Paige R. v. Blake R. , 2024 IL App (4th) 230971-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230971-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
NO. 4-23-0971 February 27, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
PAIGE R., ) Appeal from the
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
) Mercer County
v. ) No. 22DC28
)
BLAKE R., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellee. ) Matthew W. Durbin,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Zenoff and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order allocating parenting time and
decision-making responsibilities because that order was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶2 Petitioner, Paige R., and respondent, Blake R., were married in 2016 and had two
children during the marriage, J.R. (born January 2017) and W.R. (born February 2019). In April
2022, Paige filed a petition for dissolution of marriage under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2022)).
¶3 In June 2023, the trial court entered an order (1) dividing the marital estate as
stipulated to by the parties and (2) allocating decision-making responsibilities and parenting time
between the parties generally as set forth in Blake’s proposed parenting plan.
¶4 Paige appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) granting sole decision-making
responsibilities regarding education to Blake, (2) failing to adopt portions of the parties’ joint
stipulations regarding the children, and (3) granting the parties equal parenting time. We disagree
and affirm.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 A. Procedural History
¶7 In April 2022, Paige filed a petition for dissolution of marriage under the Act in
Rock Island County. The petition alleged that Paige and Blake were married in 2016 and had two
children during the marriage, J.R. and W.R. Paige also filed a proposed parenting plan pursuant to
section 602.10 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/602.10 (West 2022)), seeking, among other things, majority
parenting time and sole significant decision-making responsibilities.
¶8 In August 2022, Blake requested a change of venue to Mercer County, alleging
Paige and the children had moved to Bettendorf, Iowa. Paige agreed to the transfer.
¶9 In October 2022, Blake filed two pleadings relevant to this appeal: (1) a “Petition
to Return the Children to the State of Illinois,” alleging that, in January 2022, Paige removed the
children to Iowa without Blake’s permission and (2) a response to the petition for dissolution of
marriage, which included a proposed parenting plan that sought, among other things, majority
parenting time and joint significant decision-making responsibilities.
¶ 10 In December 2022, the trial court ordered the children to be returned to Illinois.
¶ 11 In June 2023, Blake filed a second proposed parenting plan, requesting (1) joint
decision-making responsibilities and (2) that the parties share equal parenting time with a
week-on-week-off-schedule.
¶ 12 B. The Evidentiary Hearing
¶ 13 Later in June 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition for dissolution
of marriage.
-2-
¶ 14 At the beginning of the hearing, the parties offered a joint stipulation regarding
parenting and other marital matters. The parties stipulated that they had agreed, among other
things, to (1) “share decision making in all four domains[,] to wit: religious upbringing, education,
medical and extra[ ]curricular activities;” (2) discuss and agree upon all extracurricular activities;
(3) allow each parent full access to the children’s medical care information; (4) divide holidays as
per a schedule attached to the joint stipulation; (5) allow each parent to attend appointments,
events, and activities; (6) allow for pick up and drop off by each parent and family members;
(7) split health care, school, and extracurricular expenses; and (8) a right of first refusal for
parenting time. Absent from the joint stipulations was any agreement regarding nonholiday-related
parenting time.
¶ 15 The trial court then heard testimony from (1) Paige, (2) Mitchell Snyder, Paige’s
“paramour,” (3) Dianna D., the maternal grandmother, (4) Lisa Lynn Wessels, a former neighbor
of Blake and Paige during their marriage, (5) Blake, and (6) Michelle R., the paternal grandmother.
No exhibits were offered.
¶ 16 Following the hearing, the trial court entered a written order in which it
(1) allocated to Blake primary decision-making authority regarding education, (2) ordered 50/50
parenting time, and (3) set forth a summary of the evidence it received.
¶ 17 The testimony showed that Paige and Blake started living together in May 2012
and were married in October 2016. They had two children during the marriage, one in 2017 and
another in 2019. In December 2021, Paige moved out of the marital home, located in Keithsburg,
Illinois, to live with her father in East Moline, Illinois, and took the children with her. Around that
time, Paige began dating Mitchell.
¶ 18 In January 2022, Blake was injured in a car accident, resulting in his being
-3-
comatose for about a month. Blake returned home from the hospital in May 2022.
¶ 19 In April 2022, Paige moved with Mitchell to Bettendorf, Iowa. In January 2023,
Paige moved to Moline with J.R., W.R., Mitchell, and the infant child of Paige and Mitchell.
Paige’s residence in Moline was 49 miles away from the marital home in Keithsburg.
¶ 20 C. The Trial Court’s Order
¶ 21 In its order, the trial court first addressed the issue of decision-making authority,
noting that it considered the statutory best interests factors listed in section 602.5 of the Act (750
ILCS 5/602.5(c) (West 2022)) when determining allocation of parental responsibilities.
