People v. Williamson , 2023 IL App (2d) 230148-U ( 2024 )

2023 IL App (2d) 230148-UNo. 2-23-0148
Order filed March 28, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 21-CF-612
)
TERRANCE E. WILLIAMSON, ) Honorable
) Daniel B. Shanes,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Kennedy and Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in declining to appoint new counsel to assist defendant
with his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for proceeding to trial on sexual
abuse charges before receiving the victim’s medical records, which defendant
asserts could have been used to impeach the victim’s testimony. The medical
records are not in the record on appeal, so defendant can only speculate as to their
contents. Moreover, even if the records said what defendant asserts, there is no
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if
defendant had used the records to impeach.
¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, defendant, Terrance E.
Williamson, was found guilty of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720
ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (2014)), one count of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3)
2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U(West 2016)), and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West
2014)). The victims were defendant’s stepdaughters, J.L., J.B., and R.C. The trial court sentenced
defendant to life imprisonment for each conviction of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
a 15-year prison term for criminal sexual assault, and a 7-year prison term for aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant argues on
appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint new counsel to assist him with a posttrial
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Before trial, defendant subpoenaed certain medical records pertaining to J.B. At a pretrial
hearing, the prosecutor mentioned the subpoena, explaining that “the information in the records
may contain a denial of any sexual contact with anybody, which could be a defense; including the
contact with the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) At a subsequent hearing, the prosecutor told the
court that “what the defense is hoping to achieve from the records is the victim was asked about
sexual history during the meeting with the doctor and denied having any sexual contact, which
would be a germane topic of cross examination or impeachment.” On the date set for trial, the
records had not yet been received. Nonetheless, both parties answered ready for trial. Defense
counsel did not request that the trial be continued pending the availability of the subpoenaed
records.
¶5 At trial, J.L. testified that she was born on February 6, 1999. In 2015, she resided with her
father, and her siblings resided with her mother and defendant. In May or June 2015, J.L. spent the
night at the apartment her mother and defendant shared with J.L.’s siblings. After getting ready for
bed, she went to the kitchen to say goodnight to her mother. While walking to J.B.’s room, J.L.
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-Upassed defendant, who was in her mother’s bedroom. Defendant asked her to sit on the bed. He
put his hand up her shirt and touched her breast. She was not wearing a bra.
¶6 J.B. testified that she was born on August 20, 2002. When she first met defendant, she was
living with her mother and her younger siblings, R.C., M.C., and B.K. When J.B. started sixth
grade, she was 11 years old. On one occasion while in sixth grade, J.B. watched movies with her
younger siblings and defendant in her mother’s bedroom. After her younger siblings fell asleep,
defendant put his hand in J.B.’s shorts and started touching her vagina. Eventually, he inserted his
finger into her vagina. Then he pulled off her shorts and put his penis in her vagina. J.B. also
recalled a subsequent incident while she was in sixth or seventh grade. On this occasion, which
occurred one morning while her mother took J.B.’s younger siblings to daycare, defendant put his
penis in her vagina. Usually, J.B.’s mother left the house at 5 a.m. and J.B. took the school bus at
7 a.m. J.B. also testified that defendant placed his penis in her vagina on several other occasions.
¶7 On July 3, 2015, J.B. was diagnosed with cancer. She testified to the circumstances
surrounding the diagnosis. The family had planned a trip to an amusement park. Before they left,
defendant commented that J.B. looked six months pregnant. J.B.’s mother agreed. She asked J.B.
whether she was sexually active. J.B. said that she was not, but defendant said that J.B. was lying.
J.B.’s mother asked her several more times if she was sexually active. J.B. persisted that she was
not. J.B. acknowledged that this conversation occurred after defendant had sexually penetrated
her. J.B. did not tell her mother what defendant had done, because she did not think her mother
would believe her. J.B.’s mother took her to a doctor, who initially said that J.B. had a full-term
baby. J.B. told the doctor that that was “impossible.” Ultimately, J.B. was found to have a 32-
centimeter abdominal tumor.
