In re D.W. ( 2024 )


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    2024 IL App (1st) 231107
    No. 1-23-1107
    Order filed January12, 2024
    Sixth Division
    NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
    precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    FIRST DISTRICT
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    In re D.W., D.W., and D.W., minors                      )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
    )     of Cook County.
    (THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                   )
    )
    Petitioner-Appellee,                           )     Nos. 17 JA 967, 17 JA 965, 17 JA
    )     966
    v.                                                      )
    )
    LISA W.,                                                )     The Honorable
    )     Demetrios Kottaras,
    Respondent-Appellant).                         )     Judge, presiding.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
    Presiding Justice Johnson and Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    Held: The trial court’s finding that the mother of minor children was unfit and in the best
    interests of the children her parental rights should be terminated was not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    ¶1           In 2017, three brothers, Dam., Dav., and De., then 9, 7, and 4 years old, were taken into
    the custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services due to multiple new
    and old abrasions on their bodies indicating abuse. The children told medical personnel that
    1-23-1107
    their mother, Lisa W., who adopted them in 2015, caused their injuries. Lisa was arrested and
    pleaded guilty to aggravated battery. She admitted to hitting the boys but claimed it occurred
    only once. The trial court stayed all visitation until recommended by the children’s therapists.
    ¶2         In 2021, the therapist for Dav. and De. determined they were ready to receive letters and
    prerecorded videos from Lisa. The two boys also visited her virtually in July of that year. But
    both boys emotionally regressed after the virtual visit, and their therapist recommended
    returning to letters and prerecorded videos. Lisa, who was upset about the decision, stopped
    communicating with the boys for several months. The oldest, Dam., who lives in a different
    foster home, has refused all contact with Lisa since 2017.
    ¶3         In May 2022, the State filed motions to terminate Lisa’s parental rights and to appoint a
    guardian with the right to consent to adoption for the three children. After a hearing, the trial
    court found Lisa was unfit because she (i) committed extreme or repeated cruelty to the
    children, (ii) failed to protect them from conditions injurious to their welfare, (iii) behaved in
    a depraved manner, and (iv) failed to make reasonable effort or progress toward the children
    returning home. The court further found terminating Lisa’s parental rights to be in the
    children’s best interests. The court entered a permanency goal of independence for Dam. and
    adoption for Dav. and De., whose foster mother wants to adopt them.
    ¶4         Lisa concedes the evidence supports the trial court’s unfitness finding. Still, she contends
    we should reverse because (i) the State impeded her progress and efforts at reunification by
    delaying visitation with the children for more than four years, and (ii) the trial court’s best
    interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm. The
    record shows the delay in visitation occurred because the children repeatedly said they did
    not want it. Further, the children’s therapist delayed visitation and never recommended in-
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    person visits because of the trauma the children experienced in Lisa’s care, their adverse
    reaction to visits with her, and Lisa’s failure to acknowledge that her conduct harmed the
    children. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the State proved by a preponderance of
    the evidence that terminating Lisa’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
    ¶5                                              Background
    ¶6         In 2015, Lisa adopted three boys, Dam., Dav., and De. when they were six, four, and three
    years old, respectively. (The children, who are biological siblings, have no adoptive father.
    Lisa is married but separated from her husband in1997.) On September 21, 2017, the State
    filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging the children were neglected due to
    injurious environment and abused based on physical abuse and substantial risk of physical
    injury. The State asserted that a DCFS investigator found the children had multiple scars,
    abrasions, and loop and linear marks on their bodies that, according to medical personnel, were
    consistent with abuse. The trial court granted the petitions, and the children were taken into
    temporary custody by DCFS.
    ¶7         Lisa was arrested and, in 2018, pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated battery of a
    child and sentenced to two years’ probation.
    ¶8         On April 23, 2018, the guardian ad litem filed an emergency motion asking the trial court
    to amend the visitation order so that the children would not be required to visit with Lisa against
    their will and visits would resume only on a recommendation by the children’s therapists. The
    motion asserted that the assigned social services agency, Lutheran Social Services of Illinois
    (LSSI), found that the children were engaging in behaviors as a result of their mother’s abuse,
    and two of the children said they did not want to visit with her.
