In re Marriage of Parrillo , 2024 IL App (1st) 240143-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 240143-UFourth Division
Filed May 2, 2024
No. 1-24-0143
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF )
) Appeal from the
JACQUELINE PARRILLO,
) Circuit Court of Cook County
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) No. 2017 D 004618
and )
) The Honorable Abbey Fishman Romanek,
BEAU PARRILLO,
) Judge, presiding.
Respondent-Appellant. )
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concur in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The court lacked jurisdiction to consider contemnor’s interlocutory appeal of order
amending body-attachment order nunc pro tunc. Contemnor failed to show that the
trial court erred by modifying the contempt sanction to permit his release from jail
on home confinement with electronic monitoring.
¶2 In July 2023, appellant Beau Parrillo was adjudged to be in contempt of court for failing to
comply with the judgment that dissolved his marriage to appellee Jacqueline Parrillo. The trial
court ordered him committed to jail until he purged his contempt by paying Jacqueline more than
a million dollars, which represented slightly more than half of what he owed her, but stayed the
commitment to give Beau the opportunity to make the payments. When he failed to do that, the
court entered a series of body-attachment orders directing the sheriff to take him into custody. Beau
was apprehended in December 2023 and brought before the court, which entered a series of orders
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effectively permitting Beau to be released to home confinement upon paying approximately half
of the purge amount. Beau now appeals those orders. We dismiss his appeal from one of those
orders for lack of jurisdiction. Otherwise, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Jacqueline and Beau Parrillo were married from 2002 until 2020, when the Circuit Court
of Cook County entered a judgment for dissolution. Among other things, the dissolution judgment
ordered Beau to (1) make monthly payments of $7500 for child support (2) make monthly
payments of $10,000 for maintenance and spousal support, as required by the parties’ premarital
agreement, (3) make monthly payments of $100,000 to pay down the mortgage on Jacqueline’s
home, (4) maintain $10,000,000 in life insurance, and (5) transfer to Jacqueline 50% of the marital
portion of two retirement accounts that were in Beau’s name. To facilitate the transfer of the
retirement accounts, the dissolution judgment named an attorney who would prepare qualified
domestic relations orders (see 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) (2018)) and directed Beau to furnish that attorney
with any documents she requested.
¶5 Three years later, in April 2023, Jacqueline filed a pair of petitions seeking rules to show
cause why Beau should not be held in contempt for refusing to comply with the dissolution
judgment. One petition involved Beau’s ongoing financial obligations to Jacqueline. It alleged that,
in December 2022, Beau stopped making the required child-support and spousal-maintenance
payments to Jacqueline, stopped making monthly payments to pay down the mortgage, and
stopped paying the premiums on the life-insurance policies he was required to maintain. The other
petition pertained to the transfer of Jaqueline’s portion of Beau’s retirement accounts. It alleged
not only that Beau had failed to take any action to have the qualified domestic relations orders
prepared but that the accounts had been liquidated without notice to Jacqueline by his former
employer, United Automobile Insurance Company (United Auto), which is a company owned in
part by Beau along with his brother and his father. Beau filed responses in which he blamed his
failure to make support payments on the loss of his job, denied being required to maintain the
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specific life insurance policies that he had stopped paying for, and asserted that United Auto had
“unilaterally distributed” the retirement accounts upon his termination. Beau did not specify where
the distributions—which amounted to more than $1.8 million—had gone, but he claimed not to
know whether any amount had been paid to Jacqueline. The trial court entered the rules requested
by Jacqueline, and the matter proceeded to a contempt hearing on July 17, 2023. The record does
not include a transcript of the hearing, but it shows that Beau appeared through counsel, not
personally.
¶6 Following the hearing, the court entered two orders, each corresponding to one of
Jacqueline’s two petitions, finding Beau in indirect civil contempt. The first order pertained to the
retirement accounts. It found Beau in contempt for willfully failing to pay Jacqueline the sum of
$849,038.49, which represented her share of those accounts, and it ordered him to be committed
to jail until he purged the contempt by paying that sum in full, but it stayed the commitment order
until July 31. The second order pertained to Beau’s ongoing financial obligations. It found him in
contempt for willfully failing to make $1,071,636.80 in payments for child support, spousal
maintenance, the mortgage, and the life insurance premiums, and it ordered him to be committed
to jail until he purged the contempt by paying Jacqueline 20% of the past-due amount, which the
court calculated to be $214,327.22, 1 but it stayed the commitment order until August 31.
