6103-07 Claremont, LLC v. Hunter , 2024 IL App (1st) 231287-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 231287-UNo. 1-23-1287
Order filed March 1, 2024
Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
6103-07 CLAREMONT, LLC, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
) No. 23 M1 700722
ANGELA HUNTER and UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS, )
)
Defendants ) Honorable
) James A. Wright,
(Angela Hunter, Defendant-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hyman and Tailor concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s appeal from the portion of the eviction order granting plaintiff
possession of the apartment unit is dismissed as moot. The circuit court’s monetary
judgment awarded to plaintiff for unpaid rent and costs is affirmed where defendant
failed to provide a sufficient record to show the court’s judgment was erroneous.
¶2 In this forcible entry and detainer action, defendant Angela Hunter appeals pro se from an
agreed eviction order entered by the circuit court granting possession of the subject apartment unit
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and a monetary judgment for unpaid rent and costs in favor of plaintiff, 6103-07 Claremont, LLC
(Claremont). On appeal, Hunter contends the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to
dismiss the eviction complaint filed under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)) because the pleading was legally and factually insufficient.
Hunter further contends the court violated her right to procedural due process when it ignored her
written request for a briefing schedule to address her motion to dismiss and, instead, denied her
motion sua sponte. Hunter also argues that all the orders entered by the circuit court were invalid
because they did not include language stating that the court was “fully advised in the premises.”
In addition, Hunter argues that the circuit court erred when it failed to recognize that she signed
the agreed eviction order under duress after it disregarded her motion to dismiss, and she feared
becoming homeless.
¶3 For the following reasons, we dismiss as moot Hunter’s appeal challenging the portion of
the eviction order granting possession of the apartment unit to Claremont as the sheriff has already
enforced the eviction order and Claremont has regained possession of the unit. We affirm the
circuit court’s monetary judgment awarded to Claremont for unpaid rent and costs where Hunter
failed to provide a sufficient record to show the court’s judgment was erroneous.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 The record on appeal consists only of the common law record. Documents in the record
show that on January 13, 2023, Claremont filed an eviction complaint against Hunter and unknown
occupants alleging that it was entitled to possession of the apartment unit on North Claremont
Avenue in Chicago. Claremont alleged Hunter unlawfully withheld possession of the unit after it
terminated her lease for nonpayment of rent. Claremont indicated that Hunter owed $4940 in rent
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from October 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023. Claremont requested that the court grant it possession
of the property, the amount of past due rent plus court costs, and any additional rent due to
Claremont through the date of judgment. Claremont used the eviction complaint form approved
by the Illinois Supreme Court and completed each of the four sections of the form.
¶6 Claremont attached to its complaint a copy of Hunter’s apartment lease dated April 18,
2022. The term of the lease began July 1, 2022, and ended June 30, 2023. The monthly rent was
$1300. Claremont also attached a copy of Hunter’s account statement dated January 10, 2023,
showing a balance due of $4940. The statement indicated that the last payment Claremont received
was for $1145 on October 3, 2022, with a reference code of “Cha.”
¶7 In addition, Claremont attached to its complaint a copy of its five-day notice served to
Hunter on January 6, 2023. The notice indicated that Hunter owed Claremont $4940 for past due
rent and demanded full payment of that amount no later than five days after the service date. The
notice stated that if Hunter failed to pay the amount due, her right to possession of the apartment
would be terminated. The notice included an affidavit and proof of service stating that the property
manager delivered a copy of the five-day notice to Hunter on January 6, 2023.
¶8 The record shows that both the Cook County Sheriff and a special process server made
multiple unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Hunter with the eviction summons and
complaint. On April 14, 2023, the Cook County Sheriff served Hunter with notice of the eviction
action via posting and mailed her a copy of the notice. Hunter filed her pro se appearance in the
eviction case on May 3, 2023.
¶9 On May 5, 2023, the circuit court referred the case to the Early Resolution Program (ERP)
for assessment. On June 2, 2023, the court entered an order indicating that the ERP completed
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their assessment and that the case was not settled. The order transferred the case back to the First
Municipal District for further proceedings.
¶ 10 On June 21, 2023, Hunter filed a pro se motion to “extend” the proceedings to secure legal
counsel. Hunter claimed she was working with ERP and that she had a housing voucher that was
going to expire on June 28. Hunter stated that it was hard to obtain other housing because she was
in eviction court. She claimed her unit passed inspection, but the building failed because the
engineer did not appear. Hunter further claimed the building manager became angry, did not want
to re-do the paperwork, and took her to court when the building went into abatement. Hunter stated
that Claremont put her in a position to be homeless.
¶ 11 On June 27, 2023, the circuit court entered an order continuing the case to July 13, 2023,
for an “in person trial.”
