BDR Associates, Inc. v. Toledo , 2024 IL App (1st) 230942-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 230942-UTHIRD DIVISION
March 27, 2024
No. 1-23-0942
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
BDR ASSOCIATES, INC. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 22 M 001664
)
YESNAYA TOLEDO and ERIC CLAUDIO, ) Honorable
) Jeffrey L. Warnick,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE R. VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Under the principles of res judicata, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of a
claim for monetary damages that arose from a common core of operative facts as an
earlier-filed lawsuit, and therefore could have been included in the earlier suit.
¶2 After successfully evicting tenants in one lawsuit, a landlord filed a second, separate
complaint seeking monetary damages for rent for the property from which the tenants were evicted.
1-23-0942
The circuit court dismissed the second complaint under the principles of res judicata. The landlord
appeals. We affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 BDR Associates, Inc. (BDR) purchased a townhouse at a foreclosure sale. At the time of
the purchase, Yesnaya Toledo and Eric Claudio (collectively, “tenants”) had been living there for
several years. The parties never entered into a written lease agreement, and there is no evidence
there was even a meeting of the minds regarding the rent amount. After an extended period during
which the tenants lived at the townhouse rent-free, BDR filed an eviction complaint. The court
ordered the sheriff to evict the tenants, and they were evicted about seven months later. That
complaint sought only forcible possession of the townhouse; it did not seek monetary damages for
nonpayment of rent. On the eviction order form, BDR checked the “No money claimed in Eviction
Complaint” box, and did not check the box that reads “Money claim dismissed and Plaintiff may
seek this money in the future.”
¶5 Nearly a year later, BDR filed a complaint seeking money damages under a theory of
quantum meruit. BDR sought fair market value for about one and half years of occupancy, which,
according to BDR, amounted to nearly $40,000. The tenants moved to dismiss under sections 2-
619(a)(4) and (a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4), (a)(9) (West 2020).
Section 2-619(a)(4) permits involuntary dismissal where “the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2020). The tenants argued that BDR’s complaint is
barred because there was a prior judgment for the same cause of action. Section 2-619(a)(9)
permits involuntary dismissal where “the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4)
(West 2020). The tenants argued that dismissal of BDR’s complaint is warranted because BDR
2
1-23-0942
failed to notify defendants about a rent increase. BDR responded, contending that “[the tenants]
are being silly”, and the mere fact that the eviction order form includes a checkable box that states
“Money claim dismissed and Plaintiff may seek this money in the future” indicates that a party is
not precluded from filing a subsequent suit for money damages. The court dismissed BDR’s
complaint with prejudice, holding that res judicata bars the quantum meruit claim. 1
¶6 BDR appeals.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, BDR argues that res judicata does not preclude it from seeking monetary
damages in a second lawsuit after prevailing on its eviction lawsuit against the tenants, even though
it did not claim monetary damages in the initial suit. The tenants did not file a response brief, so
we consider this appeal on appellant’s brief only, as allowed under First Capitol Mortgage Corp.
v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (“[I]f the record is simple and the
claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief,
the court of review should decide the merits of the appeal.”).
¶9 We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss de novo. Mosby v. Ingalls
Memorial Hospital, 2023 IL 129081, ¶29. De novo consideration means we perform the same
analysis that a circuit judge would perform. Court of Northbrook Condominium Ass’n v. Bhutani,
2014 IL App (1st) 130417, ¶ 25.
¶ 10 “The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their
1
In the appendix to its brief, BDR has failed to include a copy of the judgment that it seeks to
appeal, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Our supreme court rules are not
mere suggestions; they have the force of law. In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (2010). We direct counsel
to abide by our supreme court rules in his court filings.
3
1-23-0942
privies on the same cause of action.” Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (1996).
The doctrine reaches “not only to what was actually decided in the original action, but also to
matters which could have been decided in that suit.” Id. at 334–35. For res judicata to apply, there
must be: (1) “a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction”, (2)
“an identity of cause of action”, and (3) “an identity of parties or their privies.” Id. at 335. The
facts of this case satisfy these three elements.
¶ 11 The first and third elements of res judicata are not in dispute. BDR challenges only the
circuit court’s implicit determination 2 that the second element (identity of cause of action) is
satisfied here. That is, BDR argues that a forcible suit for possession only is not the same cause of
action as a suit for monetary damages. BDR misapprehends the meaning of “identity of cause of
action.”
¶ 12 Simply put, causes of action are “the same” for res judicata purposes where “the claims
asserted in the first and second proceedings [are] based on a common core of operative facts.”
Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 208 Ill. App. 3d 964, 969 (1991) (citing Rodgers v. St.
Mary’s Hospital, 198 Ill. App. 3d 871, 880 (1990)).
¶ 13 In the case at bar, both the request for forcible possession and the request for monetary
damages under a theory of quantum meruit are premised on the same operative facts: the tenants’
occupation of the townhouse without paying rent. The eviction form itself includes an option to
request monetary damages, which is, at the very least, a strong indication that the monetary relief
and eviction are the typical remedies for a tenant’s occupation without rent payment. In its brief,
BDR offers no explanation as to why res judicata should not apply, save for the general contention
2
The court did not author an extensive analysis explaining why res judicata applies. We assume
the court found that the “identity of cause of action” element is satisfied here, as that is a condition precedent
to its holding that res judicata applies.
4
1-23-0942
that there is no “identity of cause of action.” BDR does not explain how or why the request for
forcible possession and the subsequent request for monetary damages do not arise out of a common
core of operative facts – again, the tenants’ occupation of the townhouse without payment of rent.
This is because these remedy requests do arise out of a common core of operative facts.
¶ 14 BDR seems to suggest that the fact that the eviction order form allows a party to seek
monetary damages in the future precludes the application of res judicata. In other words, the
existence of that checkable box on the form creates an exception to res judicata. We need not
decide this question to resolve this appeal. “Established principles of judicial review counsel
against consideration of issues which are not essential to the disposition of the cause or where the
result will not be affected regardless of how the issues are decided.” In re Estate of Boyar, 2013
IL 113655, ¶ 36. Here, whether or not the eviction form creates an exception to res judicata, BDR
affirmed it would not be seeking monetary damages. Additionally, and importantly, the form is an
order signed by a judge. A party that defies a court order is subject to contempt proceedings. See,
e.g., People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 368 (1996) (“A court is vested with inherent power to
enforce its orders and preserve its dignity by the use of contempt proceedings.”). Allowing BDR
to pursue a claim for monetary damages now would be inconsistent with the eviction order, as the
order also serves as a notice to the tenants that BDR will not seek money damages in the future.
¶ 15 In sum, as all three elements of res judicata are satisfied, we conclude that BDR’s claim
for monetary damages is barred.
¶ 16 CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
5