¶7 Beau did not purge his contempt as to the retirement accounts by July 31, and he also failed
to appear for the remote status hearing set for that date. The court entered an order of commitment
directing the sheriff to take Beau into custody and keep him there until he posted a cash bond of
$849,038.49, the amount of the purge. It issued a separate order of attachment for contempt
directing the sheriff to take Beau into custody and either bring him before the court to answer for
his failure to pay Jacqueline her share of the retirement accounts or to release him upon payment
of an “Individual Bond set in the amount of $849,038.49.” On August 10, the trial court issued
another attachment order that directed the sheriff to take Beau into custody to answer for his failure
1
This figure appears to be a minor miscalculation: 20% of $1,071,636.80 is $214,327.36.
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to appear in court. It authorized the sheriff to release Beau if he posted a “Cash Bond” of
$849,038.49.
¶8 In late August, Beau filed a motion to vacate or stay enforcement of the attachment orders.
The motion alleged that Beau was unable to pay the purge. It appears that the court stayed the
commitment order until at least October 5. The record does not disclose what, if anything,
happened on that date, but the court did not rule on the motion to vacate. On October 16, the court
entered an order setting the motion to vacate or stay for a status hearing on October 30 and
providing that “Beau Parrillo’s remainder and statutory interest” from the July contempt orders
would be determined on November 13.
¶9 On November 13, the court entered an order of commitment based on Beau’s failure to pay
Jacqueline $1,071,636.80 in ongoing financial obligations, setting the purge amount at
$214,327.22. It also entered an attachment order commanding the sheriff to take Beau into custody
and either bring him to court to answer for his failure to comply with the July 17 order directing
him “to pay the sum of $1,071,636.80 to Jacqueline Parrillo by August 31st, 2023” or to release
him from custody upon posting an “Individual Bond set in the amount of $214,327.22.” After a
hearing three days later, which Beau once again failed to personally attend, the court entered an
order that, among other things, noted that the attachment and commitment orders associated with
both contempt findings “remain[ed] valid and outstanding.”
¶ 10 On November 29, Beau, through counsel, filed two motions. The first sought to modify his
child-support obligations. It alleged that Beau no longer had any income as a result of being fired
by his then-employer in November 2022 and, for reasons not explained, falling into a coma for
nearly two months, leading to his hospitalization from August 14 to October 4, 2023, after which
he stayed at an inpatient rehabilitation center until November 20. It further alleged that Beau was
relying on his father for financial support. The second motion asked the court to reconsider, vacate,
or stay enforcement of the attachment orders and commitment orders associated with both
contempt findings in light of his inability to pay the purge amounts. In the event the court denied
the motion, Beau asked that it “provide 304 (a) language *** to allow an immediate appeal of the
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issues herein contained.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (authorizing appeals from
final judgments as to some, but not all, claims or parties upon a special finding by the trial court).
Two weeks later, on December 14, the court set the motion for a hearing on January 23, 2024, and
gave Jaqueline until January 11 to file a response to the motion.
¶ 11 Although the precise circumstances are not disclosed by the record, it appears that Beau
was apprehended on December 20. After learning of the situation when Beau’s attorney attempted
to file some kind of emergency motion, the trial court, acting sua sponte, entered an order that
appears to be an exact copy of the November 13 attachment order (the one associated with Beau’s
failure to meet his ongoing financial obligations) with a new file-stamp dated December 20 and
four handwritten and initialed additions or alterations, which are italicized. First, the court retitled
the order as being an “Amended Attachment for Contempt Order.” Second, the court changed the
provision for an “Individual Bond” to a “Cash Bond set in the amount of $214,327.22.” Third, the
court added a notation indicating that the order was being entered “nunc pro tunc to 11/13/23.”
Finally, in addition to the new file-stamp, the court wrote “DEC 20” over the original file-stamp
date.
¶ 12 The next morning, December 21, Beau filed an emergency motion to reduce his aggregate
bond to $500,000, asserting that he was unable to pay the full purge amounts ordered by the court
but that he had been able to put together $500,000 from family members “to be applied as a purge
amount” if the court reduced the bond. The motion also requested that, if the court denied the relief
it sought, its order include a Rule 304(a) finding.
