People v. Wright , 2024 IL App (4th) 230426-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (4th) 230426-UFILED
NOTICE March 29, 2024
This Order was filed under Carla Bender
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-23-0426
4th District Appellate
not precedent except in the Court, IL
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Winnebago County
EMMITT WRIGHT, ) No. 97CF671
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Joseph G. McGraw,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed
the trial court’s judgment dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction
petition.
¶2 In 1998, defendant, Emmitt Wright, was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. In November 2021, he filed a successive
postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 2020)), arguing his sentence of natural life imprisonment for a crime he committed
at the age of 18 violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 11) and the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amend. VIII). The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, which the trial court
granted. Defendant appealed, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was
appointed to represent him on appeal.
¶3 On appeal, OSAD now moves to withdraw as counsel on the basis it can raise no
colorable argument the trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction
petition. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and
the trial court sentenced him to natural life imprisonment. He was 18 years old at the time of the
offenses. Defendant’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
¶6 In April 2001, defendant pro se filed his initial postconviction petition. The trial
court dismissed the petition as frivolous, and its judgment was affirmed on appeal.
¶7 In March 2020, defendant pro se filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition and an accompanying petition. He argued his sentence of natural life
imprisonment violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution because “the trial
court didn’t have the ability to consider [his] youth, rehabilitative potential, or any other
mitigating factors when imposing his mandatory life sentence.” The court granted defendant
leave to file a successive postconviction petition and appointed counsel.
¶8 On November 24, 2021, defendant filed an amended successive postconviction
petition, which is the subject of the instant appeal. Citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460(2012), he argued that his sentence of natural life imprisonment “violates the Proportionate
Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him, and the Eight [sic] Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the United States Constitution as well.” See
id. at 465 (holding “mandatory life [imprisonment] without parole for those under the age of 18
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at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ ”). The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, arguing he failed to
establish cause and prejudice for his failure to bring the claims in his initial postconviction
petition. Defendant filed a response to the State’s motion, in which he argued Miller gave him
cause to bring the constitutional claims because it was not decided until 2012. The trial court
granted the State’s motion on the basis defendant failed to establish cause for his failure to bring
the claims earlier.
¶9 Defendant appealed, and OSAD was appointed to represent him on appeal. OSAD
now moves to withdraw as appellate counsel on the basis it can raise no colorable argument the
trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition. We granted
defendant leave to file a response to OSAD’s motion. Defendant filed a response, arguing he
made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation that entitled him to an evidentiary
hearing on his petition. However, he made no argument that he established cause and prejudice
for his failure to bring the claims in an earlier proceeding.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, OSAD contends it can raise no colorable argument the trial court erred
in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition. Specifically, OSAD contends no
argument can be made defendant established cause for his failure to bring the claims in an earlier
proceeding. “A trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed de novo.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002).
¶ 12 The Act provides a remedy for criminal defendants who claim their conviction or
sentence resulted from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. It generally contemplates
the filing of only one postconviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020)) (“Only one
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petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of the court.”). Leave of
court to file a successive postconviction petition will be granted only if, in relevant part, the
defendant can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460; see 725 ILCS
5/122-1(f) (West 2020) (“Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause
for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and
prejudice results from that failure.”). “Cause,” for purposes of the cause-and-prejudice test, is
shown “by identifying an objective factor that impeded [a defendant’s] ability to raise a specific
claim during [the] initial post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020).
“Prejudice” can be established by showing the claim at issue “so infected the trial that the
resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” Id. “Throughout the three-stages in the
postconviction process, the State has the ‘opportunity to seek dismissal of the petition on any
grounds, including the defendant’s failure to prove cause and prejudice for not having raised the
claims in the initial postconviction petition.’ ” People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 153204,
¶ 35 (quoting People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 26).
¶ 13 Here, we agree with OSAD that no argument can be made the trial court erred in
granting the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s successive postconviction petition on the basis
he failed to establish cause for not raising the claims in his initial postconviction petition. In
People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, our supreme court squarely rejected the claims defendant
raised in his successive postconviction petition. For purposes of the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII), the Moore court held that because Miller
applies only to juveniles, its holding did not change the law applicable to young adults. Moore,
2023 IL 126461, ¶ 38. “Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived [young adult
offenders] of some helpful support for [their] [eighth amendment] claim, which is insufficient to
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establish cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. As for defendant’s claim under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), our
supreme court has held that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth
amendment does not provide cause for a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under the
proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74. “As Miller does not
directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a
claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40.
¶ 14 Because our supreme court has expressly held that Miller does not provide cause
for a young adult offender such as defendant to challenge his sentence under either the eighth
amendment or the proportionate penalties clause, we agree with OSAD that no argument can be
made the trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition. See
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464 (“The cause-and-prejudice test *** is composed of two
elements, both of which must be met in order for the petitioner to prevail.”).
¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶ 17 Affirmed.
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