¶ 22 Regarding education the trial court wrote as follows:
“The Court heard testimony that [Paige] has been caring for the children after
voluntarily vacating the family residence with the children and moving roughly
forty-five (45) minutes from the marital home. She has been responsible for
educational decision-making ***. *** [Blake] has had little opportunity to make
any decision-making as to education due to the removal of the children from the
family household while he was in a coma. Testimony from [Blake] enlightened the
Court as to his desires for his children to attend certain schools and not others.
[Paige] has not included [Blake] in determining school districts, pre-school or other
matters. [Paige] has acted without considering the wishes and desires of [Blake] for
education.”
¶ 23 Regarding healthcare, the trial court found that the children seemed to be
“chronically ill in one form or another while in [Paige’s] care. More testimony from [Blake and
his mother] indicates that the children may or may not be getting adequate and immediate care
while in the care of [Paige].” The court further wrote that Blake and Paige’s mother credibly
-4-
testified that Blake had not been able to contribute to substantial decision-making while the
children had been in Paige’s care and Paige did not provide Blake with adequate notification. Also,
W.R. was having behavioral difficulties and had been receiving follow-up care for potential lead
poisoning. The source of the lead had yet to be determined by the parties.
¶ 24 Regarding religion, the trial court found that Blake had made “diligent efforts to
accompany the children to religious events *** at the request of the children. [Paige] does not
afford the children with any religious opportunities.”
¶ 25 Regarding extracurricular activities, the trial court found that both parents had made
an effort to attend J.R.’s T-ball games. However, J.R. had not been attending dance classes when
in Paige’s care, despite evidence that the child enjoyed dancing.
¶ 26 Regarding the best interests of the children, the trial court found that the children
were having difficulty adjusting to their environment because they had been “shuffled from one
household, school, and childcare provider to another” because of Paige’s removal of the children
from the marital home. One of the children had behavioral problems stemming from his removal
from the marital home. The parents had not been able to cooperate, and Blake was not included in
decisions regarding the best interests of the children. Blake credibly testified (in the trial court’s
opinion) that he had not been adequately advised “as to the placement of the children in school,
daycare, or other programs. [He] has not been able to voice any opinion or give advice on these
matters despite having very strong opinions on the matters.”
¶ 27 Regarding prior decision-making, the trial court wrote as follows:
“Evidence received by the Court finds that some of the decisions of [Paige] as well
as the ability to adequately parent are in doubt. Testimony heard by all witnesses
indicate[s] that [Blake] is an attentive, loving and considerate parent. Maternal
-5-
grandmother of the children confirmed that [Blake] is a good and caring parent.
Maternal grandmother, Dianna [D.], hedged her testimony and could not answer
pointed questions on cross-examination about the parenting ability of her daughter
while under oath. All unbiased, biased, and otherwise credible evidence heard by
the Court leads the Court to believe that [Blake] is a diligent, loving, caring provider
wishing to share custody and some decision-making with [Paige].”
¶ 28 The trial court noted that Paige wanted primary custody of the children but, in the
court’s view, “There was no evidence heard to award such to [Paige].” Blake wanted equal or joint
custody and decision-making regarding education, and the court found that “[t]he preponderance
of the evidence favor[ed Blake] in this regard.”
¶ 29 The trial court concluded its order, writing that it had considered all applicable
factors consistent with the evidence and testimony. In addition, the court had “reviewed 750 ILCS
5/602.7 (b)–750 ILCS 5/606.10.” Ultimately, the court found that “[b]oth parents seem to have the
best interest of the children in mind, but the manifest weight of the evidence favors [Blake] over
[Paige].”
¶ 30 Paige filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied in September 2023.
¶ 31 This appeal followed.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Paige appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) granting sole decision-making
responsibilities regarding education to Blake, (2) failing to adopt portions of the parties’ joint
stipulations regarding the children, and (3) granting the parties equal parenting time. We disagree
and affirm.
¶ 34 A. The Parties’ Stipulations
-6-
¶ 35 As an initial matter, Paige argues that the trial court erred by rejecting the agreed
upon provisions of the joint stipulations without explaining why. She cites section 602.10(d) of
the Act (750 ILCS 5/602.10(d) (West 2022)) in support of that claim. We disagree.
¶ 36 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 37 Section 602.10(d) of the Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“[T]he parents may agree upon and submit a parenting plan at any time after the
commencement of a proceeding until prior to the entry of a judgment of dissolution
of marriage. The agreement is binding upon the court unless it finds, after
considering the circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence
produced by the parties, that the agreement is not in the best interests of the child.
If the court does not approve the parenting plan, the court shall make express
findings of the reason or reasons for its refusal to approve the plan. The court, on
its own motion, may conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
parenting plan is in the child’s best interests.” 750 ILCS 5/602.10(d) (West 2022).
