People v. Delaney , 2024 IL App (5th) 240231 ( 2024 )

NOTICE
2024 IL App (5th) 240231Decision filed 05/08/24. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0231
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for IN THE
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Madison County.
)
v. ) No. 24-CF-111
)
MATTHEW DELANEY, ) Honorable
) Emily J. Nielsen,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Barberis and Boie concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The People of the State of Illinois appeal the trial court’s order granting defendant,
Matthew Delaney, pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known
as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act). See Pub. Act 102-
1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting
effective date as September 18, 2023). The State argues the trial court applied the incorrect
definition for a forcible felony under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand
for a new hearing on the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release.
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¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On January 17, 2024, defendant was charged, by information, with unlawful possession of
a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony, in violation of section 4-103(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle
Code (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2022)) and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace
officer, a Class 4 felony, in violation of section 11-204.1(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code (id. § 11-
204.1(a)(1)). On the same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release
under section 110-6.1(a)(8) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2022)), alleging
defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution and was charged with a felony
offense other than a Class 4 offense.
¶4 On January 31, 2024, the State filed an amended verified petition to deny defendant pretrial
release. The petition requested detention (1) under section 110-6.1(a)(8), alleging defendant had a
high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution and was charged with any felony described
in section 110-6.1(a)(1) through (a)(5) (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(5)), and (2) under section 110-
6.1(a)(1.5) (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)), alleging defendant was charged with aggravated fleeing, a
forcible felony as defined in the statute, and that his pretrial release posed a real and present threat
to any person or the community. The petition further asserted the factual basis that defendant was
in a vehicle that was reported stolen and fled when the Madison County Sheriff’s Department
attempted to apprehend him. Defendant’s speed was 87 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone.
Defendant was on parole for home invasion, aggravated battery with a firearm, and burglaries.
¶5 At the pretrial detention hearing held on January 31, 2024, the State contended—
inter alia—that aggravated fleeing, as charged, was a detainable offense under section 110-
6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)). It reasoned that, under section 2-8 of the Criminal
Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2022)), the definition of a forcible felony included “any other
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felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual”;
however, the Act expanded the definition of a forcible felony for the purposes of section 110-
6.1(a)(1.5) to include “any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily
harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” According to the State, any felony conduct that
created a threat of great bodily harm falls within the forcible felony definition in section 110-
6.1(a)(1.5). In support of its position, the State cited People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d)
230450, where the court found the charge of resisting or obstructing a police officer causing injury
fell within the Act’s forcible felony definition, where the defendant fled from a traffic stop in
which an officer was partially trapped in the vehicle as the defendant fled. The State averred the
Third District reasoned those facts involved the threat of great bodily harm in that defendant
contemplated the use of force and was willing to use it.
¶6 The court asked what facts in this case would suggest that defendant threatened or inflicted
great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. The State argued that, after discovering
the vehicle was stolen, officers attempted a traffic stop and the vehicle was speeding in excess of
21 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. The officers deployed spike strips, which
successfully struck one of the tires. The vehicle continued to flee despite the officers having
activated their lights and sirens. The vehicle also crossed over a raised median and went head-on
with oncoming traffic. The vehicle stopped after it struck a Honda Civic head-on. The State argued
that driving through spike strips, then driving into oncoming traffic at excessive speeds and striking
a vehicle head-on, involved a threat or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement.
3
¶7 The court asked if the individual driving the Honda Civic sustained any injury. The State
averred the individual declined medical treatment, but it did not believe that negated the risk the
driving head-on in traffic posed to the community.
¶8 Defense counsel argued—inter alia—that she had never seen aggravated fleeing listed as
a forcible felony and did not believe the State could provide any case law or statute that listed or
defined aggravated fleeing as a forcible felony. Counsel noted that the defendant in Rodriguez was
not charged with aggravated fleeing and rather regarded a person resisting or obstructing a peace
officer causing injury. Counsel contended the defendant in Rodriguez knew the officer was holding
on as he continued to flee and that was why he was charged with resisting causing an injury, which
is distinguishable from the instant case. Counsel clarified that she was not contending defendant’s
offense as charged was not serious but argued there was no evidence to support the idea that
defendant contemplated his actions would harm anyone and no one was, in fact, harmed.
¶9 The court asked if the State had a response to counsel distinguishing Rodriguez. It also
specifically asked, “While [defendant’s actions] might be reckless endangerment or some other
level of—you know, gross negligence or something along those lines, what evidence do you have
that would show the Court that he contemplated injuring a specific individual or someone in the
community?” The State replied that fleeing from officers at a high rate of speed and going into
oncoming traffic creates a threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement. It reiterated that “based on the acts of this defendant created that threat as far as the
risk *** of infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability.” After the court asked if the
conduct in Rodriguez involved actual contemplation of the use of force, the State argued the act of
fleeing shows a contemplation to create a probability of threat of great bodily harm and that
defendant had an opportunity to stop this incident.
