In re Marriage of Cholach , 2024 IL App (1st) 230618-U ( 2024 )


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    2024 IL App (1st) 230618-U
    No. 1-23-0618
    Order filed May 3, 2024
    Sixth Division
    NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
    limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    FIRST DISTRICT
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    In re MARRIAGE OF:                                           )   Appeal from the
    )   Circuit Court of
    YARYNA CHOLACH,                                              )   Cook County.
    )
    Petitioner-Appellee,                                  )   No. 19 D 230474
    )
    and                                                      )   Honorable
    )   Jeanne Marie Reynolds,
    NAZAR CHOLACH,                                               )   Judge, Presiding.
    )
    Respondent-Appellant.                                 )
    PRESIDING JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1     Held: Trial court’s imposition of sanctions against respondent pursuant to Supreme Court
    Rule 219 (eff. July 1, 2022) for his repeated failure to comply with discovery or
    several court orders in the parties’ prolonged divorce proceedings was not an abuse
    of discretion.
    ¶2     Petitioner Yaryna Cholach filed an action for dissolution of marriage against respondent
    Nazar Cholach on October 21, 2019. After a default judgment was entered against respondent on
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    February 22, 2023, respondent filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the default dissolution of
    marriage on March 16, 2023, which the circuit court denied on March 20, 2023. Respondent
    appeals, contending that the default judgment entered against him constitutes a violation of his
    constitutional due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    ¶3      Although petitioner has not filed a brief on appeal, we will consider the appeal pursuant to
    the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 
    63 Ill. 2d 128
    , 131-33 (1976).
    ¶4                                       BACKGROUND
    ¶5      This case involves very lengthy and contemptuous dissolution of marriage proceedings
    between the parties. This case has previously been before this Court on two prior interlocutory
    appeals filed by respondent in November and December 2022, respectively.
    ¶6      The record reveals that this case began when petitioner filed a petition for an emergency
    order of protection (EOP) for herself and her children against respondent on September 20, 2019,
    which was granted. Respondent was served with a copy of the EOP on September 27, 2019, and
    notified of the hearing set for October 7, 2019. On October 7, 2019, the circuit court extended the
    EOP until October 23, 2019, and set a hearing on the plenary order of protection for October 23,
    2019.
    ¶7      On October 21, 2019, petitioner filed the dissolution of marriage petition that is the subject
    of this appeal. In the petition, petitioner alleged that she was employed as a cleaning lady and
    respondent was employed as a truck driver. The parties were married in Ukraine on June 18, 2005,
    and two children were born during the marriage, namely Maryana born January 24, 2006, and
    Zlata born June 6, 2016. The following day, petitioner filed an ex parte emergency petition for a
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    No. 1-23-0618
    restraining order (TRO) and thereafter a preliminary injunction against respondent based on
    petitioner’s belief that respondent would attempt to convey, conceal, hide, dissipate, transfer,
    spend, and otherwise dispose of or encumber substantial marital assets of the parties.
    ¶8     On October 23, 2019, the EOP was terminated due to an agreed restraining order entered
    by the parties. Pursuant to the agreed order, the parties agreed that: (1) respondent would provide
    an accounting regarding the matters raised in the ex parte TRO within 30 days; (2) the ex parte
    TRO petition was continued to the next court date; (3) prior to the next court date, the parties
    would exchange financial affidavits with supporting documentation; (4) respondent would
    continue paying the mortgage and assessments for the marital residence, electricity and internet
    service; (5) respondent would also pay half of daycare expenses, then totaling $230 per week
    directly to the service provider on production of the invoice; (6) a mutual restraining order was
    entered against both parties restraining them from physically abusing, harassing, intimidating,
    striking or interfering with the personal liberty of the other party or the minor children, nor remove
    the minor children without the consent of the other party; (7) respondent would temporarily reside
    outside of the marital home except that he would have the right to spend up to 48 consecutive
    weekend hours for visitation with the minor children and petitioner would spend that time outside
    of the marital home, unless petitioner had advance plans for the children, notified respondent and
    then have the children available for visitation with respondent for at least one day during that
    period; (8) respondent would notify petitioner eight to twenty-four hours in advance by text as to
    what time he would be at the marital home for 48 hours, with the 48 hours based on respondent’s
    schedule and was expected to vary from Friday evening to Monday morning with petitioner
    confirming receipt of respondent’s message by text; (9) if respondent would stay through Monday,
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    he would notify petitioner of his departure time, and if not leaving before 7 a.m. on Monday,
    respondent was to take the youngest child to daycare; if he left on Sunday, that he would leave no
    later than 10 p.m.; and (10) a status hearing was set for December 6, 2019.
    ¶9     Respondent filed his answer to the petition for dissolution of marriage on November 12,
    2019. From that point forward, the record indicates that respondent engaged in a pattern of
    noncompliance with discovery requests and failure to comply with court orders related to
    discovery and other matters, including payment of the Guardian ad litem (GAL) fees.
    ¶ 10   The initial exchange of written discovery was set for March 6, 2020, as well as a draft
    allocation of parenting time agreement or the court would refer the matter to mediation. The case
    was also continued several times during the COVID-19 pandemic. When court reconvened in the
    fall of 2020, several status dates were set for written discovery and settlement through the end of
    the year, with the completion of discovery set for January 13, 2021, and entry of an allocation
    judgment. A pretrial conference was also scheduled and held on February 19, 2021.
    ¶ 11   At the pretrial conference, the circuit court entered an order for the parties to update and
    exchange financial affidavits within 21 days; provide any outstanding discovery documents and to
    timely supplement their discovery documents including any outstanding personal and business
    bank statements for 2019, 2020 and 2021. The matter was set for discovery compliance on March
    31, 2021, via Zoom teleconference, and for another pretrial conference, which was subsequently
    continued to May 20, 2021.
    ¶ 12   On May 20, 2021, at the pretrial conference, the circuit court entered an order regarding
    respondent’s failure to complete his discovery production or update his financial affidavit in
    violation of the February 19 and March 31, 2021, court orders. The order also: granted petitioner
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    leave to file a petition for attorney fees and a motion to compel for presentation on June 7, 2021;
    allowed respondent 14 days to reply to the motion; stated that the discovery orders of February 19
    and March 31, 2021, remained in force and effect; and set a status for discovery compliance on
    June 7, 2021. Subsequently, on May 28, 2021, respondent’s counsel filed a motion for leave to
    withdraw.
    ¶ 13   Petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent’s responses to discovery and for sanctions
    against respondent for his failure to respond to discovery requests on June 2, 2021. The next day,
    petitioner filed an emergency motion to bar respondent’s unilateral decision to travel to Ukraine
    with the minor children and for return of the minor children’s passports. Petitioner also filed an
    emergency petition for a TRO and a subsequent preliminary injunction similar to the earlier one
    she filed regarding certain bank accounts and other marital assets in respondent’s possession and
    control.
    ¶ 14   Also on June 3, 2021, respondent filed a financial affidavit which indicated that he was
    self-employed, received weekly paychecks and that his gross income as of November 1, 2019, was
    $79,226. The affidavit also indicated that his gross income for 2020 was $217,619, and he owed
    income taxes. Respondent reported net monthly income of -$2689, and no assets.