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    ¶9           In response, Lisa filed a motion arguing, in part, that LSSI was unreasonably barring her
    access to the children. She asked the trial court to (i) remove LSSI and assign a new service
    provider, (ii) order that the children’s current placement is unnecessary, and (iii) deny the
    GAL’s motion to suspend visitation and order the assigned agency to begin supervised visits.
    ¶ 10         The trial court ordered that both the children and Lisa engage in therapy. The court denied
    in-person visits and allowed Lisa to prepare recordings for the children to be played in the
    presence of their therapist. The court stated that therapeutically supervised visits could begin
    when the therapist believed appropriate, and the children wanted them.
    ¶ 11         After an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found the children to be neglected due to
    injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-3(b) (West 2022)), physical abuse (705 ILCS 405/2-
    3(i) (West 2022)), and excessive corporal punishment. (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(v) (West 2022)),
    based on a stipulation of facts regarding Lisa’s battery conviction and injuries seen by DCFS
    caseworkers and medical personnel on the children’s bodies indicating abuse. The trial court
    adjudged the children wards of the court, determining that Lisa was unable to care for, protect,
    train, or discipline them for a reason other than financial circumstances. The court found that
    reasonable efforts had been made to the prevent removal of the children from the home and
    services aimed at family preservation and reunification had been unsuccessful. The court found
    removal from Lisa’s home and placement in the guardianship of DCFS to be in the children’s
    best interests. The court set a permanency goal of return home in 12 months, noting that the
    children were in services and improving, and Lisa was in services, though “minimizing” her
    responsibility for the abuse.
    ¶ 12         The permanency goal of return home in 12 months remained until February 2022, when
    the trial court changed the permanency goal to substitute care, pending determination on
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    termination of parental rights. The court noted a lack of progress and the best interest of the
    minor children. The State filed a motion to appoint a guardian to consent to adoption for all
    three boys, alleging Lisa was unfit for (i) extreme and repeated cruelty to the children (750
    ILCS 50/1(D)(e) (West 2022)), (ii) failing to protect the children from conditions in their
    environment injurious to their welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2022)), (iii) behaving in a
    depraved manner (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2022)), and (iv) failing to make reasonable
    efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal or reasonable progress toward
    return of the children within nine months after adjudication of neglect, abuse or dependency
    or within any nine months after that finding. (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2022)).
    ¶ 13                                          Termination Trial
    ¶ 14         A proceeding to terminate a party’s parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
    (705 ILCS 405/11 et seq. (West 2022)) occurs in two stages. First, the State must establish the
    parent is “unfit to have a child” under one or more of the grounds in the Adoption Act. In re
    D.T., 
    212 Ill. 2d 347
    , 352 (2004); see 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022) (setting out bases for
    finding of unfitness). At the unfitness hearing, the State has the burden of proving the parent’s
    unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352-53; 705 ILCS 405/2-
    29 (West 2022)). The heightened burden of proof arises because “the right of parents to control
    the upbringing of their children is a fundamental constitutional right.” In re D.W., 
    214 Ill. 2d 289
    , 310 (2005); see also In re Shauntae P., 
    2012 IL App (1st) 112280
    , ¶ 88 (“Because the
    termination of parental rights constitutes a complete severance of the relationship between the
    parent and child, proof of parental unfitness must be clear and convincing.”).
    ¶ 15         If the trial court finds unfitness, the proceedings advance to the second stage, where the
    court determines whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the minor’s best interests. In
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    re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352. Once the State proves parental unfitness, the focus shifts to the child,
    and the interests of parent and child diverge. In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d at 315. The preponderance-
    of-the-evidence standard is the burden of proof in the best interests hearing. Id.
    ¶ 16                                           Unfitness Hearing.
    ¶ 17          Before beginning the unfitness hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the
    adjudication order from June 2018, finding neglect and injurious environment, physical abuse,
    and abuse/substantial risk of injury and excessive corporal punishment. The court also took
    judicial notice of the disposition order entered on September 14, 2018, the termination petition
    filed on May 31, 2022, and the State’s pleading under section 50/1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act
    (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2022)), alleging six different nine month periods in which Lisa
    failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that served as the basis for removal.
