People v. Martinez , 2024 IL App (3d) 240232-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 240232-UOrder filed July 15, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal Nos. 3-24-0232,
) 3-24-0234
v. ) Circuit Nos. 23-CF-2190,
) 24-CF-543
)
JORGE L. MARTINEZ, ) Honorable
) David Carlson and Donald DeWilkins,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The State failed to prove that defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight
to avoid prosecution. (2) The court did not err in finding that there were no
conditions to mitigate defendant’s dangerousness
¶2 Defendant, Jorge L. Martinez, appeals his pretrial detention, arguing the State failed to
prove he had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, and the court erred in granting
the State’s petition where there were conditions to mitigate his dangerousness. We affirm in part
and reverse in part.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant, Jorge L. Martinez, was indicted on January 4, 2024, in case number 23-CF-
2190 with two counts of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (Class 3) (625
ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(4), (b) (West 2022)). A warrant was issued for his arrest. Defendant was then
charged on March 21, 2024, in case number 24-CF-543 with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver (Class X) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2022)), two counts of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (Class 1 and Class 4) (id. § 402(a)(2)(A), (c)), three counts of
aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (Class 3) (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(2),
(a)(3), (b) (West 2022)), and reckless driving (Class 4) (id. § 11-503(a)(1), (b-1)). Defendant was
arrested, and the State filed verified petitions to deny pretrial release in each case under section
110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).
¶5 A. 23-CF-2190
¶6 In 23-CF-2190, the State alleged that defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to
avoid prosecution. The factual basis provided that officers were conducting general surveillance.
They observed a subject enter a black Sonata. They saw it pull out and observed that it had no rear
registration light. They followed the vehicle, which made a right turn without stopping at the stop
sign. They attempted to conduct a stop on the vehicle. The vehicle took off, ignoring two stop
signs and a stop light. Their investigation revealed the car was registered to defendant’s mother.
They reviewed a photograph of defendant and identified him as the subject.
¶7 A hearing was held on March 22, 2024. The State provided the factual basis and argued
that defendant posed a risk of willful flight to avoid prosecution, based on the fact that he was
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charged with aggravated fleeing and eluding in two separate cases. Defense counsel stated that
defendant had transportation to work and would abide by court orders. The court detained
defendant, stating,
“By clear and convincing evidence I find that [defendant] poses a threat to
individuals, to the community at large and quite frankly to society as a whole. Some
of the allegations set forth in the petition include not just the idea that he, in this
Court’s opinion, fled from the police and was on pretrial release for fleeing from
the police, but that he also hurt an 11 year old child in the process. And it appears
that—I think it would be important to indicate on the record some of the issues set
forth. And that includes that he traveled at a high rate of speed, swerving in and out
of traffic and went airborne over the railroad crossing at 4:30 p.m. on a Tuesday
afternoon, while allegedly, but based upon the petition, carrying in his vehicle, that
he said wasn’t his, what’s purported to be 27 grams of rock cocaine, 9.8 grams of
field-tested positive cannabis and 44 blue pills that will either come back as
oxycodone, hydrochloride or fentanyl, once a confirmatory test is done.”
¶8 Counsel pointed out that defendant was not on pretrial release in this case when committing
another offense, but just had an outstanding warrant. The court stated that defendant did have a
prior aggravated fleeing and eluding conviction. The State asked whether the court was also
finding that defendant posed a flight risk and the court stated, “Yes.”
¶9 B. 24-CF-543
¶ 10 As to 24-CF-543, the State alleged that defendant committed a felony that involved the
threat or infliction of great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement and his release
posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. The factual basis
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provided that on November 1, 2023, officers observed defendant disregard a red light. Defendant
then traveled at a high rate of speed, swerved in and out of traffic, and “went airborne over a
railroad crossing.” The officers activated their emergency lights and attempted to catch up to the
vehicle. Officers observed that defendant crashed into a fence on the lawn of a cemetery.
Defendant exited the vehicle and began running. He was eventually taken into custody after falling
to the ground.
¶ 11 Officers learned that during the crash, defendant struck an 11-year-old pedestrian.
Defendant also crashed into another vehicle. On the passenger floorboard of the vehicle driven by
defendant was a large plastic bag containing multiple small clear plastic baggies with a white rock-
like substance, which tested positive for cocaine and weighed 27 grams. There were 44 blue pills
stamped “M30”, which were likely oxycodone, and 9.83 grams of cannabis. Defendant stated that
he thought the officers were his enemies, and he did not want to be shot at so he took off. He
denied ownership of the drugs and stated the vehicle was not his. Defendant was not the registered
owner of the vehicle, but the owner was the same individual who owned the vehicle he used to
flee in a prior case. A pretrial risk assessment indicated that defendant was a Level 3 risk, with
Level 6 being the highest level of risk. Defendant’s prior convictions included leaving the scene,
aggravated feeling the police, domestic battery, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and
unlawful possession of a handgun.
