People v. Collins , 2024 IL App (1st) 221139-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 221139-UNo. 1-22-1139
Order filed February 29, 2024
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 21 CR 1768
)
DEEQWAN COLLINS, ) Honorable
) Charles P. Burns,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirmed defendant’s sentence where the trial court neither improperly
considered an element of the offense in aggravation nor abused its discretion in
sentencing defendant to a prison term of seven years and six months for residential
burglary.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Deeqwan Collins was convicted of residential burglary
and sentenced to a prison term of seven years and six months. On appeal, defendant contends that
the trial court improperly considered an element of the offense in aggravation at sentencing,
erroneously considered his pretrial sentencing credit in determining the length of his sentence, and
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imposed an excessive sentence that did not properly consider his rehabilitative potential. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) West 2018)) for, on
or about June 4-5, 2019, knowingly and without authority entering the dwelling of Neal
Weisenburger with the intent to commit theft therein. Defendant was arrested for the offense in
January 2021.
¶4 The evidence at the April 2022 trial was that someone entered Weisenburger’s home on
the night in question while he and others were sleeping there. Weisenburger testified that, on the
morning of June 5, 2019, he noticed that his “personal electronics” (including a laptop computer,
tablet, and smartphone) that had been there in the evening were gone and an unfamiliar plastic
bottle was there. Before calling the police, Weisenburger confirmed that nobody in the home took
the electronics or left the bottle. Weisenburger did not know defendant, who did not have his
permission to be in his home or remove any items on June 5, 2019. A buccal swab from defendant
established that he was included as a possible source of the DNA from the bottle, as “the DNA
profile developed from the juice bottle is expected to occur approximately 1 in 1.2 septillion ***
unrelated individuals.” Following instructions and argument, the jury found defendant guilty of
residential burglary.
¶5 Defendant’s presentencing investigation report (PSI) stated that he was born in March 1993
and had a prior conviction for burglary in 2018, three offenses of criminal trespass in 2017, 2018,
and 2020, and retail theft under $300 in 2017. For the burglary conviction, he received two years’
of second chance probation pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.4(a) (West 2018) completed
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satisfactorily in 2020. Defendant received six months’ conditional discharge for one criminal
trespass offense and jail terms of 2 or 10 days for the other three convictions.
¶6 According to the PSI, defendant never knew his father, his mother used drugs throughout
his childhood, “he was a part of DCFS as a child because his mother burned his feet in a hot tub”
and she “was unfit to raise him and his siblings.” While he was manipulated and abused physically
and emotionally as a child and had no support from his parents, he had “a very good relationship
with his siblings.” Defendant completed the 11th grade but lost motivation to complete high school
when his grandmother died. He stated he had “plans on earning a GED in the future.” Other than
“odd jobs,” he worked one month as a forklift operator for $18.50 hourly. He was married with
one daughter, had “a beautiful relationship with his child,” and felt “his wife is his only supporting
relationship.” He lived with his family at the address on the PSI for about four months, they had
to leave previous lodgings due to unpaid rent, and he lived in a “rough” or violent neighborhood
but felt safe. He had no close friends, and he was not in a gang. He denied having ill health
physically or mentally and denied abusing alcohol or drugs.
¶7 At the June 2022 sentencing hearing, the State amended the PSI to add a second prior
conviction for burglary to which defendant pled guilty on the same day as the 2018 burglary
conviction already in the PSI, received the same sentence of second chance probation, and also
completed that probation satisfactorily in 2020. Defendant was on probation for the two buglaries
at the time he committed the instant offense. The State argued that defendant should receive six to
eight years in prison.
¶8 Defendant’s wife Adriannia Collins addressed the court, stating that he was a good father
to his own daughter and to his stepdaughter. She explained that defendant helped her through
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severe depression, his “personal upbringing, professional experiences, and academic background”
limited him to “extremely temporary and *** uncertain” odd jobs, and he was now improving
himself both financially (with an improved credit score) and spiritually. Defendant’s brother
submitted a letter describing defendant’s childhood when he was in poverty and how, after his
grandmother died, defendant became isolated until he met Adriannia, and has recovered his
purpose in life with his new family. Counsel argued that defendant made “a whole different
commitment to his life” in the interim between committing this offense in 2019 and when he was
charged, and sought the minimum sentence of four years in prison. Defendant declined to address
the court personally.
¶9 The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of seven years and six months. In imposing
sentence, the court stated that it considered statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating
factors, including the support of defendant’s family, that he had a history of employment, and that
he “had less than a favorable childhood” with “domestic abuse.” The court noted that “[t]his is a
mandatory sentence. As we know residential burglary is a Class 1 felony, nonprobationable. I think
it’s a reasoning of the legislature that there should be increased penalties for someone that invades
the province of one’s home as compared to the province of one’s garage, office or even a car.”
¶ 10 The court explained that it was concerned about “a couple different things. No. 1, defendant
did that while he was on two separate probations, two separate probations for burglary. *** I’m
particularly concerned about the fact that he is on probation for burglary when he committed this
offense. He has isolated misdemeanor cases which is concerning to me, *** three separate criminal
trespasses. Also, a retail theft. Albeit that was a misdemeanor.” The court noted that on the other
hand, “his wife and his brother seem[] to paint a different picture.” The court expressly found that
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a sentence at the higher end of the range was inappropriate and would not properly account for the
mitigating factors but the minimum sentence was also inappropriate as the offense was committed
while defendant was on probation.