4
¶ 10 Based on the State’s proffer, the parties’ arguments, and the language of section 110-
6.1(a)(1.5), the court found the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed a qualifying offense. The court
reasoned that, while the forcible felony definition statute included “any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual” (720 ILCS 5/2-8
(West 2022)) and section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) included “any other felony which involves the threat of
or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement” (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)), it interpreted the language in the Code to place a higher burden and to
be more narrow in that an injury that was not permanent or disfiguring or great in nature was not
enough. Because the court found that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that defendant committed a qualifying offense, it did not believe it had the authority to move on
and make further findings regarding whether defendant posed a real and present threat to any
person(s) or the community or willful flight.
¶ 11 The court issued a release order, finding that the State failed to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed
an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)).
The order found that the State’s reliance on Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450, was unfounded,
as Rodriguez was distinguishable because, in that case, an officer had part of his body inside the
vehicle when the defendant moved the vehicle, resulting in the officer’s arm being slammed in the
door. The order noted that the Rodiguez court reasoned the defendant contemplated the use of force
and was willing to use it. Conversely, in this case, the State failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant contemplated the use of force and was willing to use it or that
his conduct resulted in the infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.
5
The order further stated, “While his conduct may potentially threaten or could have resulted in
great bodily harm, or permanent disfigurement, no evidence was presented that anyone was injured
or that defendant contemplated the threat of the same.” The order found, based on the plain
language of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), the State failed to meet its burden that the proof was evident
or the presumption great that defendant committed a forcible felony. Accordingly, under the Code,
the court did not have the authority to determine whether defendant posed a real and present threat
to the community, whether defendant had a likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, or
whether any conditions would mitigate the real and present threat or defendant’s willful flight.
¶ 12 On February 12, 2024, the State filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently filed a
supporting memorandum. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). The Office of the State Appellate
Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal and filed a Rule 604(h) memorandum in
response to the State’s arguments. 1
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Pretrial release is governed by the Act as codified in article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS
5/art. 110 (West 2022)). A defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily
limited situations. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. After filing a timely verified petition requesting denial
of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the
proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a qualifying offense, (2) the
defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the
community or a flight risk, and (3) less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight
1
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case
was due on or before May 2, 2024, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based on the
high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the complexity
of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending the deadline.
6
from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e). The sole issue on appeal is whether the charged offense was a
qualifying offense as defined in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5).
¶ 15 The State contends that the trial court applied the wrong definition of “forcible felony”
under the Act and that no evidence of defendant’s contemplation of the use of force should be
required under the language of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Resolution of the State’s contentions
require us to interpret section110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code.
¶ 16 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that is subject to de novo review. People
v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 15. The primary object of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the true intent of the legislature, and all other rules are subordinate to this principle.
People v. Jamison, 229 Ill. 2d 184, 188 (2008). “The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is
the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Clark, 2019 IL
122891, ¶ 20. “A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of
other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation.” Id. “Each word, clause, and sentence of a
statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous.”
Id.¶ 17 Section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) defines forcible felony for purposes of detainable offenses under
the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). It specifically lists numerous felonies that are
considered forcible felonies under the Act and also contains a residual clause that includes any
felony “which involves the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement.” Id.¶ 18 The State argues that, while the trial court noted the difference between the residual clause
in section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2022)) (forcible felony
definition statute) and section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West
7
2022)) (section defining forcible felony for purpose of the Act) related to the required level of
injury, the court failed to acknowledge that, unlike the residual clause in section 2-8, the Act’s
forcible felony residual clause does not require the threat be particularized to a person or any
individual. As such, the plain language of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) does not require a defendant to
specifically contemplate injury to a particular person or make a threat targeting a particular person.
Rather, section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) includes any felony that involves the threat of great bodily harm or
permanent disability or disfigurement, in its general sense, to the community at large. It contends,
if the legislature intended to limit the definition of a forcible felony to threats particularized to an
individual, it would have stated such or drafted the section to state: “any other felony which
involves a threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability.” As such, the court
erred in requiring the State to prove defendant’s intent to injure. We agree.
¶ 19 The language of the residual clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) plainly includes any other
felony, than those listed, “which involves the threat *** of great bodily harm or permanent
disability or disfigurement.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). The legislature did not
include an intent element, a limitation that the threat be against a specific individual, or that
defendant contemplated the threat of great bodily harm. We therefore cannot read those conditions
into the statute. People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10 (“[W]here the language used is plain and
unambiguous, we may not ‘depart from its terms’ or read into the rule exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that conflict with the drafters’ intent.” (quoting Acme Markets, Inc. v. Callanan, 236
Ill. 2d 29, 38 (2009))).
