People v. Murray , 2024 IL App (1st) 221101-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 221101-UFourth Division
Filed May 2, 2024
No. 1-22-1101
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County
)
v. No. 14 DV 75903 01
)
LACOLE MURRAY, ) The Honorable Laura Bertucci Smith,
) Judge, presiding.
Defendant-Appellant.
)
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We reverse the denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate her plea where the motion
was supported by the testimony of an expert in forensic clinical psychology.
¶2 LaCole Murray pleaded guilty to domestic battery (see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West
2014)) and was sentenced to one year of probation. Murray appeals from the denial of her motion
to withdraw that plea. We reverse, vacate her conviction, and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Murray was charged with domestic battery to a minor. It was alleged that on or about
August 19, 2014, Murray slapped her 16-year-old son A.M.’s head with an open hand, punched
him in the face with a closed hand, and choked him with both hands. The incident was witnessed
No. 1-22-1101
by a case worker from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The case was
eventually set for trial on March 17, 2015.
¶5 Emergency Order of Protection
¶6 The week before trial, on March 12, the parties appeared in court and defense counsel
indicated that she would not be ready for trial because, based on discovery that had been tendered
at the last court date and some other information she had received, she needed to interview two
witnesses. The court struck the trial date and set the case for a status hearing on April 1.
¶7 After the conclusion of the hearing, A.M., who had come to the courthouse with his parents,
approached the prosecutor and asked to speak to him privately. After that conversation, and after
Murray had left the courthouse to go to work, the case was recalled at the State’s request, and it
filed a petition for an emergency order of protection.
¶8 At the hearing that followed, A.M. testified that, in January 2015, Murray hit his arm twice
using a belt after discovering a paper in his book bag saying that he had received an in-school
suspension. A.M.’s father punched him in his chest and his arms and then grabbed him around the
neck and choked him until he was dizzy. The day before Murray’s court appearance (i.e. March 11),
A.M.’s father accused him of lying about the charged incident, and Murray told A.M.’s father to
tell A.M. not to lie and to tell the truth. Murray also told A.M. that, if he wanted to start a war, he
could start a war. Before coming to court that morning, A.M.’s father grabbed him by the neck
because he thought A.M. was taking too long to clean up a mess made by a dog. Also while at
home that morning, Murray “was threatening to send [him] to a mental hospital and to have [him]
locked up.” She also repeated her remark about starting a war. Then, at the courthouse, Murray
whispered to him, “[G]ame on, b***,” as she walked past him to speak to her lawyer. After that
remark, A.M. did not feel safe going home, so he spoke to the prosecutor privately. Murray’s public
defender was in the courtroom and was permitted to cross-examine A.M. He testified on cross-
examination that he did not want to live at home anymore and that he wanted to live with a friend
whose parents wanted him to live there. He denied grabbing Murray and tackling her to the ground
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during the charged incident, but he admitted pushing Murray over a couch during the January 2015
incident.
¶9 After hearing A.M.’s testimony, the court granted an emergency order of protection that
would remain in effect until the April 1 status hearing.
¶ 10 Guilty Plea
¶ 11 On April 1, 2015, Murray’s counsel informed the court that Murray would plead guilty in
exchange for a negotiated plea of one year of probation, a mental health evaluation, parenting
classes, 100 hours of community service, and a one-year order of protection prohibiting Murray
from having contact with A.M. and ordering her to stay away from him. Counsel represented that
she had “extensively” advised Murray that there were “a lot of unknown consequences to agreeing
to” the order of protection, that she would be giving up her right to ever possess a gun, and that
she would have to “report as a violent offender for 10 years.” See 730 ILCS 154/10 (West 2014)
(registration requirement under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration
Act).
¶ 12 The trial court admonished Murray in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402
(eff. July 1, 2012). During the colloquy, Murray said she understood that she was charged with
domestic battery, that she could be sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or up to 364 days
in jail, that she had a right to plead not guilty, that she had a right to a trial before a jury or a judge,
and that by pleading guilty she was giving up her right to a trial, including her rights to see, hear,
and question witnesses, present her own witnesses, and have the State prove her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. She also said she understood that her guilty plea would require her to register
“under the Violence Against Children Act [sic]” and that failing to do so would be a Class 4 felony.
