People v. Adams , 2024 IL App (4th) 230347-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230347-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-23-0347 February 28, 2024
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Winnebago County
MAURECUS QUASHON ADAMS, ) No. 12CF1086
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Debra D. Schafer,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Steigmann and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant was not denied reasonable assistance of counsel.
¶2 Defendant, Maurecus Quashon Adams, appeals the Winnebago County circuit
court’s April 10, 2023, order granting the State’s motion to dismiss his amended postconviction
petition. On appeal, defendant asserts he was denied the reasonable assistance of postconviction
counsel. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In May 2013, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to
one count of first degree murder (felony murder) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2012)) and
received a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment (no firearm enhancement). The factual basis for
the plea provided the following. On January 5, 2012, at around 10:45 p.m., defendant knocked
on the door of the residence belonging to Jimmy Navarro and Shaquita Crawford. Crawford
opened the door, and defendant asked for Jimmy. When Navarro got to the door, defendant and
a second male, later identified as Troy Perkins, rushed through the door. Perkins was wearing
black gloves and dark clothing. Perkins put a dangerous weapon to Navarro’s head, and Perkins
and defendant yelled, “ ‘Give it up. Give me the s***.’ ” Perkins also yelled for Crawford to
come back from the kitchen or he would harm Navarro. Perkins walked Navarro toward the
kitchen and pointed the dangerous weapon at Crawford and then back at Navarro’s head. A fight
ensued as Navarro tried to get the dangerous weapon away from Perkins. According to the
factual basis, Crawford retrieved her dangerous weapon from the kitchen and used it on Perkins,
who was struck and died as a result of his injuries. Defendant had taken off running when the
fighting began. Defendant did not seek a direct appeal.
¶5 Effective July 1, 2021, Public Act 101-652, § 10-216 amended the felony murder
provision to provide a person commits first degree murder, when without lawful justification,
“he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants, commits or attempts to
commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder, and in the course of or
in furtherance of such crime or flight therefrom, he or she or another participant
causes the death of a person.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020).
In January 2022, defendant filed pro se a petition for resentencing based on the aforementioned
amendment. The circuit court entered an order stating it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider
defendant’s sentence.
¶6 On April 7, 2022, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, asserting his
constitutional rights were being violated because he was being held in the “Department of
Corrections on crime that does not fit justice/serves justice” due to the 2021 amendment. On
October 11, 2022, the circuit court entered an order finding defendant’s petition set forth the gist
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of a constitutional claim, moving the petition to the second stage of the proceedings, and
appointing defendant postconviction counsel.
¶7 In November 2022, postconviction counsel amended defendant’s petition by
attaching the 2012 version and the amended version of the first degree murder statute.
Postconviction counsel also filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c)
(eff. July 1, 2017) and a letter signed by defendant stating he had consulted with his attorney and
wished to go forward with his “post-conviction petition as written.”
¶8 On January 24, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s
postconviction petition, asserting the 2021 amendment was not retroactive. At a hearing that
same day, postconviction counsel stated he needed time to review the motion with defendant and
determine how to proceed, and the circuit court set the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss
for a later date.
¶9 On April 10, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s motion to
dismiss. The State argued the 2021 amendment did not apply retroactively based on section 4 of
the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2022)). In response to the State’s argument,
postconviction counsel argued it was fundamentally unfair and in violation of defendant’s eighth
and fourteenth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) because he was being
punished for a crime that now a person similarly situated would not be punished for.
