In re T.H. ( 2020 )

NOTICE FILED
This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 190896-U May 12, 2020
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited
Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in th
the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-19-0896 4 District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re T.H., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) McLean County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA10
v. )
Tracie H., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) J. Brian Goldrick,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in terminating
respondent’s parental rights.
¶2 In January 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect with respect
to T.H., the minor child of respondent, Tracie H. In April 2018, the trial court adjudicated the
minor neglected, made him a ward of the court, and placed custody and guardianship with the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The State filed a motion to terminate
respondent’s parental rights in July 2019. Respondent admitted to being an “unfit person” within
the meaning of Illinois’s Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)). The court then
held best-interests hearings in October and November 2019, where the court found it was in the
minor’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶3 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights;
specifically, she alleges the trial court’s best-interest determination was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On January 29, 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect with
respect to T.H.—a minor child born to respondent mother on April 12, 2012—alleging the minor’s
environment was injurious to his welfare when he resided with respondent because of her
unresolved issues of domestic violence, anger management, alcohol abuse, and/or substance abuse.
The next day, at a shelter-care hearing, pursuant to respondent’s stipulation of neglect and
immediate and urgent necessity, the trial court issued an order placing temporary custody and
guardianship of T.H. with DCFS.
¶6 A. Adjudicatory Proceedings.
¶7 On March 13, 2018, the trial court issued an adjudicatory order, finding the minor
abused or neglected as defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) in that the minor’s environment was injurious to his welfare. The court
accepted respondent’s admission to a finding of neglect based upon her unresolved issues of
domestic violence and/or anger management. In exchange for her admission, the court dismissed
the State’s allegation of neglect based upon her unresolved issues of alcohol abuse and/or
substance abuse.
¶8 The trial court also issued a dispositional order on April 25, 2018, finding
respondent, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to be unfit, unable, and unwilling
to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline T.H. and determining placement with
respondent was contrary to T.H.’s health, safety, and best interest because respondent was “just
getting started in services. She need[ed] to complete substance abuse, DV [(domestic violence)],
individual counseling, and parenting classes. She need[ed] to obtain/maintain stable housing and
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employment.” The court granted the State’s petition, adjudicated T.H. neglected, and made him a
ward of the court. The court ordered DCFS to maintain custody and guardianship over T.H. DCFS
placed T.H. in relative placement, eventually with his maternal cousin, Angela, in Country Club
Hills, Illinois.
¶9 B. Termination of Respondent’s Parental Rights
¶ 10 On July 1, 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
The State alleged she was an unfit person pursuant to Illinois’s Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)
(West 2018)) and identified three grounds supporting its allegation. At the fitness hearing on
September 4, 2019, respondent admitted to one ground; she failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the minor to the parent during any nine-month period following adjudication
of neglect, namely between October 1, 2018, and July 1, 2019 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2018)). In its petition, the State also alleged termination of respondent’s parental rights was in
T.H.’s best interests and asked for custody and guardianship to remain with DCFS, giving it the
authority to consent to T.H.’s adoption.
¶ 11 On October 23, 2019, the trial court held a best-interest hearing. Respondent was
present with counsel. The State presented no testimony.
¶ 12 Respondent testified on her own behalf. She testified she had completed substance
abuse and parenting services. As part of her substance-abuse classes, she implemented a relapse-
prevention plan, which would include attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings and
talking to a sponsor. She said she attended AA once a week but had not begun the 12-step program.
She had not secured a sponsor, but she was “[t]alking to one.” She said the last time she consumed
alcohol was in July 2019. When asked why she had missed “so many screens” since July,
respondent said screens scheduled on Monday and Tuesday were “the hardest” for her because she
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was usually “coming back from Chicago” (presumably visiting T.H.) and could not get there in
time.
¶ 13 Respondent testified she was participating in domestic violence classes with an
anticipated completion date in December 2019. She said she was learning to recognize “red flags”
and how to take “better care of [her] son and [her]self.” She also reported she was living in
Bloomington with her daughter but was on a waiting list for her own housing. She thought she
could be in her own home by December 2019. Respondent said she was employed part-time at
Super JJ, earning approximately $363 biweekly.
¶ 14 Respondent testified she loved T.H. and would do anything for him. In her opinion,
it was not in T.H.’s best interests to terminate her parental rights because she wanted her son “home
with [her] where he belongs.”
¶ 15 On cross-examination, respondent said she last visited T.H. three weeks ago. She
typically visited twice a month. Respondent explained she was related to T.H.’s foster parent,
Angela, and Angela’s sister, Maria. Maria was waiting on approval to have T.H. placed in her
home. Respondent said she had no concerns about T.H. being placed in either home. Respondent
acknowledged the best thing for T.H. was to be in a stable, safe, and healthy environment.
¶ 16 The guardian ad litem called the caseworker, Jasmine Jackson, as a witness.
Jackson explained that Angela was not an adoptive placement, but her twin sister, Maria, was
willing to adopt T.H. Jackson was waiting on approval from a Chicago area agency before she
could place T.H. with Maria, as Maria was a foster parent to other children. Jackson was asked if
she thought it was in T.H.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights despite his
placement being “up in the air.” Jackson replied affirmatively and explained, “[W]here he is now,
there is a stable and safe environment and there’s no environmental concerns and just where we
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are at in this case with progress on the parent.” Jackson acknowledged Angela was willing to care
for T.H. in the interim for “as much time as it takes[.]” Angela and Maria were willing to allow
respondent to maintain contact with T.H. as long as it would be in his best interests.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Jackson testified that, if for some reason the agency did not
consent, she would find “an adoptive and safe environment” for T.H. Jackson said respondent
needed to complete domestic violence classes and obtain housing. Counsel asked Jackson if she
would recommend a finding of fitness for respondent if respondent would complete those items.
