People v. Pruitt , 2024 IL App (3d) 210343 ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 210343Order filed May 14, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois.
Respondent-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0343
v. ) Circuit No. 03-CF-498
)
LIONELL H. PRUITT, ) The Honorable
) Katherine S. Gorman,
Petitioner-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Petitioner proved his entitlement to a certificate of innocence where he pled guilty
to the sole count in an indictment charging him with violating an unconstitutional
provision of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute and, at the same
time, pled guilty to another crime contained in a different indictment.
¶2 In 2003, petitioner Lionell H. Pruitt entered into a combined plea agreement, pleading
guilty to two charges contained in two separate indictments: aggravated unlawful use of a weapon
(AUUW) and possession of a controlled substance. After petitioner served his concurrent sentence
on those charges, he filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court granted the petition
and vacated petitioner’s AUUW conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for a certificate of
innocence (COI), which the Peoria County circuit court denied. Petitioner appeals the denial of his
petition for a COI. We vacate the circuit court’s decision and remand for issuance of a COI.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 27, 2003, the State charged petitioner with unlawful possession of a controlled
substance (720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2002)) in Peoria County case No. 03-CF-410. Two months
later, the State charged petitioner by indictment with AUUW (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West
2002))1 in Peoria County case No. 03-CF-498. The indictment alleged that petitioner “while
located in the vicinity of the 300 block of W. Richmond Street in Peoria, Illinois knowingly carried
concealed upon his person at a time when he was not on his own land, in his own abode, or fixed
place of business, an uncased, loaded firearm that was immediately accessible to him.”
¶5 On July 21, 2003, petitioner pled guilty in a combined plea agreement to the charges in
both cases. On the controlled substance charge, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 60 days in
county jail with credit for 7 days served. On the AUUW charge, the court sentenced petitioner to
180 days in county jail with credit for 67 days served. The trial court ordered petitioner’s sentences
to run concurrently. The court also ordered petitioner to serve 30 months of probation on each case
concurrently after he completed his jail sentence.
¶6 In 2013, in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22, our supreme court ruled that the Class
4 form of AUUW, which petitioner was charged with, “violates the right to keep and bear arms,
as guaranteed by the second amendment to the United States Constitution.” Thus, “the statute is
1
While the indictment cited subsection (a)(1) of the AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2002)), the
language of the indictment described the Class 4 form of AUUW, as set forth in subsection (a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) of
the AUUW statute (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d)).
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said to be void ab initio or void from the beginning.” People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d)
160648, ¶ 20.
¶7 In January 2021, petitioner, as a self-represented litigant, filed a petition for relief from
judgment. He argued that his AUUW conviction should be vacated as a void judgment because
the portion of the statute he was convicted of violating was held unconstitutional in Aguilar. The
State filed a response conceding that petitioner’s conviction for AUUW “is now void under
Aguilar.” On February 17, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting petitioner’s petition for
relief from judgment, vacating his conviction for AUUW and deeming it void ab initio.
¶8 In March 2021, petitioner, as a self-represented litigant, filed a petition seeking a COI in
Peoria County case No. 03-CF-498. He asserted that, in light of the supreme court’s decision in
Aguilar, his conviction and sentence for AUUW were unconstitutional and void ab initio, causing
him to be wrongfully incarcerated for that offense. The State filed a response, arguing that the
petition should be denied because (1) it was not timely filed, and (2) petitioner has subsequently
been convicted of additional crimes, including murder. The State later filed a response arguing
petitioner was not entitled to a COI because he pled guilty, relying on People v. Washington, 2020
IL App (1st) 163024 (rev’d, 2023 IL 127952).
¶9 The trial court held a hearing on the petition for a COI on July 9, 2021. At that hearing, the
State argued that petitioner was not entitled to a COI because (1) his petition was not timely filed,
and (2) he brought about his conviction by pleading guilty. After the hearing, the trial court entered
a written order denying petitioner’s petition for a COI, finding the State’s arguments in response
to the petition to be “well taken.”
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 11 On appeal, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition for a COI
because he satisfied all the statutory requirements. The State responds that the trial court properly
denied petitioner a COI because he failed to satisfy two of the four statutory elements.
¶ 12 A trial court’s ruling on a petition for a COI will usually not be reversed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. See People v. Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, ¶ 11. However, because
we are called upon to interpret the COI statute, the standard of review is de novo. See id.¶ 13 In 2008, the Illinois legislature enacted the COI statute. Pub. Act 95-970, § 15 (eff. Sept.
22, 2008) (adding 735 ILCS 5/2-702)). In subsection (a) of the statute, the legislature declared
“that innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes in Illinois have been frustrated
in seeking legal redress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the law and that
such persons should have an available avenue to obtain a finding of innocence so that they may
obtain relief through a petition in the Court of Claims.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(a) (West 2022).
Subsection (g) of the COI statute “states the elements to obtain a COI.” People v. Moore, 2020 IL
App (1st) 190435, ¶ 20. Subsection (g) provides:
“(g) In order to obtain a certificate of innocence the petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and
subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the
sentence;
(2)(A) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or
information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the petitioner was found not
guilty at the new trial or the petitioner was not retried and the indictment or information
dismissed; or (B) the statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or
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information was based violated the Constitution of the United States or the State of
Illinois;
(3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information
or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment or information did not
constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the State; and
(4) the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his
or her conviction.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(a)-(c),(g) (West 2022).