    ¶ 15   On June 7, 2021, the circuit court entered an order granting respondent’s previous counsel’s
    motion to withdraw and granted Attorney Kozlov leave to appear on respondent’s behalf instanter;
    respondent was ordered to tender the children’s passports to Attorney Kozlov when he returned
    from New York by Friday, June 11, 2021, and further that Attorney Kozlov would hold the
    children’s passports until further order of court; respondent was granted 14 days to respond to
    petitioner’s petition for a TRO, petitioner’s motion to bar travel, and petitioner’s motion to compel
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    discovery. Petitioner’s outstanding motions were set for hearing on June 30, 2021. Respondent’s
    responses to petitioner’s outstanding motions were filed on June 21 and June 22, 2021.
    ¶ 16   On June 30, 2021, the circuit court entered an order granting petitioner’s motion to compel,
    requiring respondent to produce the following discovery documents by July 2, 2021, at 11 a.m. as
    follows: (1) bank statements for his business bank account from February 2021 through June 2021;
    (2) personal bank account statement from March 2020 through June 2021; and (3) Chase credit
    card statements for the prior two years. Respondent’s failure to produce the discovery documents
    by July 2, 2021, at 11 a.m. would result in him being barred from leaving the country or any travel
    until he produced the requested records for discovery. Petitioner’s petition for a TRO was
    voluntarily withdrawn without prejudice; petitioner’s emergency motion to bar travel was resolved
    in that the parties agreed to allow the children to travel with respondent to Ukraine and that an
    agreed upon consent and authorization for travel would be completed by the parties’ respective
    counsel prior to July 2, 2021. Petitioner’s request for sanctions and attorney fees was entered and
    continued to trial and the matter was set for status on respondent’s compliance on July 2, 2021.
    ¶ 17   On July 2, 2021, petitioner’s counsel informed the court that respondent complied with the
    outstanding discovery documents identified in the June 30, 2021, order and a signed consent for
    travel was forwarded to respondent. The circuit court ordered that respondent’s counsel was
    allowed to release the children’s passports to respondent for purposes of travel to Ukraine; upon
    respondent’s return, the passports were to be given to petitioner within three days of his return to
    the United States; and a status hearing on settlement was scheduled for August 11, 2021. On that
    date, the case was set for pretrial on October 19, 2021, with pretrial memorandums due seven days
    prior. On October 19, 2021, both parties were ordered to update their discovery responses within
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    28 days; discovery depositions were to be completed within 60 days; both parties were ordered to
    disclose their 213(f)(2) and (f)(3) witnesses regarding real estate property and business evaluations
    within 75 days; Heidi Zells was appointed as GAL for the children; and the next status date was
    set for January 5, 2022. The January 2022 date was stricken in an agreed order and rescheduled
    for status on discovery and the GAL’s investigation on February 18, 2022. The parties entered a
    second agreed order on January 27, 2022, extending the discovery deadline to March 1, 2022, with
    discovery depositions and disclosure of expert witnesses extended to March 15, 2022. These dates
    were subsequently extended to April 11 and April 25, 2022, respectively. The matter was reset for
    status hearing on March 29, 2022, and then continued to May 9, 2022.
    ¶ 18   On March 16, 2022, petitioner issued a subpoena to Chase Bank for respondent’s personal
    and business bank statements on or before April 7, 2022. Petitioner also issued a subpoena to
    respondent’s company, Nazar Inc., for discovery documents including bank statements,
    equipment, corporate records, vehicle leases, payments to shareholders, and leases or contracts due
    on or before April 14, 2022. Additionally, petitioner issued a subpoena to RFS Group, Inc. for
    discovery documents including evidence of payments to respondent and/or Nazar Inc., tax
    statements, gas receipts, driver logs and other records, listing of and all documents showing
    trucking trips made by respondent or any other driver employed by Nazar Inc., due on or before
    April 14, 2022.
    ¶ 19   On March 28, 2022, respondent filed a verified petition for temporary relief, requesting
    that petitioner be ordered to allow an appraisal of the marital residence and order sale of the marital
    residence. Respondent alleged that he contributed the majority of the funds to the purchase of the
    marital residence as the down payment was $40,000 and he contributed $30,000 of that amount;
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    No. 1-23-0618
    and that he made substantial improvements to the residence which dramatically increased the value
    of the property. He also alleged that he made a substantial number of mortgage payments for the
    marital residence. Respondent further alleged that the marital residence lost value due to
    petitioner’s actions and that he feared that respondent would take action to remove his name from
    the deed and add a nonrelated third party. He further contended that he needed the requested
    temporary relief to continue with the litigation, defend his rights, and support himself and the
    children.
    ¶ 20   The record indicates that on April 13, 2022, petitioner filed a notice of in-person oral
    discovery deposition of respondent on April 21, 2022, which also requested that respondent
    produce certain financial documents as identified in the notice. On April 14, 2022, petitioner filed
    an emergency motion to extend the oral discovery deposition deadline and expert witness
    disclosure deadline for 45 days from April 25, 2022, because respondent did not update his
    discovery as agreed, documentation was not received pursuant to subpoena from respondent’s
    business or RPS Group. The circuit court granted petitioner’s emergency motion on April 15, 2022,
    over respondent counsel’s objection, stated that future discovery deadlines would be addressed at
    the May 9, 2022, status date and both parties were to tender their proposed allocation agreements
    by that date.
    ¶ 21   Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw on April 19, 2022, and heard on May 6,
    2022, at which time the circuit court ordered respondent to contact the GAL by or before May 10,
    2022, and schedule an appointment to speak with her regarding the case and his claims; the parties
    were again ordered to exchange proposed allocation judgments on or before May 10, 2022; the
    May 9, 2022, court date was stricken; and petitioner’s counsel’s motion to withdraw was continued
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    to the next court date, which was scheduled for May 20, 2022. Respondent filed his proposed
    allocation statement on May 10, 2022, and petitioner’s was filed on May 12, 2022. On the same
    date, respondent filed a notice of intent to claim dissipation of marital assets. In support of his
    claim, respondent contended that: (1) in November 2018, petitioner withdrew $15,000 from the
    parties’ bank account without notice to respondent and he believed that she did not use the funds
    for marital purposes, and (2) in August 2019, petitioner traded the parties’ 2014 Jeep vehicle for a
    2019 Toyota without respondent’s knowledge. Respondent claimed that he was entitled to a credit
    against petitioner for such dissipations.
    ¶ 22   Petitioner secured new counsel on May 16, 2022, who substituted her appearance and
    requested that petitioner’s old counsel withdraw from the case. On May 20, 2022, the circuit court
    granted petitioner’s new counsel leave to file her appearance; granted petitioner’s old counsel leave
    to withdraw and ordered him to surrender his file to the new counsel by May 25, 2022; petitioner
    was granted 28 days to respond to respondent’s claim for dissipation of marital assets; petitioner
    was granted 45 days to submit her expert witness disclosures; and the matter was set for case
    management and trial on allocation issues on July 23, 2022, later changed to July 20, 2022.
    ¶ 23    Petitioner’s attorney filed several motions to withdraw during the remainder of the
    proceedings based on petitioner’s inability to pay as well as the excessive fees incurred due to
    respondent’s failure to comply with discovery, the GAL or court orders and due to respondent’s
    repeated filing of random motions and petitions. On June 17, 2022, petitioner filed her response to
    respondent’s claim for dissipation of marital assets, arguing that respondent’s claims were
    conclusory, failed to state any proper specific facts, were baseless and must be stricken. Petitioner
    further stated that the marriage was not irretrievably broken until she filed for dissolution of
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    marriage in October 2019, and therefore the events alleged by respondent could not be dissipation
    of assets. Petitioner requested that respondent’s dissipation claim be dismissed and that she be
    awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against the claim. Petitioner filed a similar
    response to respondent’s petition for temporary relief on the same day. On June 21, 2022,
    petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to compel respondent’s counsel to disclose the name and contact
    information for the court reporter who transcribed petitioner’s discovery deposition, as well as to
    comply with other discovery requests because counsel’s continued willful failure to comply with
    requests for records amounted to malicious obstruction and delay of the proceedings. On July 7,
    2022, petitioner’s counsel sent a notice of subpoena to respondent’s counsel requesting records for
    companies who were believed to have business contracts and financial records of transactions with
    respondent. The following day, respondent sent copies of his updated financial affidavit as well as
    his personal and business 2021 income tax returns.