When the court asked Murray whether she was pleading guilty of her own free will, she answered,
“Yes.” The State presented, as a factual basis, that the evidence at trial would show that Murray
slapped A.M. with an open hand, punched him in the face with a closed fist, and choked him with
her hands around his neck. Finding that she understood the nature of the charge and the possible
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penalties, that her plea was being given freely and voluntarily, and that a factual basis existed for
the plea, the court accepted Murray’s plea and found her guilty of domestic battery.
¶ 13 The matter proceeded immediately to sentencing, and both sides rested on the plea
agreement. The court then asked Murray if she wanted to make a statement before being sentenced.
She responded as follows:
“THE DEFENDANT: Nothing—that, I just feel that my son is
coerced, and I feel like I’m not going to win this trial because it’s been going
on—the State never protected me in the beginning when I seeked help from
them. That’s why the caseworker was there.
So I feel like I don’t have a winning—so I’m pleading guilty because I
have two other kids at home. And all of this is causing a lot of issues with
my [l]upus, my health, and everything. And it’s being taken away from my
other two kids and they don’t deserve it. So if my son doesn’t want contact
with me, I give up. If he doesn’t want me to fight for his education and fight
for him, I give up.
So I’m guilty for that. And I accept my punishment. I accept my plea,
and I’m guilty. I’m guilty for loving my child. Wanting my child to be in a
great school. Wanting my child to do his all in school and be successful and
productive in this world that black men is hard to strive in [sic]. I’m guilty
for that. So I’m guilty. I’m guilty.”
Murray’s statement prompted the following exchange with the court:
“THE COURT: Well, okay. You have—this is obviously your
opportunity to say whatever you would like to say. You certainly—and you
can plead guilty for whatever reason you wish to plead guilty. From what
you said to me, it certainly sounds to me, like, you feel you may have some
sort of defense to this case. I don’t know if that’s true or not.
THE DEFENDANT: I’m tired.
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THE COURT: But if you choose to take the State’s offer and plead
guilty, you can do that for whatever reason you want to do that. And if
you’re choosing to do that today, that’s fine. I will accept your plea. But you
understand, I’ve already gone through these rights, that you do have a right
to have a trial and hold the State to prove the case beyond a reasonable
doubt. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: No, the State has failed me already so—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Could I just have a minute?
THE COURT: Ma’am, see when you say that, when you say the State,
I’m talking about the State that’s prosecuting this case. The State’s
Attorney’s Office right now on this case. All right?
THE DEFENDANT: I’m pleading. I’m pleading. I don’t—
(Brief pause.)
THE COURT: Okay. So the one thing that I do want to say, is you
understand that, you know, having a relationship with your son and any sort
of contact with him is completely different from pleading guilty to a
domestic battery charge to him.
THE DEFENDANT: That’s why this is going on because my son
doesn’t want to live[1], I understand.
THE COURT: But you understand that—you understand that what
we’re—I went through everything with you, I read you the charge?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: So you understand that we are dealing here today with
the charge that you were charged with domestic battery to your son?
1
Both the context of the case and her brief suggest that Murray was referring to her son’s desire
not to live with her, not a wish to be dead.
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THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: And I understand there’s also an agreement to this
Order of Protection, but regardless of that Order of Protection, this is—and
in the contact or no contact with the child, that this, as I said, is a plea to the
domestic battery charge.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: The Class A Misdemeanor. As I’ve already said to you
through all of the admonishments I’ve given you. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: All right. So is there anything else you want to say
before I sentence you?
THE DEFENDANT: No.”
In accordance with the plea bargain, the court then sentenced her to one year of probation and
entered a plenary order of protection that was effective for one year and, among other things,
ordered Murray to stay away from and not contact A.M. and prohibited her from visiting his school
or residence.