¶ 12 On July 5, 2023, Hunter filed a pro se motion to dismiss Claremont’s complaint with
prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. Hunter argued that the account statement attached
to Claremont’s complaint was, in substance, a pleading against the Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA). Hunter claimed the account statement was a separate claim against the CHA that was
improperly commingled with the complaint. Hunter argued that the complaint violated statutory
pleading standards because Claremont commingled its claims rather than pleading separate causes
of action for any alleged claims against her or the CHA.
¶ 13 Hunter further argued in her motion that Claremont never served her with the complaint or
its five-day notice. She claimed the affidavit of proof of service accompanying the five-day notice
was false. Hunter stated that she became aware of the eviction complaint when she received a
third-party solicitation in the mail during the last week of April 2023.
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¶ 14 Hunter also alleged that Claremont’s eviction complaint was factually and legally
insufficient because “[Claremont] caused abatement of its own rent from failing CHA’s
inspection.” Hunter argued that the money Claremont alleged it was owed was between Claremont
and the CHA. Hunter claimed Claremont’s complaint and statement document were “illegal” and
that Claremont’s negligence “contributed in whole to the injury of which he now complains, i.e.,
CHA’s abated Rent.” Hunter asserted that Claremont acted in bad faith in filing its complaint
knowing that the property failed CHA’s inspection. Hunter stated that any request to amend the
complaint would be futile and would prejudice her with homelessness. Hunter asked the court to
strike the July 13 trial date, set a briefing schedule for Claremont to file a response to her motion
to dismiss and for her to file a reply, dismiss the eviction complaint with prejudice, and seal the
eviction record.
¶ 15 Hunter attached several exhibits to her motion to dismiss including the eviction complaint
and its supporting documents, the affidavit for service by posting, and the notice by posting
requiring appearance in the pending eviction action. She also attached a solicitation for legal
services for assistance in the eviction action dated January 31, 2023.
¶ 16 In addition, Hunter attached six pages of notices from the CHA regarding inspections at
the subject property. A notice dated August 31, 2022, stated that the property failed an inspection
on August 29 and that property conditions were the owner’s responsibility. Another notice also
dated August 31 stated that the property passed an inspection on August 30. A partial copy of an
undated CHA notice indicated the property failed a re-inspection conducted on September 26,
2022, and the property owner was responsible for the violations. This notice further stated that the
owner’s Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) would be abated effective October 1, 2022, and that
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Hunter had the right to request moving papers. It also stated that if no one was present for the re-
inspection, the unit would automatically fail and may go into abatement if the inspection was not
rescheduled and passed prior to the expiration of the cure period.
¶ 17 Another page from a CHA notice is not numbered or dated and, thus, this court cannot
determine with which notice it belongs. A box is checked for damages/conditions caused by the
property owner. This section stated that the CHA would provide the property owner with an
opportunity to address the deficiencies in accordance with the terms of the HAP contract. The
section advised that failure to repair deficiencies may result in an abatement with an effective date
of October 1, 2022. It further noted that if payments were abated for 60 days without the
deficiencies being remedied, the HAP contract for either each non-compliant unit or all units would
be terminated. It stated, “[Y]ou are prohibited from requiring the participant to pay any amounts
withheld by CHA.”
¶ 18 On July 10, 2023, the circuit court denied Hunter’s section 2-615 motion to dismiss
Claremont’s eviction complaint. The court’s written order indicates that Hunter and Claremont’s
attorney were present in court when the order was entered. The record before this court contains
no report of proceedings.
¶ 19 On July 13, 2023, the circuit court entered an eviction order granting Claremont possession
of the subject apartment. The written order indicated it was entered “[b]y agreement (the court
having made no factual findings)” and was “[s]igned and agreed to” by [Claremont’s] lawyer and
Hunter. The people present in court were Hunter and Claremont’s lawyer, manager, and engineer.
The order stated that Hunter must move out of the property on or before August 15, 2023, and if
she failed to do so, the sheriff was ordered to evict her. In addition, the order granted Claremont a
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monetary judgment against Hunter in the amount of $12,740 in rent and $788.89 in court costs
for a total of $13,528.89.
¶ 20 Hunter appeals pro se from the eviction order. In her notice of appeal, Hunter asked this
court to: (1) void the eviction agreement because she signed it under duress and in fear of
homelessness; (2) vacate the eviction order and allow her to maintain possession of the premises;
(3) vacate the monetary judgment; (4) find Claremont’s complaint legally and factually insufficient
on its face pursuant to section 2-615; (5) dismiss the eviction complaint with prejudice; and (6)
order the eviction record sealed. Hunter has filed numerous unsuccessful motions to stay the
eviction order pending the resolution of the appeal in both the circuit court and this court. She also
filed two unsuccessful emergency motions for leave to file a petition for an original writ of
mandamus in the Illinois Supreme Court.
