rel. Illinois
Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56; accord Petrik, 2012
IL App (2d) 110495, ¶ 38 (citing Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23, and Thrall
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Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986)). “Reviewing courts
will not search the record for purposes of finding error * * * when an appellant has made no
good-faith effort to comply with the supreme court rules governing the contents of briefs.”
Estate of Parker, 2011 IL App (1st) 102871, ¶ 47; see also People v. Universal Public
Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 073303–B, ¶ 50 (it is “neither the function nor the
obligation of the Appellate Court to act as an advocate or search the record for error”).
Without an adequate record preserving the claimed error, a reviewing court must presume the
trial court’s order had a sufficient factual basis and that it conforms with the law. See
Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 157; Illinois Neurospine Institute, P.C. v. Carson, 2017 IL App (1st)
163386, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 19); accord In re Marriage of
Gulla, 234 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2009) (“we cannot review the circuit court’s finding * * *
because there is no record to review the basis of the circuit court’s finding”).
¶ 24 Ultimately, then, even if we did not dismiss plaintiff’s appeal based on her violations of
Rule 341, we would be unable to address her claims because they are not supported by the
record on appeal.
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 Accordingly, we exercise our discretion, grant defendants’ open motion which was taken
with the case, strike plaintiff’s brief, and dismiss her appeal.
¶ 27 Appeal dismissed.
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