¶ 14 Original Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
¶ 15 About two weeks after the plea, on April 13, plea counsel appeared in court for Murray to
ask for an order that would allow her to travel to Indiana for medical appointments. During the
proceeding, counsel disclosed that, because the Calumet City Police Department did not provide a
way to register as a violent offender against youth, Murray had been forced to comply with her
registration requirement by registering as a sex offender, which could take as many as 60 days to
get corrected in the state’s database.
¶ 16 On April 28, Murray, with assistance of counsel, filed a timely motion to withdraw her plea
of guilty and vacate the judgment. The motion alleged first that, on the day she pleaded guilty,
Murray had been “[p]hysically ill as well as mentally ill” as a consequence of learning that, after
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her previous appearance in court, the State had obtained an ex parte emergency order of protection
against her at the request of her son, who did not want to have any further contact with her. It
alleged that, due to her “acute[]” lupus and the “emotional distress over the loss of her child,”
Murray did not “fully comprehend” that she had a right to trial or a right to a hearing on a
permanent order of protection. Second, the motion alleged that Murray did not fully understand
the implications of her plea, including what it would mean to register as a violent offender and
how that registration could impact her life, and that she would not have pleaded guilty “[h]ad she
fully been advised of that by counsel.” Third, the motion alleged that Murray had a meritorious
defense to the charge based on self-defense, which would be supported by evidence showing her
son’s aggressive nature and previous instances of physical aggression against her. Along with the
motion, counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate stating that she had consulted with Murray to
ascertain her contentions of error in the plea of guilty, examined the court file and the transcript of
the plea hearing, and prepared the motion to withdraw. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Feb. 16, 2013).
¶ 17 On June 29, 2015, a hearing was held on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Murray
testified on direct examination that she was not in her “right mind” on the day she pleaded guilty.
She explained that, as a result of A.M. being “taken away from” her after the previous court date,
she became very emotional and experienced a lupus flare-up that required her to go to the hospital.
Murray testified that, when she entered her guilty plea, she did not understand the magnitude of
her obligation to register as a violent offender against youth, including that it could have an effect
on her career in accounting and finance. Murray also testified that the possibility of raising self-
defense was only mentioned “[a]t the last minute” and that she did not “fully” understand that she
might have a meritorious defense. On cross-examination, Murray elaborated on her career
concerns, testifying that she had not realized that being on the registry might cause her to lose her
job—and thus her ability to support her children, including A.M.—once her employer conducted
a thorough background check before transitioning her to a permanent role. When she testified that
she was not sure whether her attorney fully understood the registration obligation and that she felt
her attorney had not “properly educated” her about it, the court construed her to be claiming that
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she had been denied the effective assistance of counsel, so it paused the proceedings and continued
the hearing pending the appointment or assignment of a new attorney.
¶ 18 Modification of the Order of Protection
¶ 19 At a court appearance related to her probation in early August 2015, Murray informed the
court that A.M. had been sent to, and then kicked out of, “Lincoln Challenge” and had nowhere to
live because her uncle, with whom A.M. had been living, was refusing to take him back in. On
August 19, plea counsel—who was still representing Murray on all matters other than the motion
to withdraw the plea—filed an emergency motion to modify the order of protection. According to
the motion and to statements made by counsel in court, since the order of protection’s entry, A.M.
had lived first with Murray’s grandparents and then with her uncle before being sent to the Lincoln
Challenge in Rantoul. On July 26, he left the Lincoln Challenge and went to a hospital before
going to Murray’s home, where he spent the night. Murray’s uncle was now refusing to take A.M.
back in, and his whereabouts were unknown, although Murray believed he was living with a friend.
Murray had contacted DCFS, who had informed her that it could not help her locate A.M. or ensure
that he was being housed. The motion also alleged that A.M. had contacted Murray online and in
person at some point after the order of protection was entered and that he had returned to Murray’s
home at least once since spending the night there on July 26.