¶ 38 2. This Case
¶ 39 Paige’s argument regarding this issue is premised entirely on section 602.10(d)’s
requirement that a trial court make express findings when refusing to approve an agreed parenting
plan. However, this section does not apply to the present case because, as the court wrote in its
order, “[t]he parents have not mutually agreed to a parenting plan.” Instead, the parties each
submitted their own conflicting proposed plans and later filed the joint stipulations, which
happened to include an agreement for joint decision-making authority and a holiday schedule. For
the joint stipulations to be binding on the court pursuant to section 602.10(d) of the Act, the joint
stipulations would need to constitute a parenting plan, which they do not.
-7-
¶ 40 Section 602.10(f)(2) requires that a parenting plan must contain “provisions for the
child’s living arrangements and for each parent’s parenting time, including either: (A) a schedule
that designates in which parent’s home the minor child will reside on given days; or (B) a formula
or method for determining such a schedule in sufficient detail to be enforced in a subsequent
proceeding.” Id. § 602.10(f)(2). Because the joint stipulations do not set forth a proposed plan for
parenting time or the children’s living arrangements, they are not an agreed parenting plan under
the Act to which the trial court must defer. Accordingly, the stipulations were simply evidence for
the court to consider in exercising its discretion to determine what arrangements were in the best
interests of the children. See In re Marriage of Iqbal, 2014 IL App (2d) 131306, ¶ 36, 11 N.E.3d
1 (“Parents are not at liberty to make agreements which affect the interests of their children without
obtaining the approval of the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.))
¶ 41 B. Decision-Making Authority Regarding Education and Parenting Time
¶ 42 Paige’s primary argument is that the trial court erred by granting (1) Blake
significant decision-making authority regarding the children’s education and (2) 50/50 parenting
time because those decisions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
¶ 43 Regarding decision-making authority, Paige argues that the trial court erred
because (1) it should have issued findings specifically as to why it was not accepting the
stipulations in the joint stipulations and (2) joint significant decision-making authority was in the
best interests of the children. Regarding parenting time, Paige argues that the court erred by failing
to properly consider the best interests factors pursuant to section 602.7 of the Act (750 ILCS
5/602.7 (West 2022)) because (1) the court did not cite section 602.7 of the Act in its order and
(2) the record strongly weighs in favor of granting her the majority of parenting time.
¶ 44 We first note that we have already rejected Paige’s argument that the trial court was
-8-
required to accept the stipulations (supra ¶¶ 39-40). Second, Paige’s remaining arguments are
essentially that (1) the court should have weighed the evidence differently and (2) we should
reweigh the applicable factors without deference to the trial court’s findings. However, “[i]t is well
settled that a reviewing court’s function is not to reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility
and set aside the [trial] court’s decision simply because a different conclusion may have been
drawn from the evidence.” Jameson v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 51, 165 N.E.3d 501.
Accordingly, we give the court’s findings deference.
¶ 45 Although the trial court must consider all relevant factors when determining the
best interests of the children, the court is not required to make an explicit finding relating to each
factor. In re Marriage of Whitehead, 2018 IL App (5th) 170380, ¶ 16, 97 N.E.3d 566. We presume
that the court knows the law and properly applied it. Id. Mere assertions that the court did not
consider all of the factors are insufficient to overcome that presumption. Id.¶ 46 In addition, Paige’s argument that the trial court did not mention section 602.7 of
the Act in its order is simply wrong. In the “Conclusion and Order” section of the court’s order,
the court wrote as follows: “The Court has reviewed 750 ILCS 5/602.7 (b)–750 ILCS 5/606.10.”
¶ 47 Further, nothing in the record convinces us that the trial court’s decisions were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47 (“A
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is apparent or
when the court’s findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
¶ 48 In its order, the trial court set forth both its credibility findings and the evidence it
found compelling. For example, based on the testimony, the court found that Blake had not had
much input into the education of the children and that the parties have been unable to cooperate in
-9-
the best interests of the children regarding the children’s education. The court also found that
Paige’s ability to adequately parent was in doubt, but “[a]ll unbiased, biased, and otherwise
credible evidence heard” showed that Blake was a “diligent, loving, caring provide wishing to
share custody and some decision-making with [Paige].”
¶ 49 In her brief, Paige simply applies all the statutory factors to the evidence in the
record and concludes that her assessment of the weight to be given to the evidence shows that the
trial court’s assessment was erroneous. However, we reiterate that the weight to be given to
evidence is to be left to the trial court’s sound discretion. Young v. Herman, 2018 IL App (4th)
170001, ¶ 64, 92 N.E.3d 1070. Nothing in the record comes close to showing that (1) the court’s
evaluation of the evidence was not correct or (2) its ultimate conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 50 Last, we note that “[a]ny time a trial court serves as a fact finder, perhaps the single
most important thing the court can do is say whom it believes and whom it does not. When the
trial court favors us with such a finding, we are at the height of our deference to that court.” People
v. Carter, 2021 IL App (4th) 180581, ¶ 68, 188 N.E.3d 391. With that principle in mind, we thank
the trial court for providing a detailed written order that contained explicit credibility
determinations, which this court found particularly helpful in the resolution of this appeal.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
- 10 -