Beecham v. Department of Human Services , 2019 IL App (1st) 190084-U ( 2019 )

2019 IL App (1st) 190084-UNo. 1-19-0084
Order filed December 2, 2019
First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(c)(2).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
TIARA BEECHAM, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v.
) No. 18 CH 6892
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, )
and JAMES T. DIMAS, SECRETARY, ILLINOIS ) Honorable
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ) Thomas R. Allen,
) Judge, presiding.
Defendants-Appellants.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pierce and Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appeal dismissed where the Department’s finding of an overpayment of benefits
was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
¶2 The Illinois Department of Human Services notified Tiara Beecham she had been overpaid
$2,226 in Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits. Beecham appealed. A
hearing officer found the Department failed to present enough evidence of overpayment. The
Department issued a final administrative decision that the overpayment was not upheld. Beecham
thought the matter resolved but continued to receive notices from the Department of overpayment.
1-19-0084
Again, she appealed. After another administrative hearing, the hearing officer found that Beecham
was overpaid. The Department adopted the hearing officer’s findings of fact and issued a final
administrative order upholding the overpayment.
¶3 Beecham sought pro se administrative review in the trial court, which reversed, finding the
Department’s decision as against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Department argues it is
undisputed that Beecham was overpaid and thus, the hearing officer’s finding was not against the
manifest weight. But the Department had already issued a final administrative decision finding the
overpayment could not be upheld, so we dismiss the appeal under the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
¶4 Background
¶5 Beecham received TANF benefits from 2011 until February 2014. In June 2017, the
Department sent Beecham a letter notifying her that its Bureau of Collections (BOC) determined
she had been overpaid $2,226 in TANF benefits from August 2013 through February 2014. The
Department contended the overpayment was due to “client error,” namely that Beecham had failed
to report she was receiving income in an amount that disqualified her from the benefits. Beecham
appealed. During a telephone hearing, Beecham testified she was not sure if she received an
overpayment of benefits. A representative from the Department’s Family Community Resource
Center (FCRC) testified she had not received documents regarding Beecham’s overpayment that
had been requested from the BOC.
¶6 The hearing officer found that the BOC’s decision to charge Beecham with overpayment
of TANF benefits could not be upheld as she could not determine how the BOC had calculated the
overpayment. The Department adopted the hearing officer’s finding and issued a final
administrative decision on September 27, 2017. Without reference to any statute, rule, or
-2-
1-19-0084
regulation, the decision stated, “nothing in this decision prevents BOC from recalculating the
overpayment and sending out a new notice, so long as it is consistent with the finding and
conclusions in this decision.”
¶7 The BOC sent a second notice of overpayment to Beecham on October 11, 2017, which
included the same allegations as the first notice. Beecham tried to appeal. According to Beecham,
she was initially advised she did not need to file an appeal due to the September 27 final
administrative decision. When the notices continued, she tried to file an appeal with the
Department’s office in Champaign, but was advised she needed to file the appeal in the Melrose
Park office. That office told her she could not file the appeal there and, according to Beecham,
forced her to sign an appeal withdrawal agreement. Confused as to the status of the overpayment
matter, Beecham eventually filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking resolution (Tiara
Beecham v. Department of Human Services, 17 CH 17155). This case was not part of the appeal.
¶8 A hearing on the October notice of overpayment was held on January 25, 2018. The hearing
officer found that the overpayment finding could not be upheld because the notice had been sent
to the wrong address and remanded to the FCRC to “issue sufficient notice relating to the subject
overpayment.” The Department issued another final administrative decision stating that the
overpayment finding could not be upheld.
¶9 The Department sent a third notice of overpayment in February 2018, repeating the
allegations from the earlier notices. Beecham again appealed. An administrative hearing was held
by phone with a hearing officer. The Department was represented by Gloria Roldan-Klado, who
testified that Beecham had failed to report income that precluded her from receiving TANF
benefits. The Department submitted numerous exhibits including documents showing Beecham
was employed and receiving income during the relevant seven months.
