In re Marriage of Crecos ( 2020 )

02020 IL App (1st) 182211-U
No. 1-18-2211
May 4, 2020
FIRST DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
DIANA LYNN BARR CRECOS, ) Of Cook County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) No. 07 D 10902
v. )
) The Honorable
GREGORY CRECOS, ) Robert W. Johnson,
) Judge Presiding.
Respondent-Appellant. )
JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pierce and Griffin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: When the trial court awards fees for an appeal in a divorce case, and the trial court has
issues other than fees still pending, the award grants interim fees not subject to immediate
appeal.
¶2 In the course of divorce proceedings from Gregory Crecos, Diana Barr Crecos filed a
motion for an award of attorney fees incurred in two appeals. The trial court awarded Diana
the requested fees, and found no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the award.
Gregory appealed, claiming that Diana had not substantially prevailed in the prior appeals
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because the appellate court's order left several issues unresolved, in need of retrial. We find
that the need for further litigation of other issues raised in the case makes the award of fees
here an interim award under sections 508(a) and 501(c-1) of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(a), 5/501(c-1) (West 2016)). We
dismiss the appeal from the interlocutory order for lack of jurisdiction.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In 2007, Diana Barr Crecos petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Gregory Crecos. On
December 24, 2009, Judge Reynolds entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage and
allocating the marital property. Gregory appealed Judge Reynolds' decision, and this Court
affirmed the judgment. In re Marriage of Crecos, 2012 IL App (1st) 102158-U (Crecos I).
¶5 Both parties filed postdecree petitions. After denying a timely motion for substitution of
judge, Judge Raul Vega entered a series of orders against Diana. Diana appealed and this court
vacated all of those orders, as well as all orders that followed from and depended on Judge
Vega's orders. In re Marriage of Crecos, 2015 IL App (1st) 132756 (Crecos II).
¶6 In March 2016, Diana filed petitions under section 508(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508(a)
(West 2016)) for attorney's fees incurred for the appeals in Crecos I and Crecos II.
¶7 On September 17, 2018, the trial court ordered Gregory to pay Diana's attorney $32,952.50
for the appeal in Crecos I and $89,465.50 for the appeal in Crecos II. The court added, "There
is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of this order."
¶8 Gregory appealed on October 16, 2018, naming the September 17 order as the subject of
the appeal.
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¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, Gregory contens that the trial court should not have awarded Diana all the fees
she sought because she did not prevail on all issues. He argues, "[Diana] did not prevail at all
because the theft-of-personal-property issue is still pending in the circuit court below, awaiting
re-trial."
¶ 11 We asked the parties to submit briefs concerning our jurisdiction. Both parties assert that
this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the trial court did not enter an interim
award of fees under section 501(c-1) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1) (West 2018)); instead
the court entered a final award of attorney fees under section 503(j) of the Act (750 ILCS
5/503(j) (West 2018)). We note that neither the motion for fees nor the court's order cited
section 503(j) as the statute authorizing the award.
¶ 12 Section 508(a) of the Act provides:
"The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering
the financial resources of the parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable
amount for his own or the other party's costs and attorney's fees. Interim attorney's
fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party, in a pre-judgment
dissolution proceeding in accordance with subsection (c-1) of Section 501 and in
any other proceeding under this subsection. At the conclusion of any pre-judgment
dissolution proceeding under this subsection, contribution to attorney's fees and
costs may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subsection (j) of
Section 503 and in any other proceeding under this subsection. *** Awards may be
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made in connection with *** [t]he prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the
prosecuting party has substantially prevailed)." 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2018).
¶ 13 Section 503(j) provides, "[a]fter proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues
between the parties ***, a party's petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the
proceeding shall be heard and decided." 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2018).
¶ 14 The parties argue that Section 501(c-1) does not apply because the appeals involve
postdecree petitions. But "Section 501(c–1) applies to both predissolution and postdissolution
decree proceedings." In re Marriage of Oleksy, 337 Ill. App. 3d 946, 950 (2003). Section
503(j) on its face applies only when the court has resolved "all *** issues between the parties"
other than the award of attorney fees. The parties admit that the court has not yet resolved
some issues in the case, particularly Gregory's claim that Diana took his personal property.
Because issues remain pending, the trial court may reconsider its initial allocation of attorney
fees, and provide for an assessment of further attorney fees in connection with the pending
issues, in its final judgment. See In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2017 IL App (2d) 160631, ¶ 20.
¶ 15 Section 501 of the Act defines "interim attorney fees and costs" as "attorney's fees and
costs assessed from time to time while a case is pending, in favor of the petitioning party's
current counsel." 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1) (West 2018). Because the case is still pending, awaiting
retrial on issues Gregory raised, the order of September 17, 2018, awards amounts that meet
the statutory definition of "interim attorney fees."
¶ 16 Interim awards of attorney fees are temporary in nature, and they are subject to adjustment
(including, if necessary, the disgorgement of overpayments to an attorney) at the close of the
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dissolution proceeding. Arjmand, 2017 IL App (2d) 160631, ¶ 20. "[T]he legislature intended
the remedy for any error in the granting of interim attorney fees to be addressed through a
comprehensive reconsideration and reallocation at a final hearing on attorney fees held near
the entry of the final judgment of dissolution. In accordance with this intent, the interlocutory
appeal of interim-attorney-fee awards is not permitted by any supreme court rule." Arjmand,
2017 IL App (2d) 160631, ¶ 21. "The statute's plain language indicates interim attorney fee
awards provide temporary relief during divorce litigation. [Citation.] These interim awards are
treated as interlocutory orders and are not subject to appeal." (Emphasis in original.) In re
Marriage of Johnson, 351 Ill. App. 3d 88, 96 (2004).
¶ 17 "[T]he inclusion of the special finding [under Supreme Court Rule 304(a)] in the trial
court's order cannot confer appellate jurisdiction if the order is in fact not final." Crane Paper
Stock Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 63 Ill. 2d 61, 66 (1976). The order of September
17, 2018, which awards interim fees under section 508 of the Act, does not finally dispose of
any separate claim, and therefore the inclusion of Rule 304(a) language in the order does not
make the interlocutory order final and appealable. We must dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
¶ 18 CONCLUSION
¶ 19 Because the order of September 17, 2018, awards interim fees, subject to correction in the
final judgment, while other issues in the case remain unresolved, the order is not a final
judgment ripe for appellate review under Supreme Court Rule 304(a). Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal.
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¶ 20 Appeal dismissed.
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