People v. Williams , 2024 IL App (5th) 230418-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE
2024 IL App (5th) 230418-UNOTICE
Decision filed 07/09/24. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0418 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County.
)
v. ) No. 18-CF-44
)
ANTHONY R. WILLIAMS, ) Honorable
) Jerry E. Crisel,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cates and Sholar concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The defendant’s postconviction petition was properly dismissed at the first stage
for failing to state a gist of constitutional claim where the defendant is unable to
demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to move to sever charges
relating to the sexual assault of two minors.
¶2 The defendant, Anthony R. Williams, appeals the circuit court of Jefferson County’s
dismissal of his postconviction petition at the first stage. For the following reasons, we affirm the
dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 29, 2018, the defendant was charged in a single indictment with multiple counts
of sexual assault and aggravated sexual abuse for abusing A.H., his then-teenage niece, and H.H.,
his then 11-year-old step-granddaughter. The offenses involving A.H. occurred between 2003 and
1
2007, while those involving H.H. occurred in 2016. The defendant was then arrested. The
defendant waived a jury trial and the case proceeded to a bench trial in June 2018. During the trial,
both victims testified, and certain hearsay statements were allowed pursuant to section 115-10 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2022)). The defendant
was ultimately found guilty on all counts and sentenced to an aggregate term of 44 years in prison.
¶5 Following his conviction and sentencing, the defendant filed a direct appeal in this court.
See People v. Williams, 2021 IL App (5th) 190251-U. In his direct appeal, the defendant only
raised arguments related to the trial court’s alleged reliance on its personal knowledge in rendering
its verdict and the trial court’s alleged consideration of improper victim impact testimony during
sentencing. We affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences. Additionally, within that
decision, we determined that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and therefore, the defendant
could not show prejudice.
¶6 Following our issuance of our disposition of the defendant’s direct appeal, the defendant
then filed a pro se postconviction petition. The petition raises, inter alia, for the first time in these
proceedings, that his trial counsel rendered him ineffective assistance of counsel in that his counsel
failed to move to have the charges related to the two victims severed for separate bench trials. The
petition argues that the offenses allegedly occurred years apart and were not part of the same
comprehensive transaction. Additionally, the petition contends that this was prejudicial because,
had the charges been severed, H.H.’s credibility-bolstering hearsay statements would not have
been admissible at A.H.’s trial.
¶7 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition and this appeal followed.
2
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, the defendant asks this court to reverse the trial court’s summary dismissal and
allow his complaints to proceed to a second-stage proceeding. The court in Cole articulated the
standard of review for first-stage dismissals:
“The Act provides postconviction relief when a conviction arises from a
substantial violation of a constitutional right. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2010). A
postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on the conviction, not an appeal of the
underlying judgment. [Citation.] A defendant bears the burden of showing that he qualifies
for relief under the Act by demonstrating a violation of a constitutional right. 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2010). A postconviction petition maybe summarily dismissed within
90 days of its filing if ‘the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without
merit.’ 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2010). A frivolous or patently without merit
petition is one that ‘has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.’ [Citation.] We review
summary dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo. [Citation.]” People v. Cole, 2012
IL App (1st) 102499, ¶ 8.
¶ 10 The defendant raises two arguments in his postconviction petition, but only argues the trial
court erred in dismissing one of those arguments. Thus, any argument related to his ineffective
assistance claim regarding the failure to object to Dr. Nsa’s allegedly improper hearsay testimony
is forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Argument *** shall contain the contentions
of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record
relied on. *** Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral
argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).
¶ 11 We now turn to the defendant’s claim on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move to have the charges for each victim severed for the purpose of trial. The State
3
contends that the defendant’s claim is forfeited because the defendant could have raised it in his
direct appeal but failed to do so. See People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002) (“[I]ssues
that could have been raised, but were not, are considered waived.”). The State notes that our Illinois
case law has determined that “frivolous or *** patently without merit encompasses res judicata
and forfeiture.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 445 (2005).
¶ 12 The defendant responds that his claim is not barred because, “[a]t first-stage proceedings,
pro se petitioners like Williams are not required to fully set forth their claims” (citing to People v.
Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175 (2010)). A pro se petition is viewed with a liberal eye and assessed for its
“substantive virtue rather than its procedural compliance.” People v. Hommerson, 2014 IL 115638,
¶ 11. Here, any failure of Williams to overcome forfeiture by failing to explicitly allege ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in his pro se petition is merely a procedural defect that may easily
be cured at the second stage of proceedings once counsel has been appointed to properly shape his
claim. See People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 23 (“When a petitioner is asserting claims that
could have been raised on direct appeal, he can avoid the procedural bar of forfeiture by casting
his claims as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct
appeal.”); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 412-13 (1999) (where the pro se petition raises issues
that could have been raised on direct appeal, counsel at second-stage has the duty to amend the
petition to allege ineffective assistance of appeal counsel to avoid forfeiture).