¶ 20 The court held a hearing on the motion to modify the order of protection on September 9.
Murray called A.M., who testified that he did not want the order of protection to be in place, that
he was not afraid of Murray or his father, and that he wanted to live with Murray and for her to be
able to go to his school. On cross-examination, A.M. testified that he had been living at home with
his parents for about two weeks and that there had been no incidents or problems. In response to a
question from the court, A.M. explained why he had changed his mind about living with his
parents:
“Q. Okay. So what made you decide—why did you change your
mind? Why, why do you now feel like you can be safe in the house?
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A. I talked to my parents, and they’re the only people that can really
take care of me until I’m 18.
And I don’t want this—I’ve never wanted none of these charges against
my mom. At the time I didn’t—I didn’t want to live with her because I
wanted to do my own thing and stay with my friend, but now I see that’s not
the best choice, and they’re the only people that can really take care of me.
I really—really have my choice and interests or whatever if that make
sense—
Q. No, it makes sense. So you realize that it’s not easy to be out on
your own as a 17 year old?
A. Yes.
¶ 21 The court inquired about DCFS’s involvement, and the assistant state’s attorney stated that
DCFS had closed its investigation in December 2014 after finding that, despite an indication of
abuse, the home was safe for A.M. “with minimal parental competency.” Based on that finding
and A.M.’s testimony, the court struck the terms of the order of protection ordering Murray to stay
away from A.M., not contact him, and not visit his school or residence, but the order still prohibited
physical abuse, harassment, interference with personal liberty, and stalking.
¶ 22 Amended Motion to Withdraw the Plea
¶ 23 In June 2016, new counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the
judgment. The amended motion alleged that Murray’s plea was not knowing and voluntary “in that
she was physically and emotionally ill when she made her plea while also having an affirmative
defense of self-defense.” It further alleged that Dr. Joan H. Leska, Psy.D., had examined Murray
and opined that Murray’s “personal vulnerabilities and stressors surrounding her pleading guilty
significantly compromised her cognitive abilities to think clearly, rationally and with forethought,”
which meant that she “would have been unable to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary plead
guilty.” Counsel also filed a Rule 604(d) certificate specifying that she had consulted with Murray
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“to ascertain her contentions of error in the entry of the plea of guilty.” The State filed a response
arguing that the court had properly admonished Murray about her plea and that Murray’s “stress”
was not an adequate ground for permitting withdrawal. The court held a hearing on the amended
motion in August 2016.
¶ 24 The primary witness at the hearing was Dr. Leska, who the parties stipulated was an expert
in the field of forensic clinical psychology. Dr. Leska testified that she was asked to evaluate
Murray to determine whether she had the ability to enter a guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. She met with Murray for three hours to obtain her psychosocial, medical, and
psychiatric history, to evaluate Murray’s psychosocial and emotional functioning at the time of the
plea, and to investigate other stressors that may have been present in Murray’s life. She also spoke
to plea counsel, reviewed contemporaneous medical records, and read the transcript from the plea
hearing.
¶ 25 Dr. Leska identified several “psychosocial stressors” that were affecting Murray when she
pleaded guilty. The first was Murray’s arrest and subsequent prosecution for domestic battery. Not
only was the charge a serious one, but she had never before been involved with the criminal justice
system. The second was the prospect of enhanced charges. In the months after her arrest, Murray
had participated in services as directed by DCFS and believed that she would be able to “plea for
probation.” That expectation was upset in January 2015 when her attorney told her that the State
“wanted something else,” which Murray understood to mean filing more serious charges against
her. The third was the events of March 12, 2015, about three weeks before the plea. Murray was
already upset when she arrived at court because A.M. had been behaving aggressively and calling
her names at home. She was further upset when, in the hallway outside the courtroom, she got into
a heated argument with the prosecutor and accused him of behaving unethically. 2 When A.M. was
2
According to plea counsel, she advised Murray after the argument that the State might pursue
more serious charges. It is not clear whether Murray misremembered the date when counsel
advised her about the prospect of enhanced charges or whether the subject came up on two
separate occasions.
