People v. Copeland , 2024 IL App (4th) 240612-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240612-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is July 12, 2024
NO. 4-24-0612
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Winnebago County
MARCUS ANTONIO COPELAND JR., ) No. 24CF451
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Debra D. Schafer,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s order denying the State’s
petition for pretrial detention was not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 The State appeals the trial court’s order denying its petition to deny defendant,
Marcus Antonio Copeland Jr., pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), which was recently amended by
Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). We
affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 8, 2024, a grand jury returned three bills of indictment against
defendant for the following offenses: first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2022)),
aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), and aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-
1.2(a)(2)). The charges alleged that in February 2023, defendant and two codefendants, while
armed with a firearm, “performed acts which caused the death of Joshua Ewing, in that the
defendants, or one for whose conduct they are legally responsible, shot at Joshua Ewing,
knowing that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.”
¶5 On March 23, 2024, the State filed a verified petition seeking to deny defendant
pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).
¶6 On March 25, 2024, the trial court conducted a detention hearing. The State began
by submitting the 47-page report of Detective Nolan Walker that detailed the year-long
investigation he conducted into the shooting death of Ewing. The report was a summary of the
investigative steps taken, witnesses interviewed, and physical evidence recovered during the
course of the murder investigation. The State then orally presented the most relevant information
from that report as its proffer for why defendant should be denied pretrial release.
¶7 In response, defense counsel noted that defendant was “barely mentioned in the
entirety of the proffer.” Counsel stated, “While the charges do pass probable cause, there is no
direct involvement of my client’s involvement even from the proffer offered by the State
presently before the Court.” Based on the “rather slender” evidence of defendant’s participation,
counsel focused on defendant’s lack of criminal history, his ties to the community, and the
conditions of release that would ensure the safety of the community. The trial court asked the
State why no set of conditions could be imposed that would allow defendant to be released, and
the State answered by pointing out the shooting occurred during daylight hours on a public road,
which resulted not only in Ewing’s death but also a four-car accident after Ewing was shot while
driving.
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¶8 After hearing the proffers and arguments of the State and defense counsel, the
trial court took a brief recess to review Walker’s report. When the case was recalled, the court
gave its ruling, stating as follows:
“I’ve considered the arguments of counsel, the evidence that’s been presented, the
proffers, the pretrial service report, risk assessments, and the defendant’s criminal
history. I have a lot of concerns about this. It is a circumstantial link. There are no
allegations that [defendant] made any statements relating to this. There are some
veiled statements by codefendant pointing fingers in the direction of [defendant].
There is probable cause. I can’t find at this time that there’s clear and convincing
evidence and consequently I have to release him. That is as a result of this offense
and what I’m being held to. So that concerns me a lot, [defendant], because
there’s probable cause but the findings that I’m required to make, I don’t feel that
I can make at this time. You, however, are going to have to follow some fairly
strict requirements.”
¶9 The trial court then detailed the conditions of release it was imposing on
defendant.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 The State appeals, primarily arguing that the trial court erred by ruling that the
State had not proved defendant’s commission of a detainable offense by clear and convincing
evidence despite finding probable cause. In support of its argument, the State relies on the
special concurrence in People v. Townes, 2024 IL App (4th) 231274-U, ¶¶ 41-57 (DeArmond, J.,
concurring), in which our distinguished colleague thoughtfully explained why he would have
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held that section 110-6.1(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022)) requires only a
showing of probable cause by the State that a defendant committed a detainable offense. The
special concurrence interpreted the clear and convincing standard mentioned in that section as
applying only to whether the offense was detainable. Townes, 2024 IL App (4th) 231274-U,
¶ 48.
¶ 13 This court recently stated the applicable law and standard of review for detention
decisions under the Act in People v. Minssen, 2024 IL App (4th) 231198, ¶ 17, in which we
wrote the following:
“On appeal following a detention hearing, we apply the abuse-of-
discretion standard of review to the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence
presented. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. However, ‘[w]e
review issues of statutory construction de novo.’ People v. Jones, 2023 IL App
(4th) 230837, ¶ 13. Our objective when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and
effectuate the legislature’s intent. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 13. In
construing a statute, ‘we “may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the
evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.” ’ Jones, 2023 IL App (4th)
230837, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45). Although the
most reliable indication of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of
the statute’s language, we view the statute in its entirety. Jones, 2023 IL App
(4th) 230837, ¶ 13.”
¶ 14 Section 110-6.1(e)(1) of the Code provides that “[a]ll defendants shall be
presumed eligible for pretrial release, and the State shall bear the burden of proving by clear and
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convincing evidence that: *** the proof is evidence or the presumption great that the defendant
has committed an offense listed in subsection (a).” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022).
¶ 15 Although we believe the special concurrence of our distinguished colleague
presents a thoughtful analysis and interpretation of section 110-6.1(e), we ultimately conclude
that (1) the plain language of subsection (e) requires the State to present clear and convincing
evidence that “the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed” a
detainable offense (id.) and (2) this standard is higher than the probable cause standard
mentioned in subsection (b) (id. § 110-6.1(b)). See Minssen, 2024 IL App (4th) 231198, ¶ 21
(“ ‘Where the legislature uses certain words in one instance and different words in another,
different results were intended.’ ”) (quoting People v. Williams, 335 Ill. App. 3d 596, 599-600
(2002)). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not apply an incorrect burden of proof
at the detention hearing.
¶ 16 In addition to challenging the burden of proof applied by the trial court, the State
also briefly contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering the defendant released on
conditions. However, the record demonstrates that the court was very concerned about this case
and made a careful, individualized assessment of defendant and the necessary conditions of his
release. Accordingly, we conclude that the court appropriately exercised its discretion when
denying the State’s petition to detain.
¶ 17 Finally, the State filed a motion to extend the deadline for a decision from this
court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(8) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), and we took that
motion with the case. We now deny that motion as moot.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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¶ 20 Affirmed.
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