    ¶ 18                                                 Exhibits
    ¶ 19          The State admitted 31 exhibits into evidence, including photos showing the marks found
    on the children, interviews with the children, and medical records indicating physical abuse
    was suspected. The State also admitted nine family service plans dating from September 2018
    through September 2022, numerous Child Family Therapy summaries, a copy of Lisa’s
    criminal disposition for aggravated battery, her psychological assessment from May 2018,
    evaluations from CCJCC addressing visitation, and records from Lisa’s therapist.
    ¶ 20          The September 12, 2018, family service plan stated the case was opened because Dav. had
    welts on his arms, legs, torso, and back and told his teacher that his mother had whipped him
    with an iPad charger cord. Dam. also had injuries. The plan stated that Lisa minimized her role
    in abusing the children. She requested visitation, but the children did not want to see her. A
    June 2018 court order granted Lisa visitation if recommended by the children’s therapist, the
    children wanted to visit, and a therapist supervised. The children lived in the same foster home
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    after staying at a relative of Lisa’s until concerns were raised about the relative’s ability to
    keep the boys safe from Lisa. The permanency goal was set at return home within 12 months.
    ¶ 21         A CCJCC report dated November 30, 2018, stated that the children had told professionals
    they did not want to see Lisa or return to her care. In describing Lisa’s abuse, Dam. said she
    would hit him with an extension cord that left marks on him, not feed them, so they went to
    bed hungry and she let her husband almost kill him by choking and punching him in the throat.
    Dam. said he was afraid of Lisa and her husband and had no happy memories of living with
    her. Dav. also described being fearful of Lisa. According to the report, whether to allow
    therapeutic visits was difficult to determine, and the benefit of visits did not outweigh the
    potential harm given the children’s emotional reaction to seeing her again.
    ¶ 22         A March 2019 family service plan indicated that the children were not ready to visit with
    Lisa. The Plan stated that “[d]espite efforts by the therapist to prepare the *** minors for
    parent/child visits with [Lisa], the minors have not expressed interest in visits. Efforts to
    prepare them for visits will continue, and therapeutic visits will start if/when the therapist
    determines the minors are ready and willing to visit.”
    ¶ 23         Services plans from September 2019 and March 2020 stated that Lisa was participating in
    recommended services and had given her therapist letters and videos for the children, but they
    were not ready to read or view them. In addition, the children continued to tell their therapists
    they did not want visits with Lisa. Similarly, the September 2020 and March 2021services
    plans stated that the children did not want visitation, and their therapists were consulting each
    other to determine how to establish visits appropriately. Furthermore, Lisa had not been
    participating in therapy since March 2020 or providing her therapist with letters for the
    children.
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    ¶ 24         According to a September 2021 family service plan, Dav. and De. began receiving letters
    and prerecorded video messages from Lisa in January 2021. They also had a video visit in July
    2021, but afterward, their therapists suspended all communications because the boys’ behavior
    regressed, and they struggled emotionally. Dav. and De. told their therapist they no longer
    wanted videos and would accept only her letters. According to her therapist, Lisa struggled
    with this setback, becoming fixated on her own needs and not the children’s, so she stopped
    communicating with them. Lisa’s therapist reported that Lisa “clearly does not understand the
    parent/child role that demands the parent support their children processing of their traumas in
    their own way and time without expectation that children will consider the parent’s need above
    their own.”
    ¶ 25         In March 2022, the permanency goal was modified to termination of parental rights.
    ¶ 26                                         Witness Testimony
    ¶ 27         Sean Cline, who works for Children’s Place Association, testified that when he was assigned
    to the case in June 2019, after it was transferred from LSSI, there had been no in-person,
    prerecorded videos, or live video visits between Lisa and the children under the June 2018 court
    order. Cline said Lisa completed psychological evaluations in May 2018 and January 2019. She
    also completed parenting classes in March 2018 and began individual therapy in May 2018. Cline
    spoke with Lisa’s therapist, who was unaware of the extent of Lisa’s abuse and was under the
    impression it had been a one-time incident until Cline sent her photos and other evidence. Lisa
    changed therapists in September 2019 and did not participate in therapy from March to September
    2020.