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taken away to a private room, Murray became so angry that she left the courthouse against the
advice of her attorney, saying that she needed to go to work. According to Murray, these events
overwhelmed her and left her feeling helpless. She told Dr. Leska that she “just wanted to give up
and die.” By that point, she was having difficulty sleeping and eating, she was moody and irritable,
and she felt like a failure. She began considering whether she should give up on A.M.—which she
equated with no longer fighting in court—so she could focus on her other children.
¶ 26 As part of her evaluation, Dr. Leska also spoke to plea counsel about Murray. According
to plea counsel, at the start of the representation, Murray seemed to be organized, focused, credible,
and a good self-advocate. Throughout the representation, Murray would frequently express feeling
shocked, disturbed, and disappointed by the system. Murray was also prone to losing her temper,
generally in response to some action taken by DCFS, which would prompt her to either start
arguing with counsel or simply walk out of the room. Murray was often in bed when counsel called
her, which Murray attributed to her lupus being aggravated by stress. Plea counsel also told Dr.
Leska about what transpired on the day of Murray’s guilty plea. The matter had been set for status
that day, but the State communicated a plea offer to counsel. Counsel passed the offer along to
Murray and advised her to reject it, but Murray made up her mind to take the offer and plead guilty.
She dismissed counsel’s efforts to discuss the plea—including its consequences—and refused to
talk to counsel about other options she had. According to counsel, it was as though Murray was
not hearing what she was saying. Instead, Murray was preoccupied with talking about what DCFS
was saying about her, the State being against her, and how the system had failed her.
¶ 27 Dr. Leska also testified that she had reviewed medical records documenting Murray’s
hospital visits around the time of her plea. The records confirmed that she had been undergoing
treatment for lupus at Rush University Medical Center since 2012. During a follow-up visit on
March 17, 2015 (after the emergency order of protection was issued but before the guilty plea),
Murray complained of fatigue, anxiety, and shortness of breath. There were indications in the
records that Murray had visited the emergency room at some point in March or April 2015, but
there were no details or records from that visit. The records of Murray’s visit on April 28, 2015,
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included a physician’s note stating that she was prone to experiencing significant—and sometimes
disproportionate—anxiety. The doctor prescribed her an antidepressant and advised her to follow
up with her primary care physician for antianxiety medication.
¶ 28 Dr. Leska testified that, based on her evaluation, she concluded that the stressors present in
Murray’s life at the time of her guilty plea “had affected her emotionally to the point where she
was overwhelmed and anxious,” which “impaired her cognitive abilities so that she was unable
to *** knowingly and intelligently plead guilty.” She explained that “there were really an
extraordinary number of stressors that were going on in Ms. Murray’s life at the time,” which
“were negatively affecting her emotionally and thus cognitively.” She noted that Murray’s
cognitive impairment during that time period was evident in the medical record, her general
behavior, and the transcript of the plea hearing, and she explained that the impairment was caused
not only by the stressors themselves but by Murray’s “own personal vulnerabilities in terms of how
she manages stress and how she copes with her emotions.” Dr. Leska therefore opined that, given
the totality of the circumstances, Murray “would not have been able to knowingly and intelligently
plead guilty to the offense of domestic battery” on the day of the plea hearing.
¶ 29 On cross-examination, Dr. Leska stated that she had testified as an expert witness in about
450 cases, the majority of which were criminal. She acknowledged that she had never testified for
the State. Dr. Leska agreed that she had not diagnosed Murray with any mental illnesses or
deficiencies, and she described Murray’s apparent intellectual functioning as average. When asked
whether Murray had not been truthful during the plea hearing when she said she understood the
plea admonishments, Dr. Leska disagreed and explained that Murray’s answers to yes-or-no
questions were less probative of her actual state of mind than her open-ended statement in
allocution, which addressed matters that were peripheral or even irrelevant to the plea of guilty
such as her belief that her son had been coerced.