Postconviction counsel then noted defendant would like to make a statement related to his sole
postconviction argument, which the court allowed. Defendant likewise argued not applying the
law retroactively violated his constitutional rights. When the court asked if the amendment was
silent about whether it was prospective or retroactive, the State admitted the amendment did not
use the language retroactive or prospective but noted it did contain an effective date. After
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hearing the parties’ arguments, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 10 On April 17, 2023, defendant filed his timely notice of appeal in sufficient
compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(d)
(eff. July 1, 2017) (providing the procedure for appeals in postconviction proceedings is in
accordance with the rules governing criminal appeals). Thus, we have jurisdiction of
defendant’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 11 In his brief on appeal, defendant recognizes a split in the districts of the appellate
court regarding whether postconviction counsel can continue to represent a defendant after
counsel determines the defendant’s petition is frivolous or patently without merit and notes the
matter is currently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Huff, No. 128492. On
January 23, 2024, this court entered an order holding this case in abeyance until the supreme
court rendered its decision in Huff. Our supreme court rendered its decision in Huff on February
1, 2024 (People v. Huff, 2024 IL 128492), and thus we now decide defendant’s appeal.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Defendant appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition at the second stage
of the proceedings. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 2022)) provides a remedy for defendants who have suffered a substantial violation
of their constitutional rights at trial. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471, 861 N.E.2d 999,
1007 (2006). The Postconviction Act sets forth three stages of proceedings. Pendleton, 223 Ill.
2d at 471-72, 861 N.E.2d at 1007. At the first stage, the circuit court independently reviews the
defendant’s postconviction petition and determines whether “the petition is frivolous or is
patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2022). If it finds the petition is
frivolous or patently without merit, the court must dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS
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5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2022). If the court does not dismiss the petition, it proceeds to the second
stage, where the court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at
472, 861 N.E.2d at 1007. Defense counsel may amend the defendant’s petition to ensure his or
her contentions are adequately presented. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472, 861 N.E.2d at 1007.
Also, at the second stage, the State may file a motion to dismiss the defendant’s petition or an
answer to it. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472, 861 N.E.2d at 1008. If the State does not file a
motion to dismiss or the court denies such a motion, the petition advances to the third stage,
wherein the court holds a hearing at which the defendant may present evidence in support of his
or her petition. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472-73, 861 N.E.2d at 1008. At both the second and
third stages of the postconviction proceedings, “the defendant bears the burden of making a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473, 861 N.E.2d at
1008. A substantial showing means the allegations, if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would
entitle the petitioner to relief. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35, 987 N.E.2d 767. In
this case, the State did file a motion to dismiss, and the court granted that motion.
¶ 14 Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that he was denied reasonable assistance
of counsel at the second stage of the postconviction proceedings.
¶ 15 In postconviction proceedings, the right to counsel is wholly statutory, and the
Postconviction Act only requires counsel to provide a defendant with a “ ‘reasonable level of
assistance.’ ” People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577, 583, 831 N.E.2d 596, 600 (2005) (quoting
People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1189 (1990)). Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) “imposes specific obligations on postconviction counsel to assure
the reasonable level of assistance required by the [Postconviction] Act.” Lander, 215 Ill. 2d at
584, 831 N.E.2d at 600. Under that rule, postconviction counsel must (1) consult with the
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defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain the contentions of deprivation of constitutional
rights, (2) examine the record of the circuit court proceedings, and (3) make any amendments to
the pro se petition necessary for an adequate presentation of the defendant’s contentions. People
v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42, 890 N.E.2d 398, 403 (2007). The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating his attorney failed to comply with the duties mandated in Rule 651(c). People v.
Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 23, 955 N.E.2d 1200. Our supreme court has consistently
held remand is required when postconviction counsel failed to complete any one of the above
duties, “regardless of whether the claims raised in the petition had merit.” People v. Suarez, 224
Ill. 2d 37, 47, 862 N.E.2d 977, 982 (2007). This court reviews de novo whether an attorney
complied with Rule 651(c). People v. Blanchard, 2015 IL App (1st) 132281, ¶ 15, 43 N.E.3d
1077.
¶ 16 Specifically, defendant contends his sole postconviction argument lacked legal
merit and thus counsel’s only options were to amend the petition to state a nonfrivolous claim or
withdraw as counsel. He claims postconviction counsel’s decision to stand on defendant’s
meritless petition as written was unreasonable because it required counsel to bring a frivolous
claim in violation of both People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 206, 817 N.E.2d 511, 520 (2004), and
the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 3.1 (eff. Jan.
1, 2010).