-3-
1-19-0084
¶ 10 The hearing officer upheld the BOC’s decision that Beecham had received an overpayment
of $2,226 in TANF benefits. He found that Beecham received employment income that she did
not report to the Department and improperly received $318 in benefits per month from August
2013 through February 2014. The Department issued a final administrative decision adopting the
hearing officer’s overpayment finding.
¶ 11 Beecham filed a pro se complaint for administrative review in the circuit court, which
reversed, finding that hearing officer’s decision, adopted by the Department, was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 12 Analysis
¶ 13 In an appeal from an administrative review proceeding, this court reviews the decision of
the agency, rather than that of the circuit court. Petrovic v. Department of Employment Security,
2016 IL 118562, ¶ 22. As the trier of fact, the agency’s factual findings and conclusions are given
deference and held to be “prima facie true and correct.” 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2016); Horton
v. Department of Employment Security, 335 Ill. App. 3d 537, 540 (2002). We will not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency’s. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor
Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998).
¶ 14 Were we reviewing the Department’s May 2018 factual findings and conclusions, we
would give them the requisite deference. But the Department was precluded from relitigating the
overpayment matter under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and so we must
dismiss.
¶ 15 Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable not only to the parties in
courts of law, but also in administrative tribunals and agency hearings. “Both res judicata and
collateral estoppel apply to administrative decisions that are adjudicatory, judicial, or quasi-
-4-
1-19-0084
judicial in nature.” Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, 333 Ill. App. 3d 711,
717 (2002). The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction acts as an absolute bar to later action between the same parties or
their privies involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. For the doctrine to apply, three
requirements must be met: (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) an identity of causes of action; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies. Nowak
v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2001). The bar extends to all matters that were offered
to sustain or defeat the claim in the first action, as well as all matters that could have been offered
for that purpose. Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 389; River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d
290, 302 (1998).
¶ 16 “Collateral estoppel has a more limited preclusive effect and may be applied when the issue
decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue in the current action, there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication and the party against whom estoppel is asserted
was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior adjudication.” Bagnola, 333 Ill. App. 3d at
717. Both res judicata and collateral estoppel promote judicial economy by preventing repetitive
litigation and protecting parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of relitigating
essentially the same case. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 319; DuPage Forklift Service, Inc. v. Material
Handling Services, Inc., 195 Ill. 2d 71, 77 (2001).
¶ 17 This appeal fits squarely within both doctrines because the Department rendered a final
administrative order finding that the overpayment could not be upheld due to lack of evidence.
The subject matter of that decision is identical to the subject matter of the claim now before us,
and the parties are identical. Moreover, as noted, the res judicata bar extends to all matters that
were offered to sustain or defeat the claim in the first action, as well as all matters that could have
-5-
1-19-0084
been offered for that purpose. Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (2001). Thus, we hold the Department
barred from raising any matters it could have raised in the initial administrative hearing.
¶ 18 The Department does not address whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel preclude it from continuing to pursue the matter after it issued a final administrative
decision in Beecham’s favor. The Department asserts only that because the September 2017 prior
final administrative decision stated that the BOC could send out a new notice of overpayment,
Beecham was on notice it would likely continue to pursue the matter and thus, she cannot argue
she was denied due process. This contention, however, appears in a single sentence and without
supporting argument. Mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit
consideration and are waived. First National Bank of LaGrange v. Lowery, 375 Ill. App. 3d 181,
208 (2007). Despite the order’s language, Beecham thought the initial final administrative decision
put an end to the matter and was confused when she continued to receive overpayment notices.
Regardless, her subjective knowledge is irrelevant to whether res judicata and collateral estoppel
apply. Because they do, the Department was precluded from filing the February 2018 notice of
overpayment and holding a hearing on its merits. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
¶ 19 Based on our decision, we need not address the Department’s other arguments.
¶ 20 Appeal dismissed.
-6-