People v. Williams , 2024 IL App (1st) 240480-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 240480-UNo. 1-24-0480B
Filed May 16, 2024
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) Nos. 24 CR 34 & 24 CR 38
)
FRANC WILLIAMS, ) Honorable
) Angela Petrone
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
Justice MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court’s revocation of defendant’s pretrial release reversed. Cause remanded
for proceedings consistent with article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)).
¶2 Franc Williams appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his request for pretrial release
after a hearing on February 15, 2024. The circuit court had previously revoked his pretrial release
on January 17, 2024. For the following reasons, we find that the proceedings did not comply with
article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), which governs pretrial release and
detention, and remand with instructions.
No. 1-24-0408B
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The record before us is sparse. 1 Nevertheless, we can discern the following.
¶5 Williams was charged with retail theft after being arrested for stealing merchandise from a
Macy’s department store on State Street in Chicago on November 28, 2023. He was released. Less
than a week later, Williams was arrested again and charged with robbery for pushing and hitting a
loss prevention officer while stealing merchandise from the same Macy’s on December 2, 2023.
¶6 At his appearance on the robbery charge, the State filed a petition to revoke Williams’s
pretrial release on the basis that he was charged with committing a robbery on December 2 while
on pretrial release for the prior retail theft charge. The court denied the petition but released
Williams with conditions of electronic monitoring (EM) and placement in a residential drug
treatment facility. The State did not appeal.2
¶7 Williams was placed at a treatment facility. Sometime later, however, he returned to the
facility, after being permitted to leave temporarily, appearing to be intoxicated. A urinalysis
revealed the presence of cocaine in his system. In addition, Williams was observed appearing to
purchase narcotics in the alley behind the facility and, upon his return, suspected crack cocaine
and a pipe were found on his person. The facility reported this to the Cook County Sherriff’s
Department and indicated he could not remain there. The Sherrif’s Department then returned
Williams to the Cook County jail. No charges were filed related to the incidents at the facility.
1
There appears to be a trend of supplying an incomplete record on appeal when, as here, defendants
have more than one proceeding bearing on detention or release. A record of each of those proceedings
should be included. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(4) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). An incomplete record hampers our
review. The appellant is responsible for providing a sufficiently complete record to enable our review of
the issues raised. Todd W. Musburger, Ltd. v. Meier, 394 Ill. App. 3d 781, 795 (2009). Any doubts arising
from an incomplete record will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392
(1984).
2
It appears that these proceedings took place in the Municipal Division of the Cook County Circuit
Court. A transcript of the hearing on the State’s petition to revoke is not included in the appellate record.
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No. 1-24-0408B
¶8 Both of Williams’s charges were superseded by indictment or information and transferred
to the Criminal Division. The retail theft charge became case number 24 CR 38 and the robbery
charge became 24 CR 34. In the Criminal Division, the State filed a second petition to revoke
Williams’s pretrial release on January 17, 2024. The petition asserted the exact same basis as the
first petition that was denied in December in the Municipal Division—that Williams was charged
with the December 2 robbery committed while on pretrial release for the November 28 retrial theft.
The court granted the petition and revoked Williams’s pretrial release upon the basis that he was
charged with a robbery committed while on pretrial release in the retail theft case. Williams did
not appeal. 3
¶9 Williams next appeared on February 15, 2024. His counsel stated that Williams is provided
an apartment in conjunction with his job as an apartment building superintendent. Unless he
returned the next day, he would lose his job and housing. Counsel requested that Williams be
released with conditions of EM and confinement to his home.
¶ 10 Counsel also argued that Williams was not charged with a detainable offense and had not
been charged with an offense committed while on pretrial release. Presumably, counsel was
referring to Williams’s release following his December appearance on the robbery case. Counsel
insisted that Williams was in custody solely for violating the conditions of his release and could
be held for no more than 30 days. Williams also denied the allegations related to using or
purchasing narcotics at the treatment facility.
¶ 11 The prosecutor recounted that the State had previously petitioned to revoke Williams’s
release, but the petition was denied, and Williams was released with conditions. He returned to jail
following his expulsion from the treatment facility.
3
The State’s January 17 petition to revoke pretrial release and the court’s order granting the same
are included in the record but a transcript of the January 17 hearing is absent.