¶ 30 In rebuttal, the State called plea counsel, who testified that she usually discussed with
clients the benefits and drawbacks of any plea offers and the consequences of going to trial versus
pleading guilty and believed that she had done so with Murray. Plea counsel also testified that, at
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the plea hearing, the court admonished Murray about her guilty plea and that Murray indicated that
she understood the admonishments.
¶ 31 After hearing argument, the trial court found that Murray had not met her burden of
justifying why she should be permitted to withdraw her plea, and it denied the motion to withdraw.
¶ 32 Appeal from Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
¶ 33 Murray appealed from the denial of her motion to withdraw and was appointed counsel,
who filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Finding that
there was a nonfrivolous argument that the trial court erred when it rejected Dr. Leska’s
uncontradicted testimony and noting that the trial court had not addressed Murray’s self-defense
claim, we denied the motion to withdraw and ordered briefing. Murray was assigned a new
attorney, who filed a brief that, in addition to raising the issue concerning Dr. Leska’s unrebutted
testimony, argued that the attorney who filed the amended motion to withdraw had not filed a
certificate in full compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Dec. 3, 2015). Without
reaching the merits of the trial court’s rejection of the motion to withdraw, we remanded for strict
compliance with Rule 604(d). People v. Murray, 2020 IL App (1st) 162748-U.
¶ 34 Motion to Withdraw on Remand
¶ 35 Following remand, a private attorney appeared for Murray and filed a new motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. The motion recited three grounds for withdrawal: (1) Murray did not
fully understand the implications of her plea, particularly the registration requirement, and would
not have pleaded guilty had plea counsel fully apprised her of the consequences; (2) Murray had a
meritorious defense of self-defense, which would be supported by evidence that A.M. behaved
aggressively and documentation showing that he had become physical with her on multiple other
occasions; and (3) based on Dr. Leska’s opinion, Murray’s plea was not knowing and voluntary.
Counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, and the State filed a brief response contending, in effect,
that the court had already rejected the same arguments.
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¶ 36 The court held a hearing on the motion on October 14, 2021. The parties stipulated to the
testimony at the 2016 hearing on the amended motion to withdraw the plea and made brief
arguments addressing Dr. Leska’s opinion. The court once again denied the motion to withdraw.
Murray now appeals.
¶ 37 ANALYSIS
¶ 38 On appeal, Murray argues that the denial of her motion to vacate her plea should be
reversed under the particular circumstances of her case, including the testimony of Dr. Leska that,
insofar as multiple stressors were negatively affecting Murray physically, emotionally, and thus
cognitively, at the time of her guilty plea, she did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
plead guilty. She also contends that the possibility of raising self-defense was only brought to her
attention “at the last minute” and, had she known she could raise that defense, she would not have
pleaded guilty.
¶ 39 A defendant who pleads guilty has no absolute right to withdraw the plea and has the burden
of justifying any request to do so. People v. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d 914, 917 (2000). Due
process, however, requires that a guilty plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily. People v.
Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 370 (1999) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969));
see U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const., art. I, § 2. A request to withdraw a guilty plea should
be granted when the plea was based on a misunderstanding of the facts or the law or on
misrepresentations by defense counsel. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 918. The defendant should
also be permitted to withdraw a plea when there is doubt as to guilt, there is a defense worthy of
consideration, or the ends of justice would be better served by having a trial. Id.¶ 40 Whether to allow the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is a decision committed to the
trial court’s discretion, and our review is for an abuse of that discretion. Id. Generally, “[a]n abuse
of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or
where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Seymour v. Collins,
2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41. Although that standard is highly deferential to the trial court’s decision, we
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are mindful that the discretion to permit or reject a request to withdraw a guilty plea “ ‘should
always be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty and in the light of the preference that is
shown by law for a trial upon the merits by a jury.’ ” People v. McKirdie, 45 Ill. 2d 300, 302 (1970)
(quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531 (1952)). “The withdrawal of the plea of guilty should
not be denied in any case where it is evident that the ends of justice will be served by permitting
the plea of not guilty in its stead.” People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367, 375 (1944); see also People v.