    ¶ 28         Cline testified that he spoke with Lisa by phone in September 2019. Lisa said she took the
    children to work in September 2017, and Dam. tried to steal food from a co-worker’s purse, which
    embarrassed her, and she “whooped them” when they got home. She said she hit all three boys
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    because they knew what Dam. was doing. Lisa admitted she had gone too far but adamantly insisted
    it was a one-time incident despite pictures showing scarring in various stages of healing. She never
    sent pictures she promised Cline of the boys swimming a week before the incident, which she
    claimed would show no scarring.
    ¶ 29          Cline said he was concerned about Lisa’s lack of knowledge regarding the abuse,
    minimizing its severity, frequency, and history. He said her statements were contradictory—
    while she would acknowledge the abuse, she claimed to have done nothing to hurt the boys.
    ¶ 30          In 2019, De. told Cline that Lisa would bite his arm, make him smell her bad breath, and
    hit him with an extension cord. He told Cline that her boyfriend was even meaner and hit him
    a lot. Cline said the children’s case file contained contradictory information about Lisa’s
    husband. Cline’s understanding was that they were separated, but De. seemed frightened of the
    husband and claimed he had physically abused him.
    ¶ 31          As to visitation, Cline said his agency adopted the recommendations of the CCJCC,
    requiring collaboration between the children’s and Lisa’s therapists to determine what would
    be safe for the children. In January 2021, the therapists agreed that Dav. and De. were
    emotionally ready to start exchanging letters and prerecorded videos with Lisa. The children’s
    therapist first reviewed the letter or video and, if deemed appropriate, would share it with the
    children during a session. On cross-examination, Cline acknowledged that Lisa began writing
    letters to the children in November 2018, but they refused them until January 2021. Cline stated
    that the agency did not withhold the letters from the children, and the children’s therapists
    decided when they were emotionally ready for them.
    ¶ 32          In July 2021, Lisa visited virtually with Dav. and De. with their therapist present. After,
    the children told the therapist they were distressed and did not want virtual visits. Dav. and De.
    also began showing regressive behavior at school. The therapist discontinued virtual visits but
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    allowed prerecorded video visits and letter exchanges because the boys said they were open to
    it. Lisa did not resume writing letters or making videos until December 2021. According to
    Lisa’s therapist, she was “stuck in her own feelings and how this was affecting her instead of
    realizing the impact her behaviors were having on the boys.” Cline acknowledged Lisa was
    likely disappointed that the children asked to stop virtual visits, but he found the five-month
    period in which Lisa failed to communicate with Dav. and De. to show a lack of understanding
    about how her behavior affected the boys. Virtual visits between Lisa and Dav. and De.
    resumed in July 2022 and occurred sporadically, about once a month. Cline said he did not ask
    the boys about the visits and was unaware of issues or concerns.
    ¶ 33         Cline agreed that Lisa consistently attended weekly therapy and attempted to address her
    treatment goals. He also acknowledged Lisa was willing to engage in additional services,
    including family therapy, parent/child psychotherapy, and parent coaching, but those services
    were not available to her absent in-person contact with the children. Nonetheless, Cline
    believed Lisa had not made substantial progress in taking responsibility for her physical abuse
    or understanding how her actions and behavior have affected the children and how to respond
    to the trauma they experienced in her care positively.
    ¶ 34         Darcy Boyd, a DCFS investigator, was assigned on September 14, 2017, after receiving a
    hotline call regarding Dav., then seven years old. Boyd met Dav. at his school on September
    19. She asked him to remove his shirt and saw old and new marks on his arms, torso, and back.
    Dav. told her Lisa caused the marks. Boyd also met then-nine-year-old Dam. who attended the
    same school and saw similar marks on him. Boyd said Dam. was crying but would not tell her
    how he got the marks.
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    ¶ 35         Boyd said that the children’s injuries were significant. After talking to her supervisor, she
    took the boys into protective custody. At a hospital, she saw additional injuries, and the boys
    told Boyd they had a younger brother, De. The next day, with police assistance, Boyd removed
    De. from Lisa’s home and took him into protective custody. Boyd saw loop marks on his torso.