¶ 21 In her emergency motion to vacate the eviction order and “regain possession” filed in this
court on October 16, 2023, Hunter stated that the Cook County Sheriff effectuated the eviction
order on October 13. In a subsequent emergency motion filed in this court on October 26, Hunter
requested an order to “supersede the trespass notice posted on the property” to enter the premises
and retrieve her property. Another division of this court denied both motions.
¶ 22 ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, Hunter contends the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss
the eviction complaint filed under section 2-615 of the Code because the pleading was legally and
factually insufficient. She further contends the court violated her right to procedural due process
when it ignored her written request for a briefing schedule to address her motion to dismiss, and
instead, denied her motion sua sponte. Hunter also argues that all the orders entered by the circuit
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court were invalid because they did not include the language that the court was “fully advised in
the premises.” In addition, Hunter argues the circuit court erred when it failed to recognize that
she signed the agreed eviction order under duress after it disregarded her motion to dismiss, and
she feared becoming homeless.
¶ 24 In response, Claremont argues that this court should deny Hunter’s appeal as moot because
she was evicted from the premises on October 13, and therefore, this court cannot grant any relief
regarding the order of possession. Alternatively, Claremont argues that Hunter failed to provide
this court with a sufficient record to review the circuit court’s rulings because she did not include
a report of proceedings. Claremont asserts that this court must presume the circuit court’s rulings
were correct and affirm the judgment. Claremont further argues Hunter presented no evidence or
testimony to establish that she signed the agreed eviction order under duress.
¶ 25 As a threshold matter, we must first consider Claremont’s contention that this appeal is
moot. Generally, courts do not decide moot issues, render advisory opinions, or consider claims
where there will be no change in the outcome, regardless of how the issue is decided. In re Julie
M., 2021 IL 125768, ¶ 21. “An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or when events have
occurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief.” Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10. The facts that must be determined
in an eviction action are which party is entitled to immediate possession of the property and
whether there is a defense related to the purpose of the action that defeats the Plaintiff’s asserted
right to possession. Milton v. Therra, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 23.
¶ 26 Here, the eviction order granted Claremont possession of the apartment unit and required
Hunter to relinquish possession by August 15, 2023. Hunter failed to comply with the circuit
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court’s order to vacate the unit, to which she had agreed. Instead of vacating, Hunter filed a notice
of appeal. On October 13, 2023, the sheriff enforced the eviction order, removed Hunter from the
unit, and Claremont regained possession. Claremont then posted a no trespassing notice on the
property. On October 30, 2023, another division of this court denied Hunter’s emergency motion
to bypass that notice for the purpose of retrieving her property.
¶ 27 Consequently, Hunter’s appeal from the portion of the eviction order which granted
possession of the unit to Claremont is moot because Claremont has already acquired possession of
the property. See Circle Management LLC v. Olivier, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601, 607 (2007) (the appeal
of a forcible entry and detainer action was moot where the circuit court had entered a possession
order, and the appellant had moved out, but the court applied the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine); see also 2242 Archer Court, LLC v. Roberts, 2023 IL App (1st) 221655-U, ¶¶
14-15 (citing Circle Management in finding the issue of possession of the premises moot because
the defendant had already been evicted from the apartment); Georgakopoulos v. Blake, 2022 IL
App (1st) 210668-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (same).1
¶ 28 In her reply brief, Hunter states that Claremont’s mootness argument is a “Proverbial Red
herring” because it did not address the substantive arguments she raised on appeal. Hunter did not
otherwise reply to the mootness argument or assert that an exception to the mootness doctrine
exists as to the possession order. Accordingly, she has forfeited any challenges to the application
of the mootness doctrine. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (points not argued are
1
2242 Archer Court, LLC and Georgakopoulos are cited as persuasive authority pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023), which provides that “a nonprecedential order
entered under subpart (b) of this rule on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes.”
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forfeited). We therefore find that the appeal from the possession portion of the eviction order is
moot.
¶ 29 The eviction order, however, included a monetary judgment against Hunter for unpaid rent
and costs which was not rendered moot by the enforcement of the eviction order. See Poulos v.
Reda, 165 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1987) (although the issue of possession was moot, the claim for
rent remained a viable issue). Unfortunately, we find that our review of this portion of the eviction
order is hampered by an incomplete record. When reviewing an eviction order entered in favor of
the plaintiff, our standard of review is whether the circuit court’s ruling was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Wendy & William Spatz Charitable Foundation v. 2263 North Lincoln
Corp., 2013 IL App (1st) 122076, ¶ 27. An appellant has the burden of presenting a sufficiently
complete record of the circuit court proceedings to support any claims of error, and in the absence
of such a record, this court will presume that the circuit court’s order conformed with the law and
had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubts arising
from an incomplete record will be resolved against the appellant. Id.¶ 30 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021), the record on appeal shall include
the common law record, including every document filed in the case, and any report of proceedings
prepared in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Pursuant to Rule 323,
the report of proceedings may be a transcript prepared by court reporting personnel, or in lieu of a
transcript, an appellant may file a bystander’s report (Rule 323(c)) or an agreed statement of facts
(Rule 323(d)). Here, the record does not contain a report of the circuit court proceedings in any
format for the July 13, 2023, trial date when the circuit court entered the agreed eviction order.