¶ 17 While our supreme court in Huff did not address the issue upon which the
appellate districts are split, its analysis provides guidance for resolving this appeal. Huff, 2024
IL 128492, ¶ 16. First, in Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 23, the supreme court noted the defendant’s
acknowledgement his postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. As such, counsel is
presumed to have provided reasonable assistance, and the defendant has the burden of rebutting
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that presumption. Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 23. Here, defendant also acknowledges his counsel
filed a Rule 651(c) certificate but asserts he rebutted the presumption counsel provided
reasonable assistance.
¶ 18 The Huff court next addressed the postconviction counsel’s certification he made
any amendments to the pro se petition necessary to adequately present the defendant’s claim.
Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 24. In this case, postconviction counsel did amend defendant’s pro se
petition by attaching the 2012 version and the 2021 amended version of the first degree murder
statute. Like the defendant in Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 24, defendant does not identify any other
amendments to his pro se petition that would have allowed the petition to survive dismissal but,
rather, argues his sole claim was meritless. In Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 25, the supreme court
concluded the defendant failed to rebut the presumption by identifying anything in the record
showing postconviction counsel failed to make a necessary amendment or suggesting any
amendments counsel could have made. Likewise, defendant in this case has failed to rebut the
presumption postconviction counsel made all necessary amendments.
¶ 19 After finding the defendant failed to rebut the presumption created by
postconviction counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate, the supreme court addressed whether
postconviction counsel was ethically bound to withdraw, as suggested in Greer. Huff, 2024 IL
128492, ¶¶ 27-30. After reviewing its decision in Greer, the supreme court explained its
decision regarding an ethical duty to withdraw as follows:
“Our hypothetical in Greer suggests that, if appointed counsel knows that
a petitioner’s claims were frivolous or patently without merit, then counsel has an
ethical duty to withdraw. However, that is not the state of the case before this
court. Nothing in the record suggests that postconviction counsel knew that the
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petition was frivolous or patently without merit. See Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019) (‘frivolous’ is defined as ‘[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit;
manifestly insufficient as a matter of law’ and ‘patent’ means ‘[o]bvious;
apparent’). Also, the court, not counsel, is the ultimate arbiter of whether ‘the
claims in the petition are meritorious.’ [Citation.] Different counsel may differ in
their opinions regarding the merits of the petition. [Citation.]
In this case, petitioner presented a single Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000)] claim. That claim had already been rejected on direct appeal
and in a proceeding under section 2-1401 of the Code [of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2004))]. However, petitioner argued that the law regarding
Apprendi had changed since those decisions, so res judicata did not prevent his
claim. The pro se petition also presented a defense to the timeliness basis for
dismissal. While petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful, there is no
indication that appointed counsel ‘knew’ that the claim was ‘frivolous and
patently without merit.’ Since there is no indication in the record that
postconviction counsel knew, or even believed, that petitioner’s claim was
frivolous or patently without merit, we do not reach the issue exactly as posed in
the petition for leave to appeal. Instead, we ask and answer this question, which
is ancillary to the question that we raised in Greer: Must postconviction counsel,
who was appointed without a first-stage ruling by the circuit court, move to
withdraw when petitioner’s pro se petition posits a weak legal claim but the claim
is presented in the best possible legal form and there is no indication that counsel
knew the claim was frivolous? We find that, under those circumstances, counsel
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has no duty to withdraw.” Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶¶ 29-30.
Likewise, this court in People v. Shortridge, 2012 IL App (4th) 100663, ¶ 13, 964 N.E.2d 679,
recognized counsel has an ethical obligation to seek a withdrawal as counsel when “counsel
believes that his client’s claims are frivolous or patently without merit.”
¶ 20 As in Huff, nothing in the record suggests postconviction counsel believed
defendant’s sole postconviction claim was frivolous or patently without merit. Postconviction
counsel amended defendant’s pro se petition and argued its merits in opposition to the State’s
motion to dismiss. He did not confess the State’s motion. Moreover, we note the circuit court in
this case had found defendant’s claim was not frivolous or patently without merit. Thus,
defendant has failed to establish postconviction counsel had an ethical obligation to withdraw as
counsel.
¶ 21 Accordingly, we find postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance to
defendant.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Winnebago County circuit court’s dismissal
of defendant’s amended postconviction petition.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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