People v. Walker , 2024 IL App (1st) 220985-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 220985-UFIFTH DIVISION
March 22, 2024
No. 1-22-0985
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 18 CR 9494
)
TRAVIS WALKER, ) Honorable
) William G. Gamboney,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for aggravated
driving while under the influence.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Travis Walker was found guilty of aggravated driving
while under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4), (d)(1)(H) (West 2018)) and sentenced
to 20 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Walker contends that (1) the State failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that, at the time he was in control of a vehicle, he was under the influence of
any drug to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving; (2) the trial court erred in
admitting his complete medical record from the hospital where he was treated on the day of the
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incident leading to his arrest; and (3) he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation when
the State relied on a certified copy of his driving abstract to prove the aggravating circumstance in
its case.
¶3 The State concedes that it failed to prove Mr. Walker’s guilt of aggravated DUI beyond a
reasonable doubt. As both parties acknowledge, this renders any claim regarding admission of the
medical records moot. But the State argues that the driving abstract was properly admitted and that
this court should “affirm [Mr. Walker]’s conviction for felony driving while license revoked.”
However, as Mr. Walker points out in his reply brief, he was never charged with any crime other
than aggravated DUI, driving while one’s license is revoked is not a lesser included crime of
aggravated DUI, and thus there is no basis for doing anything other than reversing this conviction.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Mr. Walker was charged by information with a single count of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(4), (d)(1)(H) (West 2018)). The State alleged that, on or about January 23, 2018, Mr.
Walker drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
phencyclidine (PCP) and cannabis to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving. This
was charged as an aggravated offense based on his having committed this violation while he did
not possess a driver’s license, permit, restricted driving permit, judicial driving permit, or a
monitoring device driving permit.
¶6 At trial, Jeremiah Coriano testified that at about 9:30 p.m. on January 23, 2018, he was
driving his truck on the southbound entrance ramp to I-55 in La Grange when he saw a group of
cars “steering clear” of a gray sport utility vehicle (SUV) in the middle lane. As Mr. Coriano
continued up the ramp, the SUV moved into the left lane without signaling and then crashed into
the concrete barrier between the northbound and southbound lanes. The SUV moved back into the
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road, continued driving for about 100 feet, hit the barrier a second time, bounced off, and then hit
the barrier a third time and stopped. According to Mr. Coriano, the highway was well-lit and dry,
and the lanes were clearly marked.
¶7 Illinois State Police trooper Edward Kazupski testified that on January 23, 2018, at around
9:30 p.m., he responded to the scene of this accident. There, he saw an SUV on the left shoulder
of the highway, with the driver’s side “crashed up” against the left median. The front and middle
of the driver’s side of the SUV were damaged, the rear passenger side tire was shredded, and pieces
of rubber littered the roadway. Trooper Kazupski also noticed a few hundred feet of scratch marks
on the left median. The SUV was running with a key in the ignition. The driver’s door was against
the median, such that it could not open fully, and the driver was “squeezing out” of the vehicle as
Trooper Kazupski approached on foot. In court, he identified Mr. Walker as the SUV’s driver and
sole occupant.
¶8 Trooper Kazupski asked Mr. Walker whether he was injured and inquired as to what had
happened. Mr. Walker “seemed a little out of sorts.” He was responsive to Trooper Kazupski’s
questions, but Trooper Kazupski had to repeat his questions several times, and Mr. Walker only
gave short answers. At the time, Trooper Kazupski was not focused on conducting a DUI
investigation; rather, he was trying to learn about the circumstances behind the crash. At some
point, Mr. Walker reached around “on the top” of the SUV and said he was looking for its keys.
Shortly thereafter, paramedics arrived on the scene and guided Mr. Walker into an ambulance.
Trooper Kazupski “stayed back” and let the paramedics assess Mr. Walker for injuries. Trooper
Kazupski administered an alcohol/drug influence report and conducted a Law Enforcement
Agencies Data System (LEADS) check and learned Mr. Walker had a suspended driver’s license
that expired in 2006.
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¶9 Illinois State Police trooper Christopher Tor testified that when he arrived at the scene, he
saw an SUV up against the left median wall, which was scraped up with black tire marks. The
SUV was damaged on the left side, its left front tire was flat, and its right rear tire was shredded.