    Boyd said Lisa acknowledged hitting the boys with a stick, describing it as discipline and not
    abuse. In evidence are photos taken at the hospital showing loop marks and linear marks on
    the children’s legs, backs, arms, and torso in various stages of healing.
    ¶ 36                                          Lisa’s Testimony
    ¶ 37         After the State rested, Lisa testified that the children were placed with her in 2014, and she
    adopted them in 2015. She first used corporal punishment in 2017. She admitted to hitting
    them more than once and said she had remorse, and apologized to the children repeatedly. Lisa
    also told them they have a right to be angry at her for what she did.
    ¶ 38         Regarding services, Lisa testified that she completed a psychological assessment, engaged
    in therapy, completed a Juvenile Court Clinic evaluation, parenting classes, a psychiatric
    evaluation, and domestic violence counseling. She said she missed therapy from March to
    September 2020 due to the COVID pandemic and because of her and her mother’s health
    issues, but she has been consistently attending therapy since September 2020. Lisa was willing
    to participate in other recommended services, including parent coaching and family therapy,
    but they were not offered to her because the children were not ready for them yet. Lisa said
    she participated in all child and family team meetings and administrative case reviews. She
    kept in contact with the assigned caseworkers and consistently requested visits.
    ¶ 39         Lisa had no in-person visits with the children since they were taken into protective custody
    in 2017, though she repeatedly requested them. In 2018, Lisa sent letters to the children, which
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    they received in 2019 because they were not ready before then. She began sending videos in
    2021 and received videos from Dav. and De. She never received letters or videos from Dam.
    ¶ 40         Lisa virtually visited with Dav. and De. in July 2021. She thought the visit went well, but
    virtual visits were suspended because De. had emotional problems after the visit. About two
    months later, she again began sending letters to Dav. and De. and sent them videos about a
    year later. Lisa said the delay was not to punish the boys but due to her medical issues as well
    as her parents’ medical issues. Virtual visits with Dav. and De. resumed in July 2022 without
    any cancellations. But Lisa had not visited with Dam.
    ¶ 41         Lisa said she began using corporal punishment in 2017 because her life was “spiraling out
    of control.” She was taking care of her parents who both had cancer and had her own medical
    issues and was under a lot of stress, which she did not handle well. On cross-examination, Lisa
    acknowledged that DCFS hotline calls were made in 2016 regarding Dam.’s welfare, and
    DCFS opened an investigation into her physical abuse of Dam. Lisa said she separated from
    her husband in 1997, but he continued coming to her house to visit their two biological
    children. She denied that her husband used corporal punishment on Dav. Dam., or and De. and
    said she would have stopped him if he had.
    ¶ 42         Lisa acknowledged she pleaded guilty to aggravated battery of a child and was placed on
    probation for to two years. Lisa denied telling Sean Cline that she hit the boys on only one
    occasion; she admitted she hit De. more than once and hit Dav. and Dam. more than she hit
    De. Lisa said the children’s wounds never led to bleeding and denied hitting De. on the face
    with a stick, biting the boys, or burning them. Shortly before the boys were taken into
    protective custody, De. fell off his bike at daycare, causing a scar on his face.
    ¶ 43                                          Unfitness Findings
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    ¶ 44         After considering the evidence and testimony, the trial court found Lisa was unfit because
    she (i) committed extreme or repeated cruelty to the children based on the “multiple whupping
    marks” on the children, (ii) failed to protect them from conditions injurious to their welfare,
    (iii) behaved in a depraved manner, and (iv) failed to make reasonable effort or progress toward
    the children returning home. The trial court stated that the photographs admitted into evidence
    were “beyond offensive” and “demonstrate the degree of violence.” The trial court also
    considered the children’s “hesitation in having a continued relationship with their mother.”
    The court found that Lisa had not made reasonable progress, given that the children were afraid
    of her and did not want to meet or communicate with her.