¶ 13 When Beau was brought before the court later that day, his attorney, who had learned about
the nunc pro tunc order at some point that morning, complained that it had been entered without
notice or a motion filed by Jacqueline. The court explained that it had acted on its own initiative
and “fixed [the November 13 attachment order] because it was supposed to be a cash bond, not an
[individual] bond.” It reiterated the point during a later exchange with Jacqueline’s attorneys:
“THE COURT: *** [I]f you want to object to a hearing on this, he gets
an I bond because you did the attachment wrong. Anything else?
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[FIRST COUNSEL FOR JACQUELINE]: Your Honor, it’s not an I
bond. It’s a commitment.
THE COURT: No, it says, ‘individual cash bond.’ I read it. I fixed it for
you yesterday.
Go ahead.
***
[SECOND COUNSEL FOR JACQUELINE]: Your Honor, there was a
commitment order entered in July that required Mr. Parrillo to post 800 and
something thousand dollars.
THE COURT: On the I bond.
[COUNSEL FOR BEAU]: That the second—
THE COURT: On an I bond.
[SECOND COUNSEL FOR JACQUELINE]: On an I bond.
THE COURT: You did them wrong.
[SECOND COUNSEL FOR JACQUELINE]: There are those—
THE COURT: I fixed them for you.”
Counsel for Jacqueline later clarified that the court had only “fixed” the bond on the November 13
attachment order, not any of the orders associated with the first contempt finding:
“[FIRST COUNSEL FOR JACQUELINE]: I think that just for a
reminder of the Court, which I’m sure you’re aware of, there are two—were
two contempt orders that were entered on July 17th against Mr. Parrillo, and
the July 31st commitment order that you entered was a cash bond in the
amount of $849,038. Thereafter, the second commitment order was entered
a few months later, and that is the one that Your Honor fixed sua sponte
today from what my understanding [sic].”
¶ 14 With respect to the request for a reduced bond, Beau’s attorney noted Beau’s ongoing health
issues, which required him to remain in the ongoing care of a doctor, and remarked that he “would
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hate to see something happen to Mr. Parrillo at [the jail] which would cause an issue for not only
the county but all concerned.” Jacqueline’s attorneys argued that the court should “follow the
commitment order[s]” it had already entered. The court decided to take the middle road:
“[THE COURT:] Here’s the Court’s order for today because I—as of
yesterday, I recall that your concern was that Mr. Parrillo would disappear
again.
The order for today is $500,000 cash. The remaining amount of, I guess,
around 600—I want somebody else to do the math—is the bond—is the
remaining bond for EHM. I will be putting him on electronic home
monitoring. I don’t need him to be cared for in—at [the jail’s health-care
facility]. He should be—he may be cared for at home. He will not be gone
because he will be on electronic home monitoring. That’s the order.”
The court’s written order stated as follows:
“(1) The Respondent, Beau Parrillo, shall be remanded to the custody
of the Cook County Sheriff.
(2) The Respondent’s bond shall be modified as follows:
a) Respondent shall have a cash bond of five hundred thousand
dolla[r]s ($500,000).
b) Respondent shall have an additional cash bond in the sum of
five hundred sixty three thousand three hundred sixty five dollars
and sixty two cents ($563,365.62). Upon payment of the $500,000
cash bond, Respondent shall remain in the custody of the Cook
County Sheriff but shall be held on electronic home monitoring until
the sum of $563,365.32 cash bond is paid.”
The court also entered a form order placing Beau on electronic home monitoring. The order
provided that Beau should “not be placed on electronic home monitoring until he pays a cash bond
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of $500,000.00” and that he would remain on electronic home monitoring “until he pays
$563,365.62 cash purge amount [sic]” to the clerk.
¶ 15 At some point in the following days, Beau posted the $500,000 bond and was released on
electronic home monitoring. On December 26, the court entered an order to release the cash posted
as bond. The order recited that the court had entered two orders finding Beau in contempt and later
entered commitment orders, that “[o]n December 17 [sic], 2023, the Honorable Court modified
Beau Parrillo’s purge and set the cash bond in the amount of $500,000.00,” and that Beau had
posted the $500,000 bond. It directed the clerk to “immediately turn over the cash bond” to
Jacqueline.
¶ 16 On January 19, 2024, Beau filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing the court’s
December 20 and December 21 orders “for modification of an injunction, and any and all order(s)
leading up to and included in said orders premised on the manifest errors in the rendering of said
orders,” under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, Beau challenges the trial court’s December 20 order that amended the
November 13 attachment order nunc pro tunc, the December 21 orders that authorized his release
onto home confinement with electronic monitoring upon posting a $500,000 bond, and the
December 26 order that ordered the clerk of the court to turn the bond over to Jacqueline.