Trooper Kazupski was talking with Mr. Walker, whom Trooper Tor identified in court. Trooper
Tor parked behind Trooper Kazupski and approached the SUV on foot.
¶ 10 Trooper Tor engaged Mr. Walker in conversation, asking him questions. Mr. Walker’s
answers were mumbled and unintelligible. He seemed confused, and Trooper Tor had to ask him
questions several times before he received answers that made sense and that he could understand.
Mr. Walker was not swaying.
¶ 11 Paramedics arrived and escorted Mr. Walker to an ambulance. Trooper Tor entered the
ambulance to get an update on Mr. Walker’s condition. As the paramedics treated Mr. Walker, he
became agitated and combative. The paramedics put a spit hood on Mr. Walker and Trooper Tor
assisted them in placing Mr. Walker in soft restraints. Eventually, Mr. Walker calmed down.
Trooper Tor exited the ambulance, told Trooper Kazupski what had transpired, and directed him
to follow the ambulance to the hospital. Trooper Tor remained at the scene to have the SUV towed.
¶ 12 Nurse Marija Milenkov testified that she treated Mr. Walker in the emergency room at
La Grange Hospital. He had been brought into the emergency room in four-point restraints on a
stretcher and was transferred to a bed without restraints. Ms. Milenkov assessed Mr. Walker for
trauma and did not notice any signs of obvious injuries. She then performed a secondary,
neurological assessment and assessment for function. She noted that Mr. Walker was alert and
oriented, but his pupils were “sluggish.” Per orders of a doctor, she obtained blood and urine
samples and sent them to the hospital laboratory. She continued to treat Mr. Walker and gave him
intravenous fluids. He was not given any medication.
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¶ 13 Over Mr. Walker’s objection, his 80-page medical record from La Grange Hospital was
admitted into evidence. Ms. Milenkov testified that page 33 contained the results of the testing of
his urine sample. Specifically, the medical record indicated that Mr. Walker’s “urine chemistry”
was “positive” for PCP and cannabis.
¶ 14 The State presented a certified copy of Mr. Walker’s driving abstract, which was admitted
into evidence, without objection. The abstract stated that, on January 23, 2018, a suspension was
in effect for Mr. Walker’s driver’s license. The abstract also indicated that the expiration date on
the license was June 26, 2006.
¶ 15 Mr. Walker made a motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Mr. Walker
did not testify or present any evidence.
¶ 16 The jury found Mr. Walker guilty of aggravated DUI. Mr. Walker filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, which he later amended.
The trial court denied the motion. The trial court sentenced him to 20 months in prison. Mr. Walker
filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied.
¶ 17 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 18 Mr. Walker’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied on June 23, 2022, and he timely
filed his notice of appeal that same day. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under article VI,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 603 (eff. Feb 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final
judgments in criminal cases.
¶ 19 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, Mr. Walker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction
for aggravated DUI. The Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) defines the offense of DUI as “driv[ing] or
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be[ing] in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while: *** under the influence
of any other drug [besides alcohol or an “intoxicating compound”] or combination of drugs to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2018).
The offense is elevated to aggravated DUI if, as charged in this case, it was committed “while [the
driver] did not possess a driver’s license or permit or a restricted driving permit or a judicial driving
permit or a monitoring device driving permit.” Id. § 11-501(d)(1)(H).
¶ 21 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). Reversal is justified only where the evidence is “so unsatisfactory,
improbable or implausible” that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt (People v.
Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989)) or where proof of an element of a crime is wholly lacking (People
v. Sweigart, 2021 IL App (2d) 180543, ¶ 56).
¶ 22 Mr. Walker contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the
time he was in control of a vehicle, he was under the influence of any drug to a degree that rendered
him incapable of safely driving. He argues that the State relied on evidence that a urinalysis
screening showed a positive result for PCP and cannabis, which, he asserts, was insufficient by
itself to support his conviction. Noting that he never admitted to being under the influence or
having ingested drugs, he maintains that the State was required to present evidence regarding the
physiological effects of PCP or cannabis, the amount required to produce any significant effect, or
the effects of those substances on a person’s ability to drive safely. In the absence of any such
evidence, he asserts that his conviction must be reversed. The State in this case concedes that
“[w]ithout expert testimony regarding the intoxicating effects of PCP and [cannabis], the evidence
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at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction for DUI under Section 501(a)(4) according to
existing jurisprudence.”