¶ 11 The court imposed a term of seven and a half years’ imprisonment. It then asked about
defendant’s pretrial detention credit. Defense counsel told the court that defendant had 248 days
on electronic monitoring and in custody, “and pursuant to the statute, which indicates with 12
hours of home confinement there is an additional 279.” The court asked “did I have him on 11
hours a day or did I have him on 24 hours a day” and then awarded “527 days time considered
served.” The mittimus reflects credit for 527 days.
¶ 12 Defendant timely filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. In the motion, he argued that
his sentence was excessive, the trial court did not consider all mitigating factors, and the court
considered in aggravation matters inherent to the offense. The court denied the motion after brief
argument. In finding the sentence “commensurate with all the factors in aggravation [and]
mitigation,” the court stated “I’m giving defendant credit for well in excess of a year and a half
that he spent walking the streets both on pretrial and on electronic home monitoring.”
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant first contends that, in imposing sentence, the trial court improperly
considered an element of the residential burglary offense in aggravation, specifically that
defendant entered a home during commission of the offense. 1 He also contends the court
erroneously considered his pretrial detention credit in determining the length of his sentence.
1
“A person commits residential burglary when he or she knowingly and without authority enters
or knowingly and without authority remains within the dwelling place of another, or any part thereof, with
the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2018).
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¶ 14 The trial court may not consider a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation, but it is
appropriate to consider the degree and gravity of the defendant’s conduct including the threat of
harm to the public. People v. Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶¶ 25-27 (citing People v. Saldivar,
113 Ill. 2d 256, 271-72 (1986)). The court is not required to refrain from mentioning factors that
constitute elements of the offense. Id. ¶ 24. There is a strong presumption that the court based its
sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning, and we must consider the record as a whole
rather than isolated remarks. Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the trial court
improperly considered in aggravation a factor inherent in the offense. Id. We review de novo
whether the court considered a factor inherent in the offense. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 15 Here, taking the court’s sentencing remarks as a whole, it is apparent that the court was not
considering defendant’s entry into a home as an aggravating factor but merely explaining why the
legislature has imposed a higher felony class for residential burglary than for burglary. Residential
burglary is a class 1 felony punishable by 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment, while burglary of a non-
residential building is a class 2 felony punishable by 3 to 7 years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/19-
1(b), 19-3(b) (West 2018); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a), 5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018). The court clearly
separated the “reasoning of the legislature” in establishing the applicable sentencing range from
“[w]hat the Court is concerned about” in imposing a sentence within that range. Given this record,
we cannot say that the court considered an improper factor in imposing sentence.
¶ 16 As to defendant’s pretrial detention credit, we consider it decisive that the court imposed
its sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment before the topic of pretrial detention credit
was ever broached. The court’s comment in denying reconsideration about defendant “walking the
streets” may or may not indicate its displeasure with the legislature’s decision on credit as
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defendant argues. However, the record clearly shows the court awarded the full credit defendant
requested. The record does not show that the court abused its sentencing discretion based on this
isolated remark. See Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 24.
¶ 17 Defendant also contends that his sentence is excessive.
¶ 18 The trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions
are entitled to great deference. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; People v. Alexander, 239
Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). That is because it observed the defendant and the proceedings and is in a
superior position to consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral character,
mentality, environment, habits, and age. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36. We may not modify a
defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion, which we find only if the sentence is greatly
at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense. People v. Webster, 2023 IL 128428, ¶¶ 21, 32. We may not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court merely because we would weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors
differently. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213.
¶ 19 Residential burglary is a class 1 felony punishable by 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment. 720
ILCS 19-3(b) (West 2018); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2018). Defendant’s sentence of seven
and a half years falls within this statutory range and is therefore presumed proper. Webster, 2023
IL 128428, ¶ 21.
¶ 20 Defendant does not dispute that his sentence falls within the applicable sentencing range.
Rather, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in light of his self-rehabilitation
between the time of the offense and his arrest and his rehabilitative potential, noting his abusive
childhood, years of homelessness, and non-violent criminal history.
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¶ 21 “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with
the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The
mandate is to balance the retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment. People v.
Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 113. A defendant’s rehabilitative potential is not entitled
to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense, which is the most important factor in
sentencing. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214: Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 113. The trial
court is presumed to have considered any evidence in mitigation placed before it. People v. Garcia,
2023 IL App (1st) 172005, ¶ 67. It is not required to make express findings regarding a defendant's
rehabilitative potential. Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 113. A sentence within the statutory
range is excessive if it was imposed without regard for the defendant’s rehabilitative potential.
People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 58.
¶ 22 After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. Here, the trial court had all the
mitigating factors now relied upon by defendant before it at sentencing, presented via the PSI,
counsel’s argument, and witness letters and testimony. See Garcia, 2023 IL App (1st) 172005, ¶
67 (trial court is presumed to have considered any evidence in mitigation placed before it).
Contrary to defendant’s characterization that the court “was predisposed to view [him] as
incorrigible,” it remarked more than once on the mitigating factors, including defendant’s new
family, family support, history of employment, and childhood domestic abuse, and expressly found
that those factors weighed against a higher sentence. Given this record, we cannot conclude that
the court had no regard for his self-rehabilitation and rehabilitative potential or that his sentence is
excessive. See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 58. This is especially so where, as here,
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defendant committed a felony while on probation for another felony, a statutory aggravating factor
(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(12) (West 2018)). 2
¶ 23 In conclusion, we do not find the prison term of 7½ years for residential burglary, an
offense with a sentencing range of 4 to 15 years, is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose
of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its considerable sentencing discretion in the sentence, and the judgment of the court
is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
2
As noted above, the PSI as supplemented at the sentencing hearing indicated that defendant had
prior convictions for burglary in 2018, for which he received concurrent sentences of probation that he did
not complete until 2020.
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