People v. Corbin , 2024 IL App (1st) 240852-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 240852-UFourth Division
Filed July 11, 2024
No. 1-24-0852B
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County
)
v. No. 24-MC1-10102501
)
EMANUEL CORBIN, ) The Honorable William Fahy,
) Judge, presiding.
Defendant-Appellant.
)
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The order denying pretrial release was affirmed where the State met its burden of
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant’s release would pose
a threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community and where the
strength of the State’s proffer was not significantly diminished by the defendant’s
argument that the evidence against him might be susceptible to suppression.
¶2 Defendant, Emanuel Corbin, appeals from an order denying him pretrial release in
accordance with section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1
(West 2022)). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Corbin was arrested in April 2024 and charged by complaint with being an armed habitual
criminal (see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2024)) and violating a Chicago ordinance prohibiting
No. 1-24-0852B
carrying or possessing high-capacity magazines (see Chicago Mun. Code § 8-20-085(a) (2024)). 1
At his initial appearance after his arrest, the State filed a petition for pretrial detention alleging that
Corbin poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community.
¶5 At the hearing, the State proffered the following account of the charged offense:
“On April 10, 2024, at approximately 4 p.m. at the 1100 block of North
Harding Street in Chicago, *** [o]fficers were on routine patrol when they
observed this defendant walking westbound on Division approaching
Harding. Officers further observed defendant’s left jacket pocket to be
weighted [sic] down by a heavy object and the imprint of an extended
firearm magazine shape in his hoodie pocket.
As the defendant became aware of the [officers’] presence[,] this
defendant began to scan the area. Believing the defendant to be armed with
an illegal firearm[,] officers exit[ed] the vehicle to conduct an investigatory
stop of the defendant. As the officers exited the vehicle[,] the defendant
immediately began to flee southbound on Harding. After a brief foot
pursuit[,] officers were able to detain the defendant in the back of 1115
North Harding Avenue.
Officers conducted a protective pat down of the defendant in the area of
the originally observed weighted down object. Officers felt a hard metal L
shape[d] object consistent with a firearm. Officers subsequently recovered
the firearm out of defendant’s left jacket pocket[,] which was a Ruger 380
LCP[,] which was loaded with an extended magazine containing live rounds
and one live round in the chamber.
1
While this appeal was pending, the State filed a superseding indictment under case number
24-CR-0451601 charging Corbin with being an armed habitual criminal, unlawful use or
possession of a weapon by a felon (see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2024)), and two counts of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (see id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5); (a)(1), (a)(3)(C)).
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No. 1-24-0852B
Officers inquired whether defendant had possessed a valid FOID or
Conceal[ed] Carry [License,] which the defendant indicated that he did not.
Defendant was placed into custody.”
¶6 The State then proffered Corbin’s criminal history. As a juvenile, he was adjudicated
delinquent in 1997 for committing armed robbery and, after violating probation, was sentenced to
the Department of Juvenile Justice. Between 2002 and 2008, he was convicted six times for
possessing a controlled substance or for manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance. In
three of those cases, he was sentenced to probation. All three times, he violated the original
sentence of probation and, in two of them, was ultimately sentenced to prison. He received prison
sentences for the other three drug convictions. During that period, in 2005, he was also convicted
of aggravated battery of a police officer. In 2018, he was once again convicted of manufacturing
or delivering a controlled substance, and he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Most
recently, in 2022, he was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, with the aggravating factor
being strangulation. He had finished his parole term on February 14, 2024—less than two months
before the charged offense. In addition to his felony history, Corbin’s record included two
convictions for nonviolent misdemeanors and a pair of bond forfeitures.