    ¶ 24   On July 20, 2022, the circuit court entered an order setting a trial on the allocation of
    parenting time for the children for September 19, 2022. Both parties were also ordered to tender
    or update their expert witnesses for the allocation trial within 14 days of the order; the GAL was
    granted an additional retainer of $4000 with one-third to be paid by petitioner and two-thirds paid
    by respondent; closure of discovery for the allocation trial was set for August 22, 2022, without
    prejudice to the GAL inquiring or seeing the children after that date; the GAL’s written report was
    due by August 29, 2022, and both counsels were to exchange exhibits and written stipulations by
    August 22, 2022. Subsequently, the circuit court issued an order on August 15, 2022, which
    ordered respondent to pay his share of the court-ordered retainer for the GAL ($2666.66) on that
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    day or he would be barred from testifying at the allocation trial on September 19, 2022, with a
    status hearing set for August 25, 2022.
    ¶ 25   On August 24, 2022, petitioner filed a petition for specific contribution to her attorney fees
    and costs due to respondent’s failure to pay his share of the GAL fees, which were still unpaid as
    of the date of the petition. Petitioner requested that respondent be barred from testifying at the
    allocation trial as a sanction. At the status hearing the following day, the circuit court entered an
    order that barred respondent from testifying at the upcoming allocation trial due to respondent’s
    willful refusal to comply with three prior court orders on two separate dates to pay his share of the
    GAL’s fees. The court noted that respondent’s counsel provided no explanation for respondent’s
    refusal to pay except to challenge the court’s authority to act without the GAL filing a formal
    written petition for rule. The circuit court noted that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the
    minor children and found respondent’s behavior to be “contemptuous without any justification.”
    Accordingly, respondent was barred from testifying at the September 19, 2022, allocation trial.
    Additionally, petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for default against respondent because
    of his “contumacious” conduct; the GAL was granted an extension to file her written report by
    September 5, 2022, and respondent was given 21 days to respond to the fee petition filed by
    petitioner’s counsel which was set for hearing on September 19, 2022.
    ¶ 26   The GAL’s written report was filed on September 6, 2022. Her report indicated that
    respondent initially sought only a majority of parenting time with Maryana because he did not
    agree with petitioner’s church and priest, he also wanted joint and decision-making capabilities
    regarding the children, but was unwilling to discuss the case or settlement. In July 2022, Maryana
    expressed to the GAL that respondent wanted her to choose sides and his counsel indicated that
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    the marital home would need to be sold in order to address the parenting schedule. Then on August
    26, 2022, respondent’s counsel argued that the GAL did not have enough information to write her
    report. Respondent’s counsel reiterated that the marital home needed to be sold and the concern
    that petitioner would go back to the same priest. Respondent’s counsel expressed to the GAL that
    once the marital home is sold, the parties could have a flexible visitation schedule; respondent
    would put a down payment on a new place for petitioner near the children’s schools and he would
    also get a property nearby. The GAL was unclear why the sale of the home would affect parenting
    time. Respondent also initially indicated that he wanted to change his visitation to every other
    weekend with an additional overnight during the week; however, on September 2, 2022,
    respondent stated that he was then seeking visitation from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at noon
    and no overnight weekday visitation because of his work schedule.
    ¶ 27   The GAL also noted that petitioner’s position also changed throughout the case; originally
    she wanted respondent to have additional time with the children and she wanted some weekend
    time. Petitioner then changed her mind and submitted a proposal seeking one week with the
    children and then one week with respondent, with joint decisions between the parties. Petitioner
    subsequently changed again, indicating that she should have exclusive possession of the marital
    home with respondent having visitation every other weekend from Friday at 5 p.m. through Sunday
    at 6 p.m. along with two dinner visits on weeks when he did not have weekend visitation and one
    dinner visit when he did have weekend visitation. Petitioner also proposed that she have sole
    decision-making in all major areas.
    ¶ 28   The GAL reviewed documents in the case including all of the circuit court’s orders; all
    pleadings filed by the parties; proposed parenting time allocations from both parties and emails
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    sent from the parties; and documents tendered by the parties and their respective counsels’. The
    GAL also interviewed both parties.
    ¶ 29    She met with petitioner several times, who detailed the relationship between the parties,
    and described respondent’s physical violence which led to an order of protection in 2019.
    Petitioner stated that she was the primary decision maker for the children because respondent
    would not communicate with her about the children or any extracurricular activities for them.
    Petitioner expressed concern that respondent did not always give adequate notice of when he
    would be arriving for visitation so that she could plan where to go as she had to leave the home
    when he was there. Petitioner stated that respondent was upset about her church and the priest,
    whom respondent accused of having a relationship with and also that the priest molested a child.
    The GAL was provided with documents indicating that the case against the priest was dismissed
    in 2015. However, petitioner stated that she had left that church but respondent still fought.
    Respondent was a long distance truck driver and was not home during the week, only on weekends,
    though petitioner indicated that she was aware that respondent was sometimes home during the
    week but did not see the children. Petitioner wanted some weekend time with the children.
    Additionally, petitioner indicated that she thought respondent should spend more time with the
    children as he did not always complete his full parenting time with them. However, she was very
    concerned that he blamed Maryana for telling the GAL that he drank in the children’s presence
    and that he had a girlfriend, and further that he told Maryana that she had to choose which parent
    to live with.
    ¶ 30    The GAL met with respondent on December 3, 2021, via Zoom through an interpreter.
    Respondent stated that all of the problems in their marriage stem from a lack of trust and because
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    of petitioner’s church. He believed that petitioner and the priest had an intimate relationship based
    on text messages that he saw, but he had no proof of them. Respondent also stated that petitioner
    withdrew money from the marital account, that under the current visitation schedule he could come
    “anytime from Friday to Sunday,” but he usually arrived around 6 p.m. on Friday and left early on
    Sunday. When the GAL asked him why he wanted more time if did not currently exercise the time
    he was given, respondent stated that he had to work to pay bills, but he could adjust his schedule
    to spend more time with the children. Respondent admitted that he was not involved with the
    children’s school, education, and doctors as there was an English language barrier and because he
    had to work. When the GAL asked him why he only wanted to have Maryana and not Zlata,
    respondent stated that he felt that Zlata needed more of a maternal role in her life and also that,
    because Maryana was older, the priest’s intentions toward her could be stronger. Respondent was
    also concerned that because the priest had an influence over petitioner, he was worried that the
    priest could have an influence over Maryana as well. Respondent then stated that he wanted both
    children with him the majority of the time and petitioner could see them whenever she wanted, but
    then stated that petitioner was a danger to the children as she was violent and abusive. However,
    respondent did not further elaborate on the claim of violence by petitioner. Respondent also stated
    that he and petitioner did not communicate, and if there was an issue with the children, they called
    or texted. The GAL interviewed respondent again on May 10, 2022, at which time respondent
    indicated that nothing had changed. Respondent was aware that the priest no longer saw the
    children anymore but still stated that the priest was the reason his family fell apart and he still
    wanted the children with him. Respondent stated that petitioner was unstable and he worried that
    her actions in the future would not be in the best interests of the children, though he did not
    elaborate on that statement. Respondent again stated that he could change his work schedule to
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    have the children, and also that he still only wanted Maryana. Respondent further indicated that he
    was in the process of purchasing a condo in the same condo association and that petitioner could
    buy one there and see the children whenever she wanted. The GAL’s third interview with
    respondent was on September 2, 2022, at his request. Respondent again stated that the parties were
    in this situation because of the priest and even though the priest was no longer involved with the
    family, respondent was concerned that petitioner could take the children back there in the future.