¶ 14 A. Subsection (g)(3)
¶ 15 The State argues for the first time on appeal that petitioner did not satisfy subsection (g)(3)
of the statute because he did not prove for each charge he pled guilty to in his combined guilty
plea that he was innocent or that his acts did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the
State. Petitioner responds that the State forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below.
Alternatively, petitioner contends that the State’s argument is without merit because subsection
(g)(3) required him to prove only that his AUUW conviction did not constitute a felony or
misdemeanor against the State.
¶ 16 “Ordinarily, issues not raised in the trial court are considered forfeited on appeal.” People
v. Chapman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 317, 326 (2007). However, “[a]n appellee may raise any argument
in support of the trial court's judgment, even if the argument was not raised before the trial court,
provided the argument has a sufficient factual basis in the record.” People v. Coyne, 2014 IL App
(1st) 123105, ¶ 20 (citing People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 563 (2003)).
¶ 17 In the circuit court, the State asserted three reasons why petitioner was not entitled to a
COI: (1) he did not timely file his petition for COI; (2) he has been incarcerated many more times
since his conviction for AUUW and is currently incarcerated for murder; and (3) he caused or
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brought about his conviction by pleading guilty. Neither in its written responses to the petition nor
orally at the hearing on the petition did the State argue, as it does now, that petitioner failed to
satisfy subsection (g)(3) of the COI statute. However, as the appellee in this case, the State can
assert this argument for the first time on appeal to support the trial court’s denial of the petition for
COI because the record establishes that petitioner entered into a joint guilty plea for two crimes
contained in two separate indictments. See Coyne, 2014 IL App (1st) 123105, ¶ 20. Thus, we will
examine the merits of the State’s argument.
¶ 18 In construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative
intent as evidenced by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v. Palmer,
2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must interpret
it as written and not read into it “exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not
express.” People v. Legoo, 2020 IL 124965, ¶ 14. Because a petitioner’s ability to obtain a COI is
created solely by statute, courts cannot engraft conditions not contained within the statute. People
v. Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, ¶ 38.
¶ 19 Articles in a statute are meaningful; they “should not be overlooked or discounted.” People
v. Hayden, 2018 IL App (4th) 160035, ¶ 122. “‘The’ is a restrictive term; it indicates that ‘a
following noun or noun equivalent refers to someone or something previously mentioned or clearly
understood from the context of the situation.’” Sibenaller v. Milschewski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 717,
722 (2008) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2368 (1986)). “Thus, a
principle of statutory construction is that ‘the definite article “the” particularizes the subject it
precedes. It is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of “a” or
“an.”’ (Emphasis added.)” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P. 2d 644, 655 (Colo. 1969)).
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¶ 20 Subsection (g)(3) requires the petitioner to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that
he “is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or information or his or her acts or
omissions charged in the indictment or information did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor
against the State.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILC 5/2-702(g) (West 2022). “[T]he indictment” in
subsection (g)(3) is a restrictive phrase that is first mentioned in the COI statute in subsection
(c)(2), which provides: “his or her judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the
indictment or information dismissed ***. (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2-702(c)(2). As used in the COI
statute, the phrase “the indictment” means “the indictment that charged the now-vacated
conviction.” People v. Lesley, 2024 IL App (3d) 210330, ¶ 43.
¶ 21 The language of subsection (g)(3) of the COI statute does not support the State’s position
that when a petitioner enters into a joint guilty plea for crimes charged in more than one indictment,
the petitioner must prove for all charges contained in all indictments that he was innocent or that
the acts do not constitute crimes. See id. ¶¶ 43-43. Rather, the unambiguous language of subsection
(g)(3) requires the petitioner to prove only that the charges contained in the indictment charging
him with the now-vacated crime do not constitute crimes and/or that he is innocent of those crimes.
See id.
¶ 22 Here, the only crime charged by the indictment in Peoria County case No. 03-CF-498 was
AUUW, which the supreme court found unconstitutional in Aguilar, thereby rendering the statute
void ab initio. See McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶ 20. Thus, petitioner satisfied his burden
under subsection (g)(3) of demonstrating that the acts charged in “the indictment” did not
constitute a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of this state. See id. ¶ 21.
¶ 23 B. Subsection (g)(4)
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¶ 24 The State also contends that petitioner did not satisfy subsection (g)(4) of the COI statute
because petitioner voluntarily caused or brought about his conviction by pleading guilty to
AUUW. Petitioner responds that pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in People v.
Washington, 2023 IL 127952, his guilty plea did not preclude him from obtaining a COI.