Latsaras, 2022 IL App (3d) 190683-U, ¶ 14 (quoting Jameson).
¶ 41 The thrust of Murray’s argument is that Dr. Leska’s uncontradicted opinion demonstrated
that her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made as she was cognitively impaired due to the
multiple stressors present in her life at the time of her plea and the impact of those stressors on her
based on her individual psychological makeup. We agree.
¶ 42 Dr. Leska testified that, at the time of her guilty plea, Murray was not able to make a
knowing and intelligent decision about whether to plead guilty. She explained that, although
Murray had been able to give appropriate answers to yes-or-no questions during the plea colloquy,
her statement in allocution revealed that “her thoughts were disorganized” and that “she was
making irrational and irrelevant statements” and “bringing in all kinds of issues that were irrelevant
to the plea.” Dr. Leska also testified that Murray’s cognitive dysfunction was the result of particular
stressors present in her life, the most recent of which was learning that her son A.M. no longer
wanted to live with her. Dr. Leska noted that, according to plea counsel, Murray reported that the
stress was aggravating her lupus symptoms, which meant that she sometimes answered counsel’s
phone calls from her bed. She also testified that records from Murray’s visits to her doctor on
March 17 and April 28, 2015—on either side of her guilty plea—reflected that she was
complaining of fatigue, anxiety, and shortness of breath, which Dr. Leska explained were physical
manifestations of the stress that Murray was under. Dr. Leska also explained that the stressors in
Murray’s life were “negatively affecting her emotionally and thus cognitively.” But it was not just
the stressful events and circumstances themselves. It was also how they interacted with Murray’s
particular psychological makeup. As noted by one of the doctors at Rush, Murray “had a propensity
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for a great deal of anxiety and sometimes it was out of proportion to what the situation may be.”
Dr. Leska explained that Murray’s cognitive abilities were “compromised” by both the
circumstances of her life and “her own personal vulnerabilities in terms of how she manages stress
and how she copes with her emotions and that sort of thing.” In other words, Murray’s unique
psychological makeup meant that the effect of those stressors on her was much greater than it
might have been for the average person. As a consequence of all of these circumstances unique to
Murray and her life, Dr. Leska concluded that she would not have been able to knowingly and
intelligently plead guilty.
¶ 43 Having reviewed the transcript of the plea hearings, we find that nothing undermines Dr.
Leska’s unrebutted opinion.
¶ 44 The State contends that Dr. Leska’s opinion should be discounted because she failed to
make a formal diagnosis of an intellectual disability, mental illness, or other psychological
condition. Even so, Dr. Leska—an expert forensic psychologist—examined Murray, evaluated the
available information from other sources about her cognitive functioning at the time of her plea
deal, and concluded in light of her training and experience that Murray’s cognitive abilities were
“compromised” at the time of her guilty plea. The State cites no authority holding that the absence
of a formal diagnosis invalidates that considered expert opinion.
¶ 45 The State also posits that, as a matter of law, psychological distress or emotional
disturbance can never lead to a defendant being unable to make a knowing and intelligent decision
to plead guilty. See People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 157-58 (2001) (depression); People v.
Bennett, 82 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600-01 (1980) (emotional upset and family pressure); People v. Jones,
74 Ill. App. 3d 243, 245-46 (1979) (emotional strain). We observe that none of the cases cited by
the State involved unrebutted expert testimony that there were significant factors preventing the
defendant from being able to enter a knowing and intelligent plea. In Bennett and Jones, the
defendants did no more than assert that their pleas were not entered knowingly and intelligently
due to stress; there is no indication that those contentions were supported by expert testimony. See
Bennett, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 598, Jones, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 245. In Jamison, the defendant’s claim that
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medication he was taking for depression muddled his thinking and rendered his plea unknowing
was supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist, but that expert witness only testified in general
about the possible effects of the medication, never examined the defendant or reviewed his medical
records, and apparently never opined as to the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the guilty
plea. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d at 148, 150. The only evidence about the defendant, specifically, came
from his treating psychiatrist, who had testified that the medication did not appear to impair the
defendant’s thinking. Id. at 146. In other words, as the court observed, “all of the psychiatric
evidence indicated that [the] defendant *** was able to comprehend the consequences of his
decision to plead guilty” (emphasis added). Id. at 157-58. The lesson to be taken from these cases
is only that it is possible to knowingly and intelligently plead guilty even when under stress. It
does not follow that there can be no circumstances under which a particular set of stressors,
combined with complicating medical or psychological characteristics or other factors, might
deprive a specific, individual defendant of the ability to knowingly and intelligently plead guilty,
which is what Dr. Leska testified happened to Murray in this case.