    ¶ 45                                        Best Interest Hearing
    ¶ 46         Lisa did not appear at the best interest hearing. The trial court took judicial notice of the
    unfitness evidence and findings. The State again called Sean Cline, who testified that 15-year-
    old Dam. lived with his paternal great aunt since March 2021. He has an IEP and takes
    medication for ADHD and Major Depressive Disorder. Dam. had been diagnosed with PTSD
    with dissociative symptoms and was seeing a psychiatrist. He had been waitlisted for therapy
    and received trauma-focused therapy in the past. He was hospitalized for two weeks for
    suicidal ideation and was taken to the emergency room after ingesting too much edible
    marijuana. Cline said this was not Dam.’s first use of marijuana and opined that Dam. could
    benefit from substance abuse services.
    ¶ 47         Cline testified that Dam. was having instability issues because his foster parent was not
    following agency recommendations requiring supervised visits with his biological mother.
    Dam. was going on his own to see his biological mother, who told Cline she did not want to
    deal with Dam. because he was disrespectful. His foster parent also was not following the
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    agency’s recommendations on preparing Dam. for adulthood. So, the agency was exploring
    other placement options. Dam., a freshman in high school, was failing in three classes,
    frequently tardy, and missing assignments. The agency recommended terminating Lisa’s
    parental rights to Dam., whom she had had no contact with since 2017. Dam. claimed Lisa
    tried to kill him, and he had no interest in a relationship with her now or in the future and
    wanted her parental rights terminated.
    ¶ 48         Cline testified that Dav. had been in the non-relative foster home of Catherine B. since
    May 2019, along with De., who arrived in November 2019. De., who had been receiving
    trauma therapy since 2018, took medication for ADHD. De. had made progress since moving
    to his foster home and maintained good grades, though he exhibited disruptive behavior. Lisa
    had withheld food from the children, and Dav. and De. hide food under their beds and take
    things at home and school that did not belong to them. De.’s teacher frequently contacted his
    foster mother to discuss his behavior, but he was improving.
    ¶ 49         Dav. has asthma and an inhaler. He also has DiGeorge Syndrome, caused by the deletion
    of a small segment of Chromosome 22, so he has a small stature and some developmental delay
    issues. He was not currently taking medication but was being monitored annually at Lurie
    Children’s Hospital’s DiGeorge Clinic. Dav. has an IEP and is doing well in school. Dav. and
    De. see their foster mother as their primary caregiver, are attached to her, and want her to adopt
    them. Cline opined that the foster mother provides a sense of security, stability, and
    permanency and ensures their needs are met. They have a loving relationship, and adoption by
    Catherine B. would be in the boys’ best interests.
    ¶ 50         Foster parent Catherine B. testified that Dav. and De. have been living with her since 2019,
    and she wants to adopt them. She said the boys are part of her family, and she loves them. She
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    has another adopted son of 10 years, Jaylen, who was 13 years old. Jaylen has cerebral palsy
    and requires help, but Catherine B. is retired and has time to take care of him. Jaylen also has
    a DHS-provided personal assistant, and Dav. and De. help out by playing with Jaylen.
    Catherine B. recently had skin cancer currently in remission. If Catherine B. could not care for
    Dav. and De., her sister would become their primary caretaker. She also has a strong support
    system and family members who live nearby and are available to help.
    ¶ 51                                         Best Interest Ruling
    ¶ 52         After closing arguments, the trial court found the State proved by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the children’s best interests were in terminating Lisa’s parental rights. The court
    said that although Dam. was not currently in a pre-adoptive home, “he is suffering with the
    impact of the abuse. *** It is very clear*** there should be a termination of parental rights.
    And it is in [Dam’s] best interest.” As to Dav. and De., the court found “the quality of life that
    [Catherine B.] has provided these two children has been excellent, and I believe she’s on the
    path to continuing to do that.” The children “have a support system, *** they are loved and
    they are a part of a family and extended family.” The court concluded terminating parental
    rights was in Dav.’s and De.’s best interest.
    ¶ 53         At the permanency hearing, caseworker Sean Cline testified that his agency was
    recommending a permanency goal of independence for Dam. based on his current foster
    placement with his great aunt and his interest and willingness to work toward that goal. The
    agency was recommending a permanency goal of adoption for Dav. and De. because they have
    a stable, nurturing foster home and want to be adopted by Catherine B. The trial court agreed
    and entered the permanency orders Cline recommended.