    As a result, respondent wanted sole decision-making authority related to the children. Respondent
    also stated that he was willing to give petitioner money to buy a new property to be placed in trust
    and given to the children when they turned 18. Respondent wanted petitioner to have the children
    all week and he would have them on the weekend when he came home. He stated that he could
    commit to every other weekend from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at noon; respondent was not
    seeking weekday time because of his work schedule, but if his schedule changed, he would want
    that. However, respondent stated that until they resolved the housing situation, he could not
    commit to any changes in visitation.
    ¶ 31   The GAL first interviewed the children on May 17, 2022, via Zoom, after it became clear
    that the parties would not reach a settlement regarding allocation of parenting time. Maryana stated
    that she was 16 years old and in the 10th grade. She stated that they lived in the marital home, a
    three-bedroom condo and she had her own room. Maryana stated that their mom was there during
    the week and their father was usually there on the weekend. She liked that arrangement and further
    that she wanted to see both parents equally and as much as possible. Maryana detailed the activities
    that she did with both parents. Maryana confirmed that her parents did not communicate and was
    worried that her father might move back to Ukraine if she does not see him more because he told
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    her that a few times. Maryana also stated that one issue between her parents was the church they
    attended with her mom and that her dad did not like the priest. However, Maryana told the GAL
    that he was just the priest and not her mom’s boyfriend, and further that they no longer see the
    priest or attend that church. The GAL also spoke with Zlata, who was five years old and in
    kindergarten. Zlata stated that she lived with her parents on different days, she liked being with
    both parents, she had one house and did not want two houses. Zlata stated that she saw her father
    on the weekends and wanted to see him more. Zlata also stated that her father let her do whatever
    she wanted and that was something she liked about being with him. She talked about the things
    she did with both parents, and also indicated that she felt safe with both parents.
    ¶ 32   The GAL again spoke with the children on July 12, 2022. Maryana still reported seeing her
    mom during the week and her father on the weekends, either Friday through Sunday or Saturday
    until Sunday. She stated that her father drank sometimes and sometimes she drove home for him.
    Maryana indicated that it was very rare that he threw up, but that it had happened. Maryana told
    the GAL that the idea of seeing her mom on the weekend and her father during the week sounded
    weird because it had never happened; ideally she wanted equal time with both parents but it would
    be difficult with her schedule. Maryana detailed the activities she did with both parents and
    confirmed that they still did not see the priest. The GAL also spoke with Zlata, who was going to
    first grade. Zlata reconfirmed the visitation schedule with both parents, stated that her parents were
    nice although her father sometimes drank. She again indicated that she felt safe with both parents,
    who were still in the house.
    ¶ 33   On July 21, 2022, the GAL spoke with Maryana, who stated that her mom was not
    influencing her. She also stated that her father called her and told her that she had to choose
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    between him and her mom. Maryana also stated that her father said court was a lot of money and
    if she did not pick him he would leave. He was also angry with her for saying that he drank alcohol;
    Maryana was very upset about that interaction.
    ¶ 34   The GAL last met with the children on September 1, 2022. However, Zlata did not want to
    talk, so she just spoke with Maryana. Maryana indicated that her father was no longer making her
    pick sides, and she still felt like she wanted equal time with both parents. The GAL told Maryana
    that her father was seeking visitation every other weekend, and Maryana stated that she did not
    like the idea of going two weeks without seeing him. She asked if there was a day during the off
    week when she could see him.
    ¶ 35   After her interviews with the parties and the children, the GAL considered the best interests
    factors and recommended that the children reside in petitioner’s home. She noted that respondent’s
    work schedule required him to be out of town during the week; thus, she recommended that
    respondent have parenting time with the children every other weekend from Friday at 6 p.m. until
    Sunday at 6 p.m., despite his wishes to only have parenting time until Sunday at noon. The GAL
    believed, based on respondent’s earlier statements that there was more flexibility to his schedule
    than he indicated and that he had the ability to see the children later on Sunday if he wanted to.
    The GAL also noted that on his off weeks, respondent had the ability to modify his schedule to
    have an overnight visit with the children on Sunday or Thursday. She indicated that the children
    wished to see respondent more and that based on several of his statements, she believed respondent
    had the ability to make it happen. The GAL found that having both parties consistently part of the
    children’s lives would be in their best interests; however, no one could make respondent take more
    time if he was unwilling to do so. If that was the case, the GAL recommended that respondent’s
    - 17 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    parenting time be every other weekend from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at noon, because it was
    important for both parents to have weekend time with the children. She also indicated that it was
    not in the children’s best interest for respondent to continue notifying petitioner eight hours in
    advance of his coming and going because the children needed stability and the ability to make
    plans. She further recommended that the nesting schedule should not continue; petitioner should
    remain in the marital home, which should be part of the property settlement later, and if she was
    awarded the marital home, the GAL indicated that petitioner should pay the mortgage and utilities.
    Respondent should be required to pay child support, maintenance, and extracurriculars; and while
    it was unclear if he had purchased the property at 2300 Windsor Mall Drive, respondent indicated
    that he had the ability to purchase a residence as he offered to purchase it for petitioner. The GAL
    found that it made no sense for petitioner to move as the marital home was where the children
    were used to residing and wanted to live in. As petitioner was the primary caretaker for the children
    and had the majority of the parenting time, the GAL found that petitioner should stay in the marital
    home.
    ¶ 36    With respect to decision-making, the GAL concluded that petitioner should make sole
    decisions concerning the children as she was the primary caretaker and had always made the
    decisions for the children. She noted that respondent admitted that he had not been involved in the
    children’s schooling, medical or extracurricular activities though he was upset that petitioner
    attended a certain church with a certain priest. Petitioner stopped going to the church and seeing
    the priest, so it was no longer an issue although respondent, with no basis, speculated that she
    might go back to that church after the divorce. The GAL found that this was respondent’s attempt
    to try and control petitioner and argue about issues that were not present. The GAL further found
    - 18 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    that respondent was unwilling to work with petitioner and it was unlikely that they could co-parent
    and work together to make decisions for the children. The GAL further indicated that both children
    loved their parents and both parents loved the children. However, she noted that respondent’s anger
    towards petitioner and the divorce clouded his judgment and he sometimes did not act in the best
    interests of the children.
    ¶ 37    On September 8, 2022, respondent filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the circuit
    court’s August 25, 2022, order which barred him from testifying at the allocation trial. Respondent
    argued that the court’s order barring him from testifying about the allocation of parental
    responsibility was not in the best interests of the children, was an abuse of discretion and a violation
    of respondent’s constitutional due process rights. He also argued that petitioner had no standing to
    file a petition to enforce the court’s order that he pay the GAL fees; only the GAL could file a
    petition to adjudicate. Respondent also maintained that barring his testimony was a very harsh and
    disproportionate sanction to the alleged violation and was an abuse of the circuit court’s discretion.
