In re T.R. ( 2020 )

FILED
NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 190899-U May 14, 2020
This order was filed under Supreme
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-19-0899 4th District Appellate
the limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re T.R., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 19JA164
v. )
Mina R., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Karen S. Tharp,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in placing the
minor child in the guardianship and custody of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services where the father previously displayed an inability
to control the minor’s dangerous behaviors.
¶2 Respondent, Mina R. (Mother), appeals the trial court’s order making T.R. a ward
of the court and placing her under the guardianship and custody of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶3 On appeal, Mother specifically challenges the trial court’s dispositional order,
arguing the court’s decision stands against the manifest weight of the evidence because the only
evidence supporting the court’s order was a stipulation of no-fault dependency from T.R.’s
father. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On August 19, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect with
respect to T.R.—a minor child born to Mother and Thomas R. (Father) on June 27, 2007—
alleging T.R. was a neglected and dependent minor in accordance with sections 2-3(1)(a) and
2-4(1)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a),
2-4(1)(c) (West 2018)). Following a shelter care hearing, pursuant to the stipulation of neglect
and immediate and urgent necessity by Father, the trial court issued an order placing temporary
custody and guardianship of T.R. with DCFS.
¶6 In October 2019, DCFS established a family service plan for T.R. and Father.
DCFS noted Father had an open intact case since April 2019, but he had been unable to control
T.R.’s dangerous and risk-taking behaviors. For example, despite receiving psychiatric services
and intact services, T.R. continued to leave Father’s house without permission and refused to
follow his rules. DCFS noted T.R. tested positive for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) when
she was brought into care and completed antibiotics. The service plan indicated T.R. would soon
begin attending ABC Counseling. DCFS initially placed T.R. in a traditional foster home but
eventually moved her to a family placement. T.R. now lived with her sister and the home was
appropriate. T.R. had weekly visitation with Father, but she refused visitation with Mother.
DCFS’s service plan noted T.R. had been removed from Mother’s care in North Carolina.
¶7 On November 13, 2019, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing wherein
Father and the State reached an agreement for a no-fault dependency stipulation. Father agreed to
admit T.R. qualified as a dependent minor in accordance with section 2-4(1)(c) of the Juvenile
Court Act in that T.R. is without proper care necessary for her wellbeing through no fault,
neglect, or lack of concern by Father. In exchange for this admission, the State agreed to drop the
two allegations of neglect. The State then provided the following factual basis for the no-fault
dependency stipulation:
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“[O]n August 15th, DCFS hotline received a report regarding a minor by the
name of [T.R.] [T.R.] was found in a motel in Indiana. It was the third night in a
row that she had left her father’s residence without permission in the middle of
the night. [Father] had moved his bed to the living room next to the front door in
an attempt to keep her from absconding, as this was a pattern of behavior. He also
attempted to get her into the partial hospitalization program. At one point, he took
her to the emergency department at the hospital for evaluation, and there was also
an intact case there which services were provided. None of those remedies
seemed to work, and thus the hotline call was made.”
Father admitted this allegation and the court accepted his admission. Mother, who was present at
the hearing and represented by counsel, made no objection to the no-fault dependency
stipulation, Father’s admission, or the court’s acceptance of his admission.
¶8 The trial court issued an order of adjudication finding T.R. a dependent minor
based on the facts that T.R. “was exhibiting behaviors including running away out-of-state” and
“Father attempted to get help for [T.R.] including P[artial] H[ospitalization] P[rogram] and intact
services.” The court’s order placed T.R. in the custody and guardianship of DCFS, directed
DCFS to prepare a dispositional report, and granted Mother permission to participate in the next
hearing via telephone per her request.