¶ 19 A. Preliminary Matters
¶ 20 We start by addressing four preliminary matters.
¶ 21 First, while this appeal was pending, Jacqueline filed a motion to dismiss for want of
appellate jurisdiction arguing that the December 20 and December 21 orders were not injunctive
in nature and therefore not appealable under Rule 307(a). Beau filed a response contending that
both orders were appealable under Rule 307(a). He reasoned that all three orders modified previous
attachment orders and argued that the body-attachment orders are injunctive in nature because they
compelled him to post a bond. We took the motion with the case. Additionally, we have an
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independent duty to assess our own jurisdiction. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). As
explained below, we find that we have jurisdiction to review the December 21 orders but not the
December 20 order, so the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
¶ 22 Second, in his briefs, Beau contends that the trial court erred when it entered the December
26 order directing the clerk to pay the $500,000 bond Beau posted to Jacqueline. We lack
jurisdiction to review that order because it was not specified in the notice of appeal. Our
jurisdiction turns on compliance with the rules. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 11. Rule
303(b)(2) requires that a notice of appeal “specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders
appealed from.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). It follows that “[a] notice of appeal
confers jurisdiction on the appellate court to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments
specifically identified in the notice.” Clark v. Gannett Co., Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 172041, ¶ 54.
Beau’s notice of appeal, which was filed on January 19, 2024, stated that he was appealing from
the December 20 and December 21 orders “and any and all order(s) leading up to and included in
said orders.” It did not indicate that he was appealing from the December 26 order, so it did not
invoke our jurisdiction to review that order. As Beau did not perfect an appeal from that order, we
will not consider his arguments that it was entered in error.
¶ 23 Third, the thrust of many of the arguments in Beau’s brief is that he lacks the ability to pay
the purge amounts ordered by the trial court. The purge amounts reflect Beau’s unsatisfied
obligations under the dissolution judgment. When it found Beau in contempt on July 17, 2023, the
trial court expressly found that he “had, and still has, the means to comply” with those obligations
and that his failure to do so was “willful and contumacious.” In other words, the trial court found
that Beau had the ability to pay what he owed. Because those findings were accompanied by a
penalty—commitment—they were immediately appealable. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Mar. 8,
2016). Under the rules, any notice of appeal was due 30 days later, on August 16. Ill. S. Ct. R.
303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017); see Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). The time for Beau to
appeal those findings has long since passed, so they are not within our scope of review in this
appeal. See Revolution Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1025 (2003). To be sure,
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circumstances may have changed since then. Indeed, based on the same arguments he makes in
this court, Beau has filed a motion to reconsider or vacate the contempt sanctions. But that motion
is still pending, so there is no order for us to review. In short, Beau’s arguments that he is unable
to pay the purge amounts are either untimely or premature. Either way, we will not address them
in this appeal.
¶ 24 Finally, Beau’s briefs contain conclusory requests for us to “enter a supervisory order to
oversee the trial court’s management of this case.” We reject that request because, in Illinois, only
the supreme court is vested with supervisory authority over other courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,
§ 16; People v. Young, 2018 IL 122598, ¶ 28 (“[T]he appellate court does not possess supervisory
authority.”).
¶ 25 B. The December 20 Order
¶ 26 We begin with the court’s December 20 order. Beau characterizes it as a modification of
the November 13 attachment order, but the order expressly states that it is a nunc pro tunc order,
not a modification. The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct clerical errors or omissions
in the record so that it accurately reflects “what was actually done before.” Wells v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 2020 IL App (1st) 190631, ¶ 43. “In other words, a nunc pro tunc order
allows the record to express, in writing, what the court actually intended to occur.” U.S. Bank
National Ass’n v. Luckett, 2013 IL App (1st) 113678, ¶ 27. So, on its face, the December 20 order
purports to do nothing more than make a clerical correction to the November 13 attachment order
to reflect that the court had actually ordered the sheriff to release Beau only if he posted a cash
bond (which would require payment in full), not an individual bond (which would not). See In re
Mar. S., 2023 IL App (1st) 231349, ¶ 37 (stating that an oral pronouncement controls over an
inconsistent written order). The record does not contain a transcript of the November 13
proceedings, so we must presume that the record would support the trial court’s designation of the
December 20 order as a clerical correction rather than a substantive modification. See Ally
Financial Inc v. Pira, 2017 IL App (2d) 170213, ¶ 30 (presuming, based on absence of report of
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proceedings or bystander report, that nunc pro tunc order was in conformity with the law and had
a sufficient factual basis). That presumption is not rebutted by the trial court’s remarks at the
December 21 hearing that it had “fixed” the orders prepared by Jacqueline’s counsel, which are
consistent with the court having corrected a clerical error made by counsel when preparing the
written order.