¶7 The State argued that Corbin committed the detainable offense of being an armed habitual
criminal based on his prior felony convictions. The State also argued that Corbin posed a real and
present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community because (1) he was a
convicted felon who, despite having recently been released from parole, was carrying a firearm in
disregard of the law, (2) he fled from the scene to avoid criminal charges, and (3) he possessed a
loaded firearm with an extended magazine. The State also argued that no condition or combination
of conditions could mitigate the risk that Corbin poses to the community. It highlighted that Corbin
had been found guilty of committing at least three violent felonies, including the conviction for
domestic battery for which he had been serving a sentence until less than two months earlier, and
it also noted that, in four previous cases, he had been found in violation of probation conditions
that had been set by the court.
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¶8 According to a representative from pretrial services, Corbin scored a 4 for new criminal
activity and a 3 for failure to appear on a public safety assessment, leading to a recommendation
of release on level two pretrial supervision.
¶9 The defense first argued that the State had not shown that the proof was evident and the
presumption great that Corbin had committed a detainable offense because the gun was likely the
fruit of a fourth amendment violation. Counsel argued that the heavy object seen by the officers
could have been any number of things and that Corbin’s response to the officers’ arrival—looking
around the area and then fleeing—did not suggest consciousness of guilt. Because the officers
were in an unmarked vehicle and the proffer did not state whether they were in uniform, displayed
badges, or said anything about making a stop, counsel argued, Corbin may well have been acting
out of concern for his safety, not fear of apprehension. The defense next argued that, because
Corbin did not brandish the gun or even try to grab it from his pocket, his release pending trial
would not pose a real and present threat to any other person’s safety. Counsel further noted that,
despite its length, Corbin’s criminal record included only three violent offenses and that he had not
been flagged for new violent criminal activity. Finally, the defense argued that any threat could be
addressed through conditions of release, emphasizing that there were no allegations that Corbin
has ever violated electronic or GPS monitoring, and argued that, given the length of time that had
passed since Corbin’s last probation violation, counsel believed that he could abide by conditions
of release. Defense counsel also proffered that Corbin was employed full-time at a hospital, served
as a caregiver for his paralyzed uncle, and provided for his children.
¶ 10 After hearing the parties’ proffers and arguments, the court entered its findings. First, it
found that the State’s proffer showed that the proof was evident and the presumption great that
Corbin had committed the offense of being an armed habitual criminal. It noted that it had
considered the potential fourth amendment issue raised by the defense, but it explained that,
“without hearing more,” it was “difficult to really make any determination” about it. Second, based
on Corbin having only recently completed his parole after his conviction for an aggravated
domestic battery that involved strangulation and the fact that he was running from police while
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carrying a loaded gun with an extended magazine in the late afternoon, creating a dangerous
situation for himself, the officers, and members of the public who might be in the vicinity, the court
found that Corbin’s release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of others. Third, the
court found that no set of release conditions could mitigate that threat. It acknowledged the
mitigating facts proffered by the defense, but it explained that Corbin’s criminal history provided
“ten reasons why this defendant should never be near a firearm let alone a firearm like this” and
that electronic monitoring would not prevent Corbin from committing violent crimes or possessing
dangerous weapons with extended magazines. Having found that the State had met its burden, the
court granted the petition to detain.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, Corbin challenges the trial court’s findings that his release would pose a real
and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community and that no conditions
of release could mitigate that threat. He also argues that the trial court did not properly consider
whether the evidence against him would be subject to suppression on fourth amendment grounds.
¶ 13 Under recent amendments to our state’s pretrial-release statutes, all defendants are eligible
for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2024). Even in circumstances where pretrial release
may be denied, there is a presumption in favor of release, which the State has the burden of
overcoming by clear and convincing evidence. Id. §§ 110-2(c), 110-6.1(a), (e). In cases where the
State seeks the denial of pretrial release on the basis of dangerousness, it must prove three
propositions by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is evident and the presumption
great that the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) that the defendant poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, and (3) that no set of release conditions can mitigate that threat. Id.
§ 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). “Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind
of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of
Human Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74.