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U¶8 R.C. testified that she was born on February 21, 2006. Beginning when she was in first
grade, she lived in an apartment in Waukegan with her mother, J.B., M.C., and B.K. Defendant
moved in sometime later. R.C. lived in the apartment until the beginning of sixth grade, when she
was about 11. R.C. described two incidents that occurred while she was living in the Waukegan
apartment. The first incident involved defendant touching her vagina with either his finger or his
penis. The second incident involved him placing his penis in her mouth. At some point, she told
J.L. about these incidents.
¶9 J.L. testified that, in September 2020, she, J.B., and R.C. made accusations against
defendant at a family meeting attended by J.L., J.B., R.C., their other siblings, several maternal
aunts, and defendant. One of their aunts contacted the police. J.B. also testified about the meeting,
but the only attendees she mentioned were her, her siblings, her mother, and defendant; she did
not mention her aunts. She denied that, at the meeting, she accused defendant of engaging in sexual
activity with her. R.C. testified that her aunts were at the family meeting along with her, her
siblings, and her mother. At that meeting, she “didn’t tell anybody the details” of the incidents she
described in her testimony.
¶ 10 Francisco Cancino, a sergeant with the Waukegan Police Department, testified that, on
September 16, 2020, he became involved in an investigation of defendant. Cancino arranged for
R.C., M.C., and B.K. to be interviewed at the Lake County Children’s Advocacy Center. Cancino
arranged the interviews because of allegations involving R.C. M.C. and B.K. were interviewed
because they might have seen or heard something relevant to the allegations involving R.C.
Cancino also noted that B.K. was interviewed for the additional reason that she “would have been
the age that the allegations would have started when [R.C.] was that age.”
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U¶ 11 Anntoinette W., the mother of J.L., J.B., and R.C., testified for the defense that she married
defendant in August 2014. They lived in a three-bedroom apartment with J.B., R.C., M.C., and
B.K. Anntoinette testified that defendant routinely took the children to daycare. She further
testified that it was during an argument about a missed driver’s education class that J.B. first
alleged that defendant had abused her. On cross-examination, Anntoinette testified that, before
trial, she had reviewed the sign-in records for the daycare facility. She recalled seeing her signature
on the records. Asked if she recalled seeing defendant’s signature on the records, she replied that
she did not think the daycare facility permitted defendant to sign her children in.
¶ 12 After the trial court was informed that the jury had reached a verdict, the court advised the
parties that it had received J.B.’s subpoenaed medical records. The court indicated that it had
reviewed the records in camera and that they did not “add anything to the case.” The court tendered
copies of the records to the parties, but they do not appear in the record on appeal.
¶ 13 Defense counsel filed a posttrial motion, stating that defendant was claiming, among other
things, that counsel had failed to provide effective assistance. At the hearing on the motion, counsel
confirmed that defendant wanted to raise a claim that counsel was ineffective. Counsel noted that
he could not argue his own ineffectiveness. The trial court then asked defendant to explain his
concerns about counsel’s representation. Defendant noted, among other things, that counsel moved
forward with trial without J.B.’s medical records. He claimed the medical records would have
discredited her testimony. He explained that the records would have shown that
“[J.B.], *** claimed to have been raped and molested *** in 2015. And at the same time,
she was diagnosed with an illness. In which she spoke to, I believe my wife told me, two
doctors; and told them that she had never had sex with anybody at this same time in 2015.”
(Emphasis added.)
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-UDuring an exchange with defense counsel, the trial court stated, “[W]hen we finally got [the
medical records], the State may have actually stipulated to their content, had the parties wanted to
use them?” Defense counsel responded, “There was a stipulation. We did subpoena [the medical
records]. They got in late. *** But there was a stipulation.” Defense counsel explained that, before
J.B. was diagnosed with cancer, the doctor indicated that she was possibly pregnant and asked if
she was sexually active. Counsel added, “And I believe her mother was in the room with her at the
time, from my memory, if it serves me correctly. But she said, no, I haven’t had sexual intercourse.