    ¶ 38    Petitioner followed with a verified petition for rule to show cause on September 12, 2022,
    contending that respondent should be held in indirect civil contempt for his willful and
    contemptuous failure to comply with the parties’ agreed order of October 29, 2019, regarding the
    payment of daycare and extra-curricular expenses or school fees for the children. The petition
    stated that, on information and belief, respondent was working and receiving cash payments and
    intentionally concealing money received from work. Petitioner alleged that respondent owed
    $2454.50 for daycare and camp costs for the children.
    ¶ 39    On the same day, petitioner filed a motion for default judgment of allocation and for
    sanctions against respondent for his failure to pay the GAL fees. Additionally, petitioner also filed
    - 19 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    a motion to compel respondent to respond to discovery and for sanctions for his failure to comply
    with discovery. Specifically, petitioner alleged that respondent failed to produce any discovery
    related to his personal or business financial affairs, including bank accounts, nine real estate
    properties, six vehicles, businesses, life insurance, compensation from companies his business had
    contracted with, credit card statements, as well as other expenditures and expenses. Petitioner
    sought to invoke all available sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219 (eff. July 1, 2002)
    as well as attorney fees and costs.
    ¶ 40   On September 14, 2022, respondent filed a motion to strike and dismiss petitioner’s petition
    for specific contribution to attorney fees based on his failure to pay the GAL fees, restating his
    position that the circuit court’s August 25, 2022, order should be vacated as it violated his
    constitutional due process rights. Among other things, respondent argued that the petition was
    insufficient as it did not itemize the attorney fees. Petitioner responded with an amended petition
    for specific contribution to her attorney fees on September 16, 2022, which itemized all attorney
    fees related to respondent’s failure to pay the GAL fees.
    ¶ 41   That same day, petitioner filed a petition seeking contribution to her interim and
    prospective attorney fees and costs, noting that although the petition for dissolution was filed on
    October 21, 2019, there was no agreement regarding any of the outstanding financial matters raised
    in the dissolution petition, and that respondent’s answer shows that there would continue to be
    substantial disagreement as to each and every aspect of the divorce. Petitioner also filed a verified
    petition for a finding of civil contempt, to set a purge and for sanctions for respondent’s failure to
    pay the court-ordered GAL fees.
    - 20 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    ¶ 42   On September 19, 2022, the date of the allocation hearing, GAL filed a second invoice of
    her fees. The circuit court entered a written order after the allocation hearing and after
    consideration of respondent’s motion to vacate the August 25, 2022, order barring him from
    testifying at the hearing. The written order indicated that the circuit court first addressed
    respondent’s motion to vacate as well as the five pleadings filed by petitioner. The circuit court
    ordered as follows: (1) the August 25, 2022, order was vacated to allow respondent to testify at
    the allocation hearing and respondent testified; (2) petitioner was found to be the primary parent
    of the children and was awarded primary residential allocation in the current marital residence; (3)
    the current nesting situation was not working, was not in the best interests of the children,
    respondent had the financial ability to find and secure alternate housing and suitable living
    arrangements; exclusive possession of the marital residence was awarded to petitioner; respondent
    was ordered to vacate the residence by October 4, 2022, and was barred from entering the marital
    residence; respondent must exercise his parenting time at his new residence and must notify
    petitioner when he secured a new residence and the address; (4) respondent could not take or
    remove any personal property of the children and the parties were to agree in writing what property
    the respondent could remove from the marital residence; (5) respondent’s parenting time was set
    for every other weekend beginning September 30, 2022, from Friday at 6 p.m. through Sunday at
    noon, conditioned on respondent providing no less than 24 hours prior written notice to petitioner
    that he would be exercising his parenting time; failure to provide such notice results in respondent
    forfeiting his alternate weekend parenting time for that weekend; (6) respondent to continue paying
    the mortgage, assessments, taxes, utilities and insurance on the marital residence as he had been
    paying and all other court orders requiring him to pay those expenses were still in force and effect;
    (7) respondent was not to put the children in the middle or punish the children for the court’s
    - 21 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    rulings and findings regardless of whether evidence was presented based on the children’s or a
    child’s statements to the GAL or to petitioner in the past, present or future; (8) the court would
    provide a written ruling and findings regarding decision making by the parties for the minor
    children; (9) the five pleadings filed by petitioner were set for hearing on October 6, 2022, if rules
    were issued on the petitions on October 6, 2022, they were returnable instanter that day and the
    GAL’s fees would also be addressed that day; (10) respondent was given seven days to respond to
    the petitioner’s pleadings; (11) both parties were to provide updated financial disclosures within
    seven days of the September 19, 2022, court date; and (12) the case was set for case management
    on October 6, 2022.
    ¶ 43   Respondent in turn filed a motion on September 22, 2022, to strike petitioner’s amended
    petition for specific contribution to attorney fees and costs based on his failure to pay the GAL
    fees. He made the same arguments as in his previous motion. Petitioner tendered her updated
    financial affidavit to respondent on September 26, 2022.
    ¶ 44   On the same date, respondent tendered an updated financial affidavit to petitioner and filed
    several responses and motions. First, he filed a verified response to petitioner’s petition to show
    cause. In his verified response, respondent contended that he was obligated to contribute to any
    extracurricular activities for the children and further that he was not provided with any invoices
    directly from the daycare provider. He also filed an answer to petitioner’s request for contribution
    to her attorney fees. Additionally, respondent replied to petitioner’s motion to compel discovery,
    in which he contended that the discovery requests were made in 2021. Finally, respondent filed a
    motion to strike petitioner’s petition for a finding of indirect civil contempt, in which he admitted
    that the circuit court allowed him to testify at the allocation trial on September 19, 2022, but argued
    - 22 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    that the court did not hold any hearing on whether his behavior in not paying the GAL fees was
    willful. He also restated his prior argument that the GAL never filed any pleading to claim the fees
    or enforcement of the court’s prior order.
    ¶ 45   On October 4, 2022, respondent filed a verified counter petition for dissolution of marriage.
    On the same date, he filed a motion to vacate and reconsider or in the alternate stay the circuit
    court’s September 19, 2022, order. In the motion, respondent contended that the circuit court erred
    in concluding that he had the financial ability to secure a new residence and requested that the
    court reconsider not allowing him to exercise his parenting time at the marital residence.
    Additionally, respondent filed a motion to reallocate the GAL’s fees and order petitioner to pay
    50% instead of one-third.
    ¶ 46   The circuit court entered a written order on October 6, 2022, after hearing on the various
    pleadings that were filed by both parties in the case. The court ordered as follows: (1) respondent
    was granted leave to file his counter petition for dissolution of marriage but it was considered a
    response and petitioner did not have to respond to it; (2) respondent withdrew his motion to vacate
    and reconsider without prejudice; (3) respondent’s motion to sell the marital residence was
    continued for hearing as part of the trial; (4) petitioner was granted until October 28, 2022, to
    respond to respondent’s petition to reallocate GAL fees; (5) petitioner was granted until October
    28, 2022, to respond to the other outstanding pleadings filed by respondent, but if they were denied
    the circuit court would immediately proceed on petitioner’s underlying petitions on November 3,
    2022; (6) both parties’ counsels were ordered to appear at a discovery conference on October 22,
    2022; if disputes remained after the conference, the court would conduct a hearing on petitioner’s
    motion to compel discovery on the same date; (7) petitioner’s remaining pleadings were set as a
    - 23 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    priority on November 3, 2022; (8) if time was available after such hearing, the court’s case
    management conference would be concluded the court would hear respondent’s pleadings that
    were not stricken or withdrawn; (9) respondent was to overnight discovery documents to the court;
    (10) respondent was to email pleadings to petitioner’s counsel that were not received; (11) if a rule
    issued against respondent on November 3, 2022, such rule was returnable instanter for the same
    date; (12) a case management conference was set for November 3, 2022; (13) GAL fees would be
    addressed on November 3, 2022; (14) respondent’s counsel was to provide information regarding
    the exact attorney fees paid or owed by respondent by the next court date; and (15) petitioner’s
    counsel’s motion to withdraw was voluntarily withdrawn without prejudice.