¶ 20 Defendant argues that a similar argument was recently rejected in People v. Minssen, 2024
IL App (4th) 231198, which held that the legislature intended the residual clause in section 110-
6.1(a)(1.5) to encompass fewer offenses than the residual clause in section 2-8 and that the
8
possibility to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement was insufficient.
Defendant, however, misconstrues Minssen.
¶ 21 In Minssen, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the defendant
was charged with a forcible felony under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) by attempting to bite an officer.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 24. Minssen found the State failed to show there was a realistic threat that defendant could
inflict great bodily harm on, permanently disable, or disfigure the officer, where the record failed
to contain information about the circumstances of the attempted bite. The court explained that
section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) encompassed fewer offenses than the residual forcible felony clause in
section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012, where the latter required “the use or threat of physical
force or violence against any individual” and the Code required “threat of or infliction of great
bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 21. Minssen reasoned that, while it was possible biting someone could cause great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or disfigurement, not all bites would result as such. Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 22 Despite defendant’s contentions, Minssen found section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) encompassed
fewer offenses than the general forcible felony definition based on the severity of the harm at issue.
Id. ¶ 21. It did not assert that the possibility to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
disfigurement based on the defendant’s actions—alone—would be insufficient to constitute a
forcible felony under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Rather, it found that the State in that case failed to
prove the attempted biting raised the possibility of great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
disfigurement, where the State failed to proffer the circumstances surrounding the biting. See id.
¶ 22. Because Minssen did not consider whether intent or contemplation of the threat was
necessary under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), it is not informative.
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¶ 23 We acknowledge the trial court here relied on Rodriguez’s reasoning that the defendant in
that case “contemplated the use of the force and was willing to use it” (Rodriguez, 2023 IL App
(3d) 230450, ¶ 10) to distinguish Rodriguez from the instant case. However, Rodriguez did not
make this statement after analyzing whether contemplation of the use of force was a necessary
requirement under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Id. Nor was it necessary for Rodriguez to determine
such issue where the defendant in that case clearly contemplated and used force capable of great
bodily harm by driving away while part of an officer’s body was in the vehicle. Moreover,
Rodriguez cited People v. McGhee, 2020 IL App (3d) 180349, ¶ 62, to support that statement.
McGhee, however, discussed the residual forcible felony clause in section 2-8. Id. ¶¶ 58-63.
Because the language in section 110-6.1 differs from that in section 2-8, case law interpreting the
latter is not controlling here. See People v. Brannon, 2024 IL App (2d) 240059-U, ¶ 21 n.3.
¶ 24 Defendant also asserts that, under the State’s interpretation, aggravated fleeing would
automatically become a detainable offense because “[t]he threat of great bodily harm to the public
[would] be established by the very nature of the offense, regardless of whether the defendant
specifically contemplated a use of force in creating that threat.” Defendant argues such
interpretation would lead to absurd results that were not intended by the legislature because the
State could simply allege any felony offense may have the potential to involve the threat of or
infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement, through hypothetical
examples of what could have happened, instead of what actually happened in a case. We disagree.
¶ 25 Our interpretation would not require every felony or charge of aggravated fleeing to be
considered a forcible felony. Rather, under our interpretation, a forcible felony occurs only when
the circumstances of a particular case show that defendant’s actions actually threatened or inflicted
great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement.
10
¶ 26 The recent decision in People v. Salazar, 2024 IL App (3d) 240066-U, supports our
position. In Salazar, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s
aggravated fleeing and eluding charge constituted a forcible felony under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5).
Id. ¶ 16. It reasoned that fleeing officers “at a very high rate of speed, disobeying three traffic
control devices, on one occasion weaving around cars stopped at an intersection” involved a threat
of great bodily harm to other persons on the roadway. Id. In determining that the charged felony
constituted a forcible felony under the residual clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), Salazar did not
rely on evidence of defendant’s subjective intent but rather focused on the nature and recklessness
of defendant’s actions. See id.
¶ 27 Accordingly, we find the residual forcible felony clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) does not
require the State to prove defendant contemplated and was willing to use force sufficient to cause
great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement. As such, we find the court
misinterpreted the requirements of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5). Given the court’s misunderstanding of
the law, we reverse the court’s order granting pretrial release and remand for the court to hold a
new hearing on the State’s amended verified petition to deny pretrial release in accordance with
this disposition.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 The trial court erred in finding the residual forcible felony clause in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5)
of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)) required the State to prove defendant
contemplated and was willing to use force necessary to cause great bodily harm, permanent
disability, or disfigurement. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order granting pretrial release and
remand for the court to hold a new hearing on the State’s amended verified petition to deny pretrial
release in accordance with this disposition.
11
¶ 30 Reversed and remanded.
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People v. Delaney, 2024 IL App (5th) 240231Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, No. 24-CF-
111; the Hon. Emily J. Nielsen, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys
for Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People.
Appellant:
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Christopher M.
for O’Connor, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for
Appellee: the appellee.
13