¶ 25 Subsection (g)(4) of the COI statute requires a petitioner to prove by the preponderance of
the evidence that he or she “did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his
or her conviction.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(4) (West 2022). In 2021, the First District ruled that “[a]
defendant who has pled guilty ‘cause[d] or brought about his or her conviction’ [citation] and is
not entitled to a certificate of innocence.” People v. Washington, 2020 IL App (1st) 163024, ¶ 25
(rev’d, 2023 IL 127952)). Our supreme court disagreed, finding “nothing in the plain language of
the certificate of innocence statute that precludes plea petitioners from obtaining a certificate of
innocence.” People v. Washington, 2023 IL 127952, ¶ 30. The supreme court explained:
“The legislative intent, as expressed in the plain language of the statute, does not reflect a
blank prohibition precluding petitioners convicted based on guilty pleas. The legislature
expressed its intent in the statute, stating the statutory purpose as threefold: (1) to sweep
away technical obstacles, (2) to preclude certificates to those petitioners who voluntarily
caused or brought about their convictions, and (3) to provide resources and compensation
for innocent people wrongly incarcerated. 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2016). Rather than
preclude plea petitioners, the legislature focused on the voluntariness of a petitioner's
conduct in causing or bringing about his conviction. The statute looks at the petitioner's
conduct, that is, whether he voluntarily caused or brought about his conviction, not whether
he pleaded guilty. A petitioner who pleaded guilty might not have caused or brought about
his conviction. The appellate court’s ruling eliminates from this group any petitioners who
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pleaded guilty, and its conclusion conflicts with the statute’s plain language and its intent.”
Id.¶ 26 The supreme court held that the determination of whether a petitioner voluntarily caused
or brought about his conviction “should be made considering the totality of the circumstances on
a case-by-case basis in light of the remedial purpose of the statute.” Id. ¶ 42. The court ultimately
concluded that the petitioner did not voluntarily cause or bring about his conviction because
“abusive and coercive conduct of the police” rendered his confession involuntary and led to his
involuntary decision to plead guilty. See id. ¶¶ 59-60.
¶ 27 In support of its decision, our supreme court in Washington cited with approval this court’s
decision in People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, stating:
“In People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶ 21, 424 Ill.Dec. 918, 110
N.E.3d 268, the appellate court found that, because the statute under which the petitioner
was convicted was found unconstitutional, the petitioner did not cause or bring about her
conviction. The appellate court reasoned that, because the statute criminalizing the
petitioner's conduct was void, her actions that resulted in her conviction were not criminal
when she committed them and she did not ‘intentionally cause or bring about her
conviction.’ Id. McClinton bolsters the intent of the legislature to broadly construe the
statute for petitioners who did not voluntarily cause or bring about their convictions to
provide an ‘available avenue to obtain a finding of innocence.’ 735 ILCS 5/2-702(a) (West
2016).” Washington, 2023 IL 127952, ¶ 44.
¶ 28 In McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, ¶ 20, we considered whether the petitioner
voluntarily brought about his conviction for AUUW. In that case, we stated:
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“When a statute is held to be facially unconstitutional, as is the situation in this case, the
statute is said to be void ab initio or void from the beginning. [Citation.] If the AUUW
statute is void from the beginning, McClinton's conduct on March 14 would not have
voluntarily brought about a conviction under a statute that was ‘constitutionally infirm
from the moment of its enactment.’ [Citation.] This reasoning further comports with the
legislative intent of the statute, which is to ‘distinguish between a finding of not guilty at
retrial and actual innocence of the charged offenses.’” Id.With respect to subsection (g)(4), we found the petitioner “did not intentionally cause or bring
about her conviction because the statute that criminalized McClinton’s actions is void ab initio,
and therefore, her actions for which she was charged, convicted, sentenced and incarcerated were
not criminal at the time.” Id. ¶ 21. Thus, we concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the petitioner a COI. Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 29 We acknowledge the facts of this case are distinguishable from McClinton, where the
petitioner was found guilty of AUUW following a trial. See id. ¶ 5. However, our court’s reasoning
in McClinton applies equally to a petitioner who pleads guilty to AUUW. See Lesley, 2024 IL App
(3d) 210330, ¶ 50. “[I]n either case, the statute that criminalized the conduct was void and so the
conduct was not criminal at the time.” Id. A “petitioner cannot be held to have caused or brought
about his conviction by pleading guilty to an unconstitutional offense.” Id.¶ 30 Here, petitioner was charged with and pled guilty to violating the portion of the AUUW
statute that our supreme court found unconstitutional in Aguilar. Because of its unconstitutionality,
that portion of the AUUW statute is considered void ab initio. See McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d)
160648, ¶ 20. As a result, petitioner’s guilty plea did not voluntarily cause or bring about his
conviction because petitioner pleaded guilty to acts that were “not criminal at the time” of his
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guilty plea. See id. ¶ 21; Lesley, 2024 IL App (3d) 210330, ¶ 50. Thus, petitioner met his burden
under subsection (g)(4). See id. ¶ 51.
¶ 31 Because petitioner met all the requirements of subsection (g) of the COI statute, the circuit
court erred in denying petitioner a COI. See id. ¶ 53. We vacate the circuit court’s order denying
petitioner a COI and remand for the circuit court to issue petitioner a COI.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is vacated, and the cause is remanded
for issuance of a COI.
¶ 34 Vacated and cause remanded.
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