    ¶ 54                                               Analysis
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    ¶ 55                                          Best Interest Finding
    ¶ 56          Lisa concedes her use of corporal punishment was sufficient to support the trial court’s
    unfitness finding under subsections (e) and (i) of the Act. Thus, she has forfeited issues related
    to the unfitness finding. In re H.S., 
    2016 IL App (1st) 161589
     ¶ 36. See also Ill. S. Ct. R.
    341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued [in appellant’s brief] are waived and shall not
    be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”). Instead, she
    contends that (i) the delay in visitation warrants reversal of the best interest finding and (ii) the
    best interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    ¶ 57          When the trial court finds a parent unfit under one of the grounds of section 1(D) of the
    Adoption Act, it must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests
    of the child under 1-3 (4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)).
    At a best interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship
    yields to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The
    child’s best interest is the paramount consideration to which no other takes precedence. In re
    Austin W., 
    214 Ill. 2d 31
    , 46 (2005). The State bears the burden of proving that termination of
    parental rights and adoption is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence.
    In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. We will not disturb a trial court’s best interests finding unless it
    is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re B’yata I., 
    2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B
    , ¶
    41. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the facts clearly demonstrate
    that the court should have reached the opposite result. In re N.B., 
    191 Ill. 2d 338
    , 346 (2000).
    The sufficiency of the evidence in a termination-of-parental-rights case depends on the
    particular facts and circumstances presented. In re G.L., 
    329 Ill. App. 3d 18
    , 26 (2002).
    Because the grounds for unfitness are independent of one another, we may affirm the judgment
    16
    1-23-1107
    if the evidence supports any of the trial court’s grounds of unfitness. In re Addison R., 
    2013 IL App (2d) 121318
    , ¶ 35 (single ground of unfitness sufficient to support finding of unfitness).
    ¶ 58         In determining a child’s best interests, the trial court considers 10 factors in section 1-
    3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987: (i) the physical safety and welfare of the minor,
    including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (ii) the development of the minor’s identity; (iii)
    the minor’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (iv) the minor’s
    sense of attachments; (v) the minor’s wishes and long-term goals; (vi) the minor’s community
    ties, including church, school, and friends; (vii) the minor’s need for permanence, including
    his or her relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other relatives; (viii) the uniqueness
    of every family and child; (ix) the risks attendant to the minor entering and being in substitute
    care; and (x) the preferences of the persons available to care for the minor. 705 ILCS 405/1-
    3(4.05) (West 2022). The trial court “is not required to explicitly mention, word-for-word,” the
    statutory factors. In re Janira T., 
    368 Ill. App. 3d 883
    , 894 (2006). In addition to these factors,
    the trial court may consider the nature and length of the child’s relationship with his or her
    present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have on the child’s emotional
    and psychological well-being. In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 262.
    ¶ 59         Lisa argues the State’s handling of the case warrants reversal of the best interest finding.
    Specifically, she contends the State, through the assigned agency and caseworker, is
    responsible for a three-year delay between the 2018 visitation order and her first virtual visit
    in 2021, which prevented her from making progress in reunifying with the children.
    ¶ 60         Lisa relies on In re Interest of Overton, 
    21 Ill. App. 3d 1014
     (1974) for support. In Overton,
    the appellate court overturned the trial court’s finding that a mother was unfit because she
    failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for her children’s
    17
    1-23-1107
    welfare. The court held that the finding was “not based upon clear and convincing evidence”
    because the mother had shown interest, concern, and responsibility as to her children's welfare,
    but DCFS had sabotaged or frustrated her efforts. Id. at 1019. The mother sent a gift to her
    children, but DCFS never delivered it. She wrote a letter to DCFS, which did not respond. Id.
    “If [the mother] did not see her children frequently enough, the Department was prepared to
    and did file a petition alleging that [the mother] did not show reasonable interest, yet, if she
    insisted upon seeing her children in opposition to the feelings of her case worker, her case
    worker may not have recommended the return of her children.” Id. In short, the mother made
    reasonable efforts, and the DCFS failed to meet her halfway “virtually ensur[ing] that once
    [the mother] was separated from her children she would eventually lose them permanently.”
