In re Z.S. , 2024 IL App (4th) 240537-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240537-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO 4-24-0537 July 17, 2024
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re Z.S., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazewell County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 16JA71
v. )
Amanda S., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Timothy J. Cusack,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed,
concluding no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶2 In September 2018, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
respondent, Amanda S., as to her minor child, Z.S. (born in 2012). Respondent surrendered her
parental rights, and Z.S. was subsequently adopted by respondent’s mother. In July 2023,
respondent filed a pro se petition, seeking a finding she was fit. The trial court denied the petition.
¶3 Respondent appealed. This court appointed counsel to represent respondent.
Counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing
respondent’s appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. This court gave
respondent the opportunity to respond to the motion, and respondent filed a response. For the
reasons that follow, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In June 2016, the State filed a petition to adjudicate Z.S. neglected under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)), alleging
Z.S. was in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) based
on respondent’s unresolved substance abuse issues. The trial court subsequently adjudicated Z.S.
neglected, found respondent unfit, made Z.S. a ward of the court, and placed guardianship and
custody with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶6 In September 2018, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. Respondent surrendered her parental rights, and Z.S. was subsequently adopted by
respondent’s mother. In July 2019, DCFS was discharged as guardian of Z.S., the State’s wardship
was terminated, and the case was closed.
¶7 In July 2023, respondent filed a pro se petition, stating she had resolved her
substance abuse issues. Respondent wrote Z.S. “is in my life” and that respondent wanted the
“chance to get her back.” Respondent alleged her 74-year-old mother was too old to keep caring
for Z.S. but would stop only if respondent was caring for Z.S. Respondent also alleged her mother
wished to put that information in her will.
¶8 At a September 7, 2023, hearing, the trial court questioned whether it had
jurisdiction over the issue and told respondent she could not get Z.S. back by reopening the case.
However, the court also stated it would give respondent the opportunity to address the matter and
set a hearing date to address the merits. On another date, the court told respondent it would not be
able to restore custody of Z.S. to her, but it suggested perhaps a fitness finding would allow
respondent to have unsupervised visitation with Z.S. However, at a November 2, 2023, hearing,
the court told respondent it could not order visitation. The court told respondent she would have
to talk with her mother about what kind of contact with Z.S. would be appropriate.
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¶9 On October 5, 2023, the trial court characterized respondent’s petition as one
requesting the restoration of her fitness. On February 22, 2024, the court conducted a fitness
hearing. Respondent presented evidence concerning her fitness, including that she no longer used
illegal substances. Meanwhile, the record indicated respondent struggled with depression and
anxiety and perhaps used marijuana and whiskey. Respondent testified Z.S. no longer lived with
respondent’s mother. Instead, Z.S. was living with the mother of a friend of Z.S.’s, and
respondent’s visitation was limited to two phone calls per week. The record is not clear whether
DCFS was involved with the current living location for Z.S., but respondent thought an agency
and caseworker were involved. Respondent testified she had an argument with her mother and said
the two no longer spoke to each other. Respondent alleged her mother mentally abused Z.S. and
was not fit to care for Z.S.
¶ 10 The trial court denied the petition. In doing so, the court stressed that respondent’s
parental rights had been terminated. The court found respondent had not proved fitness and stated
she could refile her petition at a later date, after making additional progress. However, the court
also stated the case had been closed and it did not have jurisdiction over Z.S. The court suggested
respondent talk to the State and ask them to file something.
¶ 11 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Respondent’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw. Counsel supports his motion
with a memorandum of law providing a statement of facts, a discussion of potential claims, and
arguments why those issues lack arguable merit. Notice of counsel’s request to withdraw was sent
to respondent’s last known address. This court advised respondent she had until June 18, 2024, to
respond to the motion. Respondent filed a response on June 13, 2024.
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¶ 14 Counsel first submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court erred in denying
respondent’s petition because the court lacked the authority to reinstate wardship and reopen the
case, which would be necessary to grant respondent the relief that she sought. We agree.
¶ 15 Section 2-33(1) of the Juvenile Court Act, titled “Supplemental petition to reinstate
wardship,” provides, in relevant part:
“(1) Any time prior to a minor’s 18th birthday, pursuant to a supplemental
petition filed under this Section, the court may reinstate wardship and open a
previously closed case when:
(a) wardship and guardianship under the [Juvenile Court Act] was
vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the
Probate Act of 1975;
(b) the minor is not presently a ward of the court under Article II of
this Act nor is there a petition for adjudication of wardship pending on behalf
of the minor; and
(c) it is in the minor’s best interest that wardship be reinstated.” 705
ILCS 405/2-33(1) (West 2022).
¶ 16 The appellate court has held all three conditions listed in section 2-33(1) must be
satisfied before a supplemental petition for reinstatement of wardship may be granted. In re L.W.,
2018 IL App (3d) 170405, ¶ 18, 102 N.E.3d 812; see In re Tr. O., 362 Ill. App. 3d 860, 866, 840
N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (2005). The court has further applied section 2-33(1) to a petition to restore
fitness filed by a respondent after wardship had been terminated and the case had been closed.
L.W., 2018 IL App (3d) 170405, ¶¶ 4, 18.
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¶ 17 Here, the first condition of section 2-33(1) was lacking. Wardship was not vacated
in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the Probate Act of 1975 (755
ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)). Thus, under L.W., the trial court could not reopen the case to
restore respondent’s fitness. We note the court appeared to recognize that issue even though it did
not specifically mention section 2-33(1). In any event, an appellate court may affirm a trial court’s
judgment on any grounds which the record supports. See Water Tower Realty Co. v. Fordham 25
E. Superior, L.L.C., 404 Ill. App. 3d 658, 665, 936 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (2010). Accordingly, the
trial court properly denied the petition.
¶ 18 Counsel also submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court erred in finding
respondent failed to prove her fitness. In her response, respondent argues she has evidence she
could add regarding the issue. However, given the case could not be reopened under section
2-33(1) to address that issue, we need not and do not discuss it. We also express no opinion as to
the trial court’s suggestion that respondent could possibly proceed under a potential future cause
of action, as doing so would be purely advisory. See In re Estate of Luccio, 2012 IL App (1st)
121153, ¶ 32, 982 N.E.2d 927 (“The courts of Illinois do not issue advisory opinions to guide
future litigation.”).
¶ 19 After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, the memorandum of law, and
respondent’s response, we agree with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit.
Accordingly, we grant the motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
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¶ 22 Affirmed.
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