I believe the State stipulated to that fact, that she said that to the doctor.”
¶ 14 In rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, the trial court remarked, “Turning to
the subpoena for the medical records. Counsel did pursue that, and did get them. And convinced
the State to stipulate to the important part, for the defense at least, regarding that. So the jury did
hear what the defense wanted in that regard.” The trial court then heard arguments on the other
issues raised in the posttrial motion. The trial court denied the posttrial motion and imposed
sentence. This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint new counsel to assist him
with his posttrial claim that, by allowing the trial to proceed before receiving J.B.’s medical
records, defense counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance of counsel. We evaluate
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the two-prong Strickland test. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient
performance was prejudicial in that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.-6-
2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U¶ 17 Pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the common-law
procedure developed in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny. As our supreme
court explained in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶¶ 35-36:
“Under the common-law procedure, a pro se defendant is not required to file a
written motion but need only bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention. [Citation.]
New counsel is not automatically appointed in every case when a defendant presents a
pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] Rather, when
a defendant makes such a claim, the court should first examine the factual basis of the
defendant’s claim. [Citation.] If the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains
only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny
the pro se motion. [Citation.] However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case,
new counsel should be appointed. [Citation.]
New counsel would then represent the defendant at the hearing on the pro se
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appointed counsel can independently evaluate the
claim and avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would have in trying to justify his
or her own actions contrary to the defendant’s position. [Citation.]” (Emphasis added.)
We note that, although defense counsel himself raised defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, there is
no dispute that the claim is subject to the Krankel procedure.
¶ 18 In determining whether to appoint counsel, the trial court considers the merits of the
ineffective assistance claim in their entirety. Id. ¶ 61. “[I]f the trial court has properly conducted a
Krankel inquiry and has reached a determination on the merits of the defendant’s Krankel motion,
we will reverse only if the trial court’s action was manifestly erroneous.” People v. Jackson, 2020
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-UIL 124112, ¶ 98. A decision is manifestly erroneous when arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based
on the evidence. People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 347 (2003).
¶ 19 Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision was manifestly erroneous because it was
not based on the evidence. The trial court was under the misimpression that the jury was made
aware of the germane aspects of the medical records through a stipulation. In fact, no such
stipulation was ever presented to the jury.
¶ 20 Although it is true that the trial court’s decision was based on reasoning that was not
supported by the evidence, “[w]e review the trial court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and we may
affirm on any basis called for by the record.” People v. Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, ¶ 16.
Leaving aside the trial court’s mistaken belief that the jurors heard a stipulation equivalent to the
evidence that defendant argues should have been presented through J.B.’s medical records, it is
abundantly clear from the record on appeal that defendant failed to show possible neglect of the
case. To the contrary, defendant’s ineffectiveness claim was entirely speculative. Accordingly, the
trial court was not obligated to appoint new counsel to assist defendant with that claim.
¶ 21 As noted, to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, a defendant must show
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Although defendant contended that the medical records would have
shown that J.B. denied ever having had sexual intercourse, the record on appeal provides no
support for that contention. Defendant did not suggest that he had ever actually seen the medical
records. He merely stated that his wife had told him that J.B. had told her doctors that she had
“never had sex with anybody at this same time in 2015.” Defendant’s claim implicitly assumes
that, if J.B. had made such a statement, it would appear in the medical records. We cannot join in
that assumption. J.B.’s alleged statement was in response to concerns that her enlarged abdomen
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-Uwas the result of pregnancy. However, her physician(s) diagnosed her with a tumor that apparently
mimicked the appearance of pregnancy. It is by no means clear that her sexual history was germane
to that diagnosis, and we cannot simply assume that her physician(s) would have included any
statements pertaining to her sexual history in her medical records.