¶ 13 Ultimately, it is true that defendant did not directly raise the issue of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel in his petition, but doing so requires a higher level of legal procedural
knowledge, whereas a pro se defendant is often “unaware of the precise legal basis for his claim
or all the legal elements of that claim.” People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 245 (2001). “[B]y
definition, a ‘gist’ of a claim is something less than a completely pled or fully stated claim.” Id. A
4
pro se petition is required only to allege enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably
constitutional. People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 181653, ¶ 34.
¶ 14 The case law relied upon by the State highlights certain situations where courts have found
such “implicit” claims forfeited; however, we find those cases to be distinguishable because in
those matters the defendant either did not bring an outright ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
attempted to raise a claim unsupported by the facts alleged in the petition, or raised a completely
new claim. See Cole, 2012 IL App (1st) 102499; see also People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498 (2004).
In the petition at issue, the defendant clearly articulated and identified the issue which forms the
basis of his claim. It is readily apparent that the defendant is ultimately attempting to complain
about the failure of his trial counsel to move to sever the charges against him. And, also it is
apparent that all that is necessary to cure the procedural defect is for appellate counsel, once
appointed at the second stage, to reframe the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to that
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based upon appellate counsel’s failure to raise the
issue on direct appeal. This distinction is a nuance of the law that is beyond the typical knowledge
of a pro se defendant and to expect them to properly understand the implications of how the claim
is phrased or framed for purposes of these proceedings is not realistic. Thus, we will overlook the
forfeiture. However, the defendant still must have alleged the “gist” of constitutional violation
before the matter can proceed to a second-stage hearing. We find that he failed to do so.
¶ 15 In answering the question of whether the circuit court correctly dismissed the
postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit, we are guided by the standard set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for determining whether counsel’s
assistance was ineffective. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance under Strickland, a
defendant must show both that counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’ and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” People v. Hodges, 234
5
Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2009). “At the first stage of postconviction proceedings under the Act, a petition
alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the
defendant was prejudiced.” (Emphasis added.) Id. “Both prongs of the Strickland test must be
satisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998). “Courts, however, may resolve ineffectiveness claims under
the two-part Strickland test by reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice renders
irrelevant the issue of counsel’s performance.” Id. at 397-98.
¶ 16 The defendant argues that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to move to sever the
charges because hearsay evidence regarding H.H.’s assault was allowed into the bench trial
pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code and considered for A.H.’s charges where they would not
have been allowed had the victims’ trials been severed. Thus, the defendant contends that this
evidence allowed the State to improperly “bolster” its case for the charges against A.H.
¶ 17 Section 115-7.3(b) of the Code is an exception which allows propensity evidence to be
introduced where charges of sexual assault are alleged. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2022). The
defendant admits that pursuant to this section, both H.H. and A.H. would have been allowed to
testify regarding their personal sexual assault by the defendant in both trials had the charges been
severed. However, pursuant to the State’s two motions in limine brought pursuant to section 115-
10 of the Code and which were allowed by the trial court, the State introduced evidence which
also included hearsay statements made by H.H. to her mother, her primary care physician, and the
Child Advocacy Center caseworker. Section 115-10 acts as an exception to the hearsay rule and
allows for hearsay statements made by the victim in reporting sexual assault. Section 115-10 is
understood to allow this type of evidence only from the victim for which the defendant is being
6
prosecuted to be admitted. Thus, the defendant argues that these statements would not have been
allowed in A.H.’s trial had the charges been severed.
¶ 18 However, in this matter, the State in its motion in limine moved only for the admittance of
this evidence to be considered by the trial judge for the purpose of its case-in-chief as to the charges
alleged where H.H. was the victim. Specifically, the motion in limine states as follows: “In the
trial of this cause, with respect to Counts V and VI, the State intends to introduce evidence in its
case-in-chief certain statements that the victim in these counts, being H.H., *** made ***.”
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the State limited the introduction of this evidence into the trial only for
the purpose of being considered by the trial court for the charges relating to H.H., and not for those
relating to A.H.
¶ 19 Importantly, in this matter, the defendant was convicted following a bench trial. “Reversal
is required only if the evidence is a material factor in the defendant’s conviction; that is, the
outcome of his trial would likely have been different had the evidence been excluded.” People v.
Adams, 2023 IL App (2d) 220061, ¶ 92, appeal denied, 221 N.E.3d 404 (Ill. 2023).