Jackson said, “I’m not sure at this time due to the fact that [respondent] has not been a hundred
percent cooperative with the agency recommendations as far as random drug screens.”
¶ 18 On redirect examination, Jackson testified she would want to see a long-term period
of sobriety and clean drug screens from respondent—six months to a year. Jackson testified the
foster children in Maria’s home were T.H.’s nephews. Jackson indicated to the trial court that she
was traveling to Maria’s home on October 28, 2019, to view the residence. With this information,
the court continued the hearing until after the scheduled visit.
¶ 19 On November 19, 2019, the hearing resumed. The trial court noted the filing of an
updated best-interest report, which noted T.H. had been placed with Maria for four days, since
November 15, 2019. The State informed the court that, since the last hearing, respondent had “no
called/no showed” for a drug screen on October 30, 2019. Respondent called but did not show on
November 6, 2019. She appeared on November 15 and 18, with those results pending.
¶ 20 After the arguments of counsel, the trial court indicated it had considered the
evidence and the statutory best-interest factors. The court concluded the State had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was in T.H.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights
be terminated.
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¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Respondent argues the trial court erroneously terminated her parental rights
because the court’s best-interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We disagree and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 24 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)) govern the termination of a parent’s rights to his or her
child. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494 (2002). Together, the statutes outline two necessary steps in
the process. The State must show the parent is an “unfit person” and that terminating parental
rights serves the best interests of the child. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 494-95 (citing the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998) and the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)).
Here, respondent challenges only the trial court’s best-interest determination.
¶ 25 Once a trial court finds a parent to be an “unfit person,” it must then consider the
child’s best interests. “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-
child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212
Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004); see also In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80 (stating, once the
trial court finds the parent unfit, “all considerations, including the parent’s rights, yield to the best
interests of the child”). When considering whether termination of parental rights serves a child’s
best interests, the trial court must consider several factors within “the context of the child’s age
and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). These factors include:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of
the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious
background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including
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love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least
disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and long-
term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for
permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of
relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of
every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and
(10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.”
In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072 (2006); see also 705
ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a) to (j) (West 2018).
¶ 26 A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s decision because the
trial court is in a much better position to see the witnesses and judge their credibility. In re K.B.,
314 Ill. App. 3d 739, 748 (2000). A court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53. A best-interest determination is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate the court should have reached the
opposite result. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1072.
¶ 27 Respondent contends the trial court did not have sufficient information on T.H.’s
prospective adoptive placement to make a reasoned best-interest determination. She claims the
court placed too much emphasis on the positives of T.H.’s placement in Maria’s home when he
had been there only four days. Further, respondent argues the court placed too little emphasis on
her “nearly completed” services, her desire to parent her child, and her established bond with him.
¶ 28 Initially, we note the lack of established success of a potential adoptive placement
does not weigh against termination in this case. T.H. had resided with Angela since June 2019 and
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was reportedly doing well. Angela and her twin sister, Maria, the potential adoptive placement,
were maternal relatives of T.H. The sisters live approximately five miles apart in the Chicago area.
Each mother has their respective children in their homes, who were also maternal relatives of T.H.
Maria was also a foster mother to other maternal relatives of T.H.
¶ 29 This court and other courts have held the lack of an adoptive placement does not
per se require a finding that it is not in a child’s best interest to terminate parental rights. In re
Shru. R., 2014 IL App (4th) 140275, ¶¶ 25-26; see also In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 775
(2002) (affirming termination by noting the trial court “properly concluded that the children’s need
for a long-term, stable relationship outweighed the necessity of an available adoptive home
immediately upon termination of respondent’s parental rights”); In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d
165, 170-71 (2002) (affirming termination even though the likelihood of adoption was slim, since
so was the likelihood the respondent could care for the minor); In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 650,
665 (2000), overruled on other grounds by In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 304 (2001) (stating,
“[t]hough the current availability of an adoptive home is one of the considerations when deciding
whether termination of a parent’s rights is in the best interests of a child, it is not the only one”).
¶ 30 As such, the focus of the best-interest determination should not necessarily center
on the length of time T.H. had been in Maria’s home. Nor should the court be concerned that it
was without evidence of longevity regarding T.H.’s suitability in the home. The adoptive home
was only one factor to take into consideration. At worst, if placement in Maria’s home did not
result in adoption, T.H. could reside with Angela until a suitable adoptive placement was found.
See B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 665 (noting “the better alternative has to be taken,” i.e., “the better
alternative was to give the children a chance for some permanency in their lives, even if that meant
they were not adopted, but continued to have a secure and stable home environment with the foster
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family they had been with for some years.”).
¶ 31 Here, the trial court considered the evidence, the best-interest reports, and the
statutory factors. Noting T.H. had been in alternate care for almost two years, the court remained
concerned with respondent’s ability to maintain sobriety and actually incorporate sobriety into her
daily life. The court stressed T.H.’s need for stability and permanency and found that, because
Maria’s home had been monitored by another agency, it was reasonable to assume T.H. could
achieve both there. It was also reasonable to assume T.H.’s basic needs would be met. He was
surrounded by family and was thriving in the close familial environment. The court found these
considerations weighed in favor of termination. Because the evidence does not lead us clearly to
the opposite conclusion, we find the court’s best-interests determination was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
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