    ¶ 47   After an unsuccessful 201K conference, the circuit court held a hearing on petitioner’s
    motion to compel discovery and for sanctions against respondent and respondent’s failure to
    address the discovery deficiencies. In a written order on October 12, 2022, the circuit court ordered
    that respondent was required and compelled to provide written answers to and documentation of
    all of the items raised in petitioner’s June 19, 2022, deficiency letter by October 25, 2022,
    including: bank statements and cancelled checks from the Chase account for 2018; documentation
    of all real estate acquired from the date of the marriage through the present; documentation related
    to all vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, cycles, trailers, ATVs or snowmobiles in respondent’s name;
    documentation of any safe deposit boxes and their contents; life insurance policies; business
    accounts; business and personal credit card statements; Amazon and eBay purchases; lines of
    credit; loans, mortgages, and/or rent received; and documentation to support his claims that
    petitioner had not contributed to the accumulation of marital property or dissipated any marital
    property. Both parties were ordered to obtain current appraisals for the marital home within 30
    - 24 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    days; and the assessment of attorney fees and sanctions against respondent was continued until the
    next court date of November 3, 2022.
    ¶ 48   The circuit court held a hearing on the allocation of parental responsibilities and decision
    making and parenting time on September 19, 2022, and issued its written order with findings of
    fact after hearing on October 14, 2022. The order indicated that both parties were present and
    represented by counsel and the GAL was present. The court heard testimony from the parties and
    the GAL. The circuit court found that on October 29. 2019, an agreed order was entered and both
    parties agreed to a nesting arrangement where petitioner resided in the marital residence with the
    children during the week and respondent resided with the children in the marital residence on the
    weekends. The circuit court found that respondent repeatedly failed to cooperate with the GAL by
    refusing to make appointments with the GAL despite court orders; requesting a 50/50 parenting
    schedule despite the fact that he works out of town during the week; requesting that each parent
    have one of their children reside with each parent full-time; failing to present his proposed
    parenting plan; and failing to pay his share of the GAL fees without any valid reason. The court
    also noted that on multiple occasions it ordered respondent to pay the GAL fees and to cooperate
    with the GAL on his parenting plan requests by a certain date or be barred from testifying and in
    fact was barred from testifying by court order on August 25, 2022. After the court order was
    entered, respondent then contacted the GAL to discuss the parenting issues and the court granted
    his motion to vacate the court’s order barring him from testifying and respondent testified at the
    hearing.
    ¶ 49   The circuit court noted that it reviewed all testimony and all evidence submitted at trial
    which confirmed that the marital residence is located at 2500 Windsor Mall, Unit 1A in Park Ridge,
    - 25 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    and that petitioner and the children reside there. Respondent was and still is an independent over-
    the-road truck driver who works Sunday through Friday out of town. Petitioner testified to the
    numerous problems with respondent not communicating with her as to when his parenting time
    would begin and end, and that respondent did not consistently exercise his parenting time on
    Fridays. Petitioner also stated the respondent would often not begin his parenting time until
    Saturday and would end early on Sunday. Those inconsistencies interfered with petitioner’s work
    schedule and her need to find childcare coverage for the children during respondent’s parenting
    time. Respondent admitted that he often did not respond to petitioner’s communications believing
    that he did not have to and that his work schedule was uncertain and dependent on the jobs. Both
    parties testified that their current nesting situation was not working nor in each parent or the
    children’s best interests. Respondent testified that he wished to remain in the marital home and
    could purchase a similar home nearby for petitioner to live in. The GAL testified that respondent
    told her that he was in the process of purchasing a unit in the same vicinity. The court agreed that
    the nesting situation was not working and entered a separate order on that issue on September 19,
    2022. Petitioner proposed a written parenting plan and respondent did not.
    ¶ 50   The court indicated that it had reviewed the evidence and all of the relevant best interest
    factors as follows: (1) Petitioner had been the children’s primary caregiver since birth, made all
    major decisions for the children and sought sole decision-making for all major parenting decisions
    as respondent was not home during the week; respondent exercised inconsistent parenting time on
    the weekends and often did not notify her of when he would begin and end parenting time; failed
    to actively supervise the children which resulted in the youngest child drawing all over the walls
    in the resident; respondent has been intoxicated during his parenting time where he was unable to
    - 26 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    drive home and was sick in front of the children; and respondent left the marital residence dirty
    and a mess at the end of his parenting time; (2) Respondent on the other hand sought joint decision-
    making for all major decisions and sole decision-making regarding religion; however, the court
    noted that respondent had never participated in any decisions regarding the children; (3) the
    parties’ communication was very poor, respondent admitted that he failed to communicate with
    petitioner on parenting issues including payment of educational and extracurricular activities,
    refused to pay without explanation; respondent stated there was no court order requiring him to
    respond to petitioner’s texts and emails, which the court found unreasonable and confirmation that
    he lacked the ability to communicate with petitioner or place the children’s best interests above
    his own; and the court noted that respondent’s finances were not an issue as he paid cash for a car
    for Maryana; (4) the court noted respondent’s requests for sole responsibility for religious
    decisions based on his objections during the course of the divorce to a particular priest that had
    previously provided marital counseling and his claims regarding child molestation charges which
    the court found were not corroborated by any facts outside of respondent’s statements, and further
    that petitioner no longer attended that church or communicated with that priest since January 2022;
    (5) respondent’s failure to consistently or fully exercise his parenting time; (6) the GAL’s
    recommendation that petitioner be the primary caregiver and have sole authority to make
    responsibilities for the children as she has always done so and respondent is unavailable to be the
    primary caregiver due to his work schedule; (7) both children’s desire to have both parents active
    in their lives and to not be in the middle of their parents’ disagreements, as well as respondent’s
    discussion of the divorce proceedings and threatening to return to Ukraine without them if they do
    not support him; (8) the overwhelming evidence that petitioner had been the primary caregiver for
    the children and made all decisions for them as respondent had always been absent during the week
    - 27 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    and not objected to petitioner’s decision; and further that respondent’s position that the children
    and petitioner should be uprooted from their home for the one to two days that he is in Illinois was
    unreasonable and showed that respondent did not understand the needs of the children for stability
    nor was he willing to facilitate a good relationship between the children and petitioner; (9) the
    court adopted the GAL’s recommendation that neither parent consume excessive alcohol that
    would render the parent unable to care for and transport the children or to discuss the divorce
    proceedings with the children; and (10) the court noted petitioner’s previous order of protection
    against respondent for abuse.
    ¶ 51    As a result of its findings, the circuit court ordered that petitioner was granted sole
    allocation for the responsibility of all necessary decisions for the children in areas of education,
    healthcare, extracurricular activities, and religion; respondent was granted biweekly weekend
    parenting time from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at noon, with appropriate and timely
    communication regarding the start and end time and dates; adopted petitioner’s parenting plan
    provisions for holidays, vacation time and additional time during the week if respondent wanted
    to exercise it.