“In addition, the risk of prejudice from other-crimes evidence is lessened in a bench trial.
See People v. Felton, 2019 IL App (3d) 150595, ¶¶ 47-48 (noting that the prejudicial effect
of other-crimes evidence ‘is almost exclusively discussed in terms of impact on a jury’
(emphasis in original) and explaining that the law ‘presumes that a judge, unlike a jury, is
not likely to find a defendant guilty simply because he or she is a bad person deserving
punishment’); cf. People v. Johnson, 296 Ill. App. 3d 53, 63 (1998) (in resolving a
challenge to the admission of the minor victim’s hearsay statement in an aggravated
criminal sexual assault case, stating that ‘[w]hile a technical error may have been
committed, we cannot see how, in this bench trial, it caused any prejudice to the
defendant’).” Id.7
¶ 20 In this matter, a trial judge conducted the bench trial and rendered the verdict. A trial judge
is presumed to know the law and apply it properly. The evidence was introduced in a limited
capacity, and we have no evidence that the judge considered it outside of that properly admitted
context. The probability of prejudice is considerably minimized when there is not a jury and the
judge is acting as the factfinder.
¶ 21 Additionally, as previously stated, section 115-10 creates a previously nonexistent hearsay
exception and our courts have found that the exception “must be strictly construed where the
defendant has no opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accuser. See People v.
Bridgewater, 259 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (1994) (‘In light of the principles surrounding the
admission of a statement as an exception to the hearsay rule, section 115-10 of the Code should be
narrowly construed.’).” People v. Johnson, 296 Ill. App. 3d 53, 65 (1998). In this matter, the trial
court granted the motions in limine which limited H.H.’s hearsay statements for consideration only
for the charges involving her. Furthermore, when granting the motions in limine, the trial court
also ruled that the hearsay evidence was only admissible if H.H. testified and could be cross-
examined; thus, further limiting any prejudice to the defendant.
¶ 22 Moreover, the trial court in its written judgment articulated the specific reasonings for its
verdict. Importantly, the trial court focused on the defendant’s testimony in rendering its ruling by
laying out clearly articulated reasons it found the defendant’s testimony “was not credible.” The
trial court found that the defendant’s testimony
“consisted mostly of a detailed explanation of why no one could have committed the
offenses against A.H. on a working farm as she had claimed. According to the defendant
there was an almost constant presence of seed salesmen, farm implement dealers, farm
hands and concerned neighbors in and around the places where A.H. alleged the defendant
8
committed his crimes against her, thereby making such acts virtually impossible to carry
out without discovery.”
Additionally, the defendant, “although never actually asked, did not expressly deny any of the
charges.”
¶ 23 Furthermore, the defendant throughout the litany of appeals and challenges following his
conviction has never challenged the sufficiency of the evidence following his convictions. In the
direct appeal regarding this matter, we found that portions of the defendant’s testimony at his
bench trial were either inherently incredible or simply nonsensical. For example, despite his
testimony that he had lived “[a]ll of” his life on or around the farm in question, he could not testify
with specificity as to how many outbuildings there were at various places on the farm. When asked
about outbuildings near the house the defendant lived in at that time, the defendant testified,
“there’s the old chicken coop and the crib and the garage and then an old barn, and then there’s
what they call the laying area where the chickens used to lay the eggs, so that would be one, two,
three, four, five—five buildings—six maybe.” (Emphasis added.) When asked about outbuildings
near the house his mother and father lived in at the time, the defendant testified, “there’s the old
machine shed, the new machine shed, and then several bins. I’d have to count them up.” (Emphasis
added.) When asked about outbuildings near the house the defendant’s brother lived in at the time,
the defendant testified, “Around my brother’s is just basically nothing but old cars and stuff like
that, maybe one outbuilding or two.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, on cross-examination, the
defendant offered the rather head-spinning assertion, with regard to A.H., that “I probably was
alone with her, but, I mean, if I was, it was not in a building or at her house or anywhere by myself
with her.” (Emphases added.)
¶ 24 Therefore, in light of the defendant’s own testimony not being credible, we find that the
mere addition of “bolstering” evidence would not have changed the outcome of the defendant’s
9
trial because the trial court, here, emphasized not that it found the victims to be overly credible,
but that it disbelieved the defendant and found him not to be credible.
¶ 25 We conclude that the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s
postconviction petition, as defendant failed to show that he was arguably prejudiced by defense
counsel’s decision not to move to sever the charges. See People v. Coats, 2021 IL App (1st)
181731, ¶ 26 (as both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel must be
satisfied, courts may resolve an ineffectiveness claim in a postconviction petition by reaching just
the prejudice prong).
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Jefferson County’s dismissal of
the defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
10