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¶ 14 The standard for reviewing the trial court’s findings is not yet settled, but most published
decisions utilize the manifest-weight standard, the abuse-of-discretion standard, or some
combination of those two. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 21 (collecting cases). A
finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when “the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.”
People v. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 17. A trial court abuses its discretion by making a
decision that “is arbitrary, unreasonable, or fanciful” or by adopting a position that “no reasonable
person would have taken.” Id. ¶ 18. Some justices (including the author of this decision) have
taken the position that, given the importance of the fundamental liberty interest at stake, orders
denying pretrial release should be reviewed de novo except to the extent they are based on findings
of historical fact. People v. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 137 (Ellis, J., concurring). For
the purpose of this appeal, we do not need to decide which of these approaches to the standard of
review is correct. Whether reviewed deferentially or de novo, we find no error in the trial court’s
decision to deny Corbin pretrial release.
¶ 15 We agree with the trial court that the State’s proffer showed, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Corbin’s release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person or
persons or the community. As to the charged offense, the State’s proffer disclosed that Corbin,
whose previous felony convictions barred him from possessing a firearm, was caught carrying not
just any gun but a loaded semiautomatic handgun that was illegally equipped with an extended
magazine. The point of an extended magazine is to allow a shooter to fire more rounds before
needing to reload, so it is an easy inference that Corbin was anticipating the need to rapidly fire an
unusually high number of bullets, threatening the safety of both the intended target and any
bystanders in the vicinity. That threat was not negated by the fact that he chose not to brandish the
gun when running from the police. See 725 ILCS 5/10-6.1(g)(7) (West 2024) (enumerating
possession or access to a weapon as a factor relevant to determining dangerousness). Corbin’s
recent conviction for aggravated domestic violence underscores the danger his mere possession of
a gun poses to others. See, e.g., United States v. Rahimi, No. 22-915, 602 U.S. ____, slip op. at 5-6
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(June 21, 2024) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the especial danger posed by domestic
abusers with access to guns).
¶ 16 We also agree with the trial court’s determination that no set of release conditions could
mitigate the threat Corbin’s release would pose. The State’s proffer showed that he has a history
of violating probation conditions, demonstrating his willingness to disregard any condition the
court might set. Between that track record, the practical difficulty of detecting and acting on any
violations of release conditions meant to guard against his possession of deadly weapons, and the
severe—if not fatal—consequences should the threat he poses come to fruition, we find no error
in the trial court’s determination that no set of release conditions would be adequate under the
circumstances of this case.
¶ 17 Lastly, Corbin argues that, in finding that the proof was evident and the presumption great
that he committed the charged offense, the trial court failed to “give[] proper weight” to the
possibility that the evidence against him was acquired through violating his fourth amendment
rights. Again, we perceive no error. Although the trial court may not entertain suppression motions
during detention hearings, “evidence that proof of the charged crime may have been the result of
an unlawful search or seizure, or both, *** is relevant in assessing the weight of the evidence
against the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(6) (West 2024). Here, according to the State’s
proffer, the police officers’ encounter with Corbin was triggered by their observation of “the
imprint of an extended firearm magazine shape in his hoodie pocket,” which, if true, would give
rise to a reasonable belief that Corbin was violating a city ordinance banning extended magazines.
See People v. Page, 2024 IL App (1st) 220830, ¶¶ 28, 30 (recognizing that the violation of a county
ordinance barring possession of large-capacity magazines can provide probable cause for a search
of a car). Neither party proffered any facts to counter that representation, so we agree with the trial
court that the theoretical possibility that the officers violated Corbin’s fourth amendment rights did
not significantly diminish the strength of the State’s proffer as to the facts of the offense. We note,
however, that our decision is based strictly on the record before us, which was developed within
“the narrow purpose and scope of the detention hearing.” People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st)
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232164, ¶ 69. Our decision does not preclude Corbin from filing a motion to suppress, and we
express no view as to the merits of any motion he may choose to file. Id.¶ 18 CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying pretrial release.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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