In re C.J. ( 2019 )

NOTICE FILED
This order was filed under Supreme
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited November 13, 2019
2019 IL App (4th) 190392-U Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in
the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
NO. 4-19-0392 Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re C.J., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 19JA33
v. )
Angelina T., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Karen S. Tharp,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying respondent’s request for the right to have the
minor placed with her upon entry of the dispositional order.
¶2 Respondent, Angelina T., is the mother of the minor, C.J., born November 26, 2017.
Respondent appeals from the dispositional order entered upon the State’s petition for adjudication
of neglect and abuse. The dispositional order granted custody and guardianship of the minor to the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In this appeal, respondent claims
the trial court erred when it denied respondent the opportunity to have DCFS place the minor in
her care. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On February 6, 2019, DCFS responded to a women’s shelter after a hotline report
alleged respondent abused the minor and the abuse was supported by video evidence. DCFS called
the police, who arrested respondent for aggravated battery and domestic battery to a child. DCFS
took the minor into protective custody and placed him in relative foster placement.
¶5 On February 8, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect and abuse
in the interest of C.J. The petition named respondent and the minor’s father, who is not a party to
this appeal. The petition alleged five grounds of abuse and neglect, including allegations related
to (1) domestic violence between the parents, (2) respondent’s failure to “make a proper care plan
for the minor,” (3) physical abuse inflicted upon the minor by respondent, (4) excessive corporal
punishment inflicted upon the minor by respondent, and (5) respondent’s physical aggression
toward the minor.
¶6 On March 15, 2019, DCFS prepared an initial case plan with a goal of return home
within 12 months. Respondent’s plan required that, in order to accomplish reunification with the
minor, she must (1) cooperate with DCFS, (2) attend weekly visits with the minor, (3) participate
in individual counseling, (4) participate in parenting classes, (5) find and maintain stable
employment, (6) maintain safe, clean, and adequate housing, (7) participate in random drug
screens, and (8) participate in anger-management services.
¶7 On May 22, 2019, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing on the State’s
petition. At the start of the hearing, the State announced the parties had reached an agreement in
which respondent planned to stipulate to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence in paragraph five
of the petition in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining allegations and the State’s promise
not to use the stipulation in any criminal proceedings against her.
¶8 The State presented the trial court with the factual basis which led to the hotline
call. The State reported that on February 6, 2019, DCFS received a hotline report that respondent
was captured on surveillance video striking the 18-month-old minor on his shoulder and “jerking
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him up by his left arm.” Police were called and officers met with respondent. Body camera
evidence from one of the officers would be introduced showing respondent admitting to the officer
that she hit the minor and picked him up aggressively. The minor was taken to a hospital’s
emergency room, but no injuries were found.
¶9 After determining that the factual basis supported the allegation, the trial court
accepted respondent’s stipulation and entered an order of adjudication finding the minor neglected
on the basis of the minor’s injurious environment as evidenced by respondent’s physical
aggression toward the minor. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). In its written order, the
court noted respondent was “on video striking 18-month-old and jerking him aggressively by the
arm.” The court scheduled the matter for a dispositional hearing.
¶ 10 On June 19, 2019, the trial court entered a written dispositional order. This order
indicated the court had conducted a dispositional hearing. However, the record before us does not
include a transcript, bystander’s report, or other report of proceedings from the hearing. According
to the written order, the court found it to be in the minor’s best interest that he be made a ward of
the court and that respondent was unfit, unable, or unwilling for reasons other than financial
circumstances alone to care for the minor. The court further found the “health, safety, and best
interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his parents, guardian
or legal custodian.” The court placed C.J. in the guardianship and custody of DCFS. The basis for
the court’s determination was set forth in part as follows: “Mother still has pending criminal
charges stemming from incident with this minor. Mother is not opening up in counseling.” The
court also wrote: “Mr. Liles [(respondent’s attorney)] request[s] right to place—Denied at this
time.”
¶ 11 This appeal followed.
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¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in denying her request that DCFS
have the right to place the minor in her care. She claims the court’s decision was against the
manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion. She says the “sum total of evidence”
presented at the dispositional hearing was “the stipulation entered into by the appellant/mother,
and documents indicating the appellant/mother’s participation in services filed April 23, 2019.”
Relying on this “aforementioned evidence,” respondent claims the court’s denial of the right to
place was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 14 According to the State, a dispositional report dated June 10, 2019, was also
presented as evidence at the dispositional hearing. But this report is also not included in the record.
¶ 15 It is the appellant’s duty to present a complete record on appeal so the reviewing
court can be fully informed regarding the issues in the case. In re J.S., 208 Ill. App. 3d 602, 610
(1990). Without a complete record provided by the appellant, a reviewing court will usually
resolve any doubts caused by an incomplete record against the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99
Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984).
¶ 16 A trial court’s dispositional order will not be disturbed unless its findings of fact
are against the manifest weight of the evidence or the chosen disposition was an abuse of
discretion. In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 200 (2000). While it is unclear exactly upon what
evidence the trial court relied when it denied respondent’s request, we can garner enough
information from the record before us to determine that the court’s decision to deny the request
was not in error. Given that the primary concern in juvenile cases is the best interest of the minor,
we can determine, even without a record supporting respondent’s position, that denying DCFS the
right to place C.J. with respondent at the time of the dispositional hearing and under the
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circumstances of this case was not error. See 705 ILCS 405/1-2(3)(c) (West 2018) (“The parents’
right to the custody of their child shall not prevail when the court determines that it is contrary to
the health, safety, and best interests of the child.”).
¶ 17 Respondent was recorded on video surveillance striking her toddler and “jerking
him aggressively by the arm.” Indeed, DCFS has established a goal to reunite respondent and the
minor in one year, dependent on the success of the service plan. This service-plan progression will
allow respondent time to demonstrate her parental fitness. Until then, respondent remained unfit,
faced related criminal charges, was unemployed, and apparently lacked the knowledge and skills
for effective parenting. She was not fit to have the minor placed in her care. As such, we find
neither an abuse of discretion, nor a decision that was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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