    Id .
    ¶ 61             Lisa asserts that, as in Overton, the State hindered her efforts at reunification and “virtually
    ensured” her parental rights would be terminated by refusing to facilitate her visitation with
    the children for three years. We disagree. Overton is distinguishable as it involved an unfitness
    finding rather than a best interest finding. Further, Overton did not involve physical abuse, nor
    did the children indicate they wanted no contact with their mother.
    ¶ 62             Furthermore, the record does not show the State hindered visitation. Rather, the evidence
    shows the children’s wishes and the recommendations of their therapists guided visitation.
    CCJCC evaluated the children and decided, based on the trauma during Lisa’s care, that visits
    should not occur until the children wanted them and their therapists deemed them appropriate.
    Despite the efforts of the children’s therapists to prepare them for a visit, they remained
    adamant for years that they wanted no contact with her. The family service plans introduced
    into evidence document the children’s fear of Lisa and repeated refusal to have visits with her.
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    1-23-1107
    Dam. refused all contact with Lisa since the case began, and not until January 2021 did Dav.’s
    and De.’s therapist deem them ready to receive letters and prerecorded messages from Lisa.
    They then met with Lisa virtually in July 2021 but struggled emotionally afterward, prompting
    their therapist to stop virtual visits and resume letters and prerecorded messages. Lisa chose
    not to send letters or videos for five months because, according to her therapist, she was upset
    with the decision.
    ¶ 63          Lisa notes that the State did not call the therapists to testify at the best interests hearing.
    The State was not required to call the therapists, as the record documents their findings and
    recommendations. Moreover, Lisa could have called the therapists to testify if she believed
    they were not working to restore the bond between her and the children and actively thwarted
    efforts at reunification. In short, the record shows the children’s caseworker and therapists
    attempted to restore the relationship and facilitated communication with Lisa through letters,
    videos, and, eventually, virtual visits. Nonetheless, for years, the children wanted no contact.
    Although Dav. and De. progressed to some contact, they never wanted in-person visits, and
    their therapists never found them emotionally ready for in-person visits.
    ¶ 64          We also disagree with Lisa’s alternative argument that the trial court’s best interest finding
    was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State did not present testimony
    regarding the eight-month period between November 2022 and June 2023, when she had
    virtual visits with Dav. and De. Even assuming those visits went well, they do not provide
    grounds for reversing the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best
    interest. Notably, the trial court heard caseworker Cline testify about the recent virtual visits,
    which he said occured sporadically without any issues or concerns. So, the trial court could
    consider those visits in its best interest finding.
    19
    1-23-1107
    ¶ 65         Moreover, the evidence supports the court’s finding. Dav. and De. have been placed in a
    safe, loving, happy, and appropriate foster home. They are bonded to their foster mother, who
    provides for all their needs. The foster mother testified that she loves the boys and wants to
    adopt them. The boys are well integrated into the family and extended family; they love their
    foster mother and want her to adopt them. As to Dam., he was 15 years old and has refused all
    contact with Lisa since 2017. The photos of his injuries show the extensive abuse he endured;
    he said he believes she tried to kill him and never wants to see her again. Although Dam.,
    unlike his brothers, is not in a pre-adoptive home, given the extent of the abuse and the absence
    of a relationship with Lisa for more than five years, the trial court’s finding that termination of
    parental rights was in his best interest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    ¶ 66         The State recommended Lisa’s parental rights be terminated. Lisa did not attend the
    hearing and thus did not testify on the issue of termination of her parental rights. The children’s
    cases have been in the court system for six years, during which time Lisa has never had an in-
    person visit with them because the children did not want them, and their therapist had not
    recommended them. As a result, the children could not be safely returned to her custody any
    time soon. It was in the children’s best interests to have the stability and permanency that their
    adoption by the foster parent could afford. In re D.F., 
    208 Ill. 2d 223
    , 231 (2003) (purpose of
    the Juvenile Court Act is to secure permanency for minors who have been removed from
    custody of their parents “at the earliest opportunity.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2022)). Thus,
    we affirm the trial court.
    ¶ 67         Affirmed.
    20
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1-23-1107

Filed Date: 1/12/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2024