People v. Stoch ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 172189-UNo. 1-17-2189
Order filed May 13, 2020
Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 16 CR 10481
)
KRYSTINA STOCH, ) Honorable
) Erica L. Reddick,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery is affirmed over her contention that
the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 472(e), we remand to the circuit court so defendant may raise
her contention that her mittimus should be corrected to reflect the correct offense.
No. 1-17-2189
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Krystina Stoch was convicted of aggravated battery and
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. 1 On appeal, defendant contends that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly caused bodily harm to the victim, and that
her mittimus should be corrected to reflect the correct offense. We affirm defendant’s conviction
and remand to the circuit court to allow her to file a motion to correct her mittimus.
¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of aggravated battery to an
emergency medical technician (EMT) while performing his official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12-
3.05(d)(5)(i) (West Supp. 2015). Count I alleged defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to Todd
Williams in that she struck him about the face and body, and knew him to be an EMT performing
his official duties. Count II alleged defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to Dale Tokarz in
that she pushed him about the body, causing him to fall and injure his knee, and knew him to be
an EMT performing his official duties.
¶4 Williams testified that on June 19, 2016, he was a licensed EMT and paramedic employed
by the Chicago Fire Department. At approximately 5:10 a.m., Williams and Tokarz responded to
a call of an “injured victim” at the Eighth District police station. Williams wore “[u]niform pants,
shoes, boots, and a T-shirt” with “Chicago Fire Department” written on it. Williams and Tokarz
arrived in an ambulance and met two police officers with defendant, who was handcuffed. When
Williams first observed defendant she was “agitated,” “angry and loud,” and using profanity.
Williams informed defendant that he and Tokarz would transport her to the hospital. Defendant
told Williams that she had “wrist or hand injuries,” and that her wrists were “sore.” Williams and
Tokarz put defendant on a stretcher and secured her with seat belts. Chicago police officer Branch
1
Defendant’s name also appears as Krystyna Stoch throughout the record. We adopt the spelling
from the notice of appeal.
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No. 1-17-2189
handcuffed defendant to the side wheels of the stretcher. 2 Defendant was placed in the back of the
ambulance with Williams and Branch, while Tokarz drove. During the ride to Holy Cross Hospital,
defendant was “angry, agitated, [and] swearing,” and mentioned that the handcuffs bothered her
wrists.
¶5 When Williams and Tokarz wheeled defendant into the emergency room, Williams told
the triage nurse that defendant was complaining that her wrists were sore. The nurse instructed
Williams to place defendant into a wheelchair. Williams was at the foot of the stretcher and Tokarz
was on the left side of defendant, towards her head. Branch removed the handcuff from one wrist,
and as Williams and Tokarz tried to move defendant into the wheelchair, she “got violent and
started kicking and flailing.” Defendant became “increasingly agitated,” and “started to flail and
fight and swing.” As Williams tried to avoid the handcuff, which defendant was swinging in her
free hand, she kicked him “a couple times in [the] neck and head.” Williams testified the kicks
“stunned [him] pretty good.” Defendant continued to fight as Williams, Tokarz, and a hospital
security guard tried to calm her. Williams tried to keep defendant from kicking, but the stretcher
flipped over and Williams, Tokarz, Branch, and defendant “ended up on the floor in a big pile.”
Defendant continued to kick and fight while on the ground. Williams placed defendant under
control and put her in an emergency room bed.
¶6 The State published a video that Williams identified as a recording of the events in the
emergency room. 3 Due to the incident, Williams suffered a bruise and contusion to his neck and
head, which felt sore, and he “got dazed pretty well.”
Officer Branch’s first name was not given at trial.
2
The record on appeal includes a CD purporting to contain the video published at trial, but this
3
court was unable to access the file and could not view the footage.
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No. 1-17-2189
¶7 On cross-examination, Williams testified that he grabbed defendant’s left wrist as he
attempted to place her in the wheelchair. Williams did not notice if defendant had any deformities
to her knuckles or was holding her hands in an unusually stiff way. Williams’s shift ended at 6:30
a.m. that day, but he worked past that time doing reports and paperwork. Williams did not seek
medical treatment, but “may have taken Tylenol or Aleve.” On redirect, he identified a large bruise
to his neck in a photograph of his injuries.
¶8 Tokarz testified that on June 19, 2016, he was an EMT and licensed paramedic. That day,
Tokarz wore uniform pants and a T-shirt identifying him as an employee of the Chicago Fire
Department, and drove the ambulance to the Eighth District police station. There, he observed
police officers bringing defendant in handcuffs toward the ambulance. Tokarz testified that
defendant was “uncooperative, [and] unruly.” Tokarz was unable to examine defendant because
she was “very combative, [and] verbally abusive” toward Tokarz and Williams. Defendant was
placed in the ambulance and handcuffed to the stretcher.
¶9 Tokarz drove five to seven minutes to Holy Cross Hospital. Defendant became “abusive”
toward Tokarz and Williams when they took her from the ambulance to the emergency room.