    ¶ 52    On October 19, 2022, respondent filed a motion to vacate the court’s order of October 14,
    2022, or alternately stay both that order and the September 19, 2022, order. Respondent sought to
    continue his parenting time at the marital residence or an order requiring petitioner to sell the
    marital residence or buy out his 50% interest in the marital residence.
    ¶ 53    On November 3, 2022, respondent was ordered to pay his past due portion of the GAL fees
    by 6 p.m. or a body attachment would be issued for him, and both parties were ordered to pay the
    new fees in the same proportion within seven days or a body attachment would issue. The GAL
    - 28 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    was then discharged from her duties for the minor children without prejudice. As part of the court’s
    findings, it noted that respondent sent over $300,000 to Ukraine where his brother lived;
    respondent testified that he paid cash for a car for Maryana in February 2022; and also had funds
    to place a $40,000 deposit on another condo in the area for petitioner. The court also found that
    respondent caused the entire proceeding to be prolonged by his conduct and failure to cooperate
    which caused substantial legal expenses to be unnecessarily incurred by petitioner.
    ¶ 54   Thereafter, on November 9, 2022, the circuit court entered a final allocation of parenting
    time consistent with the prior order from October 14, 2022 and included Rule 304 (eff. Mar. 8,
    2016) language. On the same date, respondent was ordered to pay petitioner’s counsel $27,500,
    which included $25,000 in interim attorney fees and $2500 of 508 fees ordered by the court due
    to respondent’s contemptuous conduct. Respondent was also ordered to pay petitioner $4909 for
    back childcare expenses that he willfully failed to pay and for which he was held in indirect civil
    contempt on November 3, 2022. The circuit court subsequently set the case for case management
    and a hearing on January 18, 2023, on petitioner’s motion to compel and for sanctions and fees.
    ¶ 55   Due to respondent’s failure to comply with the court’s orders entered in November 2022,
    petitioner filed a petition for indirect civil contempt, setting of purge amounts and for immediate
    incarceration on November 21, 2022. Respondent failed to pay petitioner’s attorney fees as
    ordered. Among other things, the petition alleged that respondent told petitioner that he would
    financially ruin her and force her not to have counsel.
    ¶ 56   Respondent filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the circuit court’s orders of November
    3 and 9, 2022, on November 23, 2022. He argued that the court erred in granting an award to pay
    petitioner’s attorney fees because she failed to meet her burden of proof, and that the court erred
    - 29 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    in ordering him to pay other amounts for childcare expenses and other amounts for petitioner’s
    attorney fees. Respondent also filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s November 9, 2022,
    order on November 23, 2022 (case number 22-1776). Meanwhile, on November 28, 2022, the
    circuit court scheduled both parties’ petitions for hearing on December 2, 2022. On that date, the
    circuit court found that a prima facie case of indirect civil contempt was shown against respondent,
    issued a rule to show cause and respondent was ordered to appear in court on December 13, 2022,
    or risk a body attachment. Additionally, the court denied respondent’s motion to vacate and
    reconsider the circuit court’s November 3 and 9, 2022, orders. Respondent was not present for the
    court hearing.
    ¶ 57   On December 14, 2022, the circuit court entered an order of adjudication of indirect civil
    contempt against respondent and he was again ordered to pay the arrearage. Respondent was
    ordered committed to the Cook County Jail, but such commitment was stayed until December 16,
    2022, to allow respondent time to purge the contempt. In response, respondent filed a second notice
    of appeal on December 20, 2022, seeking reversal of the December 14 order finding him in indirect
    civil contempt (case number 22-1927).
    ¶ 58   On January 17, 2023, petitioner filed a motion for entry of a new body attachment for
    respondent outside of the courtroom due to the Sheriff’s Office being unable to arrest respondent
    unless he was present in court or otherwise on court property. The order of adjudication and body
    attachment was subsequently amended the following day. Respondent did not appear in court
    despite being ordered to by the circuit court. Meanwhile, also on January 17, 2023, respondent
    filed a motion to stay the circuit court’s orders during the pendency of his appeals. On January 19,
    2023, the circuit court denied respondent’s motion for a stay and again found that respondent had
    - 30 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    willfully failed to comply with discovery requests and willfully failed to comply with or otherwise
    violated the court’s orders, including orders to appear. Accordingly, the circuit court granted
    petitioner’s request for sanctions and found respondent to be in default in the dissolution action as
    a sanction for his conduct, and respondent was barred from testifying or presenting evidence at the
    hearing. The default prove-up hearing was scheduled for February 22, 2023.
    ¶ 59   At the default prove-up hearing, respondent did not appear and respondent’s counsel was
    not allowed to question petitioner as part of sanctions against respondent, over his objection that
    it violated due process. Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the hearing. At the conclusion of
    the hearing, the circuit court entered an order dissolving the marriage and awarding maintenance
    and child support to petitioner. Petitioner was also awarded the marital residence at 2500 Windsor
    Mall Drive, Unit 1A, which carried a joint mortgage, while respondent was awarded a residence
    at 2300 Windsor Mall Drive, which he bought cash. With respect to vehicles, petitioner was
    awarded the 2019 Toyota RAV 4, the 2013 Mini-Cooper for Maryana, the 2016 Artic Cat
    Snowmobile, the 2003 Peterbilt Tractor, and the 2015 Silver Audi A8. Respondent was awarded
    the 2007 Freightliner truck, Sprinter 2500, and a newer truck used for his business, as well as all
    other vehicles in his name and those he transferred to Ukraine during the marriage. Respondent
    was ordered to pay petitioner’s $70,000 credit card fees incurred during the proceedings to cover
    her attorney fees and it could not be discharged in bankruptcy. The body attachment for the
    previously entered contempt charges remained in force and effect.
    ¶ 60   On March 16, 2023, respondent filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the default
    judgment for dissolution of marriage, contending that he was denied his constitutional due process
    - 31 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    rights because his counsel was not allowed to participate in the hearing and that he could not come
    to court because he was afraid of being arrested.
    ¶ 61   The circuit court entered a written order on March 20, 2023, denying respondent’s motion
    after a hearing. Respondent was not present at the hearing. The court found that respondent was
    found in default on January 19, 2023, based on its ruling on petitioner’s motion to compel and for
    Rule 219 sanctions, noting that it made specific findings on the record on January 18, 2023, that
    respondent, on numerous occasions and after entry of several court orders, willfully failed to
    comply with discovery and failed to disclose assets in the case that had been pending for over four
    years. The court also found that the body attachment for respondent was still in force and effect
    and noted that respondent repeatedly failed to purge his contempt and made no effort to do so since
    January 19, 2023, and chose instead to pay his counsel to file an appeal of the allocation judgment,
    a second appeal of the contempt orders, and to file the motion to vacate the default judgment. The
    court further found that respondent failed to pay the mortgage and household expenses since
    November 2022 as previously ordered. The court further found that respondent’s motion to vacate
    the default judgment did not mention that respondent was defaulted and no attempt by respondent
    or his counsel to vacate the default prior to the prove-up hearing on February 22, 2023. The court
    found that respondent’s proffered reason for his failure to appear was not appropriate and because
    he was defaulted, his attorney was properly barred form cross-examining petitioner at the prove-
    up hearing. The court also entered the Uniform Order of Support and Income Withholding of
    Support based on the default judgment as respondent did not respond or object.
    - 32 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    ¶ 62   Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal on April 5, 2023, to appeal the default judgment
    for dissolution of marriage (case number 23-0618, the current appeal), thus bringing his total
    appeals to three.