¶9 In a Dispositional Hearing Report submitted for the court’s consideration, DCFS
recounted the circumstances leading to DCFS’s involvement with T.R. and Father—specifically,
T.R. repeatedly leaving home without permission. DCFS reported T.R. presented to St. John’s
Hospital with gonorrhea and chlamydia. T.R. self-reported she had sex with multiple adult
partners, both male and female. DCFS’s report noted T.R. was in the sixth grade and received
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extra assistance in math and literature. DCFS noted T.R. lived with her sister in a relative
placement. T.R.’s sister provided a safe home with proper structure, routine, and discipline for
T.R. For example, T.R.’s sister ensured T.R. followed her schoolteacher’s suggestion that T.R.
read every night and complete additional math worksheets. DCFS’s report noted T.R. had
unsupervised visits with Father in his home. As for treatment and services, T.R. successfully
completed Lincoln Prairie’s partial hospitalization program and was currently receiving services
from ABC Counseling due to her highly sexualized behaviors. T.R. also received Intensive
Placement Stabilization services. DCFS noted T.R. and her father would begin family therapy
when deemed appropriate. DCFS summed up its report by noting T.R. engaged in dangerous and
risk-taking behaviors when she lived with Father and Father, despite his repeated efforts, could
not control T.R.’s behavior or supervise her.
¶ 10 DCFS determined T.R. “needs to continue to stabilize in her foster home and
work on her treatment plan at ABC Counseling.” DCFS further opined, “[T.R.] needs to be able
to demonstrate healthy relationships, appropriate boundaries, and the ability to follow all
household rules; while obeying the law.” As for Father, DCFS determined “he needs to
demonstrate the ability that he is the authority in the home *** [and] needs to show he can
provide the structure, routine, and discipline for [T.R.] to ensure she is always safe and
successful.”
¶ 11 At the dispositional hearing on December 11, 2019, the State recommended that
custody and guardianship of T.R. remain with DCFS. Neither Father nor T.R.’s guardian
ad litem (GAL) objected to the State’s recommendation. Father, however, requested the court
give DCFS the right to place T.R. with him in the future. Father did not indicate a desire for
immediate placement. The GAL stated T.R. had no interest in being placed with Father. Mother
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participated in the hearing via telephone, though her counsel was physically present in the
courtroom. Mother opposed the State’s recommendation. Specifically, she requested T.R. be
placed with Father and not with DCFS. The court issued a dispositional order adjudging T.R. a
ward of the court and placing her in the custody and guardianship of DCFS. Per Father’s request,
the court gave DCFS the right to place T.R. with Father in the future.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Respondent mother argues the trial court’s dispositional order erroneously placed
T.R. in the custody and guardianship of DCFS. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶ 15 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2018)) governs petitions
for adjudication of wardship and outlines a “two-step process a trial court must employ in
deciding whether a minor should be made a ward of the court.” In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d
1063, 1068, 918 N.E.2d 284, 288 (2009). Step one requires the court to hold an adjudicatory
hearing where “ ‘the court shall first consider only the question [of] whether the minor is abused,
neglected[,] or dependent.’ ” Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1068 (quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1)
(West 2008)). If the trial court answers the first question in the affirmative, i.e., the minor is an
abused, neglected, or dependent child, the court must move to step two—the dispositional
hearing. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21, 981 N.E.2d 336 (citing 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West
2010)). “At the dispositional hearing, the trial court determines whether it is consistent with the
health, safety, and best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a ward of the
court,” A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21, and then if the minor “is to be made a ward of the court, the
court shall determine the proper disposition best serving the health, safety, and interests of the
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minor and the public.” 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2018). The Juvenile Court Act provides the
trial court with several options for proper disposition, including giving custody and guardianship
of the minor to DCFS. 705 ILCS 405/2-23, 2-27(1)(d) (West 2018). On review, we will reverse a
trial court’s order if the findings stand against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial
court committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re
T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1991). “The finding of the trial court is
against the manifest weight of the evidence if a review of the record clearly demonstrates that the
proper result is the one opposite that reached by the trial court.” In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d
820, 826, 649 N.E.2d 74, 79 (1995).