Tokarz and Williams attempted to transfer defendant from the ambulance gurney to a wheelchair.
A police officer removed one of defendant’s handcuffs and defendant kicked Williams. Tokarz
tried to grab defendant’s leg to put her into the wheelchair, but lost his balance and fell to the floor.
Williams, the police officer, and defendant fell on top of Tokarz. Tokarz stood up but had “severe
pain” in his knee. Tokarz tried to “walk it off,” but returned to the emergency room. He was
examined by an emergency room doctor and x-rays of his knee were taken. Tokarz identified a
portion of the video from the hospital that depicted him limping from the emergency room. Tokarz
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No. 1-17-2189
also identified photographs of his knee that were taken approximately 1½ hours after the incident,
a photo of his knee after it was wrapped by the emergency room staff, and a photo depicting
bruising around the kneecap.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Tokarz testified he knew defendant had a problem with her wrist.
At the hospital, Tokarz grabbed defendant’s left arm and placed it behind defendant’s back so the
officer could handcuff her. The police officer had defendant’s right arm and was moving the arm
behind defendant. Defendant was screaming the entire time and looked “very upset.” Tokarz did
not know defendant’s medical history regarding her wrist pain, or whether she suffered from any
debilitating conditions. On redirect examination, Tokarz testified defendant was “[v]ery strong.”
¶ 11 Defendant testified that on June 19, 2016, she was suffering from an injury that prevented
the fingers on her left hand from straightening. Defendant also had an injury to her shoulders that
limited her movement, and moving her hands was “extremely” painful due to a “nerve break or
something.” Defendant testified it was “[v]ery painful” when Tokarz grabbed her left hand at the
hospital. Later, defendant was taken to jail and she noticed she was bleeding and had blood on her
blouse. Defendant identified photographs taken at the jail that depicted her hands, bruises and
swelling to both her knees, swelling and bruises to her ankle, and bruises to her back. Defendant
testified she did not intend to cause bodily injury to the paramedics.
¶ 12 On cross-examination, defendant testified she did not remember exactly where she met the
paramedics. Defendant saw herself kicking Williams on the video after her hands were bent back
and testified, “[i]f they bent your hands in the back if you have it broken, you’d be kicking too,
really. You don’t want to kick nobody but it’s the pain.” Defendant testified the paramedics were
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No. 1-17-2189
trying to handcuff her and “[n]obody was asking what happened, if it hurt.” Defendant testified
the photos of her injuries were taken on June 21, 2016.
¶ 13 Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery of
Williams (count I) and not guilty of aggravated battery of Tokarz (count II). Defendant’s motion
for new trial was denied. Following a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to two years’
imprisonment.
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to find her guilty of
aggravated battery because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly
caused bodily harm to Williams.
¶ 15 Defendant argues that a de novo standard of review is applicable because she is not
questioning the credibility of the witnesses, but rather, whether the uncontested facts were
sufficient to convict. The State argues, and we agree, that the appropriate standard of review is
whether a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 16 Essentially, defendant contends that she did not knowingly kick Williams but only
responded to the pain in her wrists. Hence, defendant challenges the inferences the trier of fact
drew from the evidence regarding her mental state, “which presents disputed questions of fact.”
People v. Lattimore, 2011 IL App (1st) 093238, ¶ 36 (citing People v. Stewart, 406 Ill. App. 3d
518, 525 (2010) (no de novo review where defendant challenged “inferences that can be drawn
from the evidence” by claiming evidence failed to establish he acted “knowingly”)). Thus, we
decline to apply de novo review.
¶ 17 The standard of review on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
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No. 1-17-2189
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wheeler, 226
Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007). This standard is applicable in all criminal cases whether the evidence is
direct or circumstantial. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1992). The trier of fact is
responsible for assessing the credibility of the witnesses, weighing the testimony, and drawing
reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). The State
must prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235
Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the reviewing
court’s duty to retry the defendant. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011). A reviewing
court will only reverse a criminal conviction when the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory
that there remains a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Id.¶ 18 In this case, defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery of a Chicago Fire Department
EMT/paramedic. In order to sustain defendant’s conviction, the State was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt both the commission of a battery and the presence of an additional aggravating
factor. People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 16. “A person commits battery if he or she knowingly
without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes
physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West
2016). To elevate the battery to aggravated battery, the State must prove defendant knew Williams
was an EMT performing his official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(5)(i) (West Supp. 2015).
¶ 19 Defendant does not dispute Williams was an EMT performing his official duties or that she
made physical contact that caused bodily harm. Instead, defendant only challenges the State’s
evidence that she knowingly caused bodily harm to Williams.