    ¶ 63   Respondent’s first interlocutory appeal, case number 22-1776, filed on November 23,
    2022, challenged the circuit court’s allocation of parenting time between the parties. That appeal
    was decided on November 16, 2023, with this Court finding that the allocation of parenting time
    was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court also concluded that we had no
    jurisdiction to determine if it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to grant petitioner the
    marital home as it was not a final order. See In re Marriage of Cholach, 
    2023 IL App (1st) 221776
    -
    U.
    ¶ 64   Respondent’s second interlocutory appeal, case number 22-1927, filed on December 20,
    2022, challenged the contempt determinations against him and the circuit court’s underlying orders
    that led to his indirect civil contempt. That appeal was decided on February 15, 2024, and affirmed
    the circuit court's contempt determinations as well as the underlying court orders. In re Marriage
    of Cholach, 
    2024 IL App (1st) 221927-U
    .
    ¶ 65                                         ANALYSIS
    ¶ 66   On appeal, respondent contends that the default judgment entered against him constitutes
    a violation of his constitutional due process rights. He argues that the circuit court erred in not
    allowing his attorney to cross-examine petitioner and that the default was improperly entered
    solely on petitioner’s testimony. Respondent further claims that the default judgment “shocks the
    conscience.” Respondent does acknowledge that he was defaulted because of his failure to comply
    with discovery.
    - 33 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    ¶ 67   The circuit court entered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage on February 22, 2023,
    and denied respondent’s petition to vacate the default and for rehearing on March 20, 2023. A
    notice of appeal was timely filed on April 5, 2023. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant
    to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303 governing appeals from final judgments. Ill. S. Ct.
    R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); 303 (eff. July 1, 2007).
    ¶ 68   We begin by noting that respondent’s brief fails to acknowledge or discuss the fact that the
    default judgment for dissolution and what occurred at the prove-up hearing, namely that his
    counsel was not allowed to cross-examine petitioner, were the result of the circuit court’s
    imposition of Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002) sanctions against him for his conduct throughout the
    proceedings.
    ¶ 69   Pursuant to Rule 219(c), the circuit court may impose sanctions against any party who
    “unreasonably fails to comply” with the supreme court’s discovery rules or any order entered
    pursuant to those rules. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). That rule sets forth
    a nonexclusive list of sanctions which a court may impose, where just, including that “the
    offending party be debarred from filing any other pleading relating to any issue to which the refusal
    or failure relates,” “the offending party be debarred from maintaining any particular claim,
    counterclaim, third-party complaint, or defense relating to that issue,” and “a witness be barred
    from testifying concerning that issue.” 
    Id.
     Under Rule 219(c), the court may also enter a judgment
    of default against the offending party, dismiss the offending party’s action with or without
    prejudice, or strike any portion of the offending party's pleadings related to that issue. 
    Id.
    Additionally, a court “may impose upon the offending party or his or her attorney, or both, an
    appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of
    - 34 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
    Id.
    Sanctions are used to “combat abuses of the discovery process and maintain the integrity of the
    court system.” Locasto v. City of Chicago,. 
    2014 IL App (1st) 113576
    , ¶ 27.
    ¶ 70    We find our supreme court’s decision in Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 
    181 Ill. 2d 112
     (1998) to be instructive on the issue of Rule 219(c) sanctions. The court held that, when
    imposing sanctions, the court’s purpose is to coerce compliance with discovery rules and orders,
    not to punish the dilatory party. 
    Id. at 123
    . A sanction which results in a default judgment is a
    drastic sanction to be invoked only in those cases where the party’s actions show a deliberate,
    contumacious or unwarranted disregard of the court’s authority. 
    Id.
     Such sanction should only be
    employed as a last resort and after all the court’s other enforcement powers have failed to advance
    the litigation. 
    Id.
    ¶ 71    The decision to impose sanctions under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion of the trial
    court, and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 120
    . To
    determine if the trial court abused its discretion, a reviewing court must look to the criteria upon
    which the trial court relied in making its determination of an appropriate sanction. 
    Id. at 123-24
    .
    The factors a trial court is to use in determining what sanction, if any, to apply are: (1) the surprise
    to the adverse party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony or evidence; (3) the nature
    of the testimony or evidence; (4) the diligence of the adverse party in seeking discovery; (5) the
    timeliness of the adverse party’s objection to the testimony or evidence; and (6) the good faith of
    the party offering the testimony or evidence. 
    Id. at 124
    . Of these factors, no single factor is
    determinative. 
    Id.
    - 35 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    ¶ 72    In the case at bar, we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court in imposing Rule
    219(c) sanctions. As noted above, over the course of the almost four years of litigation,
    respondent’s behavior established a pattern of refusal to fully comply with discovery requests, a
    refusal to abide by court orders, resulting in several contempt orders being entered against him,
    which we note that he never attempted to purge. The record is replete with situations where, in lieu
    of complying with discovery or court orders, respondent instead filed frivolous pleadings to stall
    the proceedings. Additionally, the circuit court also found that respondent told petitioner that he
    was going to financially ruin her and make her unable to pay her attorney fees by stalling the
    litigation.
    ¶ 73    In reviewing the applicable factors, all of the factors weigh in petitioner’s favor. First, there
    was no surprise to respondent and petitioner had consistently sought sanctions for respondent’s
    failure to comply with discovery or abide by court orders to comply. The circuit court had
    previously barred respondent from testifying at the allocation trial as a sanction for failing to
    comply with discovery and failing to comply with court orders. However, respondent ultimately
    complied with discovery, requested that the order barring his testimony be vacated, which the
    circuit court granted. The record indicates that respondent never sought to vacate the default, which
    he could have done by purging the contempt orders against him, which further support the circuit
    court’s determination that respondent’s actions were willful and unreasonable.
    ¶ 74    The discovery evidence sought in discovery by petitioner would have provided a clearer
    picture of respondent’s finances and financial situation, in crafting the marital settlement
    agreement. Due to the default against respondent and the bar to his presentation of evidence, the
    - 36 -
    No. 1-23-0618
    only evidence presented at the prove-up was petitioner’s testimony, which was consistent with
    other filings and evidence before the court. As such, any prejudice to respondent was minimal.
    ¶ 75   The record established that petitioner consistently sought discovery materials from
    respondent throughout the course of the proceedings, to no avail. The record does not reflect that
    respondent objected to the sanction; he did not even appear at the prove-up hearing or the prior
    court date. Rather, his counsel only objected to not being allowed to cross-examine petitioner at
    the hearing, which the circuit court denied as part of the 219(c) sanctions. Finally, the record
    consistently shows petitioner’s good faith in participating throughout the proceedings and
    testifying at the prove-up hearing based on proffered documentation she was in possession of
    (which was previously made part of the record) and based on her information and belief. It also
    bears noting that, despite respondent’s consistent disregard of discovery requests and court orders
    and otherwise egregious behavior throughout the proceedings, the circuit court gave him numerous
    opportunities to purge the contempt before entering the default and other sanctions against him.
    ¶ 76   We conclude that, based on the circumstances presented in this case, the sanctions imposed
    by the circuit court against respondent were not an abuse of discretion and we reject his theory on
    appeal that the imposition of Rule 219(c) sanctions which also served to bar his attorney from
    participating in the prove-up hearing was somehow a violation of his constitutional due process
    rights. Rather, these were sanctions for respondent’s continued failure to comply with discovery
    and flagrant disregard of court orders, which the circuit court was within its power to impose.
    ¶ 77                                     CONCLUSION
    ¶ 78   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
    ¶ 79   Affirmed.
    - 37 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1-23-0618

Citation Numbers: 2024 IL App (1st) 230618-U

Filed Date: 5/3/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/3/2024