¶ 16 Here, Mother challenges the trial court’s dispositional order as against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Mother specifically contends Father’s stipulation of no-fault
dependency provided insufficient evidence for the court’s decision to make T.R. a ward of the
court and place her under the guardianship and custody of DCFS rather than place her with
Father. We disagree.
¶ 17 Contrary to Mother’s assertion, there was ample evidence to support the trial
court’s dispositional order, particularly its decision to keep guardianship and custody of T.R.
with DCFS rather than place her with Father. The factual basis for the no-fault dependency
stipulation in the adjudication hearing established that T.R. left Father’s home without
permission on three consecutive nights and was eventually found in an Indiana motel. Despite
Father’s efforts to supervise T.R.—he moved his bed to the living room by the front door—T.R.
still got out of the house. The factual basis further established that Father tried to get T.R. help
through a partial hospitalization program or through an emergency room admission. Father also
sought help from DCFS through intact services, but nothing worked to control T.R.’s behavior.
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These uncontested facts alone—presented at the adjudicatory hearing with no objection from
Mother—support the trial court’s dispositional order. See In re R.B., 336 Ill. App. 3d 606, 618,
784 N.E.2d 400, 409 (2003) (stating a custodial parent’s “ ‘stipulation alone is sufficient to
support the finding of neglect by the court and its adjudication of wardship’ ”) (quoting In re
Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1014, 429 N.E.2d 1364, 1372 (1981)).
¶ 18 Besides the factual basis for Father’s no-fault dependency admission, there was
other evidence supporting the court’s decision. DCFS’s dispositional report recounted the
dangerous behaviors T.R. exhibited when living with Father. She ran away from home, tested
positive for multiple STDs, and admitted to having sex with multiple adults. The dispositional
report likewise outlined Father’s failed attempts at supervising or controlling T.R.’s behavior. He
sought help for his daughter and tried to supervise her, but nothing worked. The dispositional
report detailed how T.R. improved once she was placed in relative placement and began
receiving services. For example, the report noted T.R.’s sister provided her a safe and
appropriate home. Moreover, T.R.’s sister provided proper structure, routine, and discipline for
T.R. Ultimately, the dispositional report recommended that T.R. be made a ward of the court and
remain in DCFS’s custody and guardianship.
¶ 19 Finally, at the dispositional hearing, Father did not object to the State’s
recommendation that T.R. be made a ward of the court and placed under the guardianship and
custody of DCFS. Notably, he did not ask the court to immediately place T.R. with him, rather
he asked the court to give DCFS the power to place T.R. with him sometime in the future. Like
Father, the GAL made no objection to the State’s recommendation. The GAL acknowledged that
making T.R. a ward of the court and keeping her in DCFS’s custody was in T.R.’s best interests.
The GAL informed the court that T.R. “had no interest in being placed with her father.”
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¶ 20 Ironically, Mother is not arguing she was a proper placement or that the court
abused its discretion by failing to place the child with her. In fact, after first appearing, Mother,
who lives out of state, requested she be allowed to appear by telephone thereafter. Instead, she
argues a position not even Father supported, i.e., immediate placement with him instead of
DCFS. The whole reason for the case opening was because Father was unsuccessful in his efforts
to control T.R.’s behavior. He agreed T.R. should be placed under the care and custody of DCFS
and knew she would continue her self-destructive and dangerous behavior if placed with him.
T.R. made her feelings known in that regard as well. The fact Mother would prefer her daughter
do so rather than continue to progress as she had in relative foster placement is troubling, to say
the least.
¶ 21 Reviewing this record, we cannot conclude the trial court’s dispositional order
stands against the manifest weight of the evidence. Particularly, we cannot say the trial court
should have reached the opposite result. See M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d at 826. Based on the evidence
the trial court rightly made T.R. a ward of the court and kept her in DCFS’s custody rather than
returning her to Father’s care.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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