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No. 1-17-2189
¶ 20 A person acts knowingly if she “is consciously aware that the result is practically certain
to be caused by his or her conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b) (West 2016); People v. Steele, 2014 IL
App (1st) 121452, ¶ 23. A person acts recklessly if she “consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that *** a result will follow.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2016); Lattimore, 2011 IL
App (1st) 093238, ¶ 43. “Recklessness is a less-culpable mental state than knowledge, and
evidence of recklessness is insufficient to prove that a person acted knowingly.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lattimore, 2011 IL App (1st) 093238, ¶ 43. “Whether a person acted knowingly
with respect to bodily harm resulting from one’s actions is, due to its very nature, often proved by
circumstantial evidence, rather than direct proof.” People v. Hall, 273 Ill. App. 3d 838, 842 (1995).
The “ ‘[d]etermination of defendant’s mental state may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
and this task is particularly suited to the jury.’ ” People v. Garcia, 407 Ill. App. 3d 195, 201 (2011)
(quoting People v. Moore, 358 Ill. App. 3d 683, 688 (2005)).
¶ 21 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier
of fact could have concluded that defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to Williams. The
record shows that Williams and his partner transported defendant, who complained of a wrist
injury, from the police station to the hospital. Before defendant was placed in the ambulance,
Williams noted defendant was “angry, agitated, and swearing.” Tokarz was unable to examine
defendant prior to transporting her to the hospital because she was “very combative, [and] verbally
abusive” toward the paramedics. At the hospital, Branch removed the handcuff from one of
defendant’s wrists as the paramedics attempted to lift her from the gurney to a wheelchair.
Defendant became combative, flailed her arms, and fought with the paramedics. As the paramedics
tried to place defendant into the wheelchair, she kicked Williams in the neck with enough force to
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No. 1-17-2189
stun him “pretty good.” Williams sustained bruises to his neck from defendant’s kick. Tokarz
corroborated Williams’s testimony. The State presented video and photographic evidence of the
injury and bruising to Williams. Defendant admitted kicking Williams, but claimed she was
responding to pain in her wrists.
¶ 22 Given this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find defendant acted knowingly, i.e., was
consciously aware her conduct was certain to cause bodily harm to Williams. Stated differently,
the evidence presented was not so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive to justify a
reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d at 8.
¶ 23 In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that she did not
intend to hurt Williams, but only kicked him in reaction to the pain she felt in her wrists when she
was suspended in midair by her arms. Defendant essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence in her
favor and substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. This we cannot do. It was the
responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to their testimony, and to resolve any inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. See Ortiz,
196 Ill. 2d at 259. Given its verdict, the jury found Williams and Tokarz credible and resolved the
inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the State. The jury was “not required to disregard
inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it,” or to “search out all possible
explanations consistent with innocence and raise those explanations to a level of reasonable
doubt.” People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 95.
¶ 24 Nor are we persuaded that defendant’s actions in kicking Williams were reckless. Williams
and Tokarz arrived at the police station to transport defendant to the hospital after she complained
of wrist pain. Tokarz was unable to examine defendant because she was “very combative, [and]
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No. 1-17-2189
verbally abusive” toward the paramedics. Once they arrived at the hospital, defendant lashed out
at the paramedics, “kicking and flailing” as they tried to move her to the wheelchair. Defendant
kicked Williams in the head and neck, causing bodily harm. Defendant argues that her act of
kicking Williams was reckless and a response to pain in her wrists. However, the testimony of
Williams and Tokarz supports the jury’s finding that defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to
Williams. That is, the jury could rationally find that defendant tried to prevent the paramedics from
putting her into the wheelchair and kicked Williams in the head and neck because her hands were
restrained. As mentioned, a conviction will be overturned only if the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of guilt. Beauchamp, 241 Ill.
2d at 8. This is not one of those cases.
¶ 25 Next, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that her mittimus should be amended to
reflect the correct offense of aggravated battery to an EMT, and not aggravated battery of a
“JUDGE/EMT.” The State argues, and defendant concedes in her reply brief, that this issue should
be remanded to the circuit court.
¶ 26 On February 26, 2019, while this appeal was pending, our supreme court adopted new
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472, which sets forth the procedure in criminal cases for correcting
sentencing errors in, as relevant here, “clerical errors in the written sentencing order or other part
of the record resulting in a discrepancy between the record and the actual judgment of the court.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(a)(4) (eff. May 17, 2019). On May 17, 2019, Rule 472 was amended to provide
that “[i]n all criminal cases pending on appeal as of March 1, 2019, or appeals filed thereafter in
which a party has attempted to raise sentencing errors covered by this rule for the first time on
appeal, the reviewing court shall remand to the circuit court to allow the party to file a motion
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pursuant to this rule.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e) (eff. May 17, 2019). “No appeal may be taken” on the
ground of any of the sentencing errors enumerated in the rule unless that alleged error “has first
been raised in the circuit court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(c) (eff. May 17, 2019). Therefore, pursuant to
Rule 472, we “remand to the circuit court to allow [defendant] to file a motion pursuant to this
rule,” raising the alleged clerical errors in the mittimus. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e) (eff. May 17, 2019).
¶ 27 Affirmed; remanded as to mittimus.
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