¶ 46 We also reject the State’s argument that Murray’s refusal to consider any other options
other than pleading guilty undermines Dr. Leska’s conclusion that Murray was not able to plead
guilty knowingly and intelligently. Plea counsel’s account of Murray’s behavior on the day of the
plea did not describe a person who had rationally resigned herself to pleading guilty. To the
contrary, she characterized Murray as being unwilling to listen to reason. Plea counsel told Dr.
Leska that Murray rejected her explicit advice not to take the plea deal and that, during their
conversations that day, Murray “was not hearing her” and “refused to discuss any other options.”
Instead, Murray was focused on “peripheral or irrelevant issues” involving DCFS, the state’s
attorney’s office, and the “system,” which she thought “had failed her.” Based on plea counsel’s
account, Dr. Leska explained that Murray “was not attending to” or “focusing on” her options in
the criminal case, which showed “that she wasn’t really capable of ” considering those options or
“rationally think[ing] about the consequences” of pleading guilty. That, in turn, obviously
supported Dr. Leska’s opinion that the various stressors affecting Murray were impairing her
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cognitive abilities to the point where she was not making a knowing and intelligent decision to
plead guilty.
¶ 47 To this point, we have focused our analysis on Dr. Leska’s opinion. We think it important
to recognize, however, that there are two other circumstances in this case that weighed in favor of
allowing Murray to withdraw her plea. First, although her motions to withdraw and her testimony
at the June 2015 hearing did not go into detail, Murray has repeatedly asserted that, were this
matter to go to trial, she might be able to defeat the charge against her by raising self-defense,
suggesting that she has a defense worthy of consideration. See Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 918.
Second, it is apparent from the record that Murray pleaded guilty without thinking through the
implications of being required to register as a violent offender against youth. In the days that
followed her guilty plea, she realized that registration could affect her employability and her
family’s economic security, and she filed a timely motion to withdraw the plea. Putting aside
whether the plea was constitutionally valid as a technical matter, it is difficult to see how the
interests of justice are served by holding Murray to a plea she entered—against the advice of
counsel!—when she had not fully contemplated its ramifications. We need not decide whether
these two circumstances would have, in and of themselves, required allowing the motion to
withdraw. These circumstances, combined with Dr. Leska’s unrebutted expert opinion, leave us
with the firm conviction that Murray should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea.
¶ 48 A plea of guilty is not valid unless “the plea was entered intelligently and with full
knowledge of its consequences.” People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 184 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S.
at 240-244). Just as importantly, when a defendant asks to withdraw a plea, the court should always
exercise its discretion in favor of innocence, liberty, and the fundamental right to hold the State to
the burden of proving its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial. See McKirdie, 45 Ill. 2d
at 302 (quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. at 531). In this case, Dr. Leska testified without
contradiction that, on April 1, 2015, Murray was not able to make the life-changing decision to
plead guilty knowingly and intelligently. Furthermore, Murray had a potentially meritorious
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defense. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, and in light of the law’s preference
for a trial on the merits, we hold that the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea was in error.
¶ 49 CONCLUSION
¶ 50 We reverse the trial court’s denial of Murray’s motion to withdraw her plea, vacate her
conviction, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 51 Reversed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.
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