¶ 27 Accordingly, we must treat the December 20 order as being what it purported to be: a mere
clerical correction to the November 13 attachment order. That being the case, we lack jurisdiction
to review it. In general, we have jurisdiction to review appeals from final orders or judgments. See
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). But the nunc pro tunc order here
was not a final judgment. Consequently, we only have jurisdiction if the supreme court rules
authorize interlocutory review. EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 9. There is no
supreme court rule providing for appeals from nunc pro tunc orders as such, but there is authority
for the proposition that an appeal may be taken from a nunc pro tunc order if the underlying
judgment or order being corrected would itself be appealable. See In re Marriage of Breslow, 306
Ill. App. 3d 41, 51 (1999) (stating, in the context of an order amending a final judgment nunc pro
tunc, that “[a] nunc pro tunc order may itself properly be treated as an appealable order, because it
would be manifestly unfair to allow a party no avenue in which to seek appellate review of the
propriety of such an order”). The November 13 attachment order, though, was not itself appealable.
The rules do not specifically authorize appeals from attachment orders. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)
(eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (appeals from final judgments as to some, but not all, claims or parties);
R. 306(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders); R. 307(a) (eff. Nov.
1, 2017) (appeals as of right from interlocutory orders). A prejudgment attachment can be appealed
under Rule 304(a) if the trial court finds that there is no just reason to delay the appeal. Revolution
Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1026-27 (2003). But the trial court did not make
that finding here.
¶ 28 Beau argues that the attachment order was an appealable injunction under Rule 307(a)(1),
but attachment orders are not injunctions. Cozart v. Cozart, 258 Ill. App. 3d 848, 850 (1994). “Not
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every nonfinal order of a court is appealable, even if it compels a party to do or not do a particular
thing.” In re a Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 261-62 (1989). Typically, an order is injunctive when it
“affect[s] the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation.” Id. at
262. The November 13 body attachment, while significant for Beau’s day-to-day life, had no
impact on his and Jacqueline’s legal relationship outside of the legal proceedings themselves. It
was simply the “vehicle used to effectuate” the court’s order committing Beau to the sheriff’s
custody until he purged his contempt for not obeying the dissolution judgment. In re Marriage of
Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 75.
¶ 29 Because the attachment order was not an injunction, it was not appealable under Rule
307(a)(1), nor was it appealable under any other rule. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the
trial court’s December 20 nunc pro tunc amendment of that order, which means we must dismiss
Beau’s appeal from that order. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 251-52
(2010).
¶ 30 C. The December 21 Orders
¶ 31 That brings us to the December 21 orders. Taken together, the December 21 orders provided
for Beau to be “remanded to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff” until Beau posted a $500,000
bond, after which Beau would be “remanded into the custody of the Cook County Department of
Corrections and transferred to the supervisory authority of the Sheriff’s Electronic Monitoring
Program.” He would then remain on electronic home monitoring “until he pa[id] $563,365.62 cash
purge amount,” at which point he would be “released from” it.
¶ 32 Both parties construe these as modifications to the attachment orders, but we think they
are better understood as modifying the court’s previous orders of commitment for contempt. As
previously noted, the purpose of the body-attachment orders was to authorize the sheriff to take
Beau into custody to effectuate the orders of commitment as contempt sanctions. See Harnack,
2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 76. Hence, the attachments ordered the sheriff to “take custody” of
Beau and either “immediately bring him” before the court or “accept[] bond” as set in the order
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and “require his *** appearance in court at a specified date and time.” Once the sheriff had
followed the court’s command “to serve this writ and return it without delay,” the obligations
imposed by the attachment orders were discharged in full. The commitment orders, on the other
hand, imposed ongoing obligations on the sheriff. They ordered the sheriff to “take and keep
custody” of Beau “until he purges himself of contempt by posting” the applicable purge amount,
with the July 31 commitment order (pertaining to the retirement accounts) specifying that the purge
would take the form of a “cash bond.” 2
¶ 33 Unlike the attachment orders, the December 21 orders did not contemplate that the sheriff
would merely apprehend Beau for the purpose of ensuring his appearance in court. Instead, like
the commitment orders, the December 21 orders imposed an ongoing obligation on the sheriff to
keep Beau in custody unless and until he paid the purge amounts. In substance, then, they were
modifications of the trial court’s previous orders of commitment for contempt, not of its attachment
orders. The court’s statements on the record confirm that the point of its orders was to ensure that
Beau remained in a form of coercive custody that would prevent him from disappearing while
permitting him, in light of his serious health problems, to be “cared for at home” rather than in jail.