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No. 1-24-0408B
¶ 12 The court observed that Williams had an extensive criminal history of at least 20 felony
and misdemeanor convictions and that, when released upon a retail theft charge, he was charged
with committing a robbery at the same Macy’s just a few days later. When released again, the court
noted, Williams was “kicked out” of the treatment facility based on drug related allegations. The
court continued:
“I’m looking at the statute, and it says the original Court may revoke pretrial release only
if the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, which is not a very high standard, that
no condition or conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in
court, and here is the next part, or prevent the defendant from being charged with a
subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.”
Ultimately, the court found that the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions would prevent Williams from being charged with a subsequent felony or class A
misdemeanor, specifically theft. The court then stated that it was “denying [Williams’s] request for
release” and told him he had 10 days to appeal.4 Apart from its oral pronouncements, the court
entered no written order regarding Williams’s detention or release.
¶ 13 A week later, Williams filed a notice of appeal using a form approved for filing appeals
related to pretrial detention under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec 7, 2023). His notice
includes both the robbery and retail theft case numbers. Williams stated that he was appealing the
court’s order of February 15, 2024 and checked a box indicating the nature of the order appealed
was “denying pretrial release.” He listed five separate grounds for relief: (1) his charged offense
does not qualify for pretrial detention, (2) he was not shown to be a safety threat because the
charges relate to retail thefts, (3) the State failed to show conditions of release, such as EM and an
4
He had 14 days to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
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No. 1-24-0408B
order to avoid Macy’s, would not mitigate any threat he poses, and (4) the court failed to provide
a summary of its reasons to conclude that less restrictive conditions were inadequate. The fifth
ground for relief states as follows:
“The Court did not enter a written order on 2/15/24 listing out its reasons denying pre-trial
release. The Court indicated that the reason for denial of pre-trial release was that the
defendant was arrested for a second Retail Theft case. However, this Defendant was already
charged with both matters when [he] appeared before the Court for arraignment. The
Defendant did not pick up a new case while these cases were pending before the Court, and
did not pick up any new cases while on electronic monitoring. While an alleged electronic
monitoring violation had occurred, the Defendant is entitled to a hearing on this violation,
and can be held at most for 30 days on this alleged violation.”
Williams elected not to file a memorandum supporting his appeal. The State elected not to file a
memorandum as well.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Williams’s appearance before the circuit court on February 15, 2024 was after the circuit
court’s January 17, 2024 revocation of his pretrial release. In accordance with section 110-6(j) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), the Court was required to find whether “continued
detention *** is necessary to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings
or to prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.”
725 ILCS 5/110-6(j) (West 2022). But neither the parties nor the court addressed Williams’s
detention or release consistent with section 110-6(j).
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No. 1-24-0408B
¶ 16 Instead, defense counsel made an oral request for Williams to be released with conditions
so he could maintain his employment and housing. Both defense counsel and the court referred to
a 30-day review of Williams’s detention and the State acquiesced to such a review. 5
¶ 17 The defense proceeded as though it bore the burdens of going forward and persuasion. At
the outset of defense counsel’s remarks, he stated that the court had previously revoked only the
condition of EM and that Williams was in custody solely for violating the conditions of his release.
The record contradicts those statements. The court revoked Williams’s pretrial release altogether
on January 17, 2024 and he was not sanctioned for violating pretrial release conditions.
¶ 18 Counsel then proceeded to argue that revocation was improper since Williams was not
charged with committing any offenses while he was released, presumably meaning Williams’s
second release after he appeared on the robbery charge in December. That argument would appear
directed at the court’s prior January 17, 2024 order revoking pretrial release. It is unclear whether
counsel was seeking for the court to reconsider its prior order or consider the revocation issue anew
as though the prior order had not been entered.
¶ 19 For its part, the court referred to the Code’s provision for revoking pretrial release,
suggesting that the court was considering the issue anew. Likewise, the court’s ultimate finding
applied the standard for initially revoking pretrial release—that the State had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions would reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant
for later hearings or prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or class A
misdemeanor. See id. § 110-6(a). We observe that the trial court remarked that clear and convincing
is not a high evidentiary standard. This is not so. It is second only to beyond a reasonable doubt.
