People v. Crawford , 2024 IL App (4th) 230292-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230292-UFILED
This Order was filed under
NO. 4-23-0292 March 27, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Ford County
ARTHURO L. CRAWFORD, ) No. 22CF101
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Matthew J. Fitton,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court remanded the cause for a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s
unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 Defendant, Arthuro L. Crawford, appeals his convictions for criminal sexual assault
(720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2022)), two counts of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.3(a), 12-3.3(a-5) (West 2022)), and one count of unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3 (West
2022)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years in prison for criminal sexual assault, 7 years
for each of the aggravated domestic battery convictions, and a 6-year extended-term sentence for
the unlawful restraint conviction, all to run concurrently. Defendant argues that (1) the court erred
in admitting, as an excited utterance, a 19-minute body camera recording of an officer’s initial
meeting with the alleged victim, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) the court
erred in sentencing him to an extended-term sentence for the unlawful restraint conviction, and
(4) the case should be remanded for an inquiry into his posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, we remand for a
preliminary inquiry into defendant’s unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Accordingly, we decline to address defendant’s other arguments.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 We provide only the facts necessary to understand the dispositive Krankel issue.
The State charged defendant by information with the offenses mentioned above, all of which
allegedly occurred on or about September 2, 2022. Defendant’s five-day jury trial began on
January 23, 2023. The jury found defendant guilty of all charges.
¶5 On March 14, 2023, the trial court heard and denied defendant’s motion for a new
trial. Defendant then told the court, inter alia, (1) he did not have a chance to provide or review
evidence, (2) his attorney “[s]aid he’d come see me yesterday, he didn’t come see me,” and (3) he
did not get a chance to talk to his attorney or get a phone for evidence. Defendant was admonished
by the court not to address the court directly, that this was the sentencing stage, and to refrain from
outbursts if he wanted to be present for his sentencing. In response to defendant’s statement that
his attorney did not see him the prior day, the court said, “That’s between you and your attorney.”
The court took a recess of approximately 20 minutes to give defendant time to talk to his attorney.
After the recess, the court admonished defendant that outbursts would not be tolerated, the case
was scheduled for sentencing, he could make a statement in allocution, and if he could not
“behave” he could be sentenced in his absence.
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¶6 The matter then immediately proceeded to sentencing. Defendant spoke multiple
times over a witness testifying in aggravation and was removed from the courtroom. Defendant
was sentenced in his absence.
¶7 Thereafter, defendant sent the trial judge a letter, dated March 21, 2023, which was
file-stamped by the circuit court clerk of Ford County on March 27, 2023. In that letter, inter alia,
defendant stated his counsel was ineffective and he explained he was not able to gather any
evidence to support his defense. On March 22, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
reconsider the sentence, which had been filed through counsel. The court also admonished
defendant of his appeal rights that he was not given when he was removed from the sentencing
hearing. The court made a docket entry on March 27, 2023, that the court filed defendant’s ex parte
communication and gave a copy of it to defense counsel.
¶8 Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2023, which he amended on April
12, 2023. This appeal followed.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 The parties agree that defendant’s March 21, 2023, letter raised claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel since it expressly claimed trial counsel was ineffective. The State
agrees that defendant’s letter to the trial court was timely since it was filed within 30 days after the
denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence and before the filing of the notice of appeal. See
People v. Patrick, 406 Ill. App. 3d 548, 565 (2010). Further, the parties agree the court erred in
failing to hold a preliminary Krankel hearing to address defendant’s pro se ineffective assistance
claims and that the case must be remanded for a Krankel inquiry. See People v. Ayres, 2017 IL
120071, ¶ 11; People v. Horman, 2018 IL App (3d) 160423, ¶¶ 29-30. The parties also agree that
the court erred in sentencing defendant to an extended term for the unlawful restraint conviction
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since this was not the most serious offense for which he was convicted. See People v. Jordan, 103
Ill. 2d 192, 206 (1984); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2022). Neither party provides support for us to
address the sentencing issue prior to the remand for the Krankel inquiry.
¶ 11 The State argues we should decline to address defendant’s claims other than the
sentencing issue since the Krankel determination could make those issues moot. See People v.
Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶ 37; People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL App (4th) 160917, ¶ 21.
¶ 12 To trigger the duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry, “a pro se defendant
is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” People v.
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79 (2003). It must be “clear” that the defendant is claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 18. A duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel
inquiry may arise from something a defendant writes in a letter or says in open court. Ayres, 2017
IL 120071, ¶ 11; Horman, 2018 IL App (3d) 160423, ¶¶ 29-30.
¶ 13 When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should
first conduct an inquiry into the underlying factual basis of the defendant’s allegation. Moore, 207
Ill. 2d at 79. If the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial
strategy, the court is not required to appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. People
v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, the
court should appoint new counsel to represent the defendant at a hearing on his claims of
ineffective assistance. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶¶ 35-36.
¶ 14 Addressing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level serves the
interests of judicial economy by limiting appellate issues and providing the reviewing court with
a sufficient record to review the defendant’s claims. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 21; People v.
Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st )133741, ¶ 69. “The trial court [cannot] simply ignore or fail to address
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a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without consideration of the claim’s merits.” People v.
Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 72. Instead, the court “must inquire regarding the factual basis
of a defendant’s claim.” People v. Bolton, 382 Ill. App. 3d 714, 718 (2008).
¶ 15 Our standard of review “depends on whether the trial court did or did not determine
the merits of the defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People
v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. To that end, we review de novo the issue of whether a
defendant’s allegations triggered a duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Bell, 2018 IL
App (4th) 151016, ¶ 36.
¶ 16 Here, the trial court’s duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry was triggered
twice, after the denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial and in defendant’s pro se letter to the
trial judge. After the court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, defendant informed the court
that he had not been able to communicate with his attorney and he was not able to see or review
case evidence. The court’s response was to give defendant time to speak directly to his attorney.
Defendant’s oral assertions amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court did
not inquire into the factual basis of defendant’s claims.
¶ 17 Defendant’s March 21, 2023, letter to the trial judge included, inter alia,
defendant’s statement: “First off I’ve experienced ineffective assistance of counsel with my court
appointed public defender Mr. Harvey Welch. I wasn’t able to gather any evidence to support my
defense, nor did Harvey fulfill any of my request [sic] to gather my evidence.” (Emphasis in
original.) Defendant was unambiguously complaining about his counsel’s performance at trial.
Defendant’s letter triggered a duty for the trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry
regarding his ineffective assistance claims. The court made no such inquiry.
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¶ 18 Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry
into defendant’s unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We
decline to address the other issues defendant raises in this appeal. See Bell, 2018 IL App (4th)
151016, ¶¶ 24, 37 (declining to address the defendant’s remaining arguments, including a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, where the cause first had to be remanded for the trial
court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry). Defendant asks us to address his other claims but
provides no authority to address those claims prior to remand. We recognize the parties agree there
was a sentencing error. However, like the other claims defendant raises, that issue could potentially
be mooted, depending on the trial court’s resolution of defendant’s ineffective assistance claims.
The parties and the court may take up the sentencing issue on remand, if appropriate. We do not
intend for this decision to have res judicata effect with respect to any of defendant’s claims except
the Krankel issue.
¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we remand the cause for a preliminary Krankel inquiry into
defendant’s unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 21 Remanded with directions.
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