¶ 12 A hearing was held on March 21, 2024. The State provided the factual basis and
defendant’s criminal history. The State argued the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
identity of the person or persons whose safety he was believed to pose a threat, defendant’s history,
and the fact that defendant was known to possess or have access to weapons. The State said there
were no conditions that could mitigate the threat to the public. Defense counsel asked that
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defendant be released, stating that he was working, had young kids that he assisted taking care of,
and would be able to get to court without having to drive.
¶ 13 The court granted the State’s petition, finding that it met its burden by clear and convincing
evidence. The court stated that defendant committed a detainable offense and posed a real and
present threat to the safety of the community. The court said it then had to make a determination
as to whether there were conditions that could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of
the community. The court stated,
“The Court finds the State has met their burden by clear and convincing evidence
for the following reasons: The nature and circumstance of the offense charged. Let
the record reflect I am not taking into consideration Counts, 3, 4 and 5 which are
the Aggravated Fleeing and Eluding because I did not find [probable cause]. So I
don’t believe at this time that would be appropriate to consider that. But what the
Court does have in front of us is Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Deliver, a Class-X felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
Class-1 felony, which I did find [probable cause].
What the Court also finds troubling in this matter is the fact that there was
an eleven-year-old child that was struck by the defendant’s vehicle. Whether or not
the defendant fled from the police, he left the scene of the accident where the minor
child was struck and taken to the hospital and there was [sic] witnesses to that. The
defendant also in this matter, there were observations of reckless driving, that he
was driving at a high rate of speed, driving in the other land of traffic and weaving
back and forth which, clearly, is a danger to the community in regards to that, for
the facts in this matter.”
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¶ 14 The court stated that it was also taking into consideration defendant’s history and
characteristics, the age and physical condition of the minor child, and the fact that defendant was
known to possess or have access to weapons. The court stated,
“Taking all those things into account, the Court does not believe that there’s a
condition or combination of conditions that can protect not only the minor child but
the community, in general, in this matter. Based on defendant’s—I would almost
call a horrific prior driving record where the community has been put in danger on
at least three prior occasions, notwithstanding this case that I did not consider.”
One written order was filed for both cases, on which the court checked boxes.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove (1) defendant posed a high
likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution in 23-CF-2190 and (2) that no conditions could
mitigate any threat he posed in 24-CF-543. We consider factual findings for the manifest weight
of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered
for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 8. Under either
standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.¶ 17 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied
in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified
petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that
defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any
person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this
threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and
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the conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider.
Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.
¶ 18 A. 23-CF-2190
¶ 19 We agree with defendant that the State failed to prove that he posed a high likelihood of
willful flight to avoid prosecution. “Willful flight” is defined as “intentional conduct with a
purpose to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution.” Id. § 110-1(f).
“Isolated instances of nonappearance in court alone are not evidence of the risk of
willful flight. Reoccurrence and patterns of intentional conduct to evade
prosecution, along with any affirmative steps to communicate or remedy any such
missed court date, may be considered as factors in assessing future intent to evade
prosecution.” Id.
The State solely provided defendant’s charges and prior conviction for aggravated fleeing and
eluding as evidence of his likelihood of flight. This was not enough. See People v. Slaten, 2024 IL
App (2d) 240015, ¶¶ 20-22. While defendant had a fairly extensive criminal history, there was no
indication that he ever failed to appear in court. See id. ¶ 23. Therefore, we find that the court erred
in detaining defendant on 23-CF-2190.
¶ 20 B. 24-CF-543
¶ 21 We cannot say that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to find
that there were no conditions to mitigate defendant’s dangerousness in 24-CF-543. The record
available as to conditions is sufficient for our review. People v. Hodge, 2024 IL App (3d) 230543,
¶ 11. The State presented evidence as to the statutory factors, including the nature and
circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of defendant (see id. § 110-5).
Defendant had a significant criminal history, including violent offenses. He committed both of
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these cases with a few months. The court noted that defendant had a “horrific” driving record and
continued to put the community in danger. In reaching its decision, the court considered the factors
set forth in the statute. See id. Taking the evidence before us, we cannot say the court’s decision
to detain the defendant was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
¶ 24 Affirmed in part. Reversed in part.
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