¶ 22 Defendant also argues that his description of the subpoenaed medical records matched both
defense counsel’s description of the records during the Krankel hearing and the prosecutor’s
description during pretrial proceedings. The flaw in the argument is that, as seen, defendant did
not describe the medical records themselves, but merely described statements J.B. allegedly made
during her medical appointment. The same is true of defense counsel’s remarks during the Krankel
hearing. Defense counsel advised the trial court, incorrectly, that the parties stipulated that, during
her medical appointment, J.B. told her physician(s) that she had not had intercourse. Defense
counsel did not suggest that there was any stipulation as to the content of the medical records, and
we cannot conceive of how there could have been such a stipulation, given that the parties had not
seen the medical records until after the jury began its deliberations.
¶ 23 Finally, defendant’s contention that his description of the subpoenaed records matches the
prosecutor’s description at a pretrial hearing is ludicrous. The prosecutor merely indicated what
the medical records “may” have said and what defense hoped to establish with the records. The
prosecutor never suggested he was confident as to what the records said or that the defense would
be successful. Indeed, the prosecutor made these remarks before even receiving the records. The
prosecutor had no way of knowing whether they would have any impeachment value.
¶ 24 As discussed, the medical records themselves, although received and reviewed by the trial
court, are absent from the record on appeal. Under Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92
(1984), doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record should be resolved against the
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-Udefendant (the appellant) and in favor of the judgment. Having reviewed the medical records, the
trial court stated that the records added nothing to the case. Because the records are not part of the
record on appeal, we must assume the trial court’s assessment was correct. We note that, although
the absence of the medical records from the record on appeal is a serious impediment to appellate
relief, defendant might still be able to obtain relief through a proceeding under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). However, we express no opinion on the
likelihood of success in that endeavor.
¶ 25 In an effort to circumvent Foutch, defendant contends, in essence, that because defense
counsel did not obtain the medical records before trial, the trial court record is incomplete, not the
record on appeal. Citing People v. Carter, 2021 IL 125954, ¶ 39, defendant argues that Foutch
does not apply under these circumstances. We disagree. As noted, the trial court reviewed medical
records in camera. “Even where a party is not privy to materials reviewed in camera *** that party
can request the circuit court to submit those materials under seal for appellate review.” Cascade
Builders Corp. v. Rugar, 2021 IL App (1st) 192410, ¶ 28. In Robinson v. Township High School
District 113, 2022 IL App (2d) 210107 ¶¶ 2,17, which we cite as persuasive authority under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023), we held that Foutch required affirmance of the
trial court’s in camera determination that certain emails were exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2018)), where the e-mails were not
included in the record on appeal.
¶ 26 Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the contents of the medical records included
J.B.’s supposed denial that she had intercourse, there was no reasonable probability that using that
statement to impeach J.B. would have resulted in an acquittal on any of the charges. Defendant
advised the trial court that the medical records would reveal that J.B. told her doctors, not merely
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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-Uthat it was “impossible” that she was pregnant, but that “she had never had sex with anybody at
this same time in 2015.” Notably, however, J.B. testified that, before her medical examination, she
told her mother and defendant that she was not sexually active. Defendant suggests that J.B.’s
supposed statement to her doctors that she “never had sex with anyone” would have more
definitively impeached her testimony that defendant sexually assaulted her. J.B. made clear that
she did not want to reveal to her mother that defendant had sexually assaulted her, and J.B.’s
mother was supposedly present when J.B. spoke to the doctors. Thus, J.B. was far less likely to
speak candidly on that topic with her mother present. Under these circumstances, there is no
reasonable probability that the jury would have given any significant weight to J.B.’s alleged
statements during the medical examination.
¶ 27 We stress that, notwithstanding our conclusion that defendant was not entitled to new
counsel to pursue defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, we are deeply troubled by defense counsel’s
false statements during the Krankel hearing regarding an imaginary trial stipulation. We have no
reason to believe counsel deliberately misled the court. However, we caution counsel to exercise
greater care when making such representations. Nonetheless, although the trial court’s decision
was based on a false premise (as a result of counsel’s false statements), the record simply provides
no support for defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, defendant was
not entitled to new counsel to assist him in pursuing that claim.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
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