¶ 23 The Code does not provide for a “generic” offense of DUI. People v. Workman, 312 Ill.
App. 3d 305, 310 (2000). Rather, the State must prove that the specific drug identified in a charge
has “some intoxicating effect.” Id. Because observations of alcohol consumption are a part of a
typical adult experience, a layperson may testify to a person’s alcohol intoxication. Id.; see also
People v. Phillips, 2015 IL App (1st) 131147, ¶ 18 (the testimony of a single, credible police
officer may alone sustain a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol). However, to
form an opinion that a defendant was under the influence of a substance other than alcohol, a
witness, including a police officer, must have relevant skills, experience, or training to render such
an opinion. Ciborowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 143352, ¶ 79; Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 310. When
an officer provides such testimony, his or her experience and training in the detection of controlled
substances must be taken into account. People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 31. If no qualified
witness provides competent evidence regarding the nature and effect of the drug alleged in a
particular case, and the defendant has not admitted to taking that drug and being under its influence,
then the “lack of competent testimony may create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt,
absent other sufficiently incriminating evidence.” Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 311.
¶ 24 We agree with the parties that this conviction cannot stand. Mr. Walker never admitted to
consuming PCP or cannabis or to being under the influence of those substances. The urinalysis
results, standing alone, were insufficient to prove that Mr. Walker was incapable of safely driving
due to the influence of PCP and cannabis. See Ciborowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 143352, ¶ 113 (“[i]t
is not enough for the State to show drug use by the defendant”).
¶ 25 Ms. Milenkov’s testimony established only that Mr. Walker’s urinalysis indicated a
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positive result for PCP and cannabis. As such, her testimony was no more informative than the
urinalysis results themselves. Ms. Milenkov did not know what amounts of PCP and cannabis were
detected or when they would have been consumed. Her testimony did not shed light on the question
of whether Mr. Walker, at the time he was driving, was under the influence of drugs to a degree
that rendered him unable to do so safely.
¶ 26 Neither Trooper Kazupski nor Trooper Tor testified as to having any significant experience
or expertise in detecting whether a person was driving under the influence of drugs and whether
that person was influenced by a drug to such a degree that it prevented him from driving safely.
See Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 311 (“when there is no competent evidence by a qualified witness
regarding the nature and effect of the drug alleged to have been ingested and the defendant has not
admitted to taking the drug and being under the influence, this lack of competent testimony may
create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt”).
¶ 27 Nothing in the record indicates that either trooper was knowledgeable about the
physiological effects of PCP or cannabis, what amount of consumption would produce any
significant effect, or how use of the substances would affect a person’s ability to drive safely. Put
simply, they did not display a level of expertise that would be necessary to sustain the charge
against Mr. Walker. See id. at 311-12; see also People v. Trotter, 2021 IL App (3d) 180726-U, ¶ 40
(finding that the appellate court could not rely on a witness’s occupation as a trooper to infer that
she also possessed training and qualifications necessary to render an opinion regarding the effects
of a drug on the ability to drive); Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) (nonprecedential orders
entered under Rule 23(b) may be cited for persuasive purposes).
¶ 28 In sum, the evidence presented by the State lacked a qualified opinion regarding the nature
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and effect of PCP and cannabis. Where Mr. Walker did not admit to taking PCP or cannabis or to
being under their influence, this lack of competent testimony created a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. See Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 311. Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Walker’s conviction for
aggravated DUI. This holding moots any claims regarding the admissibility of the medical reports
from the La Grange Hospital or the driving abstract.
¶ 29 The State in its response brief argues vigorously that the driving abstract was admissible
and that we should affirm Mr. Walker’s conviction for driving without a driver’s license. However,
Mr. Walker was never charged with or convicted of that offense. The State does not argue that
driving while one’s license revoked is a lesser-included offense of aggravated DUI, and our
supreme court has expressly held that it is not. People v. Nunez, 236 Ill. 2d 488, 496, 499 (2010).
In this case, the lack of a driver’s license was simply the aggravating circumstance charged in the
DUI conviction, which the parties agree must be reversed. There is no basis on which we could,
as the State suggests, “affirm [Mr. Walker]’s conviction” for driving without a license in this case.
¶ 30 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 32 Reversed.
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