The remark suggests that the court applied a lower standard. Nevertheless, upon the court’s finding,
5
The Code does not contemplate such a procedure.
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No. 1-24-0408B
it denied Williams’s request for release. That ruling was ambiguous. The court never clarified
whether its February 15 ruling was a revocation of Williams’s pretrial release or a continuation of
his detention following the revocation of his pretrial release on January 17, 2024. In any event, the
court never referenced that it had previously entered an order revoking Williams’s pretrial release.
¶ 20 Williams’s notice of appeal is inconsistent as well. The asserted grounds for relief refer to
standards for denial of pretrial release following a hearing on a State petition filed under section
110-6.1. See id. § 110-6.1 (West 2022). Such a hearing did not occur here. The notice of appeal
also refers to revocation under section 110-6 as well as sanctions for violating conditions of
revocation. Although each procedure could result in a defendant being detained, they are distinct
and different requirements apply for each.
¶ 21 Insofar as Williams’s appeal is directed at the revocation of his pretrial release, we must
consider whether the issue is reviewable in this appeal of the February 15 order when the previous
January 17, 2024 order revoked Williams’s pretrial release. Williams did not appeal the January
17 order. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(ii) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023) (providing that a defendant may appeal
an order revoking pretrial release). He only appealed the court’s February 15 order denying his
request for release at a subsequent appearance. Williams’s notice of appeal was filed beyond the
prescribed 14-day limit to challenge the January 17 order. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Dec. 7,
2023). Rule 604(h) was later amended to make pretrial detention and release orders appealable at
any time prior to conviction. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(3) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). However, under the
amended rule, the appellant must first file a motion for relief in the trial court. Ill. S. Ct. R.
604(h)(2), (3) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Procedural amendments to Illinois Supreme Court Rules may
apply to ongoing proceedings. People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶ 21. But when application of
the amended procedural rule would necessitate new proceedings in the trial court for a case
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No. 1-24-0408B
pending on appeal, the amendment does not apply retroactively. Id. ¶ 23. That is the situation here.
To apply the amended rule permitting appeal at any time prior to conviction, Williams would need
to first file a motion for relief in the trial court. Since his case is already on appeal, the amendment
cannot apply. Consequently, Williams’s notice of appeal filed on February 22 is not a timely appeal
of the January 17 order. Nevertheless, Williams’s failure to comport to the 14-day appeal deadline
does not definitively resolve the issue, and so we look to similar cases of this court.
¶ 22 In People v. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, a defendant was ordered detained on
October 17, 2023 following a hearing on the State’s petition to deny pretrial release filed the same
day. He failed to appeal but filed a petition seeking pretrial release in December. Id. ¶ 10. After a
hearing on December 6, 2023, the court found that the defendant’s continued detention was
necessary for public safety. Id. ¶ 13. The defendant filed a notice of appeal within 14 days of the
December 6, 2023 order seeking reversal of the decision to continue his detention and requesting
release with conditions. Id. ¶ 14. The grounds for relief included whether the State had met its
burden to prove the propositions necessary to initially detain him. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. On appeal, the
defendant also argued that the State’s petition to deny pretrial release was untimely. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 23 The court determined that the issues Hongo raised on appeal arose from the earlier
October 17, 2023 order and therefore it lacked jurisdiction to review them in his appeal from the
December 6, 2023 order. Id. ¶ 28. The only issue properly before the court was the trial court’s
finding that continued detention was necessary. Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 24 A similar situation arose in People v. Triplett, 2024 IL App (2d) 230388. There, a defendant
was ordered detained on September 20, 2023. Id. ¶ 8. The defendant requested pretrial release at
his subsequent appearance on October 2, 2023, which was denied. Id. The defendant filed a notice
of appeal on October 13, 2023, challenging both the September 20 and October 2, 2023 orders. Id.
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The notice was filed within 14 days of the later order but beyond 14 days from the earlier one. For
that reason, the State argued that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the earlier,
September 20, 2023 order detaining the defendant. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 25 The Second District found that the notice of appeal was untimely to challenge the
September 20, 2023 order, but the court’s October 2, 2023 continued detention order was based on
its prior findings, and it expressly incorporated the September findings in the order. Id. ¶ 11. Thus,
the appellate court concluded that the issue of the timeliness of the State’s petition to deny pretrial
release, which was commonly addressed in both the September 20 and October 2, 2023
proceedings, was properly before it. Id. The court further observed “it is plain that, if the State’s
petition to detain was untimely and thus lacked a legal basis, the justification for the October 2
order continuing the defendant’s pretrial detention pursuant to that petition is also questionable.”