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¶ 31 The record before this court consists of one volume of common law documents, which
alone are insufficient to allow this court to find an error by the circuit court in entering the monetary
judgment in favor of Claremont. The written eviction order entered on July 13, 2023, indicates it
was entered “[b]y agreement (the court having made no factual findings).” The order further shows
that Hunter, along with Claremont’s counsel, manager, and engineer, were present in court. In
addition to granting possession of the subject property to Claremont, the court awarded them
$13,528.89 in rent and costs against Hunter.
¶ 32 Without a report of proceedings, this court has no knowledge of what happened in court
that day. We know that on July 10, 2023, the court heard Hunter’s motion to dismiss the complaint
in which she argued that it was the CHA, not her, who owed the past due rent. The circuit court
denied that motion, and three days later Hunter signed the agreed eviction order. We do not know
what testimony or evidence, if any, was presented by either party or what arguments the parties
made before the court. We do not know why Hunter agreed to the eviction order. We do not know
the reasoning or rationale that provided the basis for the court to enter the order. Hunter claims
that she signed the order under duress and for fear of being homeless, but without a report of
proceedings, there is no evidence to support her assertion. Under these circumstances, this court
must presume that the circuit court acted in conformity with the law when it entered the agreed
eviction order. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005); Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d
at 391-92.
¶ 33 In reaching this conclusion, we find no merit in Hunter’s argument on appeal that the circuit
court’s orders were invalid because they did not include language stating that the court was “fully
advised in the premises.” Hunter claims this language is required pursuant to Foutch, where the
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Illinois Supreme Court explained that when a circuit court order states that it is based upon the
court having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel “and being fully advised in the
premises” it is presumed the court heard adequate evidence to support its decision. Foutch, 99 Ill.
2d at 394. Hunter has misinterpreted the legal proposition from Foutch. When the quoted language
appears in a written court order, it is an indication that the court heard evidence and arguments that
supported its decision. Such language, however, is not required for an order to be legally valid.
The fact that the circuit court’s orders in this case did not include the quoted language had no effect
on the validity of the orders.
¶ 34 Insofar as Hunter asserts that she was denied due process of law, we need not reach
constitutional questions when the issues can be resolved on other grounds. Carle Foundation v.
Cunningham Township, 2017 IL 120427, ¶ 34.
¶ 35 Finally, we address Hunter’s argument that the circuit court erred when it denied her
section 2-615 motion to dismiss the eviction complaint. Hunter correctly points out that the court’s
ruling on a section 2-615 motion is reviewed de novo, and thus, we do not need the report of
proceedings to review that ruling. See Quiroz v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2022 IL 127603, ¶ 11
(“A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 is reviewed de novo because it challenges the legal
sufficiency of a complaint by alleging defects on the face of the complaint.”). In reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those facts are taken as true. Id. The allegations in the complaint are construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff is not required to present evidence in the complaint
but must allege sufficient facts that present a claim that constitutes a legally recognized cause of
action. Id. at ¶ 12.
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Here, we find that Claremont’s eviction complaint was legally and factually sufficient, and
therefore, the circuit court’s denial of Hunter’s motion to dismiss under section 2-615 was proper.
Claremont used the eviction complaint form approved by the Illinois Supreme Court, and it is
required to be accepted in all Illinois circuit courts. Claremont completed each section of the form
and provided the address of the property, the reason for the lease termination being nonpayment
of rent, and the amount of past due rent owed for the period of October 1, 2022, to January 31,
2023. Claremont also indicated that it was demanding possession of the property, court costs, past
due rent in the amount of $4940, and rent due through the date of judgment. Finally, Claremont
attached to the complaint the written lease agreement, its five-day notice to Hunter, and its affidavit
of service of that notice. Claremont’s complaint presented the factual details necessary to apprise
Hunter of the eviction action. Hunter’s arguments that it was the CHA who owed the rent rather
than her and that the building failed CHA inspections were defenses she could have raised at trial,
and possibly she did. However, those challenges do not render Claremont’s complaint factually or
legally insufficient.
¶ 36 CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For these reasons, we dismiss Hunter’s appeal from the portion of the eviction order that
granted Claremont possession of the unit as moot. We affirm the circuit court’s order in all other
respects.
¶ 38 Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
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