Porter v. Bowman ( 2019 )


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  •                                       
    2019 IL App (1st) 182472-U
    No. 1-18-2472
    Order filed December 18, 2019
    Third Division
    NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
    precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    FIRST DISTRICT
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    KECIA PORTER,                                                   )   Appeal from the
    )   Circuit Court of
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   Cook County.
    )
    v.                                                          )   No. 18 M1 40516
    )
    TAWANDA BOWMAN,                                                 )   Honorable
    )   James J. Ryan,
    Defendant-Appellant.                                  )   Judge Presiding.
    JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
    Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1        Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment where plaintiff’s brief is insufficient to
    ascertain her claims and she has failed to furnish a sufficient record such that error
    can be determined.
    ¶2        Plaintiff Kecia Porter appeals pro se from the trial court’s order that dismissed with
    prejudice her complaint seeking the recovery of her security deposit and damages from her former
    landlord, defendant Tawanda Bowman. On appeal, she contends that the trial court failed to apply
    No. 1-18-2472
    the correct law, and improperly permitted defendant to keep a portion of her security deposit. We
    affirm.
    ¶3        There is no report of the trial court proceedings in the record on appeal. However, the
    following facts can be gleaned from the limited record on appeal, which includes plaintiff’s pro se
    complaint and motion for reconsideration, and the trial court’s orders.
    ¶4        In September 2018, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendant alleging defendant
    failed to return plaintiff’s security deposit although plaintiff left her former apartment in good
    condition.
    ¶5        On October 24, 2018, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice as
    plaintiff tendered a $150 check in open court to defendant, and defendant acknowledged receipt.
    ¶6        On November 1, 2018, plaintiff filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
    trial court’s order should have stated judgment for plaintiff after trial, and that the court erred when
    it permitted defendant to deduct $150 from plaintiff’s security deposit. On November 16, 2018,
    the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. The court also amended the October 24, 2018
    order, nunc pro tunc, to reflect that defendant tendered a $150 check to plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a
    pro se notice of appeal that same day.
    ¶7        On August 8, 2019, this court entered an order taking the case on plaintiff’s brief only. See
    First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 
    63 Ill. 2d 128
    , 133 (1976).
    ¶8        On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by not applying the applicable law,
    and abused its discretion when it permitted defendant to keep $150 of plaintiff’s security deposit
    without having filed a counterclaim or having a cause of action against plaintiff. Plaintiff further
    contends that although the trial court’s order indicates that the cause was dismissed with prejudice
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    No. 1-18-2472
    by agreement of the parties, the order was actually entered “after arguments at trial.” Attached to
    her brief in support are, in pertinent part, a letter releasing plaintiff from her lease signed by
    defendant and a copy of a cancelled check marked “security deposit.” These two documents are
    not included in the record on appeal.
    ¶9     As a preliminary matter, we note that our review of plaintiff’s appeal is hindered by her
    failure to fully comply with Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. May 28, 2018), which “governs the
    form and content of appellate briefs.” McCann v. Dart, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 141291
    , ¶ 12. Although
    defendant is a pro se litigant, this status does not lessen her burden on appeal. “In Illinois, parties
    choosing to represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the same rules and are held
    to the same standards as licensed attorneys.” Holzrichter v. Yorath, 
    2013 IL App (1st) 110287
    , ¶
    78. Supreme Court Rule 341(h) provides that an appellant’s brief should contain a statement of
    “the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument
    or comment” and an argument “which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons
    therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
    341(h)(6), (7) (eff. May 28, 2018). Pursuant to the rule, a reviewing court is entitled to have issues
    clearly defined with “cohesive arguments” presented and pertinent authority cited. Obert v. Saville,
    
    253 Ill. App. 3d 677
    , 682 (1993).
    ¶ 10   Here, although plaintiff used in part a form approved by the Illinois Supreme Court when
    filing her brief, she has failed to articulate a legal argument which would allow a meaningful
    review of her claims, and provides minimal citations to the record. An appellant is required to cite
    to the pages and volumes of the record on appeal upon which she relies “so that we are able to
    assess whether the facts which [the appellant] presents are accurate and a fair portrayal of the
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    No. 1-18-2472
    events in this case.” In re Marriage of Hluska, 
    2011 IL App (1st) 092636
    , ¶ 58; see also Ill. S. Ct.
    R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). In the case at bar, the majority of the fact section of plaintiff’s
    brief is a narrative of the case from her perspective. Moreover, although plaintiff cites repeatedly
    to the Chicago Landlord Tenant Ordinance, she fails to identify facts and pertinent legal authority
    to support her arguments on appeal. See People v. Hood, 
    210 Ill. App. 3d 743
    , 746 (1991) (“A
    reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is
    not simply a depository into which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
    research.”). “Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on
    appeal and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders,
    
    2015 IL App (1st) 141272
    , ¶ 43.
    ¶ 11    Additionally, although plaintiff attached to her brief a letter from defendant releasing her
    from the lease and a copy of a cancelled check, these documents are not contained in the record
    on appeal. It is well settled that the record on appeal cannot be supplemented by simply attaching
    documents to the appendix of a brief. In re Parentage of Melton, 
    321 Ill. App. 3d 823
    , 826 (2001).
    We cannot consider improperly appended documents not included in the record on appeal. 
    Id.
     To
    the extent that plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), her arguments
    are forfeited.
    ¶ 12    Considering the content of plaintiff’s brief, it would be within our discretion to dismiss the
    instant appeal. See Epstein v. Galuska, 
    362 Ill. App. 3d 36
    , 42 (2005) (“Where an appellant’s brief
    fails to comply with supreme court rules, this court has the inherent authority to dismiss the
    appeal.”). However, because the issues in this case are simple and plaintiff made an effort to
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    No. 1-18-2472
    present her appeal by use of the approved form brief, we choose not to dismiss the appeal on that
    ground. See Harvey v. Carponelli, 
    117 Ill. App. 3d 448
    , 451 (1983).
    ¶ 13    That said, the deficiencies in the record still prevent us from reaching this appeal on the
    merits. On appeal, the appellant, in this case plaintiff, has the burden to provide a complete record
    for review in the appellate court to support a claim of error. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 
    99 Ill. 2d 389
    ,
    391 (1984). If no such record is provided, “it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial
    court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” 
    Id. at 392
    . This is because, in
    order to determine whether there was actually an error, a reviewing court must have a record before
    it to review. 
    Id.
    ¶ 14    Here, although plaintiff contends that a trial was held on October 24, 2018, the record does
    not contain a report of proceedings or an acceptable substitute such as a bystander’s report or
    agreed statement of facts pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 323. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d)
    (eff. July 1, 2017). Without a report of proceedings or an acceptable substitute, we are unable to
    determine whether such a trial was held, and, if so, what evidence was admitted or excluded.
    Moreover, there is no record of the manner in which the trial court determined that an offset to
    plaintiff’s security deposit was warranted. Under these circumstances, we must presume that the
    court acted in conformity with the law and ruled properly after considering the evidence before it.
    Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 
    217 Ill. 2d 144
    , 156-57 (2005). In the absence of a report of
    proceedings or other record, we have no basis for disturbing the trial court’s judgment. Foutch, 
    99 Ill. 2d at 391-92
    .
    ¶ 15    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
    ¶ 16    Affirmed.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1-18-2472

Filed Date: 12/18/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2024