Id. In a later case, the Fifth District observed that the Triplett court’s determination was correct
“because a notice of appeal brings up for review unspecified orders and judgments that were a step
in the procedural progression leading to the judgment or order specified in the notice of appeal.”
People v. Neal, 2024 IL App (5th) 231049-U, ¶ 14 (citing People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 138
(2003)).
¶ 26 Comparing these cases, we observe that in Hongo, the court explicitly applied the standard
for subsequent appearances and limited its inquiry accordingly. In Triplett, by contrast, the court
expressly relied on the findings in its prior detention order, effectively incorporating its findings
into the later order. Thus, the trial court’s later inquiry was more expansive than a continued
detention determination for subsequent appearance.
¶ 27 We find the proceedings in this case resemble that in Triplett more than that in Hongo. At
the February 15, 2024 hearing, the trial court never clarified the precise nature of the issue before
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it. The court seemingly reopened proceedings on the State’s petition to revoke Williams’s pretrial
release for consideration anew despite its January 17, 2024 order. Instead of a limited inquiry
regarding the necessity of continued detention, the court expressly cited the standard for an initial
revocation determination and couched its findings in those terms. Thus, the court at least impliedly
incorporated its earlier decision to revoke Williams’s pretrial release into its February 15, 2024
ruling. Even if that ruling were viewed as a continuation of Williams’s detention based on the
court’s prior revocation of his pretrial release, the court’s treatment of the issue on February 15,
2024 connected the orders, making the prior order a step in the procedural progression leading to
the later order specified in the notice of appeal. Therefore, we conclude that we have jurisdiction
to review the revocation of William’s pretrial release.
¶ 28 We observe that the State filed a second petition to revoke Williams’s pretrial release in
January 2024, asserting the same basis as in its first petition filed in December 2023—that
Williams was charged with robbery while he was on pretrial release for retail theft. We do not look
favorably upon this practice. The court that heard the first petition already determined that
Williams’s pretrial release would not be revoked for that reason. That ruling was an appealable
order. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(ii) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023) (providing that the State may appeal from
an order denying a petition to revoke pretrial release). When Williams was expelled from the
treatment facility and returned to the Cook County jail, a second petition to revoke was
inappropriate. The Code makes clear that pretrial release can only be revoked when a defendant is
charged with a felony or class A misdemeanor committed while on pretrial release or charged with
violating a protection order. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022). Unless a defendant violates their
pretrial release by committing a felony or class A misdemeanor, their release cannot be revoked.
A violation of the conditions of their release is not by itself sufficient. Williams was not charged
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No. 1-24-0408B
with any offense following his release with conditions. Rather, he was returned to the Cook County
jail when the treatment facility determined he could not remain there. Williams’s pretrial release
could not be revoked for that reason, yet the State filed a second petition to revoke citing the same
factual basis as the earlier denied revocation petition.
¶ 29 By so doing, the State circumvented the procedures provided in the Code for a defendant
who has been ordered released but remains in custody due to an inability to satisfy a condition of
release. Subsection (e) of section 110-5 addresses such a predicament. See id. § 110-5(e) (West
2022). After Williams was returned to the Cook County jail, he should have been afforded a hearing
under subsection (e) to determine the reason for his continued detention. If the hearing revealed
that he was ineligible for a pretrial condition previously ordered, the court could reopen the pretrial
release hearing to determine “what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure
the appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of
compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. Additionally, the State
could have filed a petition for sanctions or modification of conditions of release. See id. § 110-6(e),
(f). Instead, the State bypassed these procedures by filing a second petition to revoke and
subsequently obtained a remedy that is not provided for in the Code.
¶ 30 For these reasons, we find that the circuit court improperly revoked Williams’s pretrial
release and remand for a hearing under subsection 110-5(e).
¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court revoking Williams’s pretrial release
is reversed and this matter is remanded for a hearing under subsection 110-5(e).
¶ 33 Reversed and remanded.
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