¶ 34 Because the December 21 orders modified the contempt sanction by authorizing Beau’s
release on electronic home monitoring upon partial payment of the purge amount, we have
jurisdiction to review them. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (authorizing appeals
from orders imposing a penalty upon a finding of contempt) see also In re a Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at
2
It is not clear why the two orders are different in this respect. Both orders, which were prepared
by counsel for Jacqueline, indicate that they were prepared using form CCDR 0033, part of
which reads as follows:
“IT IS ORDERED THAT the Sheriff take and keep custody of [blank] until s/he
purges her/himself of contempt by posting $ [blank] Cash Bond and/or [blank] or
until released by process of law.” Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Form
CCDR 0033, Order of Commitment for Contempt (rev. Dec. 1, 2020), available at
https://services.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/Forms/Forms/pdf_files/CCDR0033.pdf.
The November 13, 2023 order omitted “Cash Bond and/or [blank],” which was equivalent to
one line of text on the form. Despite that omission, it still bore the order code for setting a bond.
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260 (looking “to the substance of the [judicial] action, not its form,” to determine its appealability).
We therefore deny the motion to dismiss the appeal from the December 21 orders.
¶ 35 On the merits, we find no error. 3 Beau argues that the $500,000 cash bond set in the
December 21 orders failed to comply with section 12-107.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735
ILCS 5/12-107.5 (West 2022). Although the bond in this case certainly exceeded the limit set out
in the statute, which provides for “a recognizance bond in the sum of no more than $1,000”
(id. § 12-107.5(d)), the statute only applies to an “order of body attachment or other civil order for
the incarceration or detention of a natural person respondent to answer for a charge of indirect civil
contempt.” Id. § 12-107.5(a). Once a contempt order has been entered, section 12-107.5 no longer
governs. Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 72. Here, Beau had already been found in
contempt. The commitment orders (including the December 21 modifications) were entered as
contempt sanctions, not as a way to get Beau before the court for the contempt hearing, so they
did not need to comply with section 12-107.5.
¶ 36 Beau also argues that the trial court violated section 713 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 5/713 (West 2022). His argument is somewhat opaque, but
there is no need for us to try to unpack it. By its express terms, section 713 only applies to body-
attachment orders. Id. § 713(a). The December 21 orders modified the orders of commitment, not
the body attachments, so section 713 has no role to play.
¶ 37 Finally, to the extent that Beau contends that the December 21 orders improperly increased,
without a hearing, the amount he would have to pay to purge his contempt, we disagree. Whatever
the attachment orders may have said, the original commitment orders required Beau to pay the
3
Jacqueline argues that Beau forfeited these contentions of error by not raising them in the trial
court. See Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 395 Ill. App. 3d 342 at 350-51 (2009) (describing
forfeiture rule). Because we find the arguments lack merit, it is unnecessary for us to consider
whether Beau forfeited them or whether the interests of justice would require us to reach them
despite forfeiture. Cf. Door Properties, LLC v. Nahlawi, 2024 IL App (1st) 230012, ¶¶ 52-53
(looking past forfeiture to address contemnor’s claim that he had been wrongly and indefinitely
deprived of his freedom).
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purge amounts in full. The December 21 orders did not change the purge amount. They only gave
Beau the option of securing his release to electronic home monitoring upon partial payment.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 We lack jurisdiction to review the trial court’s December 20, 2023 nunc pro tunc order, so
we dismiss the appeal from that order. We find no error in the trial court’s December 21, 2023
orders modifying the contempt sanction, so those orders are affirmed. And because the trial court’s
December 26, 2023 order releasing the bond was not specified in the notice of appeal, we lack
jurisdiction to review it.
¶ 40 